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Abstract
! “Deserts of Plenty, Rivers of Want” is an environmental history of the Chihuahuan 
Desert as reflected through Faraon, Natage, and Mescalero Apache mobility, enviro-
economy, and inter-ethnic competition, from 1581-1788. It is the story of Apaches who 
constructed powerful and elastic indigenous landscapes at the same time that they 
deconstructed sclerotic European landscapes. Methodologically, this dissertation 
combines critical assessment of Spanish archival documentation, environmental 
research concerning xeric ecologies, and economic and biological game theory. The two 
principal questions that direct analysis are:  How did Apaches of the southern Great 
Plains and northern Chihuahuan Desert invert the vectors of imperial domination and 
directionality? How–when most indigenes experienced European empire through 
displacement, destruction, and exploitation–did these Apaches counter-invade the 
northern frontier of New Spain, and thrive within an indigenous territoriality–Apacheria–
that was, geopolitically and eco-economically, often more expansive and successful 
than Spanish provinces?
! Apaches inverted the colonial encounter almost as soon as it began, and initiated 
a two century long project of counter-expansion and counter-colonization. Within a 
decade of the establishment of New Mexico in the Middle Rio Grande Valley in 1598, 
Apaches learned to exploit the structural deficiencies of the Spanish riparian colony and 
had plundered horses, guns, and grains. Control over these tools of empire empowered 
Apaches to experiment with expanded mobilities and with emergent environmental 
economies. In the course of their experimentation, Apaches discovered and exploited 
ecoregions of the Chihuahuan Desert, such as the Trans-Pecos, La Junta de los Rios, 
and the Bolson de Mapimi. The Spanish had believed these areas to be wastelands and 
had shunned them, but Apaches found oases and mesopotamias that nourished and 
grew their transhumant, nomadic societies. From these landscapes Faraones, Natages 
and Mescaleros developed complex modalities of competition that empowered them to 
bend imperial economies towards their own indigenous territoriality, and to counter-
colonize lands held by regions’ previous indigenous inhabitants. By the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, Apacheria and the Chihuahuan Desert were fast becoming 
coterminous, and together the two represented the powerful function that space and 
place played within borderlands encounters.
v
Introduction: The Power of Chihuahuan Borderlands; Faraon and Mescalero   
Apacherías and the Inversion of the Colonial Encounter 
Map 1: The Progression of Chihuahuan Desert Apacherías, 1581-1788. First panel: 
Middle Rio Grande Valley and southern Great Plains, 1581-1680; second panel: Trans-
Pecos, 1681-1748; third panel: Bolsón de Mapimí, 1749-1788.
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America (New York: 
Columbia University, The Geographical Press, 1948).
! It happened quickly, and not in the way it was supposed to. Spanish 
missionaries, militia, and colonists began a series of invasions of what is today New 
Mexico, Texas, and northern Chihuahua in 1581. These agents of empire and colony 
came from the province of Nueva Vizcaya, a relatively young place (established only 19 
years earlier). Soon they had a new colony to call home, and they named it Nuevo 
Mexico (New Mexico). In addition to horses, mules, cattle, bibles, and guns, they 
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brought with them the expectation that Spanish culture and Spanish institutions would 
soon crowd the landscape as a testament to the irresistible power of New Spain. Their 
expectations, however, were soon dashed, and many of them could only look on in 
horror as the colonial encounter–as they had come to expect it from their conquests 
over Aztecs and Incas–became inverted. These Spanish colonists had succeeded in 
extending European empire in 1598, but within a decade a new, dangerous, and 
seemingly unassailable indigenous counter-territory began to take shape around them.
! In the beginning there was hardly a warning; just a quotidian report delivered to a 
bureaucrat in Mexico City. Viceroy Zúñiga y Acevedo was curious to know more about 
the new colony of New Mexico, founded three years earlier by don Juan de Oñate, in 
1598. He tasked a member of his court, don Francisco de Valverde y Mercado, with 
questioning two people who had just arrived from New Mexico, Ginés de Herrera Horta 
and Juan de Ortega. Horta and Ortega spoke similarly about the estimated population 
of Puebloans, and about the agricultural potential of the river valley into which the 
Spanish had settled, the Middle Rio Grande Valley. Other than the fact that many 
colonists were disappointed in the climate, there was nothing about their report that was 
too exciting. Towards the end of the interviews, however, they both relayed one more 
detail. Puebloans were in the habit of receiving visitors from the prairies to the east. 
Sometimes Vaquero Indians came to certain pueblos, like Pecos or Taos, and traded a 
variety of bison-derived products like meat, fat, or tallow in exchange for blankets, grain, 
or pottery. They brought shaggy dogs with them, and these were used to transport their 
goods; the Vaqueros themselves came on foot.1
2
1 Don Juan de Oñate, Colonizer of New Mexico, 1595-1628, George P. Hammond, trans. (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1953): 647, 660.
! This detail garnered almost no interest at the time, but that changed quickly. By 
1672 these Vaqueros made a distinctly different impression on New Mexico. In that year 
Franciscan missionary Francisco de Ayeta wrote to the viceroy that 6 pueblos had just 
been destroyed on the eastern and southern sides of the colony. Apaches, mounted on 
Spanish horses, had devastated two basins and daily added to the poverty and misery 
of the region. Governor Antonio de Otermín, expelled from the Middle Rio Grande Valley 
during the 1680 revolt, set out the following year to try to retake New Mexico for New 
Spain. The earth smoked with warning fires all around him. The Spanish refugees 
awoke to realize that these Vaqueros (or Apaches, as they had come to be called) had 
followed them south over 300 miles from Santa Fe, the colony’s lost capital, and were 
even then watching them from the mountain heights all around. Within three years it 
became obvious that, while Spanish imperial territory was momentarily contracting, 
indigenous territory was expanding. Field Marshall Juan Dominguez de Mendoza 
ventured out from the New Mexico refugee camp at El Paso and traveled down the Rio 
Grande to investigate rumors that included Apache invasions. In 1683 he arrived at La 
Junta de los Ríos, a place south and east of El Paso; Apaches were there too, 
harassing the local indigenes and circling the Spanish.2
! The eighteenth century brought no relief. Don Diego de Vargas, the Spaniard 
who retook New Mexico for New Spain in 1692, died on a spring day in 1704 along the 
foothills of the Sandia Mountains. He had been conducting one last campaign against 
3
2  Francisco de Ayeta, 1678, Petición tocante a Nuevo México y la ayuda dada por el rey; las cuentas del 
padre, Legajo 138, Parte 2, Audiencia de Guadalajara, Archivo General de Indias (AGI), Center for 
Southwest Research at the University of New Mexico (CSWR).
   Juan Dominguez de Mendoza, 17 December 1683, Description of the journey made by Juan 
Dominguez de Mendoza to Texas, Legajo 37, Parte 2, Expediente 4, Provincias Internas, Archivo General 
de la Nacion (AGN), CSWR.
these same Apaches, now called Faraon Apaches, across the Middle Rio Grande 
Valley. Vargas perished knowing he had failed. Meanwhile, Faraones continued to find 
their way farther and farther south. Over four decades later, in 1748, Captain Joseph de 
Berroterán, writing from the presidio of Mapimí, 500 miles south of El Paso, issued a 
warning. The Faraones who had penetrated down to El Paso and along the Rio Grande 
had passed south of the river, and they were quickly infesting the lands that lay 
immediately to the east of Nueva Vizcaya. Berroterán feared that, although these 
mounted and armed Natagés and Mescaleros (as Faraones this far south were called) 
were currently peaceful, they would soon subject Nueva Vizcaya to the same 
punishment that New Mexico had experienced.3 He was right. Twenty-three years later 
Brigadier General Hugo de O’Conor lamented at the deplorable state of Nueva Vizcaya 
and at the entrenched menace that Mescalero Apachería had become. Since they were 
4
3 A few words on the terminology I have chosen: Ethnic designations like “Faraon” and “Mescalero” are 
Spanish-produced words. It would, of course, be preferable to draw upon Native-produced lexicons, but 
evidence for Athapaskan names is virtually non-existent until late in the eighteenth century. 
  In 1777, Brigadier General Hugo de O’Conor composed a sweeping report on the northern frontier of 
New Spain, and with it provides the first glimpse of the ethnographic texture that cut across numerous 
Apache groups. He listed Faraones as “Selcaisanende,” Mescaleros as “Zetozendé,” and Natagés as 
“Zetocende.” In 1796, a Spanish lieutenant colonel, don Antonio Cordero, stationed at El Paso, performed 
another round of ethnographic research into Apache peoples. Cordero named Faraones as “Yuntajen-ne,” 
Mescaleros as “Sejen-ne,” and Natagés as “Cuelcajen-ne" (he mistook this group as a component of 
Plains, or Llanero, groups). The similarity between the 1777 and 1796 terms for Mescaleros is plain to 
see. 
  It is important to appreciate that terms like these are more likely how indigenous peoples thought about 
their own identities. Nevertheless, the Spanish and Athapaskan terms perform similar functions as lexical 
designators, and for ease of indexing across established historiography, I have elected to acknowledge 
these indigenous terms but to utilize the more commonly handled Spanish epithets. 
  Hugo de O’Conor to Teodoro de Croix, 22 Julio 1777, Informe sobre las Provincias Internas, Folio 38, 
Expediente 15, Legajo 57, Biblioteca Nacional, AGN, CSWR.
  For Cordero’s 1796 report v. Manuel Orozco y Berra, Geografía de Las Lenguas Y Carta Etnográfica de 
México: Precedidas de Un Ensayo de Clasificación de Las Mismas Lenguas Y de Apuntes Para Las 
Inmigraciones de Las Tribus (México: Impr. de J. M. Andrade y F. Escalante, 1864): 369. For an English 
translation, v. “Cordero’s Description of the Apache,” Daniel S. Matson and Albert H. Schroeder, eds., 
New Mexico Historical Review 32:4 (1957): 336, 354-355.
described by Horta and Ortega in 1601, they had come almost 1,000 miles and were 
closing in on Mexico City.4
! These early missionaries and colonists had set the geographical reach of the 
northern Spanish frontier by 1598, but within decades indigenes, Faraon Apaches 
specifically, seized horses, weapons, and information, and began a counter-invasion 
that expanded deep into the Chihuahuan Desert, alongside and inside of New Spain. 
How did the Faraon, Natagé, and Mescalero Apaches of the southern Great Plains and 
northern Chihuahuan Desert invert the vectors of imperial domination and directionality 
from 1581 until 1788? How–when most indigenes experienced European empire 
through displacement, destruction, and exploitation–did these Apaches counter-invade 
the northern frontier of New Spain, and thrive within an indigenous territoriality that was, 
geopolitically and eco-economically, often more expansive and successful than Spanish 
provinces?
! Scholarly literature has been building towards answers to these questions for 
decades. Monographs like Richard White’s The Middle Ground, Kathleen DuVal’s The 
Native Ground, Ned Blackhawks’ Violence Over the Land, and Michael Witgen’s An 
Infinity of Nations have evolved the study of the history of empire, and expanded the 
spatial and processual capacity of analytics like ‘borderland’ and ‘frontier’ to make room 
5
4 Diego de Vargas, 27 March-2 April 1704, Campaign journal, Account of operations against Faraon 
Apaches, Document 99, Spanish Archives of New Mexico II (SANM II), New Mexico State Records 
Center and Archives at Santa Fe (NMSRCA).
   Joseph de Berroterán, 17 April 1747, Informe de 1748 sobre Nueva Vizcaya, Legajo 41, Expediente 8, 
Historia, AGN, CSWR.
   Hugo de O’Conor, 6 September 1788, Informe general sobre el estado deplorable de las Provincias 
Internas, crueldad de los indios y total destrucción de las haciendas, por la guerra comenzada en 1748 
por la nación apache, Legajo 1363, Civil, AGN, CSWR.
for indigenous presence, agency, and power. Histories of European colonialism and 
imperialism in North America cannot now exist without meaningful analysis of the 
myriad ways that Native America entered into dialogue with the threats and 
opportunities intrinsic to the colonial encounter. 
! Across the revised history of empire two forms of analytical structure that 
privilege indigenous contributions are dominant. One, encapsulated by The Middle 
Ground, interrogates the constructive nature of processes like ‘accommodation’ and 
‘cooperation.’ This analytical structure typically deals in borderlands where cultures, 
ethnic identity, and political economies are formed through (mostly) non-violent means 
between dissimilar peoples who meet upon the landscape of colonialism. The vectors of 
power are neither stark nor explicitly coercive, and it is rare that one group completely 
dominates another, although there may be discernible asymmetries in how groups give 
meaning to political economy. Scholarship of this ilk does marvelous work in recovering 
indigenous agency. The other analytical structure, embodied in Violence Over the Land, 
emphasizes the ways indigenous societies co-opted the imperial process and foisted 
their own political economies onto their Native and European neighbors, often by violent 
means. Indigenous power as a function of violence and coercion is at the heart of this 
analytical structure. Needless to say, the processes and categories of each structure 
are not exclusive to one another, but often cross over and blend. In fact, there is almost 
a sense that the very analytics and methodologies of borderlands and frontier studies 
themselves exist in an intellectualized borderland all their own:  Scholars constantly 
stretch, squeeze, and question the dividing line between cooperation and conflict.
6
! It is between this division over processes of cooperation and conflict that my own 
analytical structure lies. In one sense, Apachería existed because of horses, which were 
themselves a product of Apache raiding, plundering, and violence; in another sense, 
Apachería could not have grown to its climax state if Apaches had not also committed to 
creative adaptation with the ecological and geopolitical circumstances that surrounded 
them. In order to better understand how my argumentations concerning Apacherías 
exhibit features of both cooperation and conflict, we should spend a short time tracing 
how ideas of Native-produced territories have been developed within the literature over 
the past 25 years. 
! Richard White introduced the idea of the “middle ground” in The Middle Ground: 
Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 as a way to 
describe the shared construction of space at the crossroads of the colonial encounter. 
At its heart, the middle ground is the “process of mutual invention by both the French 
and the Algonquians.” This process was characterized by the need of these two cultures 
to interact in order to find some kind of common understanding because neither one 
could wholly dominate or avoid the other. More often than not, misunderstanding riddled 
these interactions and it was only through repeated meetings that a set of shared 
meanings evolved. A key feature of this model is that French and Algonquians became 
bound by, as White puts it, fictive kinship, an idea he borrowed from the discipline of 
anthropology. Fictive kinship both demanded and reflected reciprocity between the 
cultures, and was the socio-political basis for accommodation and cooperation. In this 
model, Native peoples had much more agency to place demands on French agents and 
to shape the contours of their experience than most previous scholarship had reckoned. 
7
The idea of the ‘middle ground’ exploded the predominance of the idea of ‘frontier’ as a 
space and process that presupposed straightforward EuroAmerican ascendancy over 
indigenous cultures and their homelands. Suddenly, ‘frontiers’ could be nebulous, 
shifting, and contested spaces, and many historians rushed to investigate the many 
ways that other indigenous societies similarly mediated empire and colony.5 
! Leading off of White’s analysis, Gary Clayton Anderson’s The Indians Southwest, 
1580-1830: Ethnogenesis and Reinvention took up the tropes of kinship and mutualism 
and used them to elaborate upon borderlands of the Southwest. Anderson’s lead 
8
5 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): 50-52.
  v. Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Holt, 1947 [1920]) for the idea 
that the American frontier, as a function of space, moved from east to west as much of North America fell 
to the United States; and, as a function of process, how the frontier embodies the sense of unique 
individualism that was thought–at the time–to be emblematic of the white male citizen. 
  cf. Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (New 
York: Norton, 1987) for one of the most well-known critiques of the Turnerian Frontier Thesis.
  When White demonstrated how fully the ‘line’ of a frontier could be smeared, the idea of an indefinite 
‘borderland’ came into vogue amongst historians of empire. The term itself, however, has long roots, 
reaching all the way back to Herbert Bolton’s 1921 monograph The Spanish Borderlands: A Chronicle of 
Old Florida and the Southwest. Bolton’s formulation was directly informed by the Turnerian Frontier 
Thesis. But Bolton could not ascribe the same mythology of success and individualism to the Spanish as 
Turner had to Americans, and so he chose to avoid the term frontier. Instead, he latched onto the notion 
of the borderland in order to, at once, extol on the worth of Spanish imperialism at the same time that he 
acknowledged its failure to fully dominate the Southwest within a coherent, linear political structure. 
Bolton might have investigated the deeper meaning behind Spanish difficulty in the Southwest, but he 
was a product of his era’s prejudices, and The Spanish Borderlands became little more than a history of 
conquistadores and Spanish empire, a place and a process where indigenous peoples mattered little 
more than as reflections of the efficacy of colonial institutions. Herbert Bolton, The Spanish Borderlands: 
A Chronicle of Old Florida and the Southwest (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921).
   The Boltonian model of the borderlands persisted through the decades of the twentieth century. One of 
the most salient later examples of it comes with John Francis Bannon, The Spanish Borderlands Frontier: 
1513-1821 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), where Bannon mostly replicates 
Bolton’s analysis, but is much less laudatory of Spanish institutions and instead questions why missions 
struggled as much as they did to maintain order within a world of indigenous chaos. 
    v. David J. Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) as 
a final corrective to the Boltonian model. Weber adopted the spatial categories of Bolton, as well as his 
periodizations, but then integrated into them the (then) recent innovations concerning race, gender, and 
ethnohistory. Weber wanted to keep the Boltonian idea of borderlands alive for the sake of analytical 
coherency, and his synthetic analysis represents his best effort, but ultimately he only succeeds in 
imploding Boltonian categories. The idea of a transcontinental borderlands and the monolith institutions 
that glued it together are, essentially, Spanish categories that cannot accommodate the diversity and 
complexity inherent to the many forms of indigenous resistance, survival, and success.
analytic is the process of ‘ethnogenesis,’ the process of creating new ethnic identity 
from preexisting ethnic identities whose populations had been ravaged by disease and 
war. The Indian Southwest considers how a kind ‘middle ethnic ground’ formed between 
scattered, (semi-)nomadic societies. Anderson’s analysis features the sense of creative 
agency that featured prominently in the The Middle Ground, but also moves beyond it in 
order to find creative power in the practice of certain indigenous societies (e.g. Jumano, 
Apache, and Comanche) to compel indigenes around them to assimilate into new ethnic 
identities. Sometimes the formation of these identities entailed coercion, meaning that, 
despite its emphasis on mutualism, The Indian Southwest reads a higher degree of 
violence into the Southwest than White did in the Great Lakes. Anderson weaves a 
compelling argument that privileges the world that Natives made amongst themselves in 
response to imperialism, but in the process sometimes under-privileges the importance 
of the Spanish-Native interchange. While it is true that the Spanish were far less 
determinative of the arc of history than previously thought by the Boltonian model, the 
exclusion of the important Middle Rio Grande Valley comes often enough in the course 
of Anderson’s analysis that we are sometimes left wondering how it figured into the 
‘reinvention’ of the southwest.6 
! A response to this omission within The Indian Southwest came with James 
Brooks’ Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest 
Borderlands. Brooks builds on White and Anderson while simultaneously flipping their 
9
6 Gary Clayton Anderson, The Indian Southwest, 1580-1830: Ethnogenesis and Reinvention (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1999).
  v. Edward Spicer, Cycles of Conquest; the Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States on the 
Indians of the Southwest, 1533-1960 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962) for the notion that there 
was often persistence of indigenous ethnic identity despite the successive waves of empire and colony.
emphasis on cooperation. Captives and Cousins argues that “rituals of violence, 
exchange, and redemption were central to the men whose societies met in the 
Southwest Borderlands during the colonial era.” Within the act of exchanging people 
and materials across cultural boundaries, violence often typified a variant of the ‘middle 
ground’ where new communities emerged from brutish circumstances, and produced a 
unique system of slavery in the borderlands predicated on “patriarchal structures of 
power and patrimony.” Captives and Cousins describes a borderlands where community 
is the product of violence and alienation. It is a compelling model that is limited only by 
its strong emphasis on male agents as the initiators and benefactors of captive-
exchange within the Middle Rio Grande Valley. There is the sense throughout Captives 
and Cousins that most colonial actors, in fact, have little to no agency or power because 
of their forcible abduction into a specific market, controlled by specific agents. Brooks’ 
work is as much a study of the causalities behind slavery in the Southwest as it is an 
exploration of the limits of ‘middle ground’ in colonial New Mexico. Nonetheless, 
Brooks’ monograph makes an important contribution in the analysis of a system that 
was cruel and violent, yet that also produced new and meaningful social units.7
! In counterpoint to Brooks dystopic model of the borderlands, Susan Deeds’ 
Defiance and Deference in Mexico’s Colonial North: Indians under Spanish Rule in 
Nueva Vizcaya tracks and measures the persistence of indigenous societies in Nueva 
Vizcaya, a province that lay immediately south of New Mexico. Deeds asks how the 
many (semi-)nomadic groups that inhabited the spaces between the present-day cities 
of Chihuahua and Durango fought back, each in their own way, against pressure to 
10
7 James F. Brooks, Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest 
Borderlands (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, Omohundro Institute, 2002): 4, 65.
assimilate into missions or to labor in mining camps. Deeds characterizes acts of 
resistance by Xiximes, Acaxees, and Tarahumares, and others through the analytical 
construct of ‘mediated opportunism.’ Mediated opportunism is the “crossroads between 
cultural and environmental opportunism on the one hand and moral boundaries and 
biological barriers on the other.” Through the construct of mediated opportunism, 
Defiance and Deference reveals that a range of heterogenous outcomes were possible 
as a result of encounter with the Spanish, from defeat and assimilation to enduring 
independence. Other historians, of course, have noted that different groups of indigenes 
experienced empire differently, but Deeds was the first to emphasize this difference by 
means of cultural contingency in complement with environmental context. In this way 
she makes her strongest contribution to the borderlands ideology that informs this 
dissertation. Whereas Anderson and Brooks conceived of monolithic processes that 
seemed to work almost homogeneously over various indigenous and European 
populations, Deeds gives us a model where disparity, flexibility, and surprise feature 
prominently in the analysis. In a way, Defiance and Deference keeps the idea of a 
collaborative ‘middle ground’ alive in the borderlands by finding those unexpected and 
elusive opportunities whereby indigenes preserved their cultural integrity.8 
! Deeds gestured towards the re-empowerment of Native agents to negotiate the 
colonial encounter by means which were intrinsic to their own cultures and their choices 
over mobility and economy. Kathleen DuVal’s The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists 
in the Heart of the Continent took this turn even further by suggesting that Native agents 
had the means not only to negotiate the colonial encounter, but to guide and shape it to 
11
8 Susan M. Deeds, Defiance and Deference in Mexico’s Colonial North: Indians under Spanish Rule in 
Nueva Vizcaya (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003): 6.
their own ends through means that were not explicitly violent. Within the Mississippi and 
Arkansas River Valleys, DuVal finds that groups such as Quapaws, Osages, Caddos, 
and others snatched the initiative from the French and succeeded for centuries in 
instilling their own political economy atop the spaces of French empire. In doing so, 
these indigenes effectively reversed the power dynamic that we have come to expect 
from the European-Native encounter. This idea inspired me to look for similar markers of 
hegemony and dominance in Apaches over the Spanish, and to wonder, in the vein of 
Defiance of Deference, how the environmental contexts of the Mississippi Valley and 
the Chihuahuan Desert produced similar outcomes through dissimilar settings.9 
! We should pause here to take stock of the literature so far, because the 
progression from White to Brooks to Deeds to DuVal is crucial:  White provided a model 
of cooperative meaning-making that redefined European power as European agency, 
while it simultaneously elevated Native resistance to Native agency; Brooks 
counterposed another cooperative model, although it was steeped in violence and 
alienation; through rituals of captive-exchange Brooks demonstrated that we should 
search out social constructions in even the unlikeliest of places. Both White and Brooks 
furthered our ability to imagine the imperial period as something other than outright 
domination by Europeans, but Deeds and DuVal’s monographs took this revision one 
step further by arguing that indigenes frequently appear in positions of power, while 
Europeans appear with no more than agency. Fifteen years after The Middle Ground, it 
became possible to conceive that Native peoples could subvert empire and force 
colonists to serve a political economy that was more Native than European.
12
9 Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).
! The idea that Native societies could co-opt empire nearly completed the shift 
towards a borderlands ideology that inverted the traditional roles built into histories of 
imperialism and colonialism, but some historians questioned whether it was possible to 
go one step farther, and find indigenous imperialism that existed apart from European 
formations. Ned Blackhawk’s Violence Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early 
American West demonstrates the shift of analytical focus to indigenous imperialism and 
the violence that accompanied it. For Blackhawk, Utes stand out in the Great Basin as a 
critical example of an indigenous group performing the violence of empire on 
neighboring indigenes–namely, Paiutes and Shoshones–long before the Spanish 
themselves came to the Basin. Blackhawk’s work aligns with DuVal’s in that both 
analyses deconstruct the binary of Natives-as-colonized and Europeans-as-colonizers, 
but both also demonstrate that indigenous societies often perpetrated imperial violence 
against other indigenous societies. In this way, Violence Over the Land uncovers 
another layer of fracturing within the dissimilitude of Native America. Ideologically, we 
see in DuVal, and more so in Blackhawk, that the emphasis on a balanced, mutualistic 
borderlands as outlined in The Middle Ground began to transform back into a study of 
empires and frontiers, although ones that were Native-produced or Native-dominated 
rather than European-dominated.10
! Hämäläinen pushed this shift towards indigenous imperial power farther still with 
his model of ‘reversed colonialism,’ found in his monograph The Comanche Empire, and 
through two of his articles:  “The Rise and Fall of Plains Indian Horse Cultures” and 
“The Politics of Grass: European Expansion, Ecological Change, and Indigenous Power 
13
10 Ned Blackhawk, Violence Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2006).
in the Southwest Borderlands.” Hämäläinen tracks the stunning rise and eventual 
decline of Comanchería, the territory of Comanche power that was located throughout 
the Arkansas River Valley in the southern Great Plains from the time just before contact 
with the Spanish in 1706 until their demise in the 1870s. Hämäläinen’s scholarship 
weaves analysis of plains horse culture with a close study of the mammoth trade-empire 
of animals and captives that Comanches controlled. The facticity of Spanish empire is 
not disputed, but Hämäläinen argues persuasively that, in revision to Brooks, the 
Southwest was more than a borderlands of violent community:  it was also an 
indigenous reverse-frontier. Blackhawk and Hämäläinen’s ideas are linked in that both 
analyses find that the basis for indigenous power, even empire, rested with the co-
option of imperial tools and their successful deployment against weaker neighbors. New 
Mexico may have been a borderlands owing to the fierce contests waged over 
community and political economy, but beyond the small colony of New Mexico, 
Blackhawk and Hämäläinen’s borderlands look more like frontiers that were constructed 
and performed by a select few indigenous groups.11
! Building on White, DuVal, and Hämäläinen is Michael Witgen’s An Infinity of 
Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America. This monograph 
charts the ways that Anishinaabeg peoples participated in a process of ‘mutual 
discovery’ with the French that allowed them to evolve a new political economy and to 
negotiate the challenges and opportunities of the colonial encounter. Witgen handles 
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    Pekka Hämäläinen, “The Politics of Grass: European Expansion, Ecological Change, and Indigenous 
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some of the same geography and periodizations as The Middle Ground, but whereas 
the idea of the ‘middle ground’ requires that participants seek out creative cooperation 
as a consequence of their mutual weakness, Witgen finds that creative social and 
political transformation occurred within indigenous societies from positions of strength, 
and that indigenous social formations persisted well into the American era. In this way, 
An Infinity of Nations takes on White’s ‘middle ground,’ but folds into it DuVal’s ‘native 
ground’ and Hämäläinen’s ‘reverse colonialism.’ Witgen provides a model of non-violent, 
indigene-centric, adaptation that inscribes Native North America with the power to form 
meaningful spaces that were resistant to colonization for over a century. More than any 
other scholarship cited here, An Infinity of Nations describes a world where indigenous 
creativity had the power to devise social formations, political economies, and 
territorialities that, in turn, constitute a separate but equally significant process of 
discovery and conquest over the continent.12
! Brian DeLay has demonstrated that the violence-laden (de)constructions of the 
‘southwest borderlands’ were just as enduring and significant as those of An Infinity of 
Nations, and that they too served indigenous ends, albeit obliquely. Predating Witgen’s 
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    cf. Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the 
Peoples in Between in North American History,” American Historical Review 104:3 (1999): 814-841 for the 
controversial idea that borderlands should be thought of as “contested boundaries between colonial 
domains.” Adelman and Aron posit that interactions between Europeans and Natives are “frontiers” 
whereas engagement between two or more European empires is required for a “borderland.” This 
argument has been widely criticized for its implicit dismissal of the indigenous ability to pose meaningful 
challenges to colonizers. Adelman and Aron fall into a teleological trap when they insist that only 
European empire has the agency to evoke borderlands. This argument presupposes the inevitable 
ascendancy of European polities and their conversion into EuroAmerican nation-states. But the 
scholarship of DuVal, Witgen, Hämäläinen, and Blackhawk have all rebuked this idea and demonstrated 
the colonial history was deeply contingent and that there were many opportunities for indigenous 
ascendancy. Indeed, the categorical intervention shared by these authors’ works is that Native agents 
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work, Brian DeLay’s War of Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War 
takes a cue from Captives and Cousins and analyzes a world where mutual destruction 
between the Spanish, Comanches, Apaches, and Utes produced shared landscapes of 
ruination all across the southwest and northern Mexico. War of a Thousand Deserts 
finds that raiding and assault undid the work of colonialism and empire, and emptied the 
land of dwellings, churches, fields and ranches. The destabilizing effects of such 
ubiquitous conflict emaciated Mexico and prepared it for American invasion during the 
U.S.-Mexican War, where the visual evidence of decades of violence inspired racial and 
nationalistic prejudices in Anglo-Americans who made the mistake of thinking that the 
‘thousand deserts’ were a reflection of Mexican backwardness and Native barbarism. 
War of a Thousand Deserts argues that the destruction built into the northern frontier of 
New Spain and Mexico had far-reaching consequences, only one of which was that 
indigenes remained at liberty well into the nineteenth century because nation-building 
by the United States and Mexico struggled in the borderlands. DeLay’s work, 
chronologically, is concerned with the second half of the nineteenth century, and so it 
falls outside of my time frame; yet it has informed my project by posing the question:  
How had Natives in this region come to wield such tremendous power against Spanish 
imperialism by the middle of the nineteenth century, and why did complete devastation 
only come then, as opposed to decades or centuries earlier?13
! To answer these questions I look to William Carter’s Indian Alliances and the 
Spanish in the Southwest, 750-1750. Indian Alliances tracks the mutualistic relationship 
that developed between Apaches and Puebloans in the Middle Rio Grande Valley 
16
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previous to Spanish contact and in the century and a half afterwards. Carter argues that 
ideology, kinship, and environmental conditions bound Puebloans and Apaches into a 
common experience, and that as a result of this commonality they formed alliances that 
were firmly in place by the time the Spanish began to arrive in 1581. These alliances 
were so strong, in fact, that Carter argues that they survived the brutalities of Spanish 
imperialism during the seventeenth century and formed the basis for the cooperation 
and conspiracy that produced the 1680 revolt, among other moments. Indian Alliances 
enriches both Brooks and DeLay by suggesting that the internecine violence of captive-
exchange networks and endemic raiding had roots in interdependency. Taking a cue 
from Witgen, we should wonder how enduring these early moments of mutualism were. 
Indian Alliances offers only hints of an answer to this question because deep analysis 
stops with the coming of Vargas to New Mexico (1692-1704). Although the periodization 
of Indian Alliances does not overlap substantially with Captains and Cousins 
(1710s-1880s) or War of a Thousand Deserts (1830s-1860s), the fact that Apaches 
continued to enjoy success throughout the eighteenth century begs the question:  How 
did seventeenth century mutualism contribute to their capacities of agency and power.14 
! Carter’s work stands as a model for how, as he puts it, historians should 
conceive of interdisciplinary work that bridges “perspectives of the natural and social 
sciences with those of the humanities into a multilayered, coherent explanation of 
17
14 William B. Carter, Indian Alliances and the Spanish in the Southwest, 750-1750 (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2009).
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Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991) for a process community-
making during the seventeenth century that came about through the meeting of zealous Franciscan 
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historical events and social change over centuries.” Carter’s work, in conjunction with 
that of Hämäläinen’s, Witgen’s and, to a lesser extent, Anderson’s, points the way to the 
methodology that informs this dissertation. 
! Following Witgen’s example, I have found that Apaches mutually discovered their 
new Spanish neighbors, and ecologies that had previously been closed to them, shortly 
after contact. During the seventeenth century, just after co-opting the horse, these 
Apaches perpetrated tremendous violence in ways that were similar to Violence Over 
the Land. Soon, however, these same Apaches revealed themselves to be geopolitically 
sophisticated and the degree and intensity of destruction diminished. As often as they 
could, and in many different places, these Apaches also constructed shared meaning 
and forged cooperation, in the spirit of  ‘middle ground.’ They were obliged to do so for 
environmental reasons. Although the ecological landscapes of the northern Chihuahuan 
Desert were fecund spaces for nomadic peoples who functioned in small social units, 
the desert was not an environment that encouraged exercises of domination on par with 
that of the Comanche in the southern Plains. The protean character of the environment 
and its historical role deserves more of our attention. The next step to understanding the 
18
historiographical underpinnings of this dissertation requires that we take a brief tour of 
the study of environmental history as it relates to the history of empire.15
Map 2: The Chihuahuan Desert.
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Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.16
! William Cronon’s Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of 
New England popularized environmental history in ways that have reverberated through 
to my project. Cronon questioned the causes behind shifts in the landscapes of New 
England, as well as the displacement of indigenous cultures, from the seventeenth 
century to the nineteenth. He delivered his analysis by means of an interdisciplinary 
methodology that joined archival research with environmental science. Changes in the 
Land finds that Indians and colonists formed different reciprocal relationships with the 
land that, in turn, returned different yields. Indigenes produced “edge” habitats–spaces 
that were neither one type of landscape or another, but a hybrid–through controlled 
burns that encouraged the flora and fauna of both forests and fields. New England 
indigenes used these spaces to hunt and forage in common with one another, sharing 
the land and working to maintain its future viability. Colonists, on the other hand, 
commodified the terrain as private property and assimilated it into the colonial market 
economy. In the process they rapidly destroyed those same edge habitats because they 
were easy targets for logging, hunting, and deforestation in the creation of agricultural 
fields. Cronon makes many interventions, but the one most relevant to my work is that 
indigenous actors did not exist in total equilibrium with the landscape. Before, during, 
and after the colonial encounter Natives continued to participate with ecology in ways 
that often had unforeseen consequences. The manufactured landscapes of “edges” are 
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demonstration enough of that fact. And while the notion of an indigenous-ecological 
dialectic now seems like a commonplace idea, the ascendancy of that idea into a 
prominent position within the historiography has its roots in Changes in the Land.17
!   Monographs like Cynthia Radding’s Wandering Peoples: Colonialism, Ethnic 
Spaces, and Ecological Frontiers in Northwestern Mexico, 1700-1850 and Pekka 
Hämäläinen’s The Comanche Empire have taken up Cronon’s call and have written the 
environment into historical analysis. Wandering Peoples questions the mediative role of 
the environment in colonialism and extends it to the Native Sonoran-Spanish 
interchange. Radding’s thesis concerns “the persistence of indigenous peasant nations 
in Sonora during the transition from the Spanish Imperium to the Mexican Republic.” In 
order to execute here analysis, Radding deploys a concept that she calls social ecology: 
the “complex of relations that developed historically among diverse human populations 
and with the land they occupied...” Radding builds on Cronon by emphasizing that 
Sonorans’ engagement with their landscapes was itself a demonstration of agency that 
ultimately afforded them the means to persist. But Wandering Peoples also builds 
beyond Changes in the Land by looking to The Middle Ground, and finding that Native 
Sonorans, for a while, negotiated the colonial encounter through creative meaning-
21
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making within the spaces of Spanish missions, effectively counter-claiming Spanish 
institutions for their own ends.18
! The environmental component of Wandering Peoples–“social ecology”–is more 
social than ecology, however, and Radding does not draw as heavily on the toolbox of 
the environmental scientist as Cronon does. Whereas the physical landscape played 
almost no role in The Middle Ground, it headlined in Changes in the Land before 
retreating to the backstage in Wandering Peoples. Still, Radding’s notion of agency and 
resistance as a product of the environment opened the door to the analyses that would 
appear in Deeds, DuVal, and Witgen. Radding made it possible to imagine that Native 
societies could continue to use the landscapes around them to negotiate and, 
sometimes, prevail against the forces of market economies and religious acculturation.
! Hämäläinen’s Comanche Empire, as already discussed, has taken the idea of 
Native empowerment-through-environment the farthest. Comanche Empire is unlike 
Native Ground or Infinity of Nations, however, because Hämäläinen assigns much more 
agency to the land itself. For DuVal and Witgen, the environmental component of 
indigenous power rests more with the geographical position of colonial encounter, rather 
than with the physical engagement with landscapes as a function of that encounter. In 
some ways, the success of Anishinaabegs and Mississippi Valley Natives rests with fact 
that they were located far from the prominences of European empire, like Montreal or 
Paris, leaving them free from the constraints of the Atlantic World. Hämäläinen too 
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recognizes the importance of the physical distance between Comanchería and Mexico 
City. Much of the reason why Comanche political economy so often trumped that of the 
Spanish was because Comanches could offer (or force) an eastward plains-based 
economy upon New Mexico more easily than New Spain could mandate a southward 
facing imperial economy. Hämäläinen builds on Radding and Deeds by blending ‘social 
ecology’ with ‘mediated opportunism’ as a way to characterize the origins of 
Comanches’ prairie-based empire. At the same time, he also answers Cronon’s call to 
use environmental science as a tool to understand how indigenes engaged their 
ecosystems in ways that brought surprising benefits and consequences. 
! Hämäläinen accomplishes this by tracking the ecological consequences brought 
by Comanche horse culture over the grasslands of the Great Plains. The ‘reverse 
colonialism’ that Comanchería performed came as a direct result of the explosion of 
ungulate populations over the Great Plains. Horses were capable of evolving mobilities, 
leveling the battlefield, and conferring vast wealth upon those who owned them. 
Comanches instantly realized their value as symbols of wealth, as instruments of 
defense and attack, and as valuable trade commodities. But, unaware of the carrying 
capacity of the plains, Comanches grew their herds over the eighteenth century until 
they became unsustainable during periods of extended drought, when there was too 
much competition between horses and bison for the same pastures. Horses were both 
the means of Comanchería’s ascendancy and one of the ultimate causes of its decline. 
Hämäläinen’s “Politics of Grass” makes this case most clearly, and demonstrates as 
Cronon first did 25 years earlier that landscapes changed, sometimes slowly, 
sometimes dramatically, in response to indigenous choices. The tools of empire allowed 
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Native societies to reimagine the relationship with their habitats in radical new ways. 
Sometimes, as in the case of Comanches, the strategies they adopted proved 
unsustainable over time.19
! Some critics might think that the strong role of the environment within analyses 
such as Hämäläinen’s, or mine, verges on environmental determinism–the theory that 
environment dictates the character, state, and success of differently located societies. 
The care taken in recent scholarship, however, to acknowledge ethnographic profiles, to 
account fro multiple choices, and to trace environmental-societal dialectics deflects this 
criticism. “Deserts of Plenty, Rivers of Want” avoids the pitfall of environmental 
determinism by understanding the colonial encounter as a series of moments that were 
full of experimentation, accidents, and surprises. And while I deploy ecological 
categories and processes to help delineate the world in which actors performed, these 
factors only every serve to frame the scope of possibility, rather than to determine 
outcomes. In this formulation I am following in the footsteps of Deeds’ ‘mediated 
opportunism,’ Radding’s ‘social ecology,’ and White’s ‘middle ground’ in a sense that 
blends cultural creation with ecology.20 
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!    “Deserts of Plenty, Rivers of Want” is an environmental history of the 
Chihuahuan Desert and the significance of its landscapes as reflected by its usage and 
inhabitation by Faraon, Natagé, and Mescalero Apaches. I have studied hydrological 
systems of rivers, the paleoclimatology of both broad regions and micro-ecosystems, 
and the physical responsive characteristics of certain flora. This orientation towards the 
hard data of environmental science puts me in direct dialogue with Changes in the 
Land, Wandering Peoples, and The Comanche Empire. Just as these works trace the 
creative possibilities inherent to the protean relationship between indigenes and the 
environment, I too have measured and analyzed the practices and strategies of 
Apaches within the Chihuahuan Desert as a demonstration of their ability to survive and 
thrive during the age of colonial encounter. I draw upon the mutualistic tendencies of 
The Middle Ground and The Indian Southwest while simultaneously acknowledging that 
violence was often the primary meeting ground, as demonstrated in Captives and 
Cousins and Violence Over the Land.
! My analysis suggests that Apaches were remarkably creative and that they 
adapted to the opportunities and challenges of colonial encounter more quickly, and 
more successfully than many other groups, the Spanish included. As such, I have read 
a high degree of plasticity into their culture. Unlike the Spanish, who adapted to the 
challenges posed by indigenous ethnicities slowly and only with authorization from the 
administrative authorities in Mexico City or Madrid, Apache practices indicate that they 
evolved their mobilities, economies, and subsistence practices constantly, and in the 
process reinvented themselves as a people who had the power to exploit the most 
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glaring shortcomings of European empire. It is because of the plasticity and adaptability 
that I have attributed the Apache experience that I de-emphasize ethnographic 
argumentation in favor of economic, game theoretic argumentation.21 
! Ethnographic theory implies a certain level of cultural stasis, and as such that 
theory struggles to coexist with the degree of plasticity that I read into Apache culture. 
One of the central thrusts of my argument is that Apaches were as successful as they 
were because they were able, socially and economically, to modify and evolve 
themselves in ways that defied expectation or prediction. By the time that ethnographic 
data was being collected for Mescaleros many of the processes I will trace had already 
resolved into established cultural features. One of the core aims of “Deserts of Plenty, 
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Rivers of Want” is to uncover the origins of adaptive behaviors and to characterize the 
contingent nature of their development. In order to do so, I have devised a different sort 
of interdisciplinary methodology for this project that capitalizes on the notion of social 
evolution. There are three elements: archival research, environmental science, and 
economic theories regarding games and competition (game theory). I propose that the 
colonial encounter was composed of a series of encounters where creative 
misunderstanding and mutual discovery produced geopolitical structures, or 
conventions, that were more often than not Native-produced. As such, game theory is 
an excellent interpretive and analytical framework with which I can narrate and assess 
the efficiencies and successes of indigenous peoples. Furthermore, this methodology 
allows me to ‘level the field’ and to treat Apaches as players (or agents) that were every 
bit as sophisticated as the Spanish because game theory is concerned with outcomes, 
results, and the countervailing cost of competition, and not with the specific motivations 
of players (or agents). I denude the Spanish of assumed political sophistication merely 
because of their centralized governance and landed institutions. I find, in the same vein 
as DuVal and Witgen, that indigenous structures were surprisingly equivalent, if not 
superior to, European structures. 
! This application of game theory does not take the place of ethnography. I draw 
upon ethnographic scholarship throughout the dissertation, wherever I feel it becomes 
vital as generalized cultural context to round out the core arguments that are informed 
by primary documentation, environmental science, and game theory. Of course, game 
theory applied to history, like ethnographic upstreaming, is not without problems. Game 
theory is a product of twentieth century economic analysis; more specifically, from the 
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study of competition and payoffs that has occurred within the context of market 
capitalism, and the contest between capitalism and communism in the postwar world. 
As such, I have taken great care when applying game theory so that I do not embed 
modern occidental culture into the indigenous cultures of the past.
! The literature of game theory that informs my dissertation includes four 
monographs. Each monograph represents a prominent node of the theory that is 
extrapolated upon in numerous articles and books that also find their way into my 
analysis. A compelling feature of all these monographs is that they already feature into 
the literature of empire and Native North America discussed above. For decades 
historians have been using constructs and theories borrowed from anthropology that are 
nearly identical to those of game theory. With game theory, however, I have the 
opportunity to address a different set of gaps in the primary record.
! John Maynard Smith’s Evolution and the Theory of Games questions how fields 
like “contest behavior and reciprocal altruism have contributed to what [was then] 
emerging as a universal way of thinking about phenotypic evolution.” By phenotypic 
evolution, Smith is talking about the observable characteristics that come from 
organisms competing and profiting from a series of contests. The Dove-Hawk game 
best typifies how Smith approaches the question of contest. In this model, players 
approach a contest over a resource and, at its simplest, behave in one of two ways, as 
a ‘hawk’ that will fight for the object of the contest until the resource is won or the player 
is dead, or as a ‘dove’ a player who will lay claim to the resource, but who will then 
abandon it at the first sign of conflict. Depending on the worth of the resource and the 
cost of conflict (in terms of injury, death, damaged material, lost time) Smith comes up 
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with elaborate matrices that pick apart the utility and efficiency of different strategies. 
Within these matrices adjustments are made to account for asymmetries within 
contests, such as whether or not a player is the current owner of the resource, if a 
player bluffs, bargains, or changes strategies in the middle of play. All of these 
behaviors modify the worth of the resource and adjust the cost of conflict. Although 
competition had not been described in these terms before, the idea of games and 
phenotypic evolution appear throughout the literature on Empire and Native North 
America. Specifically, the arguments of Wandering Peoples and The Comanche Empire 
depend on the ability to demonstrate that, over repeated encounters and contests over 
resources such as labor, land, or horses, Sonorans and Comanches were deliberate 
when they engaged the Spanish, and that their strategies were built around 
manipulating the colonial moment so that they could extract as much benefit from a 
costly encounter as possible. The same holds true for the Chihuahuan Desert. That 
ecology was always marginal, and because there were not enough resources to 
adequately enrich every group, a series of competitions ensued. The colonial encounter 
was the experimentation of encounter and the development of strategies.22
! The Comanche Empire tacitly makes use of another hallmark of game theory that 
features in “Deserts of Plenty, Rivers of Want.” Thomas Schelling’s The Strategy of 
Conflict is a product of Cold War diplomacy. Schelling was concerned with how to treat 
with the Soviet Union at a time when it was already known that outright, unrestrained 
(nuclear) warfare would annihilate every player. Schelling’s strategy of conflict, then, “is 
not concerned with the efficient application of force but with the exploitation of potential 
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force. ... To study the strategy of conflict is to take the view that most conflict situations 
are essentially bargaining situations.” The Strategy of Conflict balances the high cost of 
conflict with the ways that players attenuate the amount of risk to which they are 
exposed. Like Smith, Schelling then wonders at the efficiency and utility of different 
strategies of conflict-avoidance. The Comanche Empire features elements of this game 
theoretic approach across numerous episodes. For example, Hämäläinen describes the 
calamity that befell Comanches in 1779 when a leader of theirs, Cuerno Verde, died in 
battle against the Spanish, and when, a year later, a smallpox epidemic ravaged the 
continent. Responding to this situation, Hämäläinen writes, “Comanches finally began to 
reassess their policies toward the Spaniards” and signaling their willingness to bargain. 
During episodes such as this one, Comanches were forced to acknowledge that they 
were vulnerable to total defeat, that total war could translate in their destruction, and 
that conflict was an unacceptable risk. I will later argue that Apaches likewise engaged 
in conflict-bargaining after Vargas retook New Mexico in 1692 and it became apparent 
that, although the Spanish and Apaches could do tremendous damage to one another, 
neither side could wholly prevail. In response to that intelligence, Apaches adopted a 
strategy of negotiation and threats that I will call ‘symbiotic bellicosity.’23
! Robert Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation furthers the inquiry posited in 
Schelling and Smith by asking:  When “should a person cooperate, and when should a 
person be selfish, in an ongoing interaction with another person?” Axelrod takes as his 
assumed context that players are not cooperative, and that there is no central authority 
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to compel mutualism; circumstances that match the colonial encounter. Ultimately, 
Axelrod argues that “[w]hen the interaction is likely to continue for a long time, and the 
players care enough about their future together, the conditions are ripe for the 
emergence and maintenance of cooperation” in the form of reciprocity. Evolution of 
Cooperation finds that when there is a even just a slight material advantage to limited 
cooperation the players will choose to cooperate rather than pay the high cost of 
violence, where one player might prevail, but at a cost that nullifies the worth of the 
resource. Consequently, cooperation emerges out of experimentation between threat 
and cooperation. This idea is not only present in White and Witgen’s monographs, but it 
is crucial. Within the Great Lakes region the tropes of mutualism and reciprocity loom 
large, and go directly to the assessment by indigenous actors, as well as Europeans, 
that within the violence and the uncertainty of the colonial encounter it was often 
materially advantageous to cooperate. By better understanding the process that leads 
to reciprocity and cooperation, we can better understand the moments of vulnerability 
and confidence that colored indigenous choices of strategy.24
! Finally, Robert Sugden’s The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare 
expands on the theory or cooperation, and the manner in which social routines (or, 
conventions) arise in a state of anarchy. Taking a cue from Schelling, Sugden expands 
on the idea of ‘prominence’–the idea that in a sequence of games a certain feature or 
specific location might take on meaning and influence the outcomes of future games. In 
this way, prominences set a precedence of the outcome in certain games, and compel 
players of those games to replicate previous strategies. When this happens 
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‘conventions’ develop and that particular game (marked by its prominences) tend to play 
out the same way over and over until a new prominence emerges that alters the efficacy  
of the original convention. Asymmetries, as a measure of competitive advantage over 
other players, are critical as the means by which one player can tacitly coerce other 
players into participating in a convention, despite the fact that the profits accruing to the 
coerced players are quantifiably less. This model appears, in ethnographic guise, 
throughout the works of White, Brooks, DuVal, and Witgen, among others. Most 
pointedly, we see it in Brooks’ monograph. In Captives and Cousins the practice of 
captive-exchange became a ritual (a convention) as a byproduct of cycles of conflicts 
(game series) that were rooted in violence, domination, and power (asymmetries). The 
linked ideas of ‘conventions’ and ‘prominences’ build on the literature of game 
theoretics; these categories contribute to an analytical framework that allows me to 
articulate Apache geopolitical structures, and to describe them in terms of efficiencies 
and payoffs relative to those of the Spanish and of indigenous neighbors.25
!
! Chapter one analyzes the riparian empire the Spanish built around the Middle 
Rio Grande Valley and its epistemological origins; the asymmetries woven into the 
fabric of the colony that exposed New Mexico to the hazards of climate; and the 
exploitation of those asymmetries by Apaches who, within the first decade of the 
seventeenth century, seized the tools of empire and began counter-claiming the region. 
Contrary to the dominant trends of colonial New Mexico historiography, the troubles of 
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the colony were not limited to Puebloan-Spanish tension over labor, culture, and power, 
nor to animosity between secular and ecclesiastical authorities. Rather, the declension 
of New Mexico to the revolt of 1680 had much to do with the forming indigenous 
territoriality that would be known as Apachería, and the colonial and imperial overtones 
that it carried. 
! Chapter two examines the period of the Spanish interregnum, that 12 year period 
between Spanish expulsion from New Mexico in 1680 until their restoration to the 
Middle Rio Grande Valley in 1692. These twelve years typically drop out of 
historiographical chronology because the Middle Rio Grande Valley remains the primary 
analytical focus–despite the fact the the Spanish, and the colonial encounter, shift 
southward by about 300 miles. But if we accept that New Mexico was a socio-imperial 
construct that was incongruent with the geopolitical and ecological reality of the larger 
ecoregion, we allow ourselves the ability to move south with the Spanish and, more to 
the point, with the Faraon Apaches who followed and surrounded them. This period was 
something akin to an Apache-produced reconquista, both of New Mexico as well as the 
lands that led up to the very borders of Nueva Vizcaya, an interior province of New 
Mexico. “Deserts of Plenty, Rivers of Want” examines the Spanish experience at El 
Paso del Norte as a reflection of the expanding counter-territoriality of Apachería.
! Chapter three proposes that Faraones after 1692 learned that it was next to 
impossible to annihilate the Spanish completely from the Middle Rio Grande Valley, as 
evidenced by the revolts and conspiracies of the previous twelve years. But in their 
failure to exterminate them, Faraones realized that regular, persistent attacks on the 
Spanish yielded payoffs nonetheless. These Apaches used this knowledge to develop a 
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set of strategies for engaging the Spanish in productive conflict; I call this set of 
strategies ‘symbiotic bellicosity’ and explore its functionality as a convention that 
provided benefits to both the Spanish and Faraones, but with a distinct advantage going 
to Faraones. At the same time, I question why Faraones and Jicarillas, their ethnic kin, 
experienced this period so differently. I propose that the invasion of the Trans-Pecos by 
Faraones diversified the kinds of eco-economies that those Apaches could imagine, and 
conferred upon them a degree of elasticity that went far beyond that of Jicarillas.
! Chapter four analyzes the intersection of Faraon Apaches with the Trans-Pecos 
and La Junta de los Ríos regions of the Chihuahuan Desert, from 1683 until 1748. 
During this time Faraones reinvented themselves, and became known by the Spanish 
as Natagés and Mescaleros. Whereas the previous three chapters analyzed the 
interface between Apaches, the Spanish, and certain indigenous groups, this chapter 
considers what the interior of Apachería may have looked like through a close analysis 
of river hydrology, xeric flora, and the conversion of agricultural centers into grain 
resource depots. The rapid and efficient adaptation of plains Faraones to the ecological 
profile of the Chihuahuan Desert represents the emergence of far-flung ecological 
economy that provided the means for Apachería to challenge New Mexico and Nueva 
Vizcaya economically and geopolitically.
! Chapter five charts the expansion and denouement of Apachería south into the 
Bolsón de Mapimí, a central region of the Chihuahuan Desert that bordered Nueva 
Vizcaya, Coahuila, and the provinces immediately north of the heart of New Spain. With 
this surge southward, Mescaleros further counter-invaded New Spain and continued to 
develop shunned space into fecund habitats that doubled as a passive weapon against 
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Spanish empire. Within the massive Bolsón, Apaches transformed Apachería into a 
counter-territoriality of immense size–a space of scattered resources populated by 
relatively few people. At this time Apachería climaxed geographically, and it bridged the 
Bolsón de Mapimí and the Trans-Pecos. From myriad hidden havens and ranchería 
sites Mescaleros relentlessly converted yet more Spanish fields and ranches into 
Apache grain and livestock depots. During this period Apaches seemed poised to 
complete the reversal of directionalities that had inscribed power and empire over the 
land. They nearly succeeded in pushing south far enough to install indigenous 
territoriality on the very doorstep of Mexico City. Had they accomplished this feat, 
Mescaleros would have found themselves in control of a broad north-south corridor that 
cut across North America through the landscapes of the Chihuahuan Desert. I question 
the imperialistic tone of Apachería as a space of domination during this time, and renew 
questions about the ecological underpinnings that made it possible. 
! The epilogocial conclusion examines the geopolitical decline of Apachería as a 
counter-territoriality at the same time that the landscapes of the Chihuahuan Desert 
were desiccated by drought and scorched by violence. I question to what extent 
Apachería, predicated since its inception on marginal ecologies, finally reaped the 
consequences of almost 200 years of intensive exploration and experimentation that 
colonial tools such as horses and intensive agriculture had made possible. I also 
question how the meteoric rise of Comanchería affected Apachería. With the sacking of 
San Sabá in 1758 Lipan and Natagé Apaches crowded south and west, spilling over 
into the Chihuahuan Desert, where they overloaded the fragile ecosystems of the Trans-
Pecos and Bolsón de Mapimí. My final questions concern the ecological means by 
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which Apaches survived their most daunting challenge to date:  the desertification of the 
Chihuahuan Desert.
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Chapter 1  
Discovery: Riparian Empire in the Chihuahuan Desert; Ecological Asymmetries 
around New Mexico
! On August 10, 1680, pueblos across New Mexico erupted in rebellion. In unison, 
rebel Puebloans surprised and slaughtered 422 Spanish colonists and Franciscan friars. 
The remaining 1,946 colonists, friars, allied Puebloans, and slaves were subsequently 
hounded southward out of the province, towards a backwater settlement called El Paso 
del Norte. Fifteen months after this humiliation at the hands of the very people he was 
tasked with ‘civilizing,’ the deposed governor of New Mexico, Antonio de Otermín, 
decided that it was time to retake the derelict colony for the Viceroy of New Spain and 
the Spanish King. He had spent months in his refugee barracks composing letters, 
petitions, and investigative reports. His persistence paid off, and he had convinced the 
fiscal (royal attorney to the viceroy) and the exchequer to release enough cash to allow 
him to purchase new guns and supplies for his refugee militia. Governor Otermín set out 
from El Paso del Norte on November 5, 1681 with confidence, hope, and optimism. He 
fully intended this journey to be celebrated as an entrada–an expedition of colonial 
discovery and of imperial dominance. He might have imagined that he was following in 
the footsteps of don Juan de Oñate, that Spaniard who had founded New Mexico in 
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1598, and who had claimed every drop of water, every tree, and every rock north of the 
Rio Grande for King Philip II.1
! Events did not unfold as desired. Over the next two days and one night Otermín 
led 290 people and 948 animals over 32 leagues (83 miles) of some of the driest, most 
featureless land in the northern Chihuahuan Desert.2 His aspirations for the re-conquest 
of New Mexico were still nothing more than wet ink on parchment when Otermín 
ordered his men off their horses, and insisted that they scrounge the desert floor for 
puddles of precious water. For days the Spanish and Puebloan auxiliaries wandered 
across the northern Chihuahuan Desert and scavenged for moisture. Only once, around 
a placed called Perrillo, did they come back with something potable for both humans 
and animals. The Spanish, literally and figuratively, were on their knees and in over their 
heads. They were far from the nourishing Rio Grande and its tributaries, and they were 
entering a landscape that they neither understood geopolitically, nor appreciated 
ecologically. Since they had set out, the Spanish had encountered large fires that had 
been set all across the landscape, presumably by Apaches, as a notice to other 
indigenes that the Spanish were coming, and to the Spanish that they were ever being 
watched. Everywhere these fires burned into the horizon and everywhere they found 
footprints and horse tracks. In addition to the cold and thirst, the fear of impending 
attack was visceral. The rear guard stayed vigilant, and roaming detachments of militia 
looked for insurgents or raiders. When, eventually, Otermín came to the first pueblos of 
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2 A league was a unit of measurement equivalent to about 2.6 miles.
the Middle Rio Grande Valley–over which New Mexico as a colony had existed–the 
situation did not improve.3 
! Otermín traveled the Camino Real de Tierra Adentro, the royal road that came 
from Nueva Vizcaya (the province to the south) and passed north towards Santa Fe. 
But he had just traveled a portion of that road known as the Jornada del Muerto 
(“Journey of Death”), so-named because of its perennial scarcity of water, lack of trees 
for cover or fuelwood, and its exposure to raids and attacks. The Jornada was 83 miles 
long, and when he finally exited it, Otermín came to the pueblos of Senecú and Socorro, 
the latter aptly named to mean “Succor.” He had rejoined the Rio Grande and arrived at 
the first places where he could expect shelter and maybe some more supplies. But 
Otermín discovered these two pueblos deserted and ruined, corpses strewn about. The 
next three and half months, from November 5 until after February 11, 1682, freezing 
weather, treacherous roads, starvation, ambush, and resistance greeted Otermín at 
nearly every pueblo as he made his way north along the Rio Grande towards Santa Fe. 
Ultimately, Otermín’s expedition failed; he never made it much farther than the pueblo of 
Isleta, about 80 miles south of Santa Fe.4
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4 Francisco Xavier, 26 November 1681, Avance de las tropas hasta el pueblo de Senecú, que hallan 
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Map 3: The Area of the Jornada del Muerto, with Surrounding Puebloan Linguistic 
Groupings.
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.
! Why did Otermín struggle so much in 1681, even before he had reached the first 
pueblos almost 100 miles away? Who lit the fires around El Paso del Norte? When 
revolt came in 1680, the only Puebloans who went south were those the Spanish took 
as refugees and auxiliaries. Who then followed Otermín, and what part, if any, did they 
play in the 1680 revolt? More broadly:  How did the Spanish come to put themselves at 
such a disadvantage, and why had they not remedied their situation during the first 80 
years of colony? 
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! Within the literature of New Mexico history, this story of Otermín’s failed entrada 
of 1681-1682 is only a little less treated than the 1680 Pueblo Revolt. Within scholarly 
monographs and articles, the revolt and the entrada work as analytical milestones of the 
trajectory of seventeenth century Spanish colonialism; they function as proofs of the 
abuses inherent to European empire, and of the enduring identity, agency, and 
resistance of Puebloan peoples. Historians have produced rich and nuanced renderings 
of this narrative that analyze subtle and shifting processes. Gender, sexuality, labor, 
ethnicity, and culture are just a few of the analytics that historians have used to 
illuminate New Mexico and to track how stressors like epidemic, famine, physical and 
cultural coercion, and bloodshed mediated the forced conjunction of Spanish and 
Puebloan societies. The Middle Rio Grande Valley looms large in the literature. Although 
it is seldom described as such, this section of river valley was New Mexico; nearly every 
pueblo, mission, and villa was situated upon riparian lands and dependent on river-fed 
irrigation. This geographical area has long been a convenient frame for analyses of New 
Mexico and Spanish-Puebloan dynamics.5
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! But the Middle Rio Grande Valley has been over-privileged; or, rather, the lands 
beyond the valley have been under-privileged. Histories of New Mexico and moments 
like the revolt and the entrada are tethered, analytically and geographically, to the Rio 
Grande, to its physical waters and banks. As an analytical category, we should 
understand that the Middle Rio Grande Valley by itself does not feature the depth and 
scope necessary to engage the many overlapping landscapes within which it was, and 
is, a part. True, to study Spanish New Mexico is to study the Middle Rio Grande Valley 
in the sense that the riparian lands were the locus of Spanish power in the region, but 
these geographical borders cannot support the complexity of the moment. Rather, 
Spanish New Mexico was a riparian empire that existed in context with adjoining 
ecoregions, such as the northern Chihuahuan Desert, the southern Rocky Mountain 
Steppe country, and the southern Great Plains. People from those other ecoregions 
also worked upon, sweated over, and bled onto the earth. Their labor and their 
mobilities transcended riparian empire and the river valley, and gave meaning to 
economies, societies, and territories. This analysis takes up the intersection of the 
Middle Rio Grande Valley with the northern Chihuahuan Desert, and, less so, with the 
southern Great Plains.
! Historians of the borderlands, and historical geographers of the colonial era, 
have already made similar calls for this kind of argumentation. They rightly point out that 
the discursive and cartographical categories that the Spanish imagined, and that are 
implicitly written into the documents they left behind, have shaped and limited our 
analyses. When, in April of 1598, Juan de Oñate claimed for King Philip II everything 
north of (what would become known as) El Paso del Norte, he did so through the 
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ritualistic Act of Taking Possession. This Spanish invader of the northern Chihuahuan 
Desert proclaimed that the king’s domain spread beyond the Rio Grande to encompass 
“without limitations,...the mountains, rivers, valleys, meadows, pastures, and 
waters...from the leaves of the trees in the forests to the stones and sands of the river, 
and from the stones and sands of the river to the leaves of the forest.” It was an 
exercise in place-making that was more wishful than real. Oñate the Adelantado 
(authorized conquistador and prospective governor of New Mexico) was tasked with 
identifying and making legible a new province of New Spain that could be charted, 
measured, controlled, and worked. In the ensuing decades of the seventeenth century, 
however, the Spanish narrowed their geographical gaze. We should not do the same. 
Even while we acknowledge his obvious problems as an agent of empire and 
colonialism, we should embrace Oñate’s open-ended sense of space and consider the 
many landscapes that stretched far beyond the Middle Rio Grande Valley. In doing so, 
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we will come to broader, more inclusive, and more complex critiques of the colonial 
encounter.6 
! A first step in the construction of this analysis is to understand the unintended 
linkages through which the Middle Rio Grande Valley stayed connected to neighboring 
ecoregions. Spanish colonialism in seventeenth century New Mexico was economically 
weak, geographically exposed, and ecologically dysfunctional. A close study of the late 
sixteenth century entradas into the Middle Rio Grande Valley illuminate why the Spanish 
honed in on the Rio Grande instead of the Pecos River, the region’s other major 
waterway, as the exclusive site of colony. Using Puebloan settlement patterns as their 
guide, the Spanish shunned the nearly pueblo-less Pecos River and turned wholly to 
the riparian habitats of the Rio Grande. In addition, these sixteenth century entradas, 
together with the seventeenth century development of the province, delineate the 
asymmetries that the Spanish suffered and that upland Natives, like Apaches, enjoyed. 
These asymmetries manifested in three ways: 1) sedentarism along the Rio Grande 
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intensified, limiting Puebloan mobility and thus their access to multiple resource sites; 2) 
riparian ecology was over-utilized to the point of dependence, and eventually to the 
point of exhaustion during drought years; and 3) dependence on irrigation tied the 
fortunes of New Mexico to the fickle nature of the Rio Grande’s flow. When the Spanish 
built these asymmetries into their colonial architecture, they unwittingly left the door 
open to exploitation at the hands of indigenes living upland; specifically, Faraon 
Apaches from the southern Great Plains.7
!  If we appreciate how and what the Spanish learned about the xeric landscapes 
of King Philip II’s new “domain,” we can better appreciate why the Spanish embraced 
certain omissions and oversights into their political knowledge base. After all, early 
Spanish explorers, invaders, and conquistadores traveled over swathes of what are 
today the states of New Mexico, Texas, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Kansas, but they 
chose to concentrate their attention on the Rio Grande between Senecú and Taos 
pueblos, along a north-south axis about 200 miles long. In addition, they also focused 
on two latitudinal axes that joined the Middle Rio Grande Valley to Acoma pueblo (to the 
west) and to Pecos pueblo (to the east); about 70 and 20 miles, respectively. The 
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process by which colonizers made distinctions between landscapes has everything to 
do with the construction of riparian empire and the asymmetries that were built into the 
ensuing encounters between Europeans and indigenous peoples.8 
Map 4: The Colonial Borders of New Mexico. Although this map dates from 1728, the 
boundaries of New Mexico had not changed. Note the close adherence to the Rio 
Grande, with bulb extending west to Acoma, and northeast to capture the Santa Fe 
River Valley and Pecos pueblo. The uplands are firmly outside of the borders of the 
province. 
Francisco Alvarez Barreiro, “Plano Corográfico de Las Provincias Del Nuevo México, 
1728” (New York, N.Y: Hispanic Society of America, 1992).
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! Captain Francisco Sanchez “Chamuscado” and Fray Agustin Rodriguez set out 
in 1581 with a small group of soldier and friars to investigate accounts of Natives who 
farmed and wore cotton clothing. This entrada was to be the first since Don Francisco 
Vázquez de Coronado had entered what would become New Mexico in 1540, on a 
treasure hunt for Cíbola, the fabled cities of gold. But his expensive failure and 
discouraging reports had disabused the Spanish from the idea that there was anything 
of worth in that land. Four decades later the Catholic Church led the way in a fresh 
assessment of the terrain. A flagship institution of imperialism, the church and its 
Catholic missionaries and missions provided cultural and political validation to the 
project of conquest and subjugation. From the reports that had trickled down from the 
Middle Rio Grande Valley, many Franciscans were excited at the prospect of 
proselytizing indigenes who already looked and behaved the way converted Natives 
should.9 
! Rodriguez and Chamuscado set out on June 6 from the mining area of Santa 
Bárbara in Nueva Vizcaya (near present-day Parral, Chihuahua) and went north along 
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the Rio Conchos until they came to the Rio Grande, striking the confluence of the two 
rivers near present-day Ojinaga, Chihuahua. This confluence, important as a 
dependable water source in a particularly arid part of the Chihuahuan Desert, would 
soon become known as La Junta de los Ríos. The path from Rio Conchos to Rio 
Grande subsequently became a logical pathway for cautious invaders who often 
needed plenty of water, wood, and pasturage to support their retinues. From La Junta 
the Spanish continued north along the banks of the Rio Grande. Unlike Otermín, they 
avoided the waterless plain that would earn the moniker ‘Jornada del Muerto,’ but they 
struggled greatly to find a pass for their mules and carts through the sierras of Caballos 
and Fra Cristobal. Eventually, Rodriguez-Chamuscado emerged from the Fra Cristobal 
Mountains, the river opened up before them, and they were astonished to see 20 or so 
pueblos belonging to Piro Puebloans. It was August 21, and they had been traveling for 
ten weeks so far (a slow pace). With their supplies running low, they pressed on 
northward until they found more pueblos, this time of Tiwa Puebloans. The rumors had 
been true. Rodriguez and Chamuscado everywhere saw people tending crops and 
emerging from their impressive, multi-story pueblos. Eventually they noted pueblos and 
peoples like this all over the Rio Grande Valley.10 
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Map 5: The Path Down the Rio Conchos to La Junta de los Ríos, and up the Rio 
Grande. 
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.
! Just south of the place that would become Santa Fe in thirty years, Rodriguez 
and Chamuscado heard telling news from Puebloans in the Galisteo Valley. Not far to 
the east there reportedly lived more people who were aggressive, and who lived by 
moving regularly across the landscape without any permanent abodes or structures. 
Galisteo Puebloans reported that these bellicose Native hunted the countless ‘shaggy 
cows’ (bison) for their sustenance, and enjoyed bountiful water. This news piqued the 
curiosity of the Spanish, and they soon departed for their first experience of the 
southern Great Plains, on September 28. Over the course of 9 days they wandered over 
25 leagues (65 miles), but they encountered nothing consistent with what their 
Puebloan informants had indicated–no abundant water, no rich grass, and no bison. In 
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fact, during those 9 days the expedition diarist only noted finding adequate water three 
times. In addition, the Spanish they also found and drank from sporadic depressions of 
pooled, alkaline rainwater that seemed barely potable to the invaders. Once they struck 
of river of “brackish water” that they named the Rio Santo Domingo. Given their heading 
and the distance they had traveled, this was likely the Pecos River. These scattered and 
wanting sources of water were just enough to keep the men and the horses alive. By 
the time they returned to the pueblos on the Rio Grande the fear that they might have 
perished for lack of water was palpable within the journal.11 
! If the Rodriguez-Chamuscado entrada had not yet convinced these European 
interlopers to tether themselves to the Rio Grande before, then their harrowing 
experience with dehydration and aimlessness beyond the river valley gave them many 
reasons to establish that tether. They could not have known it, but when the Spanish 
company departed east from the Galisteo Valley they left behind the relatively fecund 
riparian lands of the Middle Rio Grande Valley; soon they found themselves in an arid, 
or xeric, landscape that featured characteristics of both the southern Great Plains and 
the northern Chihuahuan Desert. This space of ecological overlap–an “edge” 
landscape–presented Rodriguez and Chamuscado with fauna they could not locate 
(bison) and flora that was less plentiful and edible than what they were used to in Santa 
Bárbara. Desert scrub covered the mesas and mountains while mixed, short-grass 
prairies blanketed the ground. These prairies were excellent pasturage. Desert grasses 
like black grama (Bouteloua eriopoda), blue grama (Bouteloua gracilis), and prairie 
grasses like buffalo grass (Buchloe dactyloides) meant that at least the horses and 
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mules had plenty to eat. But where forage for ungulates was plentiful, water seemed 
alarmingly elusive.12 
! These Spanish also found other, sociopolitical, reasons to tether their future 
travel to the Rio Grande, and to shun the uplands. On the sixth day of their nine-day 
misadventure into the edge landscape of the desert and plains, the Spanish were 
traveling down the Rio Santo Domingo when a ranchería–a collection of portable 
wickiups–appeared on the horizon. Rodriguez and Chamuscado found the bellicose, 
nomadic people of whom the Galisteo Puebloans had spoken. These were probably 
Apaches, most likely Faraon, living around the Pecos River. Chamuscado led the 
approach towards the 40 dwellings with caution, but was soon face to face with 400 
men armed with bows, arrows, and suspicion. The Spanish numbered 12, including the 
friars. Even though the Spanish had harquebuses with them–long-bore, flintlock 
shotguns that made a calamitous racket when discharged–they must have known that 
no amount of technical superiority would save them in a violent conflict. Through signing 
and gesturing, Rodriguez persuaded these Apaches to admit the Spanish to peace. It 
was trust misbegotten. Two days later the Spanish, after they shattered the quiet of the 
prairie with a harquebus shot, caught this group by surprise, and demanded one of 
these Apaches serve as a guide. The situation threatened to explode at any moment, 
but somehow the Spanish convinced their newfound foes to acquiesce to their 
demands, and their reluctant guide agreed to take the invaders to water and to bison, 
two days away. Almost certainly this was an attempt by Faraones to be rid of the 
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Spanish and to expose them to further danger in the edge landscape between the Rio 
Grande Valley and the arid uplands. But Rodriguez and Chamuscado were already on 
the retreat. They followed their guide to some bison, slaughtered them for their meat, 
and then returned to the Rio Grande without delay. They never set foot beyond the Rio 
Grande Valley again. Soon they made their return journey south to Nueva Vizcaya along 
the same path as they had come: downriver along the Rio Grande to La Junta de los 
Ríos and back upriver along the Rio Conchos. By April of the following year, 1582, most 
of them were back at Santa Bárbara.13
! This entrada laid the groundwork for the others that followed. For future Spanish 
invaders the Relación (journal) of Rodriguez’s and Chamuscado’s chronicler, Hernán 
Gallegos, became foundational as a means to intellectually and ideologically organize 
the bewildering set of landscapes north of Nueva Vizcaya. Gallegos’ Relación became 
the epistemological frame from which New Mexico would be conceived of as a colonial 
province—but it also limited the Spanish, and implicitly discouraged exploration beyond 
the Middle Rio Grande Valley. In fact, the entrada’s strict adherence to the Rio Grande 
Valley and its dependence on pueblos for food and for guides should be read as proofs 
of the Spanish failure to create meaningful connections to ecologies and cultures that 
existed beyond the milpa–the cropland. Rodriguez and Chamuscado were almost 
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wholly dependent on others for their survival. The only advantage they had came in the 
form of their weaponry and diplomacy, the latter of which was all but abandoned by the 
end of the entrada. Future incursions replicated many of these shortcomings, and it fast 
became routine to exploit both the ecology and the societies of the Middle Rio Grande 
Valley as the means by which Spanish imperialism propped itself up.
! Less than seven months after the Rodriguez and Chamuscado entrada returned 
to Santa Bárbara, Antonio de Espejo mounted a second entrada, on November 10, 
1582. This second entrada was organized as a rescue mission for two of Rodriguez’s 
friars who had remained behind at the pueblo of Puaray to begin missionary work. 
Rumors had trickled south for some months that the friars had quickly run afoul of their 
hosts and had been struck down almost as soon as Chamuscado left the Middle Rio 
Grande Valley. Nevertheless, Espejo used the imperiled missionaries as an excuse to 
re-enter these fresh landscapes, perhaps with the greedy hope that he would find his 
way to becoming the founder of a new colony and province. Espejo retraced almost 
exactly the route of Rodriguez and Chamuscado and he soon found himself among the 
Rio Grande pueblos, and then at Puaray pueblo where the Spanish Religious had long 
since been killed. It was February, deep winter, and the pueblo was deserted. The 
Puaray Puebloans had left en masse because they feared Spanish reprisal; several 
thousand of them hid in the Manzano and Sandia Mountains. Espejo waited to see if 
they would come down to greet him, but they dared not. He and his men helped 
themselves to the emergency stores of corn, squash, and beans that the Puebloans had 
ferreted away for the winter. The rescue mission was over, but Espejo was not ready to 
go home. He and his 14 men spent the remainder of 1582’s winter, spring, and early 
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summer–five whole months–traveling among the Rio Grande pueblos as far north as 
the Jemez Mountains and as far west as Acoma pueblo. On July 3 Espejo decided it 
was time to go back to Santa Bárbara, but not the same way as Rodriguez-
Chamuscado had traveled. Perhaps wanting to best Chamuscado, he elected to re-
enter the desert-plains edge in in a search for that river that lay to the east (the Pecos), 
and to try to blaze an alternate route back to La Junta and into Nueva Vizcaya.14 
! Espejo left the Middle Rio Grande Valley and immediately resolved that, if he 
should meet those bellicose and nomadic Natives, he would not curry favor with them, 
but would instead immediately take what he needed in the way of supplies and guides. 
In fact, Espejo made good on this resolve even before he left the pueblos behind for 
good. Pecos pueblo was the easternmost pueblo of the Middle Rio Grande Valley, and 
sat at the gateway to the southern Great Plains (it was a favorite place for nomadic 
plains groups to congregate for trade fairs). When Espejo entered the pueblo, 2,000 
armed Puebloans greeted him. Intimidated, Espejo ordered that torches be lit and he 
made it clear that he would burn all of their homes unless they consented to his will. The 
people of Pecos relented and Espejo robbed them of their food. He also kidnapped two 
of their number and enslaved them as his guides. These were ruthless tactics that 
featured no diplomatic finesse, but they allowed Espejo to quickly locate the Pecos 
River (called by him the Rio de las Bacas). Once he had moored his party to this river’s 
banks, he departed south, out of the southern Great Plains, down into the northern 
Chihuahuan Desert, and homeward. With the aid of his guides Espejo encountered 
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watering holes and bison aplenty, and his group did not suffer nearly as much as 
Rodriguez and Chamuscado’s. Late in the summer Espejo arrived at a playa–a surface 
depression where rainwater pools–that is now known as Toyah Lake, near present-day 
Pecos, Texas. Here the expedition met Jumano Indians, a group vaguely known to the 
Spanish owing to their traffic at La Junta. At this point Espejo realized that the Pecos 
River had begun coursing too far eastward, and that he was in danger of becoming lost. 
Consequently he took on three Jumanos to act as guides to La Junta de los Ríos. 
These guides delivered on their promise and the Spanish struck La Junta in two 
weeks.15
Map 6: The Path of the Pecos River. 
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.
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! Both Espejo and Rodriguez-Chamuscado ventured into the desert-plains edge 
landscape during monsoon season–a period of heavy rains that lasts from July to 
October; during these months the region receives roughly forty-five percent of its total 
rainfall of about 15 inches. Although tree-ring data indicates that this was a period of 
long-term drought, the local watershed would have been an active place just then, and 
whatever precipitation there was drained into the rivers and the many arroyos (deep 
gouges across the landscape cut by water erosion). In all, the Pecos River Valley drains 
about 45,000 square miles from its headwaters to the confluence with the Rio Grande. 
Of this amount, just over 20,000 square miles are drained along the lower Pecos River, 
that portion located in the present-day state of Texas. Near the juncture of the Rios 
Grande and Conchos the tributaries of the Pecos River become plentiful: Delaware 
River, Toyah Creek, Independence Creek, in addition to other creeks and draws, swell 
the river by over 50%. Many of these tributaries trace their origins to mountain ranges, 
such as the Guadalupe or Davis mountains. Although they both experienced the 
southern Great Plains and northern Chihuahuan Desert at the same seasonal time, 
Espejo fared much better than Rodriguez and Chamuscado because he actually 
pierced into the landscape and was aided by the expert knowledge of Pecos and 
Jumano guides. In a way, Rodriguez and Chamuscado left the Rio Grande watershed 
without entering the Pecos watershed. They had only wandered for 65 miles before they 
turned back. Espejo on the other hand, traveled hundreds of miles into the Chihuahuan 
Desert and experienced the landscapes much more fully. The many ojos–water holes–
that Espejo encountered were more likely playas that had just been replenished by the 
rains. Also, Espejo might have just been luckier in his day to day timing. Whereas 
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Rodriguez and Chamuscado reported no difficulty in crossing over and up the Rio 
Conchos, when Espejo gained La Junta de los Ríos he was ultimately unable to cross it 
and re-enter Nueva Vizcaya because the rivers were too swollen.16 
! Espejo experienced the possibilities of the Pecos River and the northern 
Chihuahuan Desert, yet his entrada did nothing to reverse the building focus on Rio 
Grande-riparian imperial strategy. Instead of being a gateway to ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing’ 
the Pecos River landscapes that adjoined the Middle Rio Grande Valley, Espejo’s 
Relación actually discouraged Spanish exploration and investment of the those very 
same landscapes even further. Along the entire course of the Pecos River the Spanish 
had not found a single pueblo (aside of Pecos pueblo near the headwaters). From a 
missionary point of view, there seemed to be too few souls over too wide an area who 
lived too little like ‘civilized’ peoples. Additionally, there had been no exploration of the 
uplands between the Pecos River and the Rio Grande, or of the uplands to the east of 
the Pecos. That was still tierra incognita to the imperial architects who closely correlated 
Spanish colonialism to the availability of water, wood, and arable lands. Espejo’s 
chosen route through the desert-plains edge landscape did not represent a genuine 
interaction with the broader ecology, but even if it had, it is almost certain that he could 
not have sold the landscape as a viable platform for colonization.
! Another reason for the devaluation of edge landscapes of the northern 
Chihuahuan Desert was their unsuitability for cart-passage–a feature of Spanish empire 
almost as necessary as missions or villas. Carts were the vehicles whereby colonizers 
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transported  themselves as well as the tools of empire:  guns, metal tools, bibles, sacred 
hosts, and woven cloth. Without them the Spanish economy ground to a halt and the 
trappings of domination vanished. Espejo had labored greatly over the leagues of 
mountainous and craggy foot-trails until he hit the Rio Grande seven weeks after he had 
set out. The recorded observations are anything but detailed, but there was enough 
information for colonial readers about the rockiness of the trails that the idea of taking 
caravans or supply trains would have been met with derision. The lands just north and 
west of La Junta de los Ríos are the most difficult, and are riddled with canyons and 
narrow valleys that pose serious challenges for horseback riders, let alone bulky carts. 
Whereas the Rio Conchos was useful for traveling north out of Nueva Vizcaya towards 
the Rio Grande, Espejo taught future Spanish that the Pecos River was not a viable 
river for north-south travel between the Rio Grande pueblos and Nueva Vizcaya. The 
fact that numerous mountain ranges divided La Junta from the upriver portions of the 
Pecos River closest to the pueblos came as a strong discouragement. It was almost ten 
years after Espejo’s trip before a Spaniard recommitted to exploration of the Middle Rio 
Grande Valley–and his entrada was illegal.17
! Espejo’s return journey strongly suggested to colonial authorities that the middle 
reaches of the Pecos River and the desert-plains edge landscape were unsuited to 
imperial projects, but the experiences of the next invader, Castaño de Sosa, exposed 
the difficult conditions along the Pecos River nearer to its headwaters, east of the 
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Estancia Basin and Galisteo Valley. In 1590 Lieutenant Governor Gaspar Castaño de 
Sosa, of the province of Nuevo León, initiated an unsanctioned entrada. Although he 
believed that he had viceregal authority to explore and conquer, and had sent 
messengers to Mexico City to verify his rights, his expedition was never endorsed by 
the viceroy or his deputies. Sosa made it to the Middle Rio Grande Valley and was 
actively gathering intelligence when he was arrested at Santo Domingo pueblo late in 
March of 1591. His “Memoria,” written in the months following his incarceration reads 
like a swashbuckling affair full of suspenseful Puebloan stand-offs and dedicated 
Catholic zeal. Sosa likely crafted the Memoria’s tone and content with an aim to 
persuading his prosecuting court that he had acted with piety, fealty, and good faith. 
Regardless of its theatrical context, however, Sosa’s memoria adds to the impression 
that the upper Pecos River watershed was just as harsh and rugged as the lower 
watershed–a place where cart-travel was slow, perilous, and expensive.18 
! Sosa had departed from Monclova, Coahuila on July 27, 1590 with 160-170 
people, herds of cattle, and 10 carts of maize. Sosa’s started his trip much farther east 
than Rodriguez-Chamuscado or Espejo, and it made no sense for him to try for La 
Junta de los Ríos. Instead, he forded the Rio Grande and made for the Pecos River (the 
‘Rio Salado’ to Sosa); these tasks were made daunting by the fact that he undertook 
them during monsoon season, when flow was high and rapid. His difficulty explains why 
it took him three months to strike the Pecos River, probably around the area of present-
day Sheffield, Texas. Sosa knew enough from the Espejo trip that this river would get 
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him to the Rio Grande pueblos, and so he began to travel upriver. Handicapped by their 
carts, the Spanish traveled about 5 to 8 miles a day over 500 miles of riverine terrain 
that was alternately muddy or sandy, and where forage for animals, and food for 
humans was in precious short supply. After two more months Sosa reached Pecos 
pueblo, on December 30. He visited a number of pueblos where the Spanish exacted 
loyalty to the Spanish King and erected crosses and appointed alcaldes–town council 
members.19
! We should not be distracted by Sosa’s antics in the Middle Rio Grande Valley, 
but rather should turn our attention to the Memoria’s details concerning cart travel along 
the banks of the Pecos River. As a portent of what lay ahead, Sosa encountered 
difficulty almost from the moment he struck the Pecos River near present-day Sheffield, 
Texas. The river’s flow at this point cuts across a landscape composed of dry, sandy, 
and alkaline soils that are prone to erosion. Steep slopes require careful maneuvering to 
reach the water below safely. Sosa, perhaps over-elated at finding the body of water 
that would deliver him to the pueblos, hazarded to navigate his draught animals down to 
the water’s edge, but the rough terrain proved too much for the carts and many were 
damaged. Sosa could not afford to lose these transports; they bore food, supplies, and 
the ‘royal fifths,’ meant as tribute to the viceroy and king. He was forced to pause and 
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repair them before he could proceed. It was an ignominious beginning that immediately 
cast the Pecos, yet again, as an inhospitable river.20 
! The situation did not improve as the Spanish journeyed upriver, and by the time 
they had gained the pueblos the Memoria worked more like an advisory against the 
Pecos than as any kind of boosterism. On December 24 Sosa’s maestre de campo 
(literally: master of camp, a field marshall), Cristobal de Heredia, arrived from his 
reconnaissance mission of Pecos pueblo. Heredia found the Puebloans there to be very 
hostile, probably because of their memory of Espejo’s coercive means of procuring food 
and guides. Sosa expected this, and had come prepared for it. But there was additional 
bad news that gave Sosa pause inasmuch as it jeopardized his ability to transport the 
tools, and so the means, of empire with him. The path ahead to the pueblo was a 
broken land, gouged by numerous gullies and arroyos that Heredia felt would surely ruin 
the carts. Sosa could not risk arriving at the pueblos in a position of weakness, with no 
supplies or materiel to back up his claims to dominance. He halted the carts on 
December 26 just south of a place called Urraca (near present-day Ribera, New 
Mexico; about 20 miles southeast of Pecos pueblos) and set out with a vanguard of 
soldiers. Eventually, when Sosa felt confident in his promises of peace with wary 
Puebloans, the carts rumbled out, but whereas it had taken Sosa one day to gain Pecos 
pueblo, it took the carts two weeks to navigate the exit from the Pecos River and to 
enter the Middle Rio Grande Valley. So treacherous was the path and so battered were 
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the carts that they kept breaking down, and the Spanish could only manage one league 
of travel a day.21
! Late sixteenth century Spanish entradas into the Middle Rio Grande Valley via 
the Rio Conchos and the Rio Grande recorded travel conditions and landscapes that 
elicited fear, thirst, and hunger in the Spanish invaders. Neither the Rodriguez-
Chamuscado nor the Espejo entrada inspired easy confidence in would-be 
conquistadores of the Rio Grande pueblos. If those parties had had such a difficult time 
ascending the Rio Grande, then what would colonial audiences have made of the 
stories brought back by Sosa’s tale of the Pecos River? Travel up the Pecos had been 
so brutal and slow that those Spanish had debased themselves by eating grass seed, 
mesquite bark, or seed grain in order to survive. Colonial architects who studied the 
Rodriguez-Chamuscado, Espejo, and Sosa entradas would have read the Pecos River 
Valley and the desert-plains edge landscape as places that were logistically challenging 
and ecologically lacking. Before New Mexico was even founded as an official colony of 
New Spain, the Pecos became an imperial backwater. Had the Pecos River been dotted 
with pueblos to furnish colonizers with supplies, the problem of rugged travel might have 
been overlooked, but the Spanish only documented one pueblo (Pecos) and many 
nomadic bands who seemed too ephemeral, poor, and bellicose to be relied upon as a 
resource. And although both rivers drain about 26,000 square miles, the Pecos River 
Valley was a less bountiful river because its origins were in the Sangre de Cristo 
Mountains, a much smaller and drier range than the San Juan Mountains that fed the 
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Rio Grande. Using Puebloan settlement as their guide, the Spanish learned from them 
that the Pecos River was insufficient to support sedentary, agricultural living.
! The last entrada of the sixteenth century drew upon the experiences of the three 
previous entradas, and finally codified Spanish empire in the northern Chihuahuan 
Desert. Don Juan de Oñate’s 1598 entry into the Middle Rio Grande Valley defined:  the 
path that would become the camino real; the geographical shape of Spanish colony; 
and, consequently, the structure of the imperial economy. The (Spanish) father of New 
Mexico left from the Valle de Santa Bárbara in January of 1598, during one of the 
coldest and driest seasons of the Chihuahuan Desert. The timing was inconvenient, and 
not of his choosing. He had actually amassed enough supplies and attracted enough 
volunteers to begin his trek in 1596, but the business of Spanish empire was already 
encumbered by excessive bureaucracy, and two royally mandated inspections had 
delayed him. Oñate suffered attrition of men and supplies as a result of delays. To make 
the most of what he had left, he blazed a more direct trail to the Middle Rio Grande 
Valley than Rodriguez-Chamuscado and Espejo had done. Instead of departing to the 
northeast down the Rio Conchos to La Junta, and then traveling up the Rio Grande 
northwest, Oñate set a heading for due north, and struck out overland. He arrived at the 
Rio Grande near what would become El Paso del Norte and performed the ritual 
ceremony of formal possession for King Philip II on April 30. Staying true to his 
northward heading, Oñate became the first Spaniard to push his caravan across the 
arid plain that would become the Jornada del Muerto. His carts took over a month to 
make the distance over unfamiliar and waterless land, and when he emerged among 
the Piro pueblos only 21 carts remained of the 43 that he had set out with from Santa 
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Bárbara; the rest had been abandoned to help preserve the strength of the oxen. The 
path that Oñate chose became El Camino Real de Tierra Adentro, the route by which 
future colonists and supplies caravans made the journey to and from Santa Fe.22
! What can we learn about the Spanish experience traveling to, and living in, the 
Middle Rio Grande Valley from Oñate’s camino real? This was an expensive route that 
privileged expediency over ecological caution. Oñate shunned the route that went by La 
Junta because it was too far east, and he likewise shunned the Rio Grande itself just 
north present-day Las Cruces, New Mexico until present-day Socorro because it jogged 
too far west and passed through difficult mountain terrain. But when Oñate chose to 
hasten across the land, he de facto devalued certain landscapes within the Chihuahuan 
Desert. Granted, by avoiding the Rio Conchos and La Junta de los Ríos and making 
straight for the future site of El Paso del Norte, he avoided the alternating canyons and 
gorges that make travel difficult up the Rio Grande–but at the cost of ignoring an 
unusually fertile landscape of the Chihuahuan Desert. Every Spanish chronicler who 
had passed the confluence in the sixteenth century noted the pueblos and the bountiful 
fields of maize, squash, and beans of La Junta. This area was a small-scale Middle Rio 
Grande Valley in terms of arable land and perennial water resources, but it would be 
almost 100 years before it again received the attention of the Spanish empire. In the 
meantime, this breadbasket within the Chihuahuan Desert passed outside the scope of 
Spanish economy and influence.23 
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! In addition to depriving future Spanish travelers of access to pueblos and riparian 
crops at La Junta, the camino real that Oñate founded north of El Paso del Norte was 
riddled with danger and risk. From the northern parts of the Mesilla Valley, north of El 
Paso, Oñate diverged from the Rio Grande and travel northward across the Jornada del 
Muerto. Reporting back to officials in Mexico City about the new colony of New Mexico, 
Juan de Ortega, a captain of cavalry, reported in 1601 that the Jornada del Muerto was 
40 leagues long (about 90-100 miles) over a flat, waterless plain composed of sand, 
clay and gravel. During the colonial era of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
when climatic conditions were cooler and drier than they are today, the average annual 
precipitation was probably less than 9 inches. The Jornada was firmly situated within 
the Chihuahuan Desert and offered little more to travelers than desert grasses, like 
black grama (Bouteloua eriopoda), that had long since evolved tolerances to drought. 
As the name suggests, passage along this portion of the camino real caused Spanish 
travelers anxiety, despair, and occasionally deaths. If the camino real had instead 
followed the river, there would have been much greater access to shelter, water, and 
forage, but at the risk of lost time, longer distances, and exposure to attack or cart 
breakages. As long as it took carts to travel across the Jornada del Muerto, it would 
have taken them longer to pass through the rugged foothills of the Caballos and Fra 
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Cristobal Mountains. Oñate set a precedent wherein the practicalities–and limitations–of 
Spanish transportation technology overrode ecological considerations.24
! Oñate, as adelantado and first governor of New Mexico, cemented the Spanish 
empire as a set of institutions and peoples that existed almost exclusively along the Rio 
Grande. Granted, Oñate’s choices formed a significant and lasting extension of Spanish 
empire along the Middle Rio Grande Valley, but this was a riparian empire that 
manifested in disjunctive ways to the complex interconnectivity of adjacent edge 
landscapes, ecoregions, and the peoples who inhabit them. Read this way, New Mexico 
was from its beginnings ecologically isolated as a direct result of the Spanish cultural 
and political preference for riparian places and sedentary, agricultural indigenes. The 
‘Chihuahuan borderlands’ of the Spanish and Apaches can be traced to this moment, 
when the Spanish turned away from the hundreds of thousands of square miles of the 
northern Chihuahuan Desert and southern Great Plains to focus on 200 miles of river.
! After Oñate’s time in New Mexico had come to a close (he departed in 1608 or 
1610), future governors and Franciscan missionaries continued to construct Spanish 
empire as a riparian colony, and to overlay their European culture, political, and 
economic structures atop the world of Puebloans. Quickly, institutions like missions and 
encomiendas–labor camps means to acculturate the laborers–sprang up across the 
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valley and among the pueblos. Quickly these institutions set about converting  (or 
attempting to convert) Puebloans to Catholicism and coercing them into functioning as 
agents of mercantilistic agricultural economies. The idea was to transform Puebloans 
into vecinos (colonists) and to task them with performing empire and populating 
colonies. Ironically, these strategies of control worked against the Spanish almost from 
the start. Although the Spanish stimulated the economic profile of the Middle Rio 
Grande Valley by introducing horses, cattle, metal goods, and harquebuses, the abusive 
imperatives of empire strained the social and economic fabric of the valley. After all, the 
newly arrived capital was not intended to better the lives and material fortunes of 
Puebloans, but was intended as an investment that would ultimately benefit New Spain. 
The problem that the Spanish did not anticipate–and that they were at a loss to answer–
was that many indigenes (Puebloans and non-Puebloans alike) wanted to seize parts of 
this new economy for their own ends. It was at this moment that a longtime inhabitant of 
the desert-plains edge landscape, Faraon Apaches, found themselves both imperiled 
and empowered by the colonial encounter. Soon, they began to experiment with ways to 
access and subvert this new imperial economy.25
! Before we analyze Faraon engagement with New Mexico, we should give our 
attention to the ways that the Spanish altered the demographic profile of the Middle Rio 
Grande Valley because of the direct bearing that it had on inter-regional encounter. In 
July of 1601 Captain Joseph Brondate, a seasoned cavalry officer in Oñate’s troop, 
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reckoned that 130 pueblos dotted the Middle Rio Grande Valley, and that inside them 
dwelled 50,000 to 60,000 Puebloans. Twenty-nine years later, fray Alonso Benavides 
counted approximately 44,000 Puebloans farming in about 70 pueblos. Benavides was 
the custo (superior, or chief administrator) of the Franciscan Order of New Mexico from 
1626-1629, and he was in an excellent position to compile information regarding the 
region from the many friars and colonists there. These figures, although not part of a 
sophisticatedly executed census, strongly suggest that the number of Puebloans in New 
Mexico probably declined by approximately 20% between 1601 and 1630.26
! The loss of 6,000 to 16,000 Puebloans in the space of 29 years is drastic. 
Although the Spanish were often brutal in their treatment of Puebloans (as in the case 
of Oñate’s slaughter of men at Acoma pueblo in 1599), there is no evidence that 
violence reached such a fevered pitch that thousands were put to the sword. More likely  
is that epidemic disease, brought on by sustained contact with colonists, ravaged the 
colony. Furthermore, the only reason why the decline in population was not greater was 
because many thousands of Puebloans had probably already perished as a result of 
disease borne by the first three entradas of 1581 to 1591, or that of Coronado’s. 
Whatever the cause of so many thousands dead, what is clear is that the number of 
inhabited pueblos shrank by about 45%. Whether the Spanish combined populations of 
multiple pueblos into one pueblo for administrative purposes–congrecación–or because 
68
26 Alonso de Benavides, The Memorial of Fray Alonso de Benavides, 1630, Mrs. Edward E. Ayer, trans. 
(Albuquerque: Horn and Wallace, 1965): 19-26.
    Daniel T. Reff, “Contextualizing Missionary Discourse: The Benavides ‘Memorials’ of 1630 and 1634,” 
Journal of Anthropological Research 50 (1994): 59-61.
    Elinore M. Barrett, Conquest and Catastrophe: Changing Rio Grande Pueblo Settlement Patterns in 
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 2002): 53-62, 
although Barrett appears to underestimate the number of extant pueblos by about 40 in the time of Oñate.
    Don Juan de Oñate, 629-639.
a number of the 1601 pueblos had existed as alternative agricultural stations, the effect 
was the same: concentrated, ultra-sedentary riparian settlement that strained local 
resources and intensified the effects of periodic droughts. Actually, concentration of 
Puebloans into fewer pueblos may have contributed to population decline because 
common water wells and food storage rooms would have been more vulnerable to 
microbial infection and transmission.27
! The social and economic threat posed by population concentration becomes 
apparent when we consider the importance of water. There were few acequias–
irrigation canals–in the Middle Rio Grande Valley when the Spanish first made contact. 
Pueblos typically practiced dry-farming–they relied on seasonal rainfall to water their 
crops of maize, squash, and legumes; sometimes they also used rough ditches 
alongside the Rio Grande to capture the periodic overflow from spring thaw freshets, or 
monsoon season floods. When the Spanish arrived, Puebloans had successfully 
cultivated approximately 15,000 to 25,000 acres of land, and from that the early 
entradas estimated that most pueblos could afford to store 2 to 3 years’ worth of food–
an impressive surplus. If rains failed and dry-farming collapsed, archaeological data 
suggest that pueblo populations may have also migrated in times of climatic stress to 
other settlement sites, a kind of flexible sedentism. This kind of limited mobility provided 
crucial elasticity to Puebloan societies to answer the challenge of finding water in a xeric 
environment where moisture did not always appear in the same place. The permanent 
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abandonment of alternate pueblo sites and the concentration of populations around 
missions, pueblos, and encomiendas of the middle Rio Grande valley would have laid 
hardship on Puebloans and the Spanish alike in times of localized drought. Whereas 
Puebloan practices, developed over hundreds of years before empire, reflected the 
marginal nature of agriculture in the northern Chihuahuan Desert, Spanish policy 
represented a shift to an engagement with the local ecology more rooted in the 
presumed efficacy of irrigation technology rather than the reality of a variable climate.28 
! The Spanish realized early on that the Middle Rio Grande Valley could easily 
leave them impoverished and famished, and so almost immediately vecinos began to 
build acequia networks. The Spanish desired more arable lands around inhabited 
pueblos so that they could establish Spanish encomiendas and ranchos in order to 
increase agricultural yields. Over time, acequias madres, or mother canals, appeared 
across the Rio Grande Valley. These large canals tapped into Rio Grande tributaries like 
the Santa Fe, Chama or Puerco Rivers, and into springs, or sometimes into the Rio 
Grande itself at some point far above the settlement. The canals were oriented in a 
north-south direction (as were the irrigated fields) so that gravity corralled the water into 
the countryside, at which point sangrías, or secondary canals, carried the water to the 
fields, where a farmer working wooden head-gates could irrigate 5 or 6 acres a day. 
Usually the residual canal waters were then directed back into to the river farther 
downstream of the settlement. Often the acequia madre needed to be serviced each 
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spring and its fallen banks excavated. Stone diversion points and wooden gates also 
needed vigilant maintenance because they were prone to breakage. Spanish reliance 
on canal irrigation is in the numbers: in 1600 there were 22 or so ditches irrigating about 
25,555 acres of land. By 1700, there were 61 ditches irrigating 73,580 acres of land.29
! To better understand the transactional dividends of dry-farming versus acequia 
irrigation, we should step back and consider the environment and climate of the Middle 
Rio Grande Valley since both systems were only as effective as the waters that 
sustained them. The Rio Grande begins in the high and complex San Juan Mountain 
range of the southern Rocky Mountains, in present-day Colorado. The snow that falls 
and piles on the rock and trees during the winter thaws during spring and summer, 
creating runoff that courses down slopes and feeds the headwaters. These waters run 
southward through the canyons and gorges of the Colorado Plateau Shrublands (a sub-
ecoregion of the Colorado Rockies Forests ecoregion north of the Chihuahuan Desert) 
and coalesce into a river. Eventually the Rio Grande winds its way past Taos pueblo, 
and at an elevation of 7,000 feet, where it then enters the Middle Rio Grande Valley. 
This section of river valley was often referred to as the rio abajo in colonial times; above 
Taos the Rio Grande was the rio arriba. The Middle Rio Grande Valley itself is an 
ecotonal space, carrying a rich variety of flora and fauna from the Chihuahuan Desert 
as well as the Rocky Mountains and the Great Plains. The northern boundary of the 
Chihuahuan Desert can be discerned somewhere near or just north of the Albuquerque 
and Belen sub-basin, near the present-day cities of those names, owing to the presence 
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of Creosote Bush (Larrea tridentata), a woody, xeric plant, and black grama grass, both 
keystone species. The Colorado Plateau Shrublands extend as far south as two of its 
keystone species: blue grama and buffalo grass, to the Jornada del Muerto in some 
cases.30
! The Middle Rio Grande Valley is situated within the Rio Grande Basin, that 
topographical formation defined by the presence of tributaries and springs that feed the 
Rio Grande. Those tributary waterways, as well as the Rio Grande itself, constitute the 
region’s hydrology–the course and nature of water flow over the land. The Rio Grande 
flows about 470 miles through New Mexico; the Rio Grande Basin captures about 160 
miles of that flow and drains 24,760 square miles with direct tributaries draining about 
12,800 square miles. Sub-basins within the Rio Grande basin, like the Española or 
Albuquerque basins, are set apart by narrows that restrict the watershed to narrow 
valleys. These basins are not large: they vary from 30 to 100 miles in length and 10 to 
35 miles in width. The width of the basin is set by natural borders, such as mountain 
ranges, volcanic uplifts, or volcanic flow fields. Inside the sub-basins natural features 
such as alluvial fans (the fan-like spread of a fast-moving source of water from a canyon 
or an arroyo onto flat land), or bajadas (the compounding of such alluvial fans when 
abutted against a mountain or mesa slope) provide a kind of natural canal from which to 
compose irrigation networks, although the sources of those flows are much more 
dependent on local, seasonal rainfall.31  
72
30 Rio Abajo: Prehistory and History of a Rio Grande Province, Michael P. Marshall & Henry J. Walt, eds. 
(Santa Fe: New Mexico Historic Preservation Program, 1984): 3-5.
    Water Resources in New Mexico, 129, 143.
    Muldavin, 458-460.
31 Water Resources of New Mexico, 129-144.
    Scurlock, 181-184.
! If the Rio Grande’s average annual flow was consistent and if agriculture alone 
was practiced over the land, these figures might seem impressive enough to argue that 
the Spanish model of riparian empire was sustainable. After all, the Spanish were 
themselves not many and the indigenous population of the valley had declined by as 
much as 20% by 1630, meaning that there were far fewer mouths to feed than the 
region had previously supported. There is a problem with making that claim, however. 
The flow rates of the Rio Grande were widely variable, and the Spanish soon learned 
that disappointing rainfalls were a typical feature of life in New Mexico. Additionally, 
waters derived from acequias was not utilized solely to produce food for human 
consumption. Pastoralism formed around European species of livestock constituted a 
novel, vital, and problematic feature of Spanish empire. As sources of meat, milk, wool, 
and transportation, European animals bore on their backs and in their udders the 
promise that the Rio Grande Valley could be self-sufficient. Architects of Spanish 
empire, like Oñate, must have felt that there was little need to sustain the trading 
relationships external to the Middle Rio Grande Valley since husbandry and agriculture 
promised to yield all the protein and carbohydrates that they needed. Furthermore, 
entradas to the Great Plains had been humiliating endeavors to find water, bison, and 
friendship from nomadic tribes like Apaches. Independence from the Puebloan-Apache 
trading relationship appeared as a gateway to superiority over both: starve the former of 
control and ration animal protein; starve the latter of grain carbohydrates through 
restricting trading in the pueblos. 
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! But the combination of agriculture and pastoralism proved contentious from the 
start. In fact, news of trouble between crop and hoof reached Mexico City often enough 
to elicit a cedula–a royal order. On March 10, 1620 Viceroy Don Diego Fernandez de 
Cordoba sent regulations to the still fledgling colony entitled “Pastures of 
Encomenderos.” This cedula dictated that Spanish livestock be kept at least three 
leagues clear of milpas lest their hooves ruin crops, especially those of Puebloans. 
Even the horses of presidials had to be hobbled by day and corralled by night if they 
were absolutely needed within three leagues of milpas. Later, when the Spanish found 
themselves crowded and huddled against the Rio Grande at El Paso del Norte–
refugees of the 1680 revolt–strict orders were again given that livestock be kept from 
fields and canal ways lest their hooves cave in the banks. Given that many of the arable 
lands situated around pueblos, missions, and other Spanish institutions were fed by the 
growing network of canals, the problem of animal hooves and irrigation was a recurrent 
problem that threatened to overtax riparian lands.32
! The fact that many animals were attracted to the lush banks of the Rio Grande 
only added to the strain. The absence of domesticated animals before the Spanish 
meant that hardy, protein-rich and sodium-heavy riparian grasses like desert saltgrass 
(Distichlis spicata) were abundant and attractive sources of pasturage. Desert saltgrass 
had been grazed upon before the Spanish, but only by small game, like deer, or–less 
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often–by bison that might wander over during especially wet years. This grass was and 
is ideal for pasturage along the river banks of New Mexico. Its pointed, rhizomatous 
roots–horizontal, underground stems–can press across water, clay, and shale in order 
to establish new plots, and thereby expand the size of the pasture. In addition, these 
pastures of saltgrass were more evolutionarily suited to riparian lands than crops or 
other grasses. Increased salinity was a perennial problem along the Rio Grande 
because periodic flooding or irrigation, once evaporated, often left deposits of salt on 
the earth that built to toxic levels for most flora. Desert saltgrass, however, had evolved 
to use the intense solar radiation common to the northern Chihuahuan Desert to offset 
high saline levels. Even after the Spanish invaded the region and converted many of 
these riparian pastures into croplands, there must have been an ecological tendency for 
saltgrass to recolonize the banks. To counter the threat of livestock among the crops, 
the colony’s sizable animal population was forced far from riparian pastures towards 
upland pastures–where they were more exposed to harsh elements, less nutritious 
grasses, and the danger of raids.33
! But how many animals were likely in New Mexico? At his second royal 
inspection, Oñate was required to account for every pound of material committed to the 
entrada. These records contain rich, detailed inventories of the materials that the 
Spaniard amassed. Oñate reported during the winter of 1597 and 1598 that his men 
had with them a staggering 5,600 head of livestock. Three years later, it appears that 
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there were as few as 2,350 to as many as 6,500 animals actually present in the Middle 
Rio Grande Valley. Benavides’ observed that, by 1630, livestock populations in New 
Mexico were increasing by leaps and bounds as a result of the virgin pastures that 
nurtured them. Regardless of exact livestock figures, it is enough to note that thousands 
of domesticated animals had abruptly appeared in the Middle Rio Grande Valley, 
feeding ravenously on riparian grasslands. The sudden presence of so many new 
organisms within the ecosystem, feeding upon finite resources, came as a shock to the 
system; a shock made worse by the tremendous volumes of water that these animals 
needed to stay hydrated and functioning. Within sub-basins that were only 15 to 35 
miles wide, the need to remove so many animals from milpas must have come as a 
hardship that naturally led to crowding, and to conflict over land assignment.34
! We can gauge the level of tension between the practice of agriculture and of 
pastoralism if we can grasp the historical climate and weather of the Middle Rio Grande 
Valley. Dendrochronology–tree-ring research–makes it possible to reconstruct 
approximately the average annual rainfall of an area: dendroclimatology. 
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Dendroclimatology is a boon to historical research because it provides a historical 
context where the primary records might be silent.35
! Two seasonal periods feed the Rio Grande watershed. The most plentiful rainfall 
comes during the summer monsoons, from July through September, that dump 
localized rainfall into the valley and into the watershed, forming runoff and swelling the 
flow. These rainstorms are often short, torrential, and frequent. During the winter 
snowfall in the mountainous areas of the watershed, mostly from December through 
February, adds moisture to the watershed that will become available after the spring 
thaw. Anywhere from 43-54% of annual rainfall, 15 inches, occurs during the summer 
monsoons; wintertime snowpack provides anywhere from 1-40% of annual rainfall (this 
wide range correlates to drought); and the remaining moisture comes in more or less 
regular quantities throughout the year. Puebloans learned this watershed over centuries 
of experience, and wisely chose the 200 miles of the Middle Rio Grande Valley as their 
habitat because the vast majority of perennial tributaries are north of their position. On 
the surface, then, it appears that a robust hydrology is at work in the Middle Rio Grande 
Valley: snowmelt during the spring and early summer swells the river from March 
through May, and summer monsoons comes from July through September. Early 
historical reports, however, reveal that prolonged droughts were common to the area.36
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! While the colony was still in its embryonic phase, Oñate was trying to articulate 
the potential of the new colony to the viceregal court, and he often painted it in glowing 
terms, but suspicion was mounting that his reports to Mexico City were less than 
complete. Oñate was the adelantado of New Mexico, and he had made a significant 
investment of his personal fortune into the enterprise. Officials desired a more impartial 
assessment of the venture than Oñate could be expected to offer. In 1601 don 
Francisco de Valverde y Mercado, of the viceregal court, was tasked by the viceroy with 
interviewing recent arrivals from New Mexico for a more honest picture. Two of the 
people he interviewed were chief auditor and legal assessor Ginés de Herrera Horta, 
and captain of the cavalry Juan de Ortega, both late arrivals in New Mexico and not part 
of Oñate’s original party. They each gave accounts of conditions in the new colony that 
diverged from Oñate’s. Horta told his questioner that almost all of the colonists in New 
Mexico wanted to leave and to return south because the climate froze them with brutal 
cold for 8 months, and then baked them alive for the next 4 months. Food had become 
such a problem that 7 cattle were being slaughtered a week, a high figure, and the 
herds of cattle that came with reinforcements were already being eyed for the plate. 
Valverde must have been alarmed to hear that Oñate’s party had even slaughtered and 
eaten some of their draught animals–oxen–before resupply came with more cattle.37 
! Valverde’s next respondent, Ortega, corroborated Horta’s account. For his part, 
Ortega claimed that even the reinforcement cattle could have been totally consumed by 
the time of Valverde’s questioning because they were being butchered so quickly by 
starving colonists. This accelerated rate of consumption, and the low supply of 
78
37 Don Juan de Oñate, 651-656.
foodstuffs, augured trouble for an environment where Puebloans preferred to keep 2 to 
3 year’s worth of food tucked away in case of drought. Ortega indicated that these 
emergency supplies were rapidly being eaten as well–a fact which suggests that the 
next drought would have immediate and devastating consequences, when food 
production collapsed. Ortega echoes Horta’s observation that most colonists wanted to 
leave New Mexico because of the extreme climate and the sterility of the land.38
! Ortega was right to be concerned:  drought in the Middle Rio Grande Valley was 
always just around the corner. The trees that have been standing since the time of 
Oñate tell a painful story about the aridity of the ecosystem. Dendroclimatology 
suggests that cycles of drought far outnumbered periods of wetness. From 1598 to 
1680, annual rainfall was below average 68% of the time. During the same period wet 
years account for just 15% out of the 82 years. The remaining 14 years experienced 
average annual rainfall at about 13-15 inches. Over two-thirds of the time the Spanish 
first practiced empire in the Rio Grande Valley dry to extremely dry conditions prevailed. 
Conditions might have actually been worse during the colonial era:  The Little Ice Age–a 
global cooling event lasting from about 1450 to 1850–brought lower temperatures and 
less rainfall to the northern Chihuahuan Desert, further increasing its propensity to 
drought. The structure of the Rio Grande basin had all the mechanics to provide for a 
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robust riparian empire, but the realities of local climate defined the structure in ways that 
were severely disadvantageous to the Spanish and Puebloans alike.39
! Population concentration coupled with heightened sedentarism and dependence 
on the fickle flow rates of the Rio Grande ultimately proved less than ideal for the kind of 
empire that Spanish colonials fantasized for themselves. The intertwined practices of 
pastoralism and agriculture exposed Middle Rio Grande Valley inhabitants to climatic 
vicissitudes, and made periods of drought much more painful. Oñate and his 
successors tethered Spanish empire to the Middle Rio Grande Valley, and thus isolated 
it in ways that served to impoverish its economies and societies. And yet the Spanish 
persisted, and their imperial economy continued to reorganize the landscape and to 
introduce new flora and fauna to the region. At the same moment this was happening, 
indigenes from the uplands saw an economic opportunity in New Mexico that could 
drastically contribute to their lives, and they quickly found ways to access it. 
! The Spanish implicitly shunned the broader ecoregion when they focused solely 
on the Middle Rio Grande Valley as the seat of northern colony and empire. In 
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consequence, they left indigenes from upland ecotonal spaces free to negotiate the 
colonial encounter on their own terms and under circumstances that more often 
benefitted them. Faraon Apaches, specifically, who moved between the southern Great 
Plains and the northern Chihuahuan Desert quickly explored the opportunities offered 
by their geographical position within the colonial encounter. Through raiding and trading 
Faraones frequently forced their way into the daily life of New Mexico. Their deliberate 
behavior compels us to decenter the Middle Rio Grande Valley and the Spanish-
Puebloan dynamic from our narrative, and to move towards an analytical frame that 
acknowledges the contributions made from the upland landscapes. Apache claims to 
space and resources rang out from the beginning of the seventeenth century and point 
to a world where non-Puebloan indigenes utilized Spanish-shunned landscapes to 
reshape the vectors of domination and to turn the moment to their advantage. Through 
actions that date back to Oñate’s time and that continued for nearly 200 years, Apaches 
set about isolating and exploiting Spanish empire and turning the strategies and tools of 
the Spanish against them in ways that would reverberate within and beyond New 
Mexico.40 
! Trading rather than raiding seems to have initially typified Faraon engagement 
with the pueblos. Puebloans at Pecos and Taos were especially accustomed to trading 
blankets and grain with Vaqueros–Apaches–from the Great Plains, who in turn supplied 
Puebloans with bison products like meat, tallow, and hide. In mid-September, one of 
Oñate’s sergeant majors, Vincente de Zaldívar Mendoza, accidentally found himself in 
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the middle of this Apache plains-based economy. Mendoza ventured out from Oñate’s 
headquarters at Santo Domingo pueblo in search of bison at nearly the same moment 
as Oñate created the province of New Mexico on paper. It was late summer when 
Mendoza passed by the pueblo of Pecos and proceeded eastward to the shortgrass 
prairies where he soon found vast herds of bison. The sergeant major tried for nearly 
two weeks to herd these undomesticated animals towards the pueblos for further study, 
but he failed utterly. He was unaccustomed to hunting beasts that seemed like little 
more than shaggy cows but that were very much wild and could defeat any corral he 
built in their way. Finally, he gave up his hunt after he narrowly missed a large herd 
because they had been pursued by “Vaqueros,” as his guide told him. Mendoza learned 
that these Apaches had recently passed through the area from trading at Picuríes and 
Taos (making them Jicarillas, probably), where they exchanged bison products and salt 
for cotton blankets, pottery, maize, and some turquoise.41
! Nearly two and a half decades later, fray Andres Juarez provided a closer view of 
this indigenous economy. Juarez was serving as a missionary at Nuestra Santa de Los 
Angeles, by Pecos pueblo, when he witnessed Apaches approach from the prairie. 
Pecos pueblo was situated on a mesa near Glorieta Pass, near the headwaters of the 
Pecos River and removed to the east from the Rio Grande Valley itself. It was a place 
that existed in the heart of edge landscapes:  part Chihuahuan Desert, part Great 
Plains, part Rio Grande Valley. Faraon Apaches often came to this pueblo to trade. 
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When they came again in 1622, Juarez noted that they brought their wares stacked on 
polls that were pulled by little shaggy dogs. Juarez immediately saw that the Puebloan-
Apache exchange was mutualistic and lucrative; a trade that provided both parties with 
food and wares that the other could not easily produce for themselves. This mutualism 
was not, however, strictly required. Before the introduction of Spanish livestock, 
Puebloans could usually find protein from the turkey, deer or other small game along the 
Rio Grande; likewise, Apaches sometimes planted maize for carbohydrates, but their 
milpas were dry-farmed, and were often left unattended until harvest time.42 
! Even though their was no explicit need for nutritional interdependency, 
Puebloans and Apaches had chosen to exchange resources for decades, if not 
centuries. But with the arrival of the Spanish, so too arrived a sense of protectionism 
that compelled the colonizers to regulate Apaches’ access to pueblos, a disruption to 
the valley-plains trade. Apaches were understandably annoyed. The Spanish, through 
horses, mules, guns, and other items, diversified and expanded the Rio Grande Valley 
economy, but then made it difficult for Apaches to participate in the exchange of these 
attractive new goods. Over time, capricious regulations and outright abuses by the 
Spanish made Apaches desperate enough to raid, and, later, powerful enough to 
plunder. The problem was that Spanish protectionism had a fatal flaw:  it was almost 
unenforceable because Spanish governors and Franciscan missionaries could seldom 
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afford to back up their interference with Puebloan-Apache trade because the colony 
was too weak. From its inception, riparian empire and its economy seldom yielded as 
much wealth as the Spanish had hoped; although they would have been loathe to admit 
it, the Spanish suffered without the plains trade. In response, Faraones forged 
asymmetrical gains over the Spanish through raiding, and in the process placed the 
Spanish on unsteady ground. This process–where the Spanish proclaim an exclusive 
imperial economy only to see it sucked into larger, irresistible indigenous economies–is 
a theme that we will revisit frequently and in many different places until the late 1780s.  
! In Oñate’s time raiding was already beginning to become an important strategy 
within the Apache and Spanish-Puebloan relationship. Alonso Benavides, Ginés de 
Herrera Horta, and Juan de Ortega all commented on the regularity of trade between 
pueblos and “Vaqueros” from the plains, but another of Valverde’s 1601 respondents, 
Marcelo de Espinosa, went one step further. He characterized that trading relationship 
as one that sometimes devolved into a raid. At these times, Apache fighters typically 
attacked the pueblo, commanded acquiescence, and took what they wanted or needed. 
Whereas the entire pueblo population might be caught at home and off guard, Apache 
women and children remained safe, hidden in nearby mountains.43
! The Spanish arrival magnified the Apache impetus to raid, not only for the crops 
and wares produced by pueblos but also for newly arrived technology and animals from 
New Spain. Spanish harquebuses and horses were an attractive target to populations 
who immediately saw their utility within marginal edge landscapes. The Spanish feared 
that if imperial tools should become widely available to their enemies, then their 
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technological advantage would be neutralized, or erased. Faraones were no less 
perceptive and soon it became apparent that horses were the leading target of raids. 
The enhanced mobility that came with these animals would soon refashion the 
relationship of Apaches and other indigenes with their environments.44
! In March of 1608 Viceroy Don Luis de Velasco, on behalf of fray Lazaro Jimenez 
in New Mexico, wrote to King Phillip III in Spain. Unusually, the viceroy’s letter was not a 
cool, level-headed summary of colonial affairs. Rather, his missive was terse, its tone 
imbued with panic and doubt. New Mexico, it seems, was already imperiled, and Oñate 
had not even left the Rio Grande yet. The colony was barely 10 years old and already 
scores of adobes stood in ruins throughout the Middle Rio Grande Valley, burned by the 
same Apaches who were wont to assault and raid the Spanish and Puebloans. Most 
alarmingly, horses, the “nerve” of war and domination, had vanished by the herds into 
the upland landscapes of Apaches. The royal court in Madrid must have also been 
disturbed by these accounts that hinted at the impending loss of significant investment 
capital as well as territory. Velasco’s request for more soldiers and supplies was 
approved at breakneck speed. Spanish imperial architects like Oñate, fray Jimenez, and 
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the viceroy were under no illusion; they knew that it was by force of guns and horses–
and the occasional germ–that so few colonists could, most times, defeat such large 
numbers of indigenes in battle. This technology edge, however, was already eroding, 
and to the royal and viceregal courts New Mexico seemed to be crumbling at the same 
moment that it was forming. The political fantasy of riparian empire was already coming 
apart when faced with the larger ecological and economic realties of a landscape still 
dominated by indigenous actors.45
! By 1610 Oñate had been replaced as governor and New Mexico lingered on as a 
province dedicated to the missionary effort, heavily subsidized by the rest of New Spain. 
The poverty of New Mexico soon received regular attention through relief brought by the 
mission supply service, a caravan that came to New Mexico every three years laden 
with necessities. Many in New Mexico came to cherish the supply service as a lifeline 
that connected the interior of New Spain to a province that could barely subsist. But this 
tenacious measure did not make up for the asymmetries that the Spanish had created 
for themselves. Thirty-two years later, in 1640, Spanish riparian empire was still being 
forced to acknowledge indigenous geopolitical imperatives when Apaches stormed 
down from the Sangre de Cristo Mountains around Santa Fe and attacked horse herds 
along the Santa Fe River. Raids like this had begun the year before and carried on 
almost without pause. In 1653, Capitán General Hernando de Ugarte y la Concha 
struggled to find accomplishment during his decade-long struggle to minimize losses 
from Apache raids. He complained once in a letter to the king that his men were at a 
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hopeless disadvantage. Apaches were mounted, and had become excellent riders. The 
only chance he had to punish the raiders came when mounted militia acted quickly, and 
even then only if they also had enough harquebuses to guarantee a martial advantage. 
On one particular occasion, Ugarte y la Concha’s militia was successful in catching and 
killing many of the Apaches, and Spanish horses were “captured with valor on the 
enemy rivers.” These “enemy rivers” must be in reference to the Pecos or Canadian 
River, or to some perennial tributary located at a higher elevation of the Pecos 
watershed. This is a telling detail. The Rio Grande was clearly privileged by the 
Spanish, but Ugarte y la Concha’s recapture of stolen horses on another, “enemy,” river 
demonstrates that Apaches actively utilized waterways beyond the rio abajo–the 
shunned spaces–and were already deploying those resources against the Spanish of 
New Mexico.46
! Nevertheless, this intelligence did not alter how the Spanish countered threats 
posed by Apaches, or compel them to rethink the riparian focus of their colony. Juan de 
Medrano lived these lapses firsthand, and he must have been grievously frustrated. Not 
eight months into his appointment as governor of New Mexico he reported on the dire 
situation of the colony, in early summer of 1669. In his short time in Santa Fe, 6 soldiers 
had been killed, a high figure considering the low population of New Mexico at this time 
and the lack of men-at-arms. Additionally, 300 colonists and 73 Puebloans had been 
relived of 2,000 head of horses and 2,000 head of cattle, along with all the nutrition and 
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labor that they represented. Pueblos became so strapped for livestock that Medrano 
was forced to look to fray Joseph Trujillo, of San Diego de los Jemes mission, to bail out 
the affected people with a gift of 20 fanegas of unleavened bread, 200 young cattle, and 
24 mature cattle. No doubt Apaches had long benefited from Viceroy Francisco Nunez 
Basurto’s cedula of 1620–the regulation that required livestock be kept at least 3 
leagues (about 8 miles) away from milpas and acequias. Spanish crowding and the 
destruction of pasture on the Rio Grande’s banks forced these animals into the uplands, 
and made them easy targets as a commodity that could seldom be attained at the over-
regulated trade fairs.47 
! The pressure that Apaches applied over the Middle Rio Grande Valley intensified 
during the decade leading up to the 1680 revolt. Custo Francisco de Ayeta became 
apoplectic with the “mountain-borne and heathen Apaches” who had ravaged the 
Tompiro pueblos of the Estancia Basin and the Piro pueblos of the lower Middle Rio 
Grande Valley to the point of ruin. Before 1672 the Estancia Basin had supported nearly 
1,500 families in 5 pueblos:  Los Humanos, Chilili, Cuarac, Las Salinas, and Abó. This 
basin was targeted because it was an eastern outlier of the Rio Grande Valley and 
because it lay across the northern border of the Siete Rios region, what we now call the 
Central Closed Basin–a place that had probably become an Apache stronghold by this 
point. The Central Closed Basin was an arid, enclosed geographical niche that offered 
nothing to the Spanish, and so became shunned and was consequently available to 
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upland, nomadic groups. Average rainfall is just less than 14.5 inches and, although it 
drains nearly 15,000 square miles, the only sources of water are mountain streams that 
typically percolate or evaporate before they reach the valley floor. Sometimes monsoon 
rains produce temporary lakes–playas–in the depressions of the valley floor. Agriculture 
and pastoralism on the Spanish scale would have been intensely difficult, or impossible. 
Another pueblo, belonging to Piro Puebloans, was also destroyed that year:  Senecú. 
Senecú was the southernmost of the Piro pueblos and was situated at the northern 
gateway to the Jornada del Muerto. It is impossible to know exactly what Apaches were 
up to with the destruction of these 6 pueblos because most the documentation from 
these years would soon be lost in the violence of the 1680 revolt, but it is telling that 
only pueblos that lay on the southern and eastern periphery were targeted, while Pecos 
pueblo (the easternmost pueblo with long ties to Faraones) passed virtually intact. By all 
appearances, Faraones were working to isolate New Mexico, to compress it, and to 
bleed off some of the colony’s few precious resources. The year after Ayeta 
documented these Apache-sponsored removals, 1679, New Mexico erupted in revolt. 
Apaches participated heavily. One wonders if the destruction of the Tompiro pueblos 
89
and a Piro pueblo were not the early salvos that presaged an indigenous war of 
extermination upon the Spanish and their collaborators.48
! An additional irritant to Apaches that may have prompted this escalation in 
violence was Spanish slave-raiding. As early as 1625 Spanish governors led Puebloan 
auxiliaries on sporadic raids to the near plains to attack and enslave Apaches for use as 
laborers within the colony. This practice was officially illegal and was the source of much 
distress between the Church in New Mexico and the secular governorship. Rare until 
the late 1650s, Spanish attempts to enslave Apaches intensified in the years 
immediately preceding the sacking of the Estancia Basin and the 1680 revolt. For 
example, in 1659 Governor Mendizábal captured scores of Apaches on the plain and 
sent 70 to work as slaves in Parral, Nueva Vizcaya. The following year Mendizábal sent 
30-40 more to Sonora. Finally, in the year of the revolt, 1680, Francisco Xavier lured 
Faraones to Pecos pueblo with the promise of a trade fair. Once everyone had arrived, 
Xavier gave the order to attack and captured dozens of Apaches. Some persons he 
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enslaved for his personal use; the rest he sent to Parral to his friends. Apaches had 
plenty of rational, geopolitical reasons to co-opt the economy of New Mexico into their 
ecotonal spaces, but slave-raiding added a personal dimension to the violence.49
! People staggered and stumbled down the path. Nearly 1,000 of them; mostly 
women, children, and men who could not put up much of a fight even if their lives 
depended on it–as was the case, actually. Surrounded by only skinny and lame horses, 
and with almost no supplies except for what they carried on their backs, they walked 
with quiet intensity. They were trying to reach some kind of haven before the ground 
gave way. It would have been hot, very hot, in August, when temperatures in the 
northern Chihuahuan Desert climb into the 90s and low 100s. The summer monsoon 
rains, if they came that day, would have probably dampened their blisters and their 
meager stores of grain. They trudged along river banks, took some refuge in the stands 
of cottonwood, willow, pinyon, or juniper, but they dared not linger for long in any one 
place. They were escaping from horses and harquebuses, but they would not be fast 
enough. Before long, the roads behind and the hills around would shake with armored 
horses carrying armored men holding loaded guns. They would have to forsake a 
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number of their party to the riders. They found themselves on the wrong side of the 
colonial encounter. The Spanish could barely hope to escape the Apache.
! On August 10, 1680 Puebloans and Apaches across Spanish New Mexico rose 
up as one body and killed friars, colonists, and militia in the pueblos around Santa Fe. 
Over 400 were killed before Otermín and his lieutenant governor, Alonso Garcia 
succeeded in escaping from Santa Fe and Isleta, respectively, and leading the nearly 
2,000 refugees south to El Paso del Norte, where Ayeta was waiting for them with 
supply carts that had been previously dispatched for New Mexico. The Spanish had just 
been expelled from New Mexico, and the Middle Rio Grande Valley would not return to 
the imperial orbit until Don Diego de Vargas’ reconquista of 1692. During those twelve 
years the Spanish fortified their position at El Paso del Norte with what paltry supplies 
they had with them and with what they were able to wrangle from the parsimonious 
exchequer. When Spanish empire finally succeeded in returning to Santa Fe in 1692, 
the strategy of colony and empire had changed fundamentally. The hated encomienda 
system was abolished; Puebloans were freed from slave-labor that kept them 
impoverished and their own milpas untended; and the cultural violence perpetrated by 
zealous missionaries was curbed so as to not alienate entire indigenous societies.50 
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! There is a problem within the historiography, however. Most literature handles the 
1680 revolt as a strictly Spanish and Puebloan event that took place wholly within the 
Middle Rio Grande Valley, but this formulation uses a geographical and political frame 
that was produced by Spanish colonists to describe a Native-produced moment. The 
fact that Spanish institutions and observers failed to anticipate or counter the 1680 
revolt suggests that the revolt has its roots in peoples and geographies that transcend 
the Middle Rio Grande Valley. Indeed, historians have recently begun to question if 
Apaches did not play a much larger role in framing, preparing, and executing the 
uprising. Apaches had much to gain from the Spanish expulsion from New Mexico 
(access to horses and guns), less to lose than Puebloans (their habitats were not the 
site of conflict), and much greater means to inflict pain (they were already mounted). 
The revolt appears to have had wide ranging implications for the uplands, strengthening 
the Apache position in ways that were not incidental. Perhaps most important, this was 
not the first revolt. Apaches and Puebloans had been conspiring for decades to kill or 
expel the Spanish, but all their pre-1680 attempts had failed. The fact that these prior 
attempts had taken place—and the nature of those earlier conspiracies—offers a picture 
of Puebloan and Apache resistance that was both systematic and deeply rooted. This 
resistance, and Apache contributions to it, expands the meaning of the revolt to include 
the edge landscapes and the peoples beyond the Rio Grande Valley, and situates it 
among broader strategies of indigenous counter-claim.51
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51 v. Carter, 184-186 for the most recent and strongest case for Apache involvement with the Pueblo 
Revolt. Carter argues that “Apaches...played central roles in Pueblo insurrections throughout the 
seventeenth century, beginning with rebellions in the Oñate era, and were vital to the success of the 1680 
uprising.” The centuries-long alliances that had bound Puebloans to Apaches before Spanish colonialism 
had not been severed with the coming of New Mexico; rather, the kinships and socio-economic linkages 
persisted and served as the basis for cooperation, often covert, and conspiracy against the Spanish.
! When Otermín finally escaped Santa Fe on August 21, 1680, he had to work 
hard to guard his nearly 1,000 wards with the few soldiers and mounts left to him. He 
set out for Isleta, 50 miles south, where he hoped to rendezvous with Alonso Garcia and 
find reinforcements. Otermín had already survived 11 days at Santa Fe while the revolt 
raged around him. He had had time while he was besieged to study the situation around 
him. Soon the governor became chagrined to learn that “Apache infidels” had worked in 
unison with Puebloans from Taos to Isleta in order to kill every Spanish colonist in New 
Mexico. But this was intelligence that Otermín was not able to elaborate upon as he was 
soon forced to flee Santa Fe when the insurgents sabotaged Santa Fe’s acequia. The 
road south was treacherous. A few days after leaving Santa Fe, Otermín ran into a 
group of mounted Natives herding a large number of animals on the opposite bank of 
the Rio Grande. When one of his soldiers approached to learn their identity, they fired 
on the soldiers with harquebuses, whereupon more mounted Natives appeared, also 
armed, and many more on foot. Otermín gave the signal and the retreat hastened 
southward, but the Spanish were harassed for several more leagues.52 
! Similar accounts of the revolt across New Mexico echo the usage of horses and 
guns by insurgents. Alcaldes (councilmen), also from Santa Fe, despaired that pueblos, 
missions, and encomiendas were all looted. These Spanish could only watch in anguish 
as valuable horses, cattle, and guns were whisked away into the steep and impassable 
mountains around. They could not imagine putting up a fight against well-armed and 
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52 Antonio de Otermín, 21 August 1680, Report of the battle wherein 300 Indians dies; of the Puebloans 
confederation with Apaches; of the total dearth of Spanish and Religious from Taos to Isleta over 51 
leagues; and the Order of the Governor to reunite with other survivors at Isleta before the next attack, 
Legajo 26, Parte 1, Historia, AGN, CSWR.
  Antonio de Otermín, 24 August 1680, Report of the Governor on the successes, injuries and deaths at 
Santo Domingo while en route south from Santa Fe, Legajo 26, Parte 1, Historia, AGN, CSWR.
positioned Apaches when all that had been left to them were skinny horses and poor 
firearms. Powerfully, these alcaldes lamented that over the course of 80 years of 
dealing with the Spanish, Apaches had become so agile on horses and well-versed in 
harquebuses that they dominate the landscape “from Veracruz to Sonora.” Hyperbole 
aside, the sentiment that their enemy was so powerful and wide-ranging is not 
surprising. Accounts like these, drawn from the immediate moment of an incredible shift 
in the geopolitics of the region, drill home the argument that Puebloans and Apaches, 
but Apaches in particular, had long been co-opting and learning Spanish technology in a 
protracted bid to make counter-claims to territory and economy. Apaches used the tools 
of empire to tighten their grip over the upland landscapes and to project their own 
political economy over the Middle Rio Grande Valley.53
! Almost a week before Otermín abandoned Santa Fe, Lieutenant Governor 
Alonso Garcia panicked at Isleta pueblo. By August 14, only four days into the revolt, he 
had received shaky intelligence that led him to suspect Otermín was already dead and 
that Santa Fe had been overrun. He immediately prepared his troops, as well as 
colonists and willing Puebloans to travel south to meet Custo Ayeta with the supply 
carts from the Holy Office. In the south, from a position of safety, Garcia hoped to 
resupply and take stock of his options. The lieutenant governor was afraid for his life, 
but that fear had less to do with possible Puebloan attack than Apachean. He knew that 
he was legally obliged to remain in New Mexico until officially ordered or relieved, but he 
did so anyway, and justified his actions by referencing Apaches as “those who give us 
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south, Legajo 26, Parte 1, Historia, AGN, CSWR.
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war.” Recent intelligence from northwards had convinced Garcia that Apaches had used 
the revolt as an opportunity to seize 150 harquebuses with enough powder and shot to 
pose a definite risk to Spanish forces. In addition to guns, Garcia reckoned that 
Apaches had enough horses and enough cattle to support a four month siege of Isleta 
pueblo, should he be trapped there.54
! So he fled, and ten days later he was not much better off. Around the Piro pueblo 
of Socorro he stopped to take stock of his situation. The refugee party felt that Apache 
eyes were on them constantly at Socorro, roaming the banks that bordered the 
Magdalena Mountains to the west and the southern tip of the Manzano Mountains to the 
northeast. Socorro would not have been a difficult place to reach for Apaches who had 
spent time in the Central Closed Basins and who had recently depopulated the Estancia 
Basin to the north. Coming from the southern Great Plains or the Pecos River basins, 
they would have encountered virtually no resistance since the Spanish were in full 
retreat. At some point, a Puebloan from Jemez, undoubtedly a prisoner, was brought 
before Alonso Garcia for interrogation. The Puebloan refused to answer questions, but 
instead sang a song about the eventual victory of the Puebloans and the slaughter of all 
the Spanish. This demonstration of indigenous pride, confidence, and disregard visibly 
shook the refugees. Instead of fearing Puebloan assault, however, the group of friars, 
women, children, and men feared Apaches most of all. As he prepared to continue the 
journey to El Paso del Norte, Alonso’s agitation took on fantastic qualities. The camino 
real was said to have shaken under the weight of mounted “infidel Indians”–the term 
used to denote Apaches. While Spanish women and children doubled over with pain 
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54 Alonso Garcia, 14 August 1680, Letter of the Maestre de Campo and Lt. Governor explaining his 
actions, Legajo 26, Parte 1, Historia, AGN, CSWR.
from hunger, the Apaches–like “demon weeds” sown into the land–seemed to sprout 
from the earth as some kind of chthonic doom.55
! This image is powerful. The idea of the earth trembling with Apaches who choke 
the land like weeds exposes the fragility of Spanish fantasies about empire and their 
own position in the ecoregion. The cumulative impact of violence and privation suffered 
during the previous eighty years, topped off by a revolt that fell like a hammer stroke, 
must have made the Spanish feel isolated and weak. Since 1672 the Spanish had been 
hemmed in from the east and the south with the taking of the Estancia Basin and the 
destruction of many Piro pueblos; now, eight years later, they were being squeezed out 
altogether. It is profound the way that Alonso’s language inverts the typical ways we 
think about European-Native relationships in the early years of contact. Instead of 
Puebloans fearing horses and scuttling away to hide or put up puerile resistance, it is 
the Spanish who feared horses and the guns, and who desperately sought refuge as 
the net seemed to close all around them. Apaches were close competitors of the 
Spanish, and they required only a small edge of revolt and displacement to level the 
playing field, or even tilt it to their favor.56 
! The usage of “demon weeds” as an analogy is also fascinating in regards to the 
evolving geopolitics of New Mexico. Catholic faith provided the Spanish with a preferred 
model for how the world would look, work, and serve them. The continual referencing of 
Apaches as infidels hints that Franciscan inability to induce these nomadic populations 
into mission lifestyles made them dangerous outsiders whose very existence, let alone 
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actions, imperiled the colony. By conferring the title of “demon” indirectly onto Apaches, 
via the analogy, Alonso empowers their presence in history by identifying them as the 
arch-foes of the Spanish, immortal and ubiquitous, evenly set against all their efforts at 
“civilization” and “faith.” The lieutenant governor was merely being flippant when he 
used the term “weeds” to describe Apaches. He was probably just trying to denigrate 
their humanity and to place them firmly outside of civilized society. Nevertheless, this 
term resonates ecologically. Given the troubled environmental base upon which the 
riparian empire had built itself, the meaning of “weeds” is doubly significant. Weeds, 
after all, are not cultivated but grow naturally over a variety of landscapes, and often 
choke out more desired flora if unchecked. As such, Garcia’s statement can be read as 
a suggestion that the sudden ascendancy of Apaches as “weeds” points to a broader 
rebuttal of Spanish environmental practices: that irrigation, agriculture, and pastoralism 
had faltered, perhaps fatally. Garcia phrasing augurs that the Apaches who inhabited 
the northern Chihuahuan Desert and the southern Great Plains would continue to 
compete ecologically, politically, and economically with Spanish designs through their 
“weed”-like influence.
! Garcia had good reason to believe that Apaches would continue to meddle and 
interfere with Spanish empire and colony. After all, they already had. Revolts and 
conspiracies had been attempted before. They had been found out and quashed just as 
the 1680 revolt itself had almost been put down. (Originally, it had been scheduled to 
commence on August 11, 1680, but Otermín had been made aware of it on August 9, so 
insurgents induced revolt the very next day.) Since at least the 1640s a pattern of 
Puebloan-Apache complicity repeatedly tried to find ways to exterminate and remove 
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the Spanish. The fact that the 1680 revolt succeeded and the previous attempts failed is 
immaterial to the observation that in every case there was Apache complicity. Whatever 
internal political and social squabbling may have occurred within the Rio Grande 
between the pueblos and the missions and presidios, it was clearly not insulated or 
hidden from the view of the larger ecoregion. Apache participation means that the 
uplands were concerned and involved in reshaping the riparian settlements to serve 
broader geopolitical ends.
! The evidence for pre-1680 attempted revolts is scattered. But as early as the 
governorship of Don Fernando de Arguéllo, in the year 1645, there had been 
conspiratorial rumblings. That year Arguéllo had whipped, buried, and hanged twenty-
nine Puebloans in the pueblo of Jemez for confederating with Apaches to target and kill 
Spanish targets. Not ten years later, in 1650, during the time of General Hernando de 
Ugarte de la Concha, there were hanged many Puebloans from Isleta, Alameda, San 
Felipe, Cochiti, and Jemez for likewise confederating with the Apaches. That plot was 
bold, and illuminating. Certain Puebloans contrived to earn the trust of Spanish 
pastoralists so that they would hand over a herd of mares for safe-keeping. The 
Puebloans were then to deliver those horses to Apaches in order to make a general 
mounted assault on the colony. But a presidial, Captain Alonso Baca, followed the 
Puebloans and found them out, thus giving the Spanish ample time to preempt the 
revolt. Sergeant Diego López de Zambrano, a contributor to this account, noted that the 
1650 conspiracy was especially dangerous because of the possible delivery of horses–
the “principal nerve of war”–to Apaches. Some time later, another conspiracy unfolded 
during the governorship of Fernando Villanueva (1665-1668), but it came to naught and 
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nine Puebloans were hanged for helping Apaches stage ambushes. They operated from 
the Magdalena Mountains (near the Piro pueblos), and killed five of the Spanish before 
they were stopped. Unfortunately, Zambrano provided no other specific information 
about this incident.57
! These conspiracies did not mature much past the planning stages, and much of 
their primary documentation was lost when Santa Fe was burned during the 1680 revolt, 
making it is impossible to accurately estimate their scope, character, and intent. 
Nevertheless, these conspiracies demonstrate a linkage between Apache and Puebloan 
resistance in seventeenth century New Mexico. The similarity between the earlier 
conspiracies and the 1680 revolt cannot be understated. Apaches, horses, and 
mountains formed a constellation of factors that were necessary to any assault on the 
Spanish position. It is likely that Puebloans would not have attempted to fight the 
Spanish if they did not have at least some guarantee from Apaches that there would be 
aid and refuge in the mountain havens that had for so long thwarted militia. Read this 
way, the fact that the Spanish were ousted for twelve years becomes almost incidental 
in light of Apaches’ extended efforts to isolate the Middle Rio Grande Valley and to 
reorient its economy towards their own geopolitical claims. Such was ostensibly the 
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point in 1645 and 1650, and during Villanueva’s tenure, and such was the still the point 
in 1680.  
! When Otermín labored up the camino real late in 1681 he was trying to 
reintegrate a a lost province that was built upon a geopolitical fantasy. New Mexico 
represented over eighty years of colonial investment, and the Spanish were loathe to 
imagine that their mission churches, proselytized Puebloans, and all their irrigated 
milpas and herds were lost forever. But when Otermín made his doomed entrada, he 
modeled it on the entradas that had preceded him by exactly 100 years. Of course, the 
Rodriguez-Chamuscado party had included only 12 men, whereas Otermín had nearly 
300, but traveling over landscapes that offered only marginal resources with large 
retinues was hardly an innovation. The character of Otermín’s entrada demonstrates 
that the Spanish had learned almost nothing from 100 years of exploration and 82 years 
of colony of the ecological and geopolitical realities that permeated the northern 
Chihuahuan Desert and the Middle Rio Grande Valley. Early Spanish invaders had 
perceived the desert and the valley as two distinct landscapes that could be divorced 
and engaged individually, when in fact the entire area had long since functioned as one 
edge landscape of engagement and exchange. But Spanish missionaries and vecinos 
were singularly interested in investing in those areas where they could convert 
sedentary peoples to Catholicism, and practice acequia agriculture and pastoralism 
simultaneously–the Middle Rio Grande Valley. Their focus on riparian landscapes 
produced a riparian empire–an anomalous construct that did not fit the indigenous world 
into which it was dropped. The consequences of this fantasy were manifold and severe. 
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The revolt of 1680 was only the clearest indication of the political and economic price 
that the Spanish were constantly paying.
! The world beyond the Middle Rio Grande Valley, although implicitly shunned by 
Spanish disinterest, would not be ignored and it frequently bumped into the economies 
and societies of the Rio Grande. These ‘bumps’ came, periodically, in the form of trade 
fairs involving plains groups, or they came, more frequently, by way of raids that 
emanated from the many mountain ranges that bordered and defined the Rio Grande 
Basin. The Spanish were at a loss to respond to challenges to their vision of geopolitical 
landscape. The colonizers had put their full faith in the perceived fecundity of the Rio 
Grande watershed as a source of water that would allow them to sow crops, raise 
livestock, and become economically self-sufficient. The Middle Rio Grande Valley, 
however, carried many features of the arid Chihuahuan Desert, and the Spanish quickly 
realized that they were dependent on a watershed that was more frequently mired in 
drought than not. Still, these grave miscalculations about the ecological profile of the 
area went uncorrected for as long as Spanish New Mexico existed, with the result that 
powerful asymmetries found their way into the basic architecture of the empire. These 
asymmetries, in turn, produced opportunities for Apaches, specifically Faraon Apaches, 
to exploit Spanish empire and to seize upon the tools of empire at an early date.
! As the seventeenth century came to a close and the eighteenth approached, the 
Spanish were consumed with the question of their failure in 1680 and with the riddle of 
how to regain their lost province. Apaches meanwhile continued to use the northern 
Chihuahuan Desert and its edge landscapes as a place to experiment economically and 
to create new sense of geopolitics and territoriality. Faraones had seen in New Mexico 
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an extension of European imperial economy that was weak, and that was vulnerable to 
indigenous counter-claims. They seized the moment and initiated a set of processes 
that would soon carry them deeper into the Chihuahuan Desert, closer to New Spain, 
and nearer to a redoubtable Apachería.
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Chapter 2  
Invasion: Faraon Reconquista and Spanish Interregnum Reinterpreted
! Antonio Otermín sat inside a small adobe room within the battered pueblo of 
Isleta. He was far from the governor’s residence in Santa Fe–his ultimate destination–
and he knew that he would not get there. It was late December of 1681 and the first 
serious frosts of winter picked at the landscape. Otermín must have been annoyed and, 
almost certainly, miserable. In August of the previous year Puebloans across the Middle 
Rio Grande Valley had united and made a spectacular surprise attack on the Spanish, 
forcing them to flee south to El Paso del Norte. Humiliated and furious, Otermín had 
lobbied the viceregal court for guns and supplies and, having got them, began his 
attempted reconquista of New Mexico in November of 1681. Success and victory, 
however, never materialized, and Puebloans were only slightly less indignant towards 
the Spanish as they were in August of 1680. His entrada had already come apart at the 
seams. Hunkered down fifteen miles south of present-day Albuquerque, Otermín could 
only look northward wistfully. In a tepid attempt to save face, he abandoned the original 
mandate of the entrada and used his time at Isleta to interrogate Puebloans for fresh 
intelligence, perhaps hoping to gain information for a future entrada. In addition, he sent 
Maestre de Campo (Field Marshall) Juan Domínguez de Mendoza out on a misguided 
campaign north into the Middle Rio Grande Valley, but that failed as well. Soon 
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Dominguez returned and there was no one left to interrogate, and so he turned back 
south, back to the refugee camp that was El Paso–empty-handed. 
! Otermín soon came to the northern edge of the Jornada del Muerto. He departed 
from the ruined pueblo of Senecu on January 19, 1682, but he was no more the master 
of the Jornada than he had been two months earlier. For days he lumbered with his 
carts and struggled with buckled loads that became mired in snow. His party found little 
surface water for two weeks (typically, precipitation at this time and place equaled less 
than a third of an inch). Instead, man and beast scrounged the ground for snow to melt. 
Thirty-seven pack-mules and seven soldiers’ horses went lame because of the loads 
that they bore during this punishing time of year. Daytime temperatures probably 
reached no higher than the low 50s, Fahrenheit, while at night temperatures fell into the 
20s or the 10s. Whatever pasturage there was would have been buried underneath this 
snow and required time and work to dig out. And even if they managed to find feed for 
the horses, these grasses were dormant, and protein and minerals were lacking. 
Spanish travelers typically tried to take no more than 24 hours to cross the Jornada del 
Muerto, but Otermín took much longer. For over two weeks he journeyed across the 
waterless and treeless plain until, on February 4, he emerged and started for the 
Órganos Mountains (located just north of present day Las Cruces, New Mexico).1 
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carts traveled an average of 12 miles a day on the camino real. That it took Otermín 14 days to make the 
90 miles meant that he was traveling much more slowly, at about 6.5 miles per day, over a stretch that 
most Spanish spurred their animals to cross in 48 hours. 
! Otermín left the main body of his expedition to investigate the Órganos. He 
needed to find fuelwood to alleviate the hypothermic condition of his men and animals. 
The snow covered plain of the Jornada del Muerto had offered nothing to the 
expedition, and over those two weeks they must have depleted their own stores while 
they tried to stay warm in the sub-freezing temperatures. But he also planned to search 
the Órganos for timber that would serve as building material at El Paso del Norte. The 
entrada a failure, Otermín must have sensed that the Spanish presence at El Paso del 
Norte would last much longer than he had reckoned, and that it was prudent to begin 
scouting for resources that would make El Paso more sustainable. But disappointment 
heaped upon disappointment, and he spent only three days in the mountains before 
returning to his expedition with news that only a few pines, almost certainly Ponderosa 
Pine, were on those rugged slopes, nearly inaccessible and inadequate anyway for 
Spanish purposes.2 
! Otermín resumed his march but almost immediately had to pause near a place 
called Estero Largo (near present-day Las Cruces). His animals were fatigued and 
could travel no further. It was probably just as well since he needed to await the coming 
of five carts and seventeen cattle that he had left straggling along the path coming out 
of the Jornada. The waters of the Rio Grande were again within sight, and the refuge of 
El Paso del Norte lay close at hand. During this intermission, Otermín might have 
pondered how he would form his report for the viceroy and the junta general (the 
viceregal court). “New Mexico” was no more in Spanish hands after the 1681 entrada 
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finding nothing good, Legajo 26, Parte 3, Historia, AGN, CSWR.
than it was on August 11, 1680. Suddenly a rider appeared on the frozen horizon, 
coming towards them at a gallop. This lone horseman was no raider, however, but a 
messenger who soon arrived in the camp. Dutifully, he delivered news from the royal 
settlement of San Lorenzo, where most of the Spanish survivors were concentrated, 
about 32 miles south of El Paso del Norte. Dated January 3, 1682, fray Nicolas Hurtado 
wanted Otermín to know that Apaches had come while the governor was away, and that 
they had taken 200 animals from the refugees.3 
! Before Otermín could rush back to San Lorenzo to launch missives to Mexico 
City for more supplies and men enough for a presidio, he most likely had another 
thought: the Órganos. The Órganos Mountains, standing almost as a turret over the 
southern access point of the Jornada del Muerto and the northern Chihuahuan Desert 
generally, held much more than just pine trees. Although Otermín had not found the 
wood and timber he sought, a cave set into the mountain caught his eye. He 
approached cautiously. Though abandoned, the governor found recently snuffed 
campfires across the floor. Evidence of rancherias appeared everywhere around the 
Spanish, doubtlessly alerting them to their danger. The guides confirmed what Otermín 
had suspected upon setting out for the mountain: Apaches had been there, and 
recently–perhaps the very same ones who had raided El Paso del Norte. It seems 
Otermín had just missed them.
! This final detail about Otermín entrada and the events at San Lorenzo suggests 
that Apaches were present south of the Jornada del Muerto and down around El Paso 
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del Norte. Apache activity like this was unheard of before 1680, and so its occurrence 
so close on the heals of the Pueblo Revolt raises important questions:  How did 
Apaches insert themselves into a new geopolitical setting so far from Rio Grande Valley 
places, like Pecos and Taos pueblos? Why had Apaches bothered to follow the 
Spanish? If the point of the 1680 revolt had been to punish the Spanish, or to expel 
them from Middle Rio Grande Valley, then had success not already been attained? 
Finally, what does it mean that Apaches migrated south and continued their raiding 
campaigns of the seventeenth century? The entire sequence of events had a cryptic 
and mysterious air about it. Otermín had not been at San Lorenzo on January 3 to 
witness the raid on cattle, nor did he cross paths with the dwellers of the Órganos 
mountains. Yet the episode was also deeply familiar:  Raiders had appeared from 
nearby mountain heights, struck haciendas and ranchos quickly, and withdrew to those 
same montane havens before a Spanish counter-attack could be mounted. This event 
could just as easily have occurred at Santa Fe or Santo Domingo pueblo instead of San 
Lorenzo. Although the Spanish had fled New Mexico to escape indigenous violence, 
certain elements haunted them.
! Still, this detail of Apache presence around El Paso–so soon after the 1680 
revolt–has not received extensive treatment in scholarship. Instead, historians have 
tended to analyze other important topics, such as the Spanish-Puebloan dynamic within 
the shifting balance of power between secular and religious authority. As the Spanish 
learned more and more about the 1680 revolt, consensus quickly formed that 
antagonisms perpetrated by zealous friars upon Puebloan religiosity must shoulder a 
hefty portion of blame for creating the crisis. Encomiendas and the abusive labor 
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practices that often prevailed on them also came under fire as a cause of the revolt, but 
that problem was handily solved by simply outlawing what had become a feudal 
practice. Arguments like these make valuable contributions:  they track the changing 
relationship that colonizers formed with the colonized in the Middle Rio Grande Valley 
and mark off a defining moment in the way that the Spanish altered the ways in which 
they imagine empire. Because of them, we have better understanding of how 
Puebloans and the Spanish alike adjusted their expectations of the colonial encounter 
and entered into new, if still asymmetrical, systems of reciprocity as the eighteenth 
century approached. Two of the shortcomings of this approach, however, are that only a 
few moments of the interregnum receive analysis (the beginning and end), and–even 
though the Spanish had just transitioned to an entirely new landscape at El Paso–the 
geographical focus remains fixed on the Middle Rio Grande Valley.4
! What happens if we take a deeper look at what was happening around El Paso 
during the interregnum? If we linger a bit longer at places like the Órganos Mountains, 
the Hueco Basin (the basin that houses El Paso), and the Rio Grande downriver from 
the refugee Spanish, then another narrative begins to emerge. It is a narrative that 
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complements and enriches analyses of Spanish-Puebloan dynamics by highlighting the 
importance of the interregnum for Apaches, who were then still vigorously exploring the 
best ways to negotiate the colonial encounter. Those twelve years, it turns out, reflected 
a period of Spanish declension at the same time that it signaled the ascendancy of 
Apache power throughout the Trans-Pecos, the northernmost ecoregion of the 
Chihuahuan Desert. Until 1680, Apaches had exploited the ecologically inferior position 
of the Spanish riparian empire from upland places that they had called home for 
decades, if not centuries. After the revolt, it appears that they did something entirely 
new:  they capitalized on the interregnum to begin reconnoitering and counter-
discovering the Chihuahuan Desert, reversing the directionally of empire. The years 
1680 to 1692 represent the beginnings of Apachería, that Apache-produced territory that 
existed where xeric ecology and creative indigenous adaptability intersected.5!
! Reports from captured or errant Puebloans during Otermín’s interrogations of 
1681 paint a picture of aggressive Apache exploitation. Immediately following the 1680 
revolt, Faraones intensively raided Piro and Tompiro pueblos, just north of the Jornada 
del Muerto. These pueblos had already been sacked in the early 1670s by Apaches, 
and their worth as raiding targets could not have been great. Nevertheless, Faraones 
would have had political and geographical reasons to raze as much of them as they 
110
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could. Historically, Piro and Tompiro pueblos had cooperated closely with the Spanish. 
During the worst days of the rebellion, for example, when Lieutenant Governor Alonso 
Garcia fled south with a mob of colonists, these pueblos had sheltered them for a few 
days while they gathered the strength to press on. Geographically, these pueblos were 
closest to the Spanish at El Paso, and thus were the nearest places where the Spanish 
might re-invade and gain a fresh foothold to the valley. Faraones wiped these places 
and, in the process, assured that an attempt at Spanish re-entry would be vastly more 
difficult. In addition, they reestablished trading relationships among the northern Tiwas, 
most notably those around Taos pueblo, and the Towas, around Jemez and Pecos 
pueblos. In the years before 1680 trade had been restricted by a complex maze of laws 
and regulations issued by Spanish secular authorities; with the Spanish gone, 
indigenous peoples could reform markets that were defined by their own cultural mores. 
In this economic revitalization, Faraones joined the Jicarillas, their Athapaskan-speaking 
kin, who dwelled north and east of Taos into present-day central Colorado.6 
111
6 v. Harry W. Basehart, Apache Indians XII: Mescalero Apache Subsistence Patterns and Socio-Political 
Organization (New York: Garland Publishing, 1974): 93-96 for overview on the importance of a raiding 
economy to Faraones. 
   Forbes (1960), 164, 188-190.
Map 7: The Jornada del Muerto and Location of Piro and Tompiro Pueblos.
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.
! Meanwhile, the fragile inter-pueblo cooperation that had made the revolt feasible 
quickly unraveled.The nominal leader, Popé, soon became despotic and was deposed 
and killed. In his place two leaders arose, Tupatú and Alonso Catití, although Tupatú 
seemed to enjoy slightly greater authority. This change in leadership, however, could not 
allay the effects of a severe drought that struck in 1681 and lasted until 1686. The fields 
and herds of pueblos diminished and people began to starve. Normally, pueblos held 
stores of food as a safeguard against eventualities such as this drought, but the valley 
had for years been operating at a deficit where encomenderos and friars took far more 
than Puebloans could produce. As grains harvests fell, Apache-Puebloan trade fairs 
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suffered, and these two groups began to turn on each other in their efforts to find 
enough material to support the societies and economies that they had developed while 
the mission supply service still ran.7  
! By 1681, then, long-term drought had made the effects of the violent rebellion 
painfully felt across the valley. Faraon raiding along Piro and Tompiro places had further 
reduced the number of sites that might produce grains or raise livestock. Yet it was 
Otermín’s entrada, ironically, that most likely tipped the region into ruin and invited 
Faraones, in a way, farther into the Trans-Pecos. During the governor’s marches along 
the Rio Grande pueblos, he had ordered the destruction of all stores of maize, so that 
rebels and Apaches could not use them. Otermín ecologically and economically 
damaged the Middle Rio Grande Valley. Faraones watched this happen, and then they 
watched Otermín return south. They followed him back to fresh colonial settlements like 
El Paso del Norte or Casas Grandes, where Spanish materials and livestock could be 
found aplenty.8
! Otermín’s entrada northward in 1681 reads like a catalogue of desertion and 
ruination, but it also provides the first post-1680 clues that Faraones were counter-
invading territory south of their usual habitat in the southern Great Plains. Just before 
the crush of winter, in late November, Otermín exited the Jornada del Muerto to reach 
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the Piro pueblo of Senecu, located on the western side of the Rio Grande. He found it 
ruined and littered with corpses–at least some appeared mutilated. He surveyed the 
wreckage of the church, noted the desecration of the host and the structure, and then 
he ordered the march to resume. Before long he encountered similar conditions at the 
now-ruined pueblos of San Pasqual, Socorro, Alamillo, and Sevilleta. He was forced to 
seek shelter in these ruined pueblos, where he and his men were surrounded by horse 
tracks that were rumored to belong to Apaches. The hoof-prints were fresh and served 
as a constant reminder to the Spanish that there were never alone, and that their 
mounted adversaries watched them from nearby. Only when he drew near to the pueblo 
of Isleta on December 5 did he find signs of life. Warily, Otermín divided seventy men 
into four squadrons and approached the pueblo at dawn. Their harquebuses were 
loaded, cocked, and ready to fire. The Spanish were unused to a leveled playing field, 
and Otermín’s abundance of caution is telling. From the time of Oñate until 1680 the 
Spanish had come and gone from pueblos with impunity, and without fear of assault. 
But the geopolitical landscape had convulsed in the past fifteen months, and fear and 
doubt now nettled their confidence. Otermín was reluctant to approach what might be 
an ad hoc Apache campsite, or more rebel Puebloans.9 
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! His forces fanned out and blockaded the pueblo, covering the routes to the 
uplands as well as up and down the river. When the light of dawn began to reveal the 
world beyond the pueblo’s walls, the Isletans inside gave a cry and unleashed a volley 
of arrows. None of the shafts pierced the Spanish and, seemingly in the next breath, the 
besieged recognized the Spanish, checked their fire, and welcomed them. The governor 
of New Mexico was understandably irritated at being attacked and demanded answers 
once inside the pueblo. Isletan leaders immediately apologized for making an attack on 
Otermín, and excused themselves by claiming, suspiciously, that they had mistaken the 
Spanish for Apache raiders. The Spanish soon understood that Faraones had been 
particularly active around the pueblo recently and had menaced its people on numerous 
occasions. Otermín believed, them, but just to be sure he relieved the Puebloans of 
their bows and arrows. This event occurred quickly–in the space of minutes–and one 
gets the sense that disaster was only narrowly averted. If we clear away the 
misidentification and the hastiness, and elaborate on the factors that motivated Isletans, 
then what insights can we gain about Faraones and the changes in the geopolitical 
landscape?10
! The first clue came as soon as Otermín and Ayeta entered Isleta. To their horror, 
they discovered that the pueblo had been sheltering its cattle in the ruins of a mission 
church. The Spanish rebuked the Isletans severely for this practice, as it was a gross 
sacrilege to their Catholic faith. Indeed, it seems strange that Isletans would repurpose 
the church as a make-shift corral given the fact that the pueblo sat on the western bank 
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of the Rio Grande, where pasturage should have been plentiful. Bouteloua eriopoda and 
Bouteloua gracilis would have grown in the uplands, above the floodplain, while along 
the riparian sections desert saltgrass (Distichlis spicata) would have thrived. As its name 
implies, saltgrass is a grass species that is suited to the increased alkalinity that is often 
found along rivers such as the Rio Grande. Alkaline conditions prevailed wherever the 
river rose above its banks and then receded; after the flood waters evaporated or 
percolated sodium remained that eventually formed a share of the soil profile. Typical 
grama grasses would have withered there, but not saltgrass. This is an unlikely 
explanation, however. Desert grasses are known for being drought-tolerant and that 
Isletans almost certainly did not possess enough cattle to overgraze anyway. Rather, 
the most likely reason for keeping cattle in the church had geopolitical, not ecological, 
roots.11 
! Francisco de Ayeta caught a glimpse of that geopolitical causality. Sensing the 
impending failure of the entrada, he began interviewing Isletans and gathering 
intelligence late in December of 1681. He knew that the viceroyalty would be furious 
that Otermín had met with disaster considering the expense on supplies and men, and 
that the court would demand an explanation. Ayeta found that most people across the 
Middle Rio Grande Valley regretted the revolt, but not out of love or fealty towards the 
Spanish. Puebloans still remembered well abuses at the hands of encomenderos and 
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vicious individuals like Maestre de Campo Francisco Xavier. (Ironically, Xavier was then 
at Isleta and it was to him that Ayeta dictated his thoughts. His presence aggravated 
Isletans greatly.) Puebloans rather expressed that they regretted the revolt because 
newly armed and mounted Apaches were in the habit of surrounding them and enacting 
“atrocities” and “maladies” upon them. The Spanish had been a buffer against these 
kinds of attacks, but now pueblos like Isleta were naked in their defense. It must have 
hurt Ayeta’s pride to hear that most Puebloans still preferred that the Spanish stay 
expelled, even if Apaches sometimes treated them like slaves and took women and 
children at will.12
! Perhaps it was pride, and disbelief in Spanish inequity, that led Francisco Ayeta 
to dismiss many of these reports. He believed that this pandemic fear of Apaches was a 
smokescreen, merely designed to be exculpatory of Puebloan reluctance to be rid of 
whatever biblical demon must have possessed them to become apostate. He took as 
evidence the recalcitrance of nearby pueblos to treat with Otermín. Puebloans north of 
Isleta had declined Otermín’s invitations and instead opted to take refuge in the nearby 
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mountains, despite freezing winter temperatures and heavy snow. Ayeta missed the 
mark. His fixation on phantoms, biblical causation, and the Puebloan-Spanish dynamic 
kept him from interrogating broader regional trends. In his haste to displace blame for 
the failure to retake New Mexico, Ayeta failed to assess the complex political landscape 
into which the pueblo world had emerged. Instead of seeing a complicated matrix where 
Puebloan factions, divergent Spanish interests, and Apachean expansion twisted and 
contorted against one another as so many causalities, Ayeta saw little more than the 
Spanish-Puebloan binary. It would take two more years, until Maestre de Campo 
Dominguez led an expedition into present-day west and central Texas, in 1683, for the 
Spanish to comprehend the divided world of the pueblos, where linguistics, culture, and 
geography created divisions that superseded the political fiction inherent in Spanish 
categories of ‘apostasy’ and ‘province.’13
! Fortunately, we do not have to skip ahead two years to find evidence of 
geopolitical change. The very next day, less than twenty-four hours after Ayeta had 
officially blamed demons for Puebloan behavior, an Isletan named Juan de la Cruz, 
well-versed in the Castilian language, rushed to Otermín with news. During the previous 
night, unknown to the Spanish, the pueblo of Alameda had been surrounded by fifty 
Natives on horseback who harangued them for cooperating with the Spanish, and who 
had threatened to kill the women and children of the pueblo. Otermín immediately 
dispatched twenty men to ride to Alameda and to assess the situation. They reported 
back that the enemy escaped as they drew near the besieged pueblo and that they had 
evacuated the settlement and brought the people of Alameda to Isleta. De la Cruz 
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stayed behind with Otermín as an informant, and handed the governor an advantage 
when he pointed out a rebel Indian already at Isleta pueblo, the curandero Pedro 
Naranjo. Naranjo was brought before Otermín and questioned about the nature of the 
rebels and their future plans. The curandero warned the Spanish that rebels from Taos 
planned to launch an attack on Isleta pueblo soon. The Tiwa and Tewa apostates 
intended to kill the men and the elderly, and to sell the women and children to Apaches. 
The plan to surrender so many people to Faraones was part of a larger plan to mollify 
Apaches for the losses that they had suffered in their wars with the Spanish, and also to 
cement their friendship.14
! It is impossible to know if the armed riders around Alameda pueblo, scarcely 25 
miles north of Isleta, were Apaches or if they were Puebloan rebels. But this ambiguity 
really does not matter because, regardless of the identification, it appears that the 
demands of Apaches or the potential threat of their raiding determined choices over 
what to do, and to whom, in the Middle Rio Grande Valley. If the riders around Alameda 
were Apaches, then the reason for keeping cattle in the church at Isleta and for 
mistaking Otermín’s party as Apaches reflects the palpable fear wrought by Faraones. It 
would mean that Apaches were trimming and constricting the southward reaches of the 
pueblo world in order to keep the Spanish out and to consolidate their access not only 
to Puebloan goods and wares, but also to Puebloan bodies and labor. Even if the riders 
around Alameda had actually been northern Tiwas or another group of Puebloan rebels, 
de la Cruz’s and Naranjo’s testimonies indicate that their choices were circumscribed by 
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the imperatives of an Apachean political economy. Naranjo’s account delineates the 
limitations of autonomy for the Puebloans:  though they may ride horses and attack and 
pillage, it was key for them to trade some of the most valuable plunder–people–with 
Apaches in order to win their friendship and to “repay” them for the dead that they 
suffered during the revolt and the years leading up to it. This word choice, recompensa 
in the original Spanish, is important. It carries the sense that Puebloans were, at best, 
engaged in reciprocity with Apaches or were, at worst, subordinate to them. Either way 
the identity of the fifty riders around Alameda is formulated, Apaches emerge as 
irresistible players in the Middle Rio Grande Valley.15 
!
! When Fray Nicolas Hurtado wrote Maestre de Campo Francisco Xavier on 
January 3, 1682, it was to inform him that Apaches had penetrated the El Paso del 
Norte area while he was away, and that they had taken about 200 animals. The raiders 
had likely taken advantage of the fact that El Paso was not a single settlement that 
could be easily defended by refugee militia. One villa, one presidio (yet to be built), 
three missions, and three pueblos comprised El Paso del Norte and were spread out 
leagues from one another. These places were grouped into the Hueco Basin that 
stretches from present-day Las Cruces, New Mexico downriver on the Rio Grande to 
present-day Fabens, Texas, about thirty miles southeast of El Paso. The basin is 
bordered on the north by the Órganos Mountains; east by the Hueco Mountains; on the 
west by the Potrillo Mountains; and on the south by the Sierra de Guadalupe. This was 
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an arid basin that has historically received less than ten inches of rain per year. During 
these early years of Spanish investment, from 1680 to 1684, the area was gripped by 
drought similar to the one Middle Rio Grande Puebloans suffered through. Ironically, the  
recent Apache raid had targeted a new pueblo named Isleta del Sur–Isleta of the 
South–the refugee counterpart to the New Mexico pueblo where Otermín was then 
positioned. But whereas Otermín’s entrada had only confirmed what the Spanish 
already suspected about Apache and rebel Puebloan depredations in the Middle Rio 
Grande Valley, Hurtado’s letter came as more of a shock. It revealed that the Spanish 
were not alone in the Hueco Basin–Faraones had followed them. Soon, attacks and 
thefts like the one at Isleta del Sur would soon become commonplace. These raids 
came as unwelcome reminders of what the final years in New Mexico had been like, 
and they would destabilize the settlements of El Paso del Norte while they were still in 
their infancy. The question left for the Spanish was why had Faraones come over 300 
miles south from Pecos pueblo, and to what end?16 
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Map 8: The Hueco Basin and its Mountain Borders.
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! By March Otermín had arrived back at San Lorenzo, and to a camp that was 
worse off than when he left it in November, owing to the loss of cattle. Supplies were 
dangerously low. To make matters worse, Otermín returned to El Paso with more than 
he left. About 385 Puebloans from Isleta and Alameda came with him, and they too 
needed immediate food and shelter. The 1681 entrada that was purposed to retake New 
Mexico had instead placed an even heavier strain on resources. The surviving member 
of the Santa Fe cabildo and other vecinos balked at the entrada’s failure, the loss of 
cattle, and the arrival of so many more mouths to feed. The former cabildo members 
wasted no time in initiating proceeding that would allow them to abandon El Paso and to 
retreat into Nueva Vizcaya, leaving New Mexico behind as a discarded idea. They were 
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prepared to quit. As the powder-keg beneath his feet rumbled, Otermín took the drastic 
step of publishing a bando (writ) stipulating that anyone caught leaving El Paso without 
his permission would be executed as a traitor to king and country. The disgraced 
governor was making enemies faster than he could defeat them, and starving all the 
while.17 
! In fact, food soon became a more pressing cause for alarm than the threat of 
raids. The prospect of physical violence seemed always to hang on the horizon like a 
fist, but famine’s teeth were already sinking in at home. The Spanish and Puebloans 
could not sufficiently acquire or produce enough basic carbohydrates and proteins to 
stay nourished. Otermín took additional steps to temper the frustration of his 
countrymen and to alleviate their hunger by seizing some private property of the 
wealthier refugees. On March 7, the same day that he issued his bando, he issued an 
emergency executive order that appropriated some of the cattle of vecino Jidoris Alonso 
del Rio La Ignacio. This solution was a short-term fix at best. Otermín and everyone 
else must have known that cannibalizing existing resources instead of producing new 
ones was a game that could only be played briefly. The Spanish had yet to devote the 
time and resources to the establishment of infrastructure. There existed at this time no 
means for collecting and storing monsoon rainfall, or diverting river flow in acequias. 
Importing food was not an easy alternative, either. Since December, the number of draft 
animals had declined so precipitously that it became, physically, impossible to fetch 
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grain and meat over the 375 miles of harried camino real. Even if Apaches had left 
enough oxen and mules for the refugees, there was also a dangerous shortage of 
carts–most had been lost in the winter-time travel of the 1681-1682 entrada. Otermín 
tasked his Secretary of War and Governance, Francisco Xavier, with begging around 
Nueva Vizcaya for enough carts so that their few mules could at least attempt to bring 
food. The governor armed Xavier with the promise that any lent carts would be returned 
in April of 1683–provided they could be successfully guarded. Faraones, probably 
unintentionally, had precipitated a food crisis at El Paso that distracted Otermín from the 
task of waging war or mounting resistance.18
! At the same time that the governor admitted that the refugees could barely meet 
their subsistence needs, he also confessed to the viceregal court that he had been 
unsuccessful in finding a satisfactory site for a presidio. Earlier in 1681, Otermín had 
received permission to establish a garrison at El Paso del Norte and was guaranteed 
that it would be staffed by fifty soldiers who would offer protection for the pueblos, 
haciendas, and ranchos. Otermín had been remiss in establishing this presidio, 
however, probably because he had high hopes for his forthcoming entrada. 
Subsequently, when Otermín began to search for a suitable spot in earnest, he found 
that he faced formidable environmental obstacles. Seasonal flooding of the Rio Grande 
was violent, and regularly gushed with enough force to destroy crops and nearby 
buildings. Sometimes, in major floods, the river jumped its banks altogether and shifted 
into another bed, in a process known as avulsion (though this was less common around 
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El Paso). Without an effective means of water control and acequia-structure, any plans 
for sowing subsistence crops or erecting an earthen fort were dead on arrival. But 
Faraon depredations necessitated that there be a presidio and that fields and settlement 
be clustered around it, lest crops and livestock vanish into the Trans-Pecos. For now, 
however, Otermín could only watch as vecinos instead fanned out across the basin to 
find arable land. Although the flood plain and the quality of the soil demanded that 
settlements be widely dispersed, the geopolitical reality of an expanding Apachería 
meant that a thinly distributed population was dangerously exposed. Finding the 
balance between ecological stricture and Faraon pressure would have to await 
Otermín’s successors.19
! We should not over-focus on El Paso del Norte, however; Faraones certainly did 
not. Soon after Otermín’s arrival in the Hueco Bolsón, Spanish reports began to trickle, 
then stream, in that Faraones had added other sites to their repertoire of targets farther 
down and along the Camino Real de Tierra Adentro. Three vecinos from Casas 
Grandes, a Nueva Vizcayan settlement about 140 miles southwest of El Paso, relayed 
that raiding was taking part all over the northern borderlands of New Spain. Or, to 
categorize the space from the perspective of Athapaskan-speakers: the expanding 
southern edge of Apachería. While Otermín and the viceregal court were still taking 
stock of how to reclaim old territory to the north, Apaches had attacked to the south. 
Raiders killed a small number of herders and took nearly every horse and cow that 
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belonged to the area. The exact number of livestock taken was not recorded but the 
haul was large enough to be distributed amongst the eighty-odd Athapaskan rancherias 
that were believed to dot the horizon. At first the Casas Grandes vecinos did not know 
what hit them. Clues as to the specific identity of the raiders finally came from Janos 
Indians in the area who had witnessed that assault and who had managed to capture a 
few raiders. Under interrogation the invaders spoke an Athapaskan language, and 
revealed that they were from hundreds of leagues to the north. They had traveled at 
speed by horse and were using the Florido and Gila Mountains as bases. Eventually 
these newcomers and their successor kin would become known as Gileño Apaches, but 
for now they were still Faraones from the Middle Rio Grande Valley and the southern 
Great Plains.20
! Otermín could do little. His tenure as governor of a province that nearly ceased to 
exist was coming to a close. Under different circumstances he might have understood 
his enemy better, learned more about his complicated environment, and figured out a 
way to fit the idea of New Spain into the xeric reality all around him. But he was oriented 
towards a different time and place. Otermín’s time in New Mexico reflected the end of 
that period during which Church-State conflict hoarded Spanish attention, and 
prevented a thorough understanding of the landscapes beyond the riparian. In a time 
when the world outside the Middle Rio Grande Valley was exploding, Otermín, in a way, 
never left the idea of the governor’s residence in Santa Fe. True, he identified Apaches 
as enemy number one and saw them everywhere he looked, but he failed to attach 
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enough significance to the fact that Apaches who had been known to ride one hundred 
leagues by horse to attack and sack the Tompiro pueblos of New Mexico were now 
riding two or three hundred leagues for the same purpose. As Otermín’s successors 
prepared to reform and adapt to new geopolitical demands, Faraones continued their 
practices: they counter-explored and raided Spanish imperial places, and slowly choked 
off colonists’ access to animal, mineral, and plant resources. 
! Puebloans of the Middle Rio Grande Valley could have told anyone that during 
the seventeenth century–and probably earlier– Faraones were not part of a simplistic 
binary, a Native versus European battle. Apaches targeted non-Athapaskan indigenes 
just as often as they targeted the Spanish. Of course, Apaches had allies–like those in 
Pecos pueblo and at Taos–but even friendly status was not an absolute immunity from 
raiding. From Oñate through the 1680s the Spanish documented the attacks by 
Apaches on pueblos and mission alike in the regions of the Middle Rio Grande Valley. It 
appeared as if Apaches capitalized on the tumult of the colonial encounter to reimagine 
all of their relationships and how they could best navigate and access new economies, 
and how to best dodge new stressors. This process of counter-discovery never ceased. 
Soon after 1680, the Spanish began to document raids in the Hueco Basin and its 
environs and the neighborhood around Casas Grandes, near present-day Nuevo Casas 
Grandes, Chihuahua. By 1683, it also became glaringly clear that that Faraones were 
also making aggressive inroads far to the east of the Spanish, to the Pecos River and 
beyond, among Native groups with whom the Spanish had little to no experience. We 
know now what the Spanish could not have known then: Faraones had begun the long 
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and hard work of reorganizing a seminal region of the northern Chihuahuan Desert:  the 
Trans-Pecos.21 
! Juan de Sabeata arrived at San Lorenzo from La Junta de los Ríos on August 11, 
1683 with eleven other Jumano leaders. A native of New Mexico, born in the Tompiro 
pueblo of Las Humanas, but long exiled from that place, Sabeata came to El Paso to 
ask for help from the Spanish. Apaches, it seems, had overrun their territory around the 
confluence of the Rio Conchos and the Rio Grande, and were then harrying their people 
from all sides. Otermín empathized with Jumano starvation at the hands of Apache 
raids, but he was disinclined to pledge aid given his own impoverished situation. 
Jumano leaders, in a gesture towards reciprocity, then presented ten vecinos whom had 
been rescued from New Mexico during the preceding three years. These people had, 
ostensibly, been captives and were held at the pleasure of Puebloans or Apaches. 
Jumanos made a calculated plea that was designed to entice the Spanish into a 
partnership that would see liberated more of their kinsmen (Jumano and Spanish alike) 
who were being held throughout the Middle Rio Grande Valley and the Trans-Pecos. 
Sensing that Otermín was still reluctant, the captains dangled in front of the Spanish 
governor the prospect of establishing new missions among the Julimes, a people who 
were settled in pueblos at La Junta. Shrewd and determined, these Jumanos invited the 
Spanish to settle in their territory by promising conditions similar to those of the Middle 
Rio Grande Valley Puebloans.22
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! Jumanos had long been known as preeminent traders who operated a trade 
network that reached from the headwaters of the Pecos River to La Junta, and whose 
rancherias dotted the Trans-Pecos. They were producers, warehousers, and traveling 
traders of everything from pelts to acorns and nuts, serving lands as far east as the 
Mississippi and as far south as the Rio Grande Valley at the Gulf of Mexico. Into Oñate’s 
time they were still in control of the Trans-Pecos and its northern boundaries, but almost 
immediately began to bleed territory when Faraones began to turn the tools of empire 
against neighboring indigenes. Most Jumanos became refugees from the Great Plains, 
and subsequently permitted Franciscan missionaries to relocate them to the Tompiro 
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pueblos by the late 1620s and 1630s. Others, also fleeing the Apache advance, found 
their way to the early, and abortive, efforts at missions around what would become El 
Paso in the 1650s. During the seventeenth century theirs was a story of declension:  
their homes in the Tompiro pueblos had been wiped out by Apaches by the 1670s, 
sending survivors to La Junta. Now that La Junta de los Ríos was under attack, 
Jumanos again tried a defensive pact with the Spanish. Sabeata’s pitch reflects the 
Jumano feeling that their world was shrinking dangerously fast, and to just a few spots 
along the lower reaches of the Rio Grande.23
! Ultimately, Otermín disappointed them when he replied that any action would 
have to await the new governor, don Domingo Jironza Petriz de Cruzate, who would be 
in El Paso del Norte, the new de-facto capital of New Mexico, within three months. 
Sabeata left disappointed, but arrived again at El Paso with another Jumano delegation 
later that October. This second Jumano attempt again requested missionaries be sent 
to La Junta de los Ríos so that they might set up Spanish institutions there. Their 
interests were not completely ecclesiastical, just as before:  Granted, Jumanos may 
have been genuinely interested in proselytization. Perhaps they believed that a new 
kind of faith that featured a salvation-oriented theme that might help them cope with the 
difficult situation within which they found themselves. But in addition to socio-cultural 
concerns, Jumanos were also eager to establish the kind of trade and military linkages 
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that mission life would bring. With missions came the chance for a presidio, and with 
both came Spanish agents of empire, with horses and harquebuses, and their need to 
attain regularly supplies from the interior of New Spain. The Jumanos were bidding on 
access to the broader trans-regional economy that existed to the south for reasons of 
protection and enrichment. Faraones had blocked Jumano access to economies in the 
north, and the Spanish represented one of their last opportunities to turn the colonial 
encounter to their advantage. Thus, they might let the Spanish walk in their territory and 
convert among their number, but they were counting on getting something out of the 
arrangement too: protection and wealth.24
! Sabeata was (he thought) more lucky this time around. Governor Jironza saw an 
opportunity in the Jumano leader’s words. When Jironza had arrived at El Paso he had 
found himself saddled with factional strife; a rotten leftover from some litigation that had 
festered between some of the camp’s most powerful players. Perhaps it was to defuse 
the situation and be rid of the key figures on one side of the intra-Spanish quarrel that 
he decided to send Maestre de Campo Dominguez and fray Nicolás López, 
Dominguez’s Franciscan ally, to La Junta de los Ríos. Sabeata gave Jironza the perfect 
pretext for dividing his fragile forces:  the Jumano leader had promised that there would 
be a grand gathering of nations far to the east, on the present-day Texas Edwards 
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Plateau, who were eager to establish relationships with the Spanish. There had also 
been a few whiffs of rumor about French exploration in that vicinity, and thus the threat 
of European imperial competition also allowed Jironza to justify an entrada at an 
otherwise dangerous time. Finally, the Jumano chief promised that the expedition would 
provide an opportunity to attack Apaches, thus allowing the Spanish a chance at 
revenge for decades of abuse and the humiliation of the revolt. On Jironza’s orders, 
Maestre de Campo Dominguez set out with seventeen soldiers in mid-December of 
1683, a short time after fray López had departed for the pueblos at the confluence of the 
Rio Grande and the Rio Conchos. Jironza would have more than one occasion to regret 
the absence of so experienced an officer and so many men in the six months they were 
away.25
! The events of Dominguez’s journey to La Junta de los Ríos and the Texas 
Edwards Plateau are no less significant than what concurrently occurred at El Paso del 
Norte, but the two events represent different processes. Dominguez was not the first 
Spaniard to travel downriver along the Rio Grande to La Junta, or to see the southern 
reaches of the Trans-Pecos area of the northern Chihuahuan Desert. The entradas of 
the 1580s had come up that way from the Valle de Santa Bárbara in Nueva Vizcaya, as 
detailed in chapter one. The maestre de campo, however, was the first to document the 
ecology and topography such that it is possible to reconstruct how Faraones colonized 
certain areas of the landscape, accessed portions of the ecosystem, and related to 
other groups of indigenes. The Mendoza-López journey sheds light on processes that 
reorganized the Trans-Pecos geopolitically as a domain of Faraon Apachería over other 
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Native societies. This dimension is distinct from that which evolved among heavy 
Spanish surveillance or presence in places like Santa Fe, Casas Grandes, or El Paso. 
For now, we need to remain with Jironza in the Hueco Basin so that we can understand 
the different strategies that Faraones devised to deal with their Spanish competitors 
who were still, relatively, better armed and resourced than indigenous competitors.
! When Maestre de Campo Juan Dominguez de Mendoza finally turned back 
towards El Paso in May of 1684, the news that trickled back to him along the Rio 
Grande was bad:  Mansos housed in pueblos all around San Lorenzo had revolted, and 
Sumas and Apaches were participating fully in the uprising. Dominguez wisely elected 
to avoid the Rio Grande and instead traveled up the Rio Conchos until he could cut due 
west across land and reach the site of present-day Ciudad Chihuahua, where he 
mounted the Camino Real de Tierra Adentro and proceeded almost due north. He opted 
to approach El Paso from one of the only directions that he felt was secure, although it 
meant he had to pass over 45 miles of hard waterless plain and another 97 miles over 
fine sand that would have made his mules and horses strain under their bison hide 
loads. He took much longer to reach El Paso than he or Jironza would have liked, but 
he had good reason to be afraid. Not only was the rebellion gaining momentum even 
then, but Dominguez had left crosses on a hill every time he came to a stop during his 
journey. Meant both as markers for future expeditions as well as signs of Spanish faith 
and power, these hilltop crosses also gave detailed information to aggressors in the 
area about which routes the Spanish preferred and what campsites were popular. For 
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months Dominguez had been giving away Spanish positions. He was probably right to 
believe that his enemies were lying in ambush.26
! As for those Jumanos who had beseeched the Spanish for aid, they soon faded 
from the historical record, ostensibly annihilated by Apaches or subsumed by them. If 
so, it was a long time coming. One of Oñate’s sergeant majors, Vincente de Zaldívar 
Mendoza encountered Apaches (whom he named Vaqueros for the bison they hunted) 
in 1598 on the southern Great Plains, probably in present-day Oklahoma or the 
panhandle of Texas. Ironically, almost a hundred years before Sabeata asked Otermín 
and Jironza for help with a war against the Apaches, the “striped ones” whom Zaldívar 
met asked for help with their war against the “Xumanas,” to the south. Like Jironza and 
Dominguez, Oñate and Zaldívar did nothing for their petitioners. Instead, they shunned 
the contest for territory and power in the uplands, but, again, at a price. The destruction 
of the Tompiro pueblo Las Humanas by the Apaches during the 1660s and 1670s, 
followed by their incursions over the La Junta de los Ríos by the 1680s testifies to the 
sharp ascendancy of the striped Vaqueros over the “Xumanas,” and the looming 
genesis of Mescalero Apachería.27
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! Mescaleros, however, as a people and as an appellation, were still over fifty 
years in the future. For now, Faraones performed the heavy lifting that would make 
future iterations of Apachería possible. Juan Dominguez de Mendoza was still camped 
out on the Middle Conchos River, awaiting the nations that Sabeata said would come 
and regal the Spanish, when El Paso erupted into revolt. For the second time in four 
years the Spanish of New Mexico were again confronted with what seemed like 
overwhelming indigenous hostility. Not long before midnight on the evening of March 14, 
1684, the cold slumber of the refugees was shattered by the whisper of conspiracy. The 
governor of the Tiguas, Francisco Tilagua, his lieutenant, and twenty Piros had 
summoned Governor Jironza de Cruzate to an emergency meeting. They brought a 
fantastic report:  the neighboring Mansos had been fomenting rebellion and were 
actively recruiting; Apaches figured into the plans; outbreak was imminent. Jironza must 
have started, and probably thought to the conflagration at Santa Fe in August of 1680 at 
the same time that he thought of Maestre de Campo Dominguez all those hundreds of 
leagues to the east, unable to help. Jironza was not six months into his first year as 
governor, but it must have seemed that time was already running out.28  
! But Jironza could not have been taken totally by surprise. Even before his arrival 
he knew he was walking into a bees’ nest and had had the foresight to request from 
Martín Solís Miranda, the fiscal (the viceroy’s attorney), 3,000 pesos for a strong 
presidio, 100 more harquebuses, gunpowder and lead, and carts to haul all his supplies. 
Faraones had recently become so adept at scouring the settlements that horses could 
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not be left in the fields overnight, but instead had to be tethered to the dwellings where 
the Spanish slept. Miranda, perhaps viewing El Paso as an expendable collection of 
vecinos and Puebloans, refused Jironza’s request. The two had dueled with petitions 
and proclamations, but in the end Jironza had to make due with only 2,000 pesos, fifty 
harquebuses, 100 pesos for lead, some carts, and whatever was left over from the 
shipment of goods sent to Otermín for the 1681 entrada. On his way to El Paso late in 
1683 he spent some of his own money to procure a few more arms and soldiers from 
Zacatecas, but word had gotten around and he found few volunteers.29
! When Jironza got to El Paso he quickly set about the task about which Otermín 
had failed:  situating the presidio near enough to the river that it could be supported with 
fields and supplied with water, yet also sitting close enough to nearby haciendas and 
milpas as to be effective. He finally decided to situate the presidio halfway between the 
riparian mission Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe and San Lorenzo, twelve leagues 
southward. The presidio was called Nuestra Señora del Pilar y el Glorioso San José. 
Jironza’s achievement was nothing short of remarkable considering that his ability to 
organize militias, build acequias, and muster enough bodies to work fields and grow 
crops was much reduced. In 1681 Otermín had recorded 1,946 persons; later, in 1684, 
Jironza would record only 1,051. Despite being forbidden to abandon the province and 
the settlements of El Paso, nearly one in two had fled the troubled place. Puebloans 
returned north and colonists dispersed to Casas Grandes, Parral, or elsewhere. It is 
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also likely that many of those missing in 1684 simply died, given that many had long 
been famished or perhaps carried old injuries. The new governor nevertheless 
managed to achieve more with less.30
! Thus, Jironza, despite being a new governor, had a few advantages over those 
enjoyed by Otermín. When Francisco Tilagua, governor of the Tiguas, apprised the 
governor of conspiracy on the night of March 14, 1684, Jironza heard that Mansos had 
been attempting to recruit Natives for a rebellion and that they planned to attack them 
no later than Easter Day when the Spanish guard would be down. They would emulate 
their Puebloan comrades to the north, kill as many Spanish as possible, and force the 
rest to run for their lives. The rebels then planned to turn their attention to Casas 
Grandes and the mission at Janos immediately after destroying El Paso. Jironza 
capitalized on this intelligence and quickly arrested the majority of the alleged 
conspirators, including the ringleader, don Luis of the Mansos. He desired to execute 
them immediately as a message to other rebels, but delayed until Dominguez could 
return from the east, with the seventeen badly needed soldiers. In the meantime, the 
governor gathered all the Spanish and friendly Puebloans to within five miles around the 
mission Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe and the nearby presidio. In doing so, he 
gambled that he could preserve the majority of El Paso’s population and stock, but at 
the cost of placing his wards under siege.31 
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! Living in siege conditions at this time would have put the Spanish and their 
Puebloan counterparts through tremendous suffering and hardship. Evidence suggests 
that there was sustained drought from 1681 to 1686. In terms of grains, the land around 
Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe and the presidio was not sufficient to produce enough 
food to support a high population density for long. Stores would have been soon 
depleted and would have had to be replenished by more from Nueva Vizcaya or from 
the holdover seeds meant for the next sowing. Water-borne illness would also have 
risen as more people depended less on the Rio Grande or on alternate sources, and 
instead crowded around ponds or wells that were prone to contamination. In terms of 
livestock, palatable grass populations could have been seriously depleted under 
intensive grazing by horses, mules cattle, sheep, and goats. The only thing that may 
have spared the grasslands within the siege zone from such heavy grazing might have 
been, ironically, that Apaches had taken so many animals that the livestock population 
was much reduced. In any event, Spanish suffering increased dramatically as hunger 
and illness afflicted so many people competing for the same scant food and water 
sources.32
! The siege began quietly enough, however, and April went by without so much as 
a hiccup. Stunned that their plans had been betrayed, the insurgents regrouped and 
considered their next move. The hammer fell on May 6 with two major attacks across 
the region. Diego, don Luis’ lieutenant among the Tigua, organized the Sumas and 
Janos groups to attack La Soledad, a mission near Casas Grandes, killing the 
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Franciscan along with his guard. The rebels seized the stores of the Nueva Vizcayan 
mission. In a coordinated movement, the Sumas around the mission of Santa Gertrudis 
del Ojito also revolted, killed a Spanish family there, robbed the church, and burned the 
New Mexican site. Shockwaves reverberated at Casas Grandes and El Paso. The 
rebellion had arrived.33
! The next direct blow came almost a month later. On June 2 Maestre de Campo 
Alonso Garcia, Otermín’s former lieutenant governor, helped Francisco Ramirez de 
Salazar, the alcalde at Casas Grandes, repel 2,000 attackers who included Mansos, 
Janos, Sumas, and Jocomes in their ranks. Casas Grandes was under siege for almost 
a week before Maestre de Campo Garcia and Alcalde Ramirez rallied enough strength 
to mount an unexpected counterattack. The rebels retreated north from Casas Grandes 
and made for the Rio Grande, towards the area of the Órganos Mountains and Faraon 
country. But their retreat was easily tracked because they traveled over a wide valley 
called the Llanos Carretas. Mounted militia and armed vecinos were, for once, 
unhampered by rocky or harsh terrain and were able to catch up and engage the their 
enemy in the Sierra del Diablo (present-day Sierra Boca Grande), 78 miles north of 
Casas Grandes. The Spanish caught sight of the siege force just as it ascended the 
foothills, and although they attempted rearward attack, they failed to halt the rebels 
before they made it to a mountain basin haven. A protracted battle followed and, 
although the rebels did not escape cleanly, clear victory evaded the Spanish. One 
militiaman died along with several Puebloan auxiliaries–enough of a sting to force the 
Spanish to withdraw. It was just as well; the conflagration was spreading. At that same 
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moment, to the east, Julimes and Conchos of La Junta de los Ríos joined the revolt in 
retaliation for one of their own being executed in Parral on charges of inciting revolt.34
Map 10: Casas Grandes and the Sierra Boca Grande, with Llanos Carretas.
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.
! The Spanish were reeling. El Paso del Norte was still under siege-like conditions, 
Casas Grandes had only just emerged from siege, and now the missionaries at La 
Junta de los Ríos were feared dead because violence had erupted there too. Governor 
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Jironza and his Nueva Vizcayan counterpart, Bartolomé Estrada de Valdéz y Ramírez 
Jove, had thought that the vectors of violence lay to the north and ran longitudinally until 
the Jornada del Muerto, but now it became clear that similar violence has spread 
latitudinally all across the frontier, both east and west. Maestre de Campo Dominguez, 
apprised of the dire situation from downriver on the Rio Grande, arrived in El Paso del 
Norte on July 18 from his long detour up from the south on the camino real–the only 
safe passage. With a veteran officer and survivor of the 1680 revolt at his side, 
Governor Jironza felt safe enough to execute don Luis, his lieutenant, Diego, and other 
rebels at the start of August. Jironza wanted to make a demonstration out of these 
leaders to everyone in the region, but his message must have seemed feeble 
considering that it came a full five months after hostilities had begun. Indeed, retaliation 
came quickly. In early September Jironza found himself sitting with a Manso informant, 
named Juan, bearing alarming news:  ten nations were gathered in a Suma rancheria 
somewhere farther down the Rio Grande. These indigenes, from all over the Trans-
Pecos and beyond, plotted to kill every single one of the Spanish at El Paso and to 
seize every scrap of food and every head of livestock. Then they planned to impale 
Jironza’s head on a stake–as a ‘demonstration’ to all the other Spanish and their allies. 
The governor immediately dispatched one of his captains, Roque Madrid, with seventy 
soldiers to depart eastward with orders to eradicate the rebels.35 
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! But the Spanish were deceived. On September 15, while Captain Madrid was off 
down the Rio Grande to the east with 70 men, those ten rebel nations launched an 
attack on Casas Grandes to the west. They did not kill every Spanish, but they did burn 
many homes and reserves of food; they carried off herds of horses, cattle, sheep, and 
goats. They had almost certainly orchestrated the moment to divide the Spanish forces 
with a decoy before they targeted another spot. It was a simple yet well executed piece 
of strategy. The outrage felt by the Spanish, however, escalated the conflict and 
precipitated a rebuke that would hasten the decline of the revolt. One month after Casas 
Grandes was sacked, in the middle of October, Alcalde Ramirez attacked rebels about 
21 miles outside of Casas Grandes. Ramirez achieved a decisive victory. He killed 
many men, took dozens of women and children captive, and recovered or stole much 
property. This moment signaled the beginning to the end of the 1684 revolt and 
demonstrated to Mansos, Sumas, and Apaches that the Spanish, though weakened and 
isolated, would be a lasting and powerful foe. Analytically, the end of the 1684 rebellion 
is probably more important than either 1680 or 1692 because it was at this precise 
moment that indigenes ‘learned,’ finally and totally, the deep, transcontinental character 
of their foes the Spanish. After this moment many Puebloan peoples, and Faraones as 
well, broke off from strategies oriented towards total annihilation and began 
experimentation with more mixed and subtle strategies that–while still hostile to the 
Spanish–concurrently acknowledged their political and geographical permanence.36
! Rebels launched no more serious attacks after their October defeat outside 
Casas Grandes. After the long dry winter of 1684-1685, most groups requested peace, 
142
36 Hughes, 355-357.
citing hunger, fear, and internal discord. As far as Mansos and their allies were 
concerned, the revolt was over by March of 1685. Mansos, Sumas, Janos, and Julimes 
had risked everything to revolt, on the chance that they might gain control over arable 
fields, access to water, and, to a lesser extent, ownership of horses and metal goods. 
These groups, like the Puebloans to the north, were motivated by a desire for autonomy 
and the means to implement their own political economy, rather than that of the 
Spanish. For seven months these rebels managed to decoy and besiege the Spanish, 
and they seemed to be gaining over the colonists. But then the victory of Alcalde 
Ramirez came at a bad time:  the onset of autumnal and winter weather when 
precipitation was down, harvests were over, and frigid high desert temperatures arrived. 
These indigenes did not  have the means to regroup, socially or materially, and to 
escape the hardships of the season. The loss of so many rebels, community members, 
and stores of goods crippled their ability. This situation was made worse by the reality 
that Mansos, Sumas, and others never possessed enough horses or mules to 
repopulate or grow their own stock. Without the ability to pick up and move across the 
terrain to new resource depots, they could cover only a fraction of the terrain on foot 
and they would have felt more acutely the effects of drought that racked the area from 
1683 to 1685. Whereas Apaches could still raid or trade at pueblos of the Middle Rio 
Grande Valley and the La Junta de los Ríos for carbohydrates, Mansos and Sumas 
would have been at a loss unless they procured grain through trade.37 
! April 1685 found the region in devastation. At least three missions had been 
burned, two pueblos sacked, and franciscans and vecinos killed. The losses of livestock 
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were severe. Casas Grandes lost an estimated 2,000 horses and mules in addition to 
2,000 of sheep and cattle. Fray López estimated that between El Paso and Parral about 
6,000 horses vanished from Spanish hands. El Paso weathered the raids with surprising 
success:  their meager herds remained more or less intact. Jironza’s concentration of 
people and resources around Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe and the presidio had 
worked.38
! We cheat ourselves out of a more complex analytical moment, however, if we 
mark the start and finish of the 1684 revolt too neatly. It is true that something happened 
in March of 1684 that signaled the beginning of a series of future attacks that resembled 
rebellion; likewise, after March of 1685 there was a noticeable downturn in violent 
confrontations following the defeat of a large group whom the Spanish regarded as 
being homogenous with the previous year’s rebels. But across and outside of these 
dates there occurred other events that tease us with a larger picture. Specifically, 
Faraon raids, assaults, and conspiracies preceded and followed the Manso Rebellion, 
just as they preceded and followed the Pueblo Revolt. Apaches were co-actors, and 
likely co-creators, of each rebellion, and as such it is worth reorienting our perspective 
to better understand how these moments fit into larger Faraon projects. Apache 
movement southward and eastward reveals that there was an inter-regional dimension 
to it that ties the experience of El Paso in 1684 to that of Santa Fe in 1680 and to that of 
La Junta in 1683. Viewed within the larger context of pre-1680 conspiracies around the 
Middle Rio Grande Valley,  El Paso and the Manso Rebellion appear less and less like 
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parenthetical episodes and more like clarion signals of deeper, if more obscure, 
trends.39
! Jironza witnessed evidence of the transcendency of Faraones’ presence early in 
his administration. It was administrative protocol across the provinces of New Spain that 
outgoing governors remained in their province upon the arrival of incoming governors, 
who would then conduct a review, a residencia, of their predecessor’s administration, its 
flaws and successes. When Jironza arrived as the new governor of New Mexico in the 
autumn of 1683, he did not need to labor hard during his residencia of Otermín’s term to 
figure out what was wrong with the refugee site and why. When he arrived he felt that 
“there is not any tongue that can describe the necessities that have passed.” The 
vecinos were malnourished, having survived on a shocking diet of mesquite bark and 
cowhide. The horses and cattle had lost so much weight that Jironza thought they 
looked more like furry bones than beasts of burden or war. Everywhere he turned it 
seemed that the poverty he witnessed was down to the Faraon attacks that nettled the 
area. So beleaguered, wary, and dejected were the Spanish that the few horses left to 
them had to be physically secured to the shacks where people slept, lest they be stolen 
under the refugees’ very noses. Disallowed to roam and graze on grasses (that were 
already desiccated following the drought), the health of the horses, cattle, and other 
livestock suffered, and the entire camp felt the degeneration of animal labor and protein. 
The diligence and tenacity of Faraones guaranteed that the theft of livestock that had 
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greeted Otermín on his February 1682 return to El Paso had only accelerated by the 
time Jironza arrived.40
! Jironza desired to demonstrate to the refugees, his enemies, and the vicegeral 
court that he was a force to be reckoned with. He gathered what fresh forces and 
supplies he had brought with him and conducted an entrada into the countryside against 
Faraones. It was a bold move for someone with no experience in the region. There is no 
evidence of the specific route he took or what exactly happened among the mountains 
and rancherias, but the new governor apparently scored an early victory. In a rather 
canned recitation of the day’s events, he boasted to the viceroy that he had routed the 
Apaches in their homes, killed many, and captured twenty-two. One of the captured 
Faraones confessed to Jironza that their principal aim was to root out and destroy all 
the Spanish. Congratulating himself on his success, and eager to be the one to put 
Santa Fe back into Spanish hands, the governor was probably hasty when he claimed 
that he had cowed the Apache groups and was ready to attempt a reconquista of New 
Mexico. Otermín had once had fresh arms and more than a handful of soldiers, but 
withering raids and an inhospitable terrain whittled down his forces until they were in the 
same deplorable state in which Jironza found them. In any event, Jironza soon learned 
that the Faraon problem extended beyond a few rancherias that he chanced upon in the 
Hueco Basin.41
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! Juan Facestado Guaptido was born in New Mexico before 1680. It appears that 
he adopted Catholicism and dwelt in one of the pueblos, acting as a servant to a 
Spanish vecino before joining the ranks of the apostates in the general rebellion. At 
virtually the same moment that Jironza was apprising the viceroy of his exploits over 
Faraones in the field, Juan Guaptido arrived on the banks of the Rio Grande. He was 
fresh from the Middle Rio Grande Valley, and his coming presaged a sobering revision 
for the new governor.42
! Guaptido entranced Jironza with a captivity narrative that also served as 
tantalizing evidence about what was happening farther north along the Rio Grande. The 
pueblos of Jemez, Taos, and Pecos were still the principal headquarters of the rebellion, 
and they remained in alliance with Apaches. Otermín would have likely met with disaster 
had he managed to make it that far north, where anti-Spanish sentiment was still 
virulent. Eventually, for reasons that Guaptido did not make clear, he one day decided to 
travel southward to El Paso, but he met with misadventure almost immediately. Apaches 
(Faraon or Jicarilla) who patrolled the Sangre de Cristo Mountains above Santa Fe 
captured and enslaved him. These Athapaskans held him prisoner for three years, and 
continuously threatened to kill him. (In this Guaptido seems to reflect the harsh 
exchange in bodies that Otermín and Ayeta discovered in their interviews with Isletans 
two years previously.) Eventually, these Apaches gave him to Pecos pueblo where he 
found sympathy with some Christian Natives, who had managed to hide their faith well 
enough to survive. These Puebloans, in turn, sent him to El Paso as a messenger to the 
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Spanish. The Catholic elements of Pecos pueblo wanted the governor to know that 
crops were being sown and that the area was not completely lost to ruin, but that the 
entire region was locked down by Plains Apaches. It is likely that Faraones were 
working with their kin the Jicarilla, located north of Taos pueblo, to enforce this 
lockdown, but the fact that this news came out of Pecos pueblo strongly suggests a 
Faraon attitude. These Apaches, then, seemed to dictate the foreign policy of the Middle 
Rio Grande Valley:  People like Guaptido were not permitted to move about freely and 
the fruits of agriculture would remain firmly attached to Apache-Puebloan trade 
linkages.43 
! Thus, even if Jironza somehow managed to crush Faraon populations in the 
Hueco Basin area, it appears that he had only scored a victory in the southern tip of a 
much larger force that was, at that very moment, strong in the Middle Rio Grande Valley 
and probably down through the Jornada del Muerto, and across the Trans-Pecos. 
Faraones lacked any kind of centralized authority, yet the trade fairs that they attended 
every year at places like Pecos pueblo served as a platform for the exchange of 
information, the coordination of their future campaigns, and the territory of individual 
rancherías. An elastic network of so many small to medium-sized rancherías thus 
comprised wider Faraon Apachería; where there was weakness or setback in one sub-
area, another ranchería could have learned of it and quickly taken its place. For Jironza, 
it soon became clear that there would be no attempt at a reconquista in 1683:  the 
viceroy’s fiscal would not fund it and the New Mexico governor should have known that 
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such a military excursion would be premature given the decrepitude of El Paso del 
Norte. Perhaps he realized that he was about to engage the same foe who had harried 
Otermín and Alonso Garcia south along the Rio Grande; who had watched and 
harassed Otermín later on his failed entrada, clouding the horizon with smoke from their 
fires; who had terrorized the pueblos just north of Jornada del Muerto; who were known 
to dwell in the many mountain ranges surrounding El Paso; and who had been raiding 
that the camps were on the verge of starvation.44 
! There is also evidence that Apaches had influence within El Paso del Norte as 
well. The day after Jironza learned of the initial Manso plot to rebel, on March 15, he 
discovered that there was present in the area an ethnic Apache from one of the 
pueblos, who was complicit in the revolt. Jusepillo had likely been captured as a boy 
during an engagement with Apaches and had been raised in the pueblos, learning about 
Spanish and Puebloan culture and, equally likely, keeping up ties with his kinsmen 
through the many trade fairs that occurred between the Rio Grande pueblos and Plains 
Indians. He was in a perfect position to dialogue between cultures and societies. Jironza 
interrogated Jusepillo for ten hours, then decided that he was complicit in the plotted 
rebellion. As evidence he cited reports that Jusepillo was an iniquitous person who had 
participated in various schemes against New Spain. Unfortunately, the nature of these 
schemes has not survived in the primary record. Jusepillo’s moment in the sun faded 
quickly. Jironza, after he had hanged the Manso conspirators, got back around to the 
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Apache and ordered him executed along with another Athapaskan for the theft and 
slaughter of livestock in El Paso. This other Apache was likely Jusepillo’s brother, a 
person alluded to in the secondary plot that Jironza learned of on March 16.45
! Faraones pop up in enough places and at enough times that their conscious and 
deliberate involvement in conspiracies and revolts is probable. But the records that 
reveal these events are fragmentary, anecdotal, and vague, especially regarding 
Apaches. Considering that the Spanish seldom missed a chance to brand them as the 
principal stressor in the region, colonial authors did a remarkably poor job in 
documenting the subtleties of their activity. It is impossible to document precisely how 
explicitly Faraones grafted themselves over the political agenda of the rebels. 
Conspiracies, by their nature, usually passed in whispers and shadow, and rumor often 
decoyed the truth. The constellation of violence that conspiracies produced, however, 
provides clues as to the membership and their interests. Faraones were part of a larger 
strategy that was framed by some kind of centralized understanding, most likely formed 
around lines of kinship and seasonal meetings. The evidence of Apache activities during 
the revolt combined with what we know about their movements beforehand strongly 
suggest that they played a significant role in organizing certain pueblos and semi-
sedentary tribes against the Spanish to their own benefit. In doing so they were 
continuing their work of the Middle Rio Grande Valley and La Junta de los Ríos in the 
Hueco Basin.46 
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! Even during the time frame of the Manso Rebellion, Faraones could never be 
ignored or discounted. More than once these Apaches forced their way to the 
foreground despite the overwhelming threat posed by Mansos. The earliest instance 
came at a momentous time in the rebellion. Manso conspiracy swirled around the villa 
of San Lorenzo and the missions along the Rio Grande and rebel-Puebloan attacks 
pricked the landscape. Governor Jironza was pinned down inside of battered adobe 
walls, and had, so far, survived 15 withering attacks. When he and his presidial guard 
peeked over the ramparts, however, they did not see so many Mansos or Sumas, but 
rather Faraones. During this time the governor did not dare to leave the walls of shelter 
without the company of presidials, or militia, and it was only at great peril that he 
permitted animals to be grazed, or crops tended. If he looked south then it was to do so 
dolefully. The Camino Real de Tierra Adentro leading into Nueva Vizcaya offered little 
hope for aid or reinforcements:  travelers were just as likely to be cut down in ambushes 
as they were when Otermín was still dusting himself off in 1681. Even the return of 
Maestre de Campo Dominguez and his troop to El Paso on July 18 did not produce an 
advantage for the Spanish. If anything his men were tired, their horses spent, and their 
supplies low. The governor hoped for reinforcements from the presidios surrounding him 
in Nueva Vizcaya, and thus inked a missive to Viceroy Tomás Antonio Manuel Lorenzo 
de la Cerda y Aragon on July 24, 1684 wherein he summed up what he knew about the 
rebellion.47 
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! Rattled at the reality that he had been held prisoner by the very same peoples he 
had boasted of subjugating on last October, Jironza wrote that the “Christian” Mansos, 
having been taken by a “demon,” were in league with “all the infidel nations that are 
many and who surround[ed them] with their people.” Here the governor referred to 
Faraones. The usage of the phrase “infidel nations” is crucial because it is the same 
language used to describe Apaches in the Middle Rio Grande Valley in the decades 
leading up to 1680 and subsequently. Whereas settled Natives who had converted to 
Catholicism but who later revolted are invariably described as ‘apostates’ or ‘traitors,’ 
the designation “infidel” is always reserved for groups who have never come under the 
supervision of the Franciscan Order; groups like Apaches. At this time the only other 
groups that could have earned the title of infidel would have been Tobosos or 
Tarahumaras who were in revolt to the south in Nueva Vizcaya, but they are not noted 
in New Mexican reports. Furthermore, Jironza’s description of the infidel nations as a 
“demon” is strongly reminiscent of the phrasing provided by Lieutenant Governor Alonso 
Garcia on his August 1681 retreat from New Mexico when he excoriated Apaches as 
“demon weeds.” The Spanish seamlessly co-identified Faraones, demons, infidels, and 
weeds into one bursting idea that had little explanatory worth, but that nonetheless 
communicated the perceived power and ubiquity of Apachería.48 
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! Faraones continued to exploit the climate of rebellion to assail the Spanish. In 
August of 1684, Jironza again diverted resources to confront Apaches. He sent Captain 
Madrid out with fifty soldiers–nearly the entire complement that he had brought to El 
Paso del Norte–to attack Apache rancherias. Even accounting for militia leftover from 
the Otermín years and some help from Casas Grandes, this decision represents a 
dangerous gamble to find an elusive enemy while putting the besieged people of El 
Paso at even greater risk. After all, the rebellion at this moment showed no signs of 
abatement, and Alcalde Ramirez hallmark victory outside Casas Grandes would not 
come for another two months. The New Mexico governor had no way to know that the 
decline of the revolt was at hand. Nevertheless, Jironza felt that the Apache threat had 
reached such a frenzy and that without immediate relief the revolt–and Apaches–would 
further prevail. Ultimately, Captain Madrid was unlucky and his troop came back empty-
handed with nothing more to show for their labor than lame horses. The impetus for the 
action was that four Faraones had been captured the month before, and the prisoners 
supplied provocative intelligence. The month following Madrid’s failed expedition, on 
October 17, Jironza executed two of these Apaches. There is no direct evidence here 
that Mansos and Faraones were coordinating their activity such that Spanish forces 
were constantly divided and chasing ghosts, but it is hard not to see it this way. The 
combination of actual attacks, decoy attacks, and false intelligence suggests that there 
was a choreography inherent to Manso-Suma-Faraon activity that goes beyond 
coincidence.49   
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! When Jironza first arrived at El Paso, Guaptido made it clear that the Faraon 
world was at that time much larger than Spanish New Mexico. By the time the Manso 
Rebellion came to a close, Jironza learned that this larger geopolitical reality had not 
changed. On February 12, 1685, a month before the Manso and Suma components of 
the rebellion would come to terms with the Spanish, an apostate Isletan named Lucas 
was dragged before Jironza. Lucas was a fugitive of the Isleta pueblo there at El Paso, 
and had earlier absconded upriver with a few paltry supplies in a bid to reach his kin 
and to learn the news of the Puebloans in the Middle Rio Grande Valley. In the Piro 
areas of the valley, not much had changed since Otermín passed through. At San Felipe 
Lucas found poor and dejected people who expressed sadness and disappointment that 
the Spanish did not try to re-enter New Mexico and save their pueblos from the 
Apaches. Faraon pressure, it seems, had never relented in the lands north of the 
Jornada del Muerto. Just as Isletans and Alamedans had complained of, Faraones were 
wont to take captives, pilfer of crops, and seize what little livestock remained.50 
! Lucas was disheartened, and perhaps so too was Jironza. Standing in half ruined 
pueblos and talking to a destitute people, the Isletan probably felt that the Spanish 
offered at least a semi-functional aegis to Puebloans like himself, whereas Faraones 
offered only greater subjugation. He turned back from the Middle Rio Grande Valley, but 
as he wound his way back down the Rio Grande and through the Jornada del Muerto he 
ran into Apaches. At this point Jironza halted the interview, and expressed amazement 
that the man had lived to tell the tale, prompting his fourteenth question to the 
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respondent:  how did he survive the Apaches? Unexpectedly, Lucas narrated, he was 
allowed to pass and they even went so far as to guide him back, leading him as far as 
nearby grove of Cyprus nuts.51
! Why would Apaches guide him back? It seems surprising that they would not 
have captured or killed him. After all, Lucas had been formerly with the Spanish and had 
recently fraternized with his home pueblo of Isleta, which was a known target to 
Faraones. He was their enemy; but he was also their tool. The idea that Apaches were 
working constructively to build their own world in the Chihuahuan Desert by 
deconstructing the Spanish imperial landscape is just as demonstrable through their 
moments of diplomacy as much as through their practice of violence. It is possible that 
these Faraones spared him for his worth as a messenger, and that his escort to El Paso 
was meant to guarantee that Lucas would relay to Jironza that the Middle Rio Grande 
Valley was still Apache-controlled; nothing of Apachería had diminished in the past four 
and half years. Following their defeat at the hands of Jironza in October of 1683, 
Faraones might have been experimenting with softer forms of power, such as the use of 
Puebloans as diplomatic instruments.52
! The conclusion of the Manso Rebellion in March of 1685 had little effect on the 
raiding practices of Faraones. The Spanish had only enough time to begin reorganizing 
El Paso del Norte and Casas Grandes for successful and profitable agriculture before 
Apaches intensified their assaults and reopened fresh wounds. Captain Madrid reported 
with chagrin in the first part of April 1685 that he had been unsuccessful in preventing 
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raids, finding aggressors, or protecting property. Sometime in late March or early April 
he had marched with twenty-five soldiers north along the Rio Grande above the Jornada 
del Muerto, eager to punish Faraones on their own turf. Jironza himself funded and 
supplied the excursion, but it was money poorly spent. Near the pueblos of Senecu and 
Isleta, barely outside of the dreaded and waterless Jornada, Captain Madrid found 
himself outmaneuvered and unable to proceed. He had traveled too heavy and perhaps 
too quickly, resulting in the death or crippling of a significant number of his animals. 
Deciding that even the provisions granted by his governor were insufficient to fight 
Apaches, he turned back. There would be no victory over Faraones to match that over 
Mansos and Sumas.53
! When Captain Madrid returned, Jironza again called on him to lead fifty soldiers 
and 170 Puebloan auxiliaries to Casas Grandes to “punish the Apaches, and attack the 
apostates and their allies.” The Spanish had recently learned that an indigenous 
coalition was planning to attack El Paso, despite the fact that the rebellion had ended. 
Details of the route are missing, but the soldiers ranged over the area of the Hueco 
Basin, staying in the field long enough to find a few rancherias, deserted and full of 
snuffed out fires. Unable to locate the enemy or uncover a conspiracy, they returned 
empty-handed to Casas Grandes. But when they entered the settlement, they were 
greeted with a grim surprise. Madrid and the others found that Faraones had visited in 
their absence, that they had raided the area and taken most of the horses and cattle. 
The similarities to the decoy attacks that occurred in January of 1682 and September 
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1684 make this more than a coincidence. What is more, Apaches were the only group 
specifically mentioned during the April 1865 humiliation–a fact that bolsters the notion 
that they were complicit in the acts of rebellion from early on. Spanish gullibility is the 
only surprising element to this story. Seven months had passed since the Manso named 
Juan had convinced Jironza to make an identical blunder. There is no evidence directly 
linking Juan to Apaches, but the congruity between the two episodes suggests that a 
common membership was pursuing the common interest of raiding for Spanish goods 
and animals.54
! Alcalde Francisco Ramirez was convinced that Apaches were the master 
architects of the region. Corroborating Captain Madrid’s account, he penned a letter to 
the viceroy on April 14, 1685, lamenting his efforts and failures as a loyal vassal to the 
king. He briefly chronicled the desperate straits that the people of Casas Grandes and 
El Paso del Norte had found themselves in since May 6 of the previous year; the frantic 
shuffling of troops; the poverty of so few horses and cattle; and their near-destruction at 
the ramshackle defenses of El Paso, when arrows rained down on them. During one 
assault their defenses were so compromised that every Spanish feared they would be 
dragged away and killed–such a fate actually befell a few soldiers. These descriptions 
of brutal wartime scenes served only as a preamble to the broader assertion that the 
enemy that he and Governor Jironza knew under the appellation “Apache” were a 
populous people who swarmed over the land at will. Attempts to find and destroy them 
led to disappointment and humiliation because Faraones hid themselves well inside the 
mountain basins all around. Hidden among the precipices above the Spanish, Faraones 
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could track their foe and, at the opportune moment, strike with precision and efficiency. 
They swarmed the roads with impunity, attacking travelers, taking their animals and 
wares, and finding refuge easily once militia or presidials gave chase. Ramirez gave up 
on Nueva Vizcaya, and although he never came out and said so directly, the purpose of 
the alcalde’s letter was to seek permission to abandon Casas Grandes.55 
! There were three more attempts on El Paso and Casas Grandes before Vargas 
attempted a reconquista of New Mexico in 1692. The first effort was somewhat 
lackluster. The virtually unknown don Pedro Reneros de Posada, the next governor of 
New Mexico, made an attempt to reconnoiter up the Rio Grande in 1687, a year into his 
administration. While he was away, the Mansos around El Paso del Norte revolted but 
little came of the action in the form of either success or documentation. The second 
attempt came during the second administration of Jironza, from 1689 until the start of 
1691. The governor was eager to use the energies of his second term to attempt an 
entrada into New Mexico in May of 1690. Jironza felt that the Manso Rebellion had 
cheated him out of the opportunity to garner the prestige that would come with 
successfully restoring Santa Fe to the Spanish empire. That never happened, however, 
because a Piro Puebloan reported to the governor that Faraones were again 
collaborating with Sumas, Conchos, and others at La Junta de los Ríos to attack El 
Paso del Norte while Jironza was away, and that they planned for nothing less the total 
destruction of the Spanish.56
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! Jironza resigned himself to the exigencies of the situation, and reluctantly 
diverted resources meant for the expedition northward for an emergency excursion to 
the southeast. By the time his soldiers arrived at La Junta de los Ríos the rebels had 
gone, vanished into the mountain chains that surrounded the confluence. It is unclear 
whether Jironza interrupted a genuine conspiracy to attack El Paso del Norte or if the 
Spanish were again decoyed by Apaches and their allies, just as had happened in 
September of 1683 and April of 1685. If the former, then this example demonstrates 
Spanish clumsiness in surveying and traversing Apache territory (one thinks of the 
many crosses left by Maestre de Campo Dominguez across the Spanish route to La 
Junta). Just as in Oñate’s period, the Spanish privileged superiority in armor, arms, and 
supplies over nimbleness and the ability to live off of the land. Just as Oñate had 
experienced, the dividends of such a strategy were often slim when the Spanish took 
the offensive. 
! If, however, the ruse at La Junta de los Ríos was a decoy, then it strongly 
suggests that the acumen of these Faraones was far more sophisticated than the 
Spanish ever gave them credit. The implication from such a maneuver would not only 
mean that Apaches had outcompeted the Spanish in the Middle Rio Grande Valley, but 
also that they had also acted with deliberateness and intelligence in the prevention of a 
Spanish return northward for nearly twelve years. Faraones had kept the Spanish poor 
and busy with a cat-and-mouse game of attrition that prevented them from amassing 
the kinds of supplies and energy required of an entrada. These Apaches were more 
than simple raiders who happened to be in the right places at the right times, colluding 
with Puebloans and semi-nomadic peoples opportunistically. Faraon activity before and 
159
during the interregnum suggests that these Apaches acted deliberately, and developed 
a concerted and imperialistic strategy that utilized the tools of empire within a wide and 
shifting web of inter-indigenous alliances.57
! One more episode deserves note. Later, while don Diego de Vargas was 
governor but had not yet begun his reconquista, the Hueco Bolsón again came alive 
with raids and fires. In July of 1691 Faraones and Sumas struck the El Paso pueblos of 
Socorro and Ysleta del Sur, thirteen miles apart. They captured the entire horse herd 
from each. Immediately Vargas set out with two squadrons of cavalry to capture them 
before they could make it to the Hueco Mountains. At first he thought that Apaches 
alone were responsible, possibly with the help of other Apache groups like the Siete 
Rios, or Salineros–peoples identified with the Central Closed Basin and the Pecos 
watershed. But over the course of a night’s riding and searching he learned that Sumas, 
gathered at the mission of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe, were also complicit. He set 
an ambush for them and continued his pursuit of Apaches, but all his canvassing and 
searching came to naught.58
! Ironically, Vargas’ reference to the Hueco Mountains is the first we have during 
the whole interregnum, although Otermín and Jironza were doubtlessly familiar with this 
nearby mountain range. The Huecos lay northeast of El Paso del Norte and, as they 
name suggests, were named for the many ‘hollows’ or ‘tanks’ that are all around and 
that are known for capturing and storing rainwater. The historical significance of this 
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place is just as much a mystery as every other mountain range that Faraones possibly 
used but left no documentation about. Fortunately for this history, however, this sierra 
has recently become the subject of archeological analysis. One particular study site, 
Cerro Rojo, located deep in the heights, contains enough material artifacts and 
structural ruins that some have suggested that a huge rancheria existed there, capable 
of housing hundreds of people and sporting defensive stone walls and earthen 
ramparts. Archaeologists generally agree that Cerro Rojo was an inhabited site during 
this time, and that Apaches were so dominant in the area, which makes it probable that 
this was a place known to them. Perhaps it was to Cerro Rojo that Faraones escaped 
once Vargas gave chase. The celerity with which the Spanish cavalry pursued these 
Apaches, and their subsequent failure, strongly suggests that their havens and bases 
were nearby. Alternatively, the veteran inhabitants of the region, the Mansos and 
Sumas, most likely knew about any habitations in their immediate vicinity and would 
have passed that information on, willingly or not, to Faraones–their known 
collaborators.59
 
! The Manso Rebellion of 1684 is the most analyzed event of the interregnum. 
This insurrection, more than any other moment during those twelve years, came the 
closest to inflicting terminal damage to the Spanish, and it threatened to destroy New 
Mexico and to amputate parts of northern Nueva Vizcaya. It very easily could have been 
another August 1680 for the Spanish. Indeed, it is typically perceived that way in 
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scholarship. Native actors from across the region banded together and made surprise, 
coordinated, and sustained assaults against Spanish settlements and interests. Even 
the causalities that we understand behind this event echo the kinds of antagonisms that 
plagued the Middle Rio Grande Valley and produced the revolt of 1680:  Food scarcity 
and privation; a lack of basic protection and stability; and Puebloan-vecino friction 
regarding land and culture. But there was no mass slaughter of the Spanish and 
certainly no quick victory for the insurgent indigenes. El Paso del Norte was not isolated 
in the same way as Santa Fe; there was no Jornada del Muerto or Rio Grande dividing 
this settlement from the rest of New Spain. The interior garrisons of Nueva Vizcaya 
were still far enough away, but there was more of a Spanish military presence than New 
Mexico ever had. Finally, rebels and would-be rebels did not have as much time to 
synchronize their plans and their means as did the long-suffering Puebloans of the 
Middle Rio Grande Valley, who had had decades to prepare and rehearse resistance. 
With these factors in mind, the Manso Rebellion begins to look less and less similar to 
the Pueblo Revolt, and echo of common causality begins to elongate away.60
! The 1684 revolt, rather, should more properly be viewed as continuous with the 
1680 revolt as a reflection of the high level of Apache manipulation of the geopolitical 
landscape. Just as the rio abajo Puebloans had not been alone in the planning and 
casting out of the Spanish, neither were the rebels who rose up around El Paso del 
Norte and Casas Grandes. They were aided and possibly also guided by Faraones who 
162
60 The Presidio and Militia on the Northern Frontier of New Spain, 1570-1700, Vol. 1, Thomas H. Naylor 
and Charles W. Polzer, S.J., eds. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986): 483-485.
    v. John L. Kessell, “A Long Time Coming: The Seventeenth-Century Pueblo-Spanish War,” New Mexico 
Historical Review 86:2 (2011): 153, for the idea that Puebloan success in 1680 can be adduced to their 
long history of suffering at the hands of Spanish agents and their repeated attempts to conspire against 
them.
developed complicated alliance networks among Manso, Sumas, and perhaps even 
Piros and Jumanos, in order to destabilize the Spanish imperial structures of the region. 
At El Paso and Casas Grandes, it seems incredibly likely that Faraones purposefully 
mimed the stressors that had precipitated the 1680 revolt around Santa Fe. Faraones 
had seen firsthand the success that was possible in 1680, and so it seems natural that 
they would attempt a similar blow that would force their most serious competitors further 
to the margins and to claim for themselves even more sites and tools of empire. In this 
rethinking, the provenance of imperial momentum and movement rests just as much in 
Native actors as in European ones, with the contest always far from settled.61
! The activities and movements of Apache peoples from 1680-1692 reflect 
continuity within a much broader timeline that reached backwards and forwards. Faraon 
Apaches (Athapaskans from east and south of Pecos pueblo) continued the strategies 
that had worked so well for them before 1680:  they seized the physical tools of empire 
(e.g. horses and harquebuses), and forged advantages for themselves. The 
appearance of Faraones outside the Middle Rio Grande Valley in 1681 signaled the 
start of their expansion into the northern Chihuahuan Desert. Well armed and well 
mounted thanks to the 1680 revolt, Faraones passed with relative ease across the 
landscapes east of the Rio Grande and south towards Nueva Vizcaya. In the process 
they became the first indigenous group in what we know call the borderlands to invert 
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the colonial encounter. In the process Faraones formed a redoubtable Native space–
Faraon Apachería–that carried with it distinctly imperialistic markers. Although Faraones 
never formed colonies or governed from a central authority, they succeeded in claiming 
a disproportionate share of resources in the region and did a better job of coercing their 
neighbors into their own political economies than the Spanish could. Many of these 
developments, however, would come in the future, after 1692, but for now it is enough 
to say that the beginnings came during the interregnum.62 
!  This chapter is concerned with Reconquista—but not that of Vargas’. Eighteen 
months after August 1680 and nearly twelve years before don Diego de Vargas would 
“restore” New Mexico to the crown, the ecoregion had already been reconquered, in a 
way. Apaches had reasserted their trading privileges with certain pueblos and 
consolidated their access to those markets by ruining other pueblos that were politically 
or geographically closer to the Spanish, specifically the Piro pueblos of the lower 
reaches of the Rio Grande and the Tompiro pueblos that were east of the Manzano 
Mountains. Additionally, at the same time that the Spanish were trying to figure out how 
to get back into New Mexico, it is likely that Apache interests were behind the failed 
Manso rebellion of 1684 and at least one subsequent conspiracy around El Paso. It 
would appear that Governors Otermín, Jironza, and Reneros were matched in their 
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attempts to retake New Mexico by indigenous groups who themselves were trying to 
keep and consolidate the Chihuahuan Desert.63
! Spanish imperialism actually funded this Apache-sponsored reconquista by 
means of the broad, inter-continental economy that kept faraway and insolvent places 
like Santa Fe or El Paso afloat. When Faraones had attacked the Spanish from Sangre 
de Cristo mountain havens around Santa Fe before 1680, they inadvertently furthered 
the need of, and demand for, the mission supply service that had been to keep New 
Mexico stocked and alive with basic supplies that could not be produced locally. 
Admittedly, the need of the refugees at El Paso was already great when they arrived, 
but that need only intensified under the pressure of Faraon raids from the mountains 
that made up the basin inside of which El Paso rested. Faraones tried to take all they 
could, and annihilate the Spanish if possible. It is all but certain that this was their 
intention both during the 1680 revolt, and during the revolts and conspiracies that were 
to follow during the interregnum. They failed. Spanish empire was remarkably durable 
and although places like New Mexico might exist as provinces on the edge of poverty 
they nonetheless persisted as subsided outposts of a much broader network. But 
Faraon failure to eradicate the Spanish was actually a boon. Spanish survivors were 
repeatedly faced with supply shortages, and subsequently petitioned for aid from Nueva 
Vizcaya, and Mexico City. When fresh wealth arrived in El Paso, it had the effect of 
buoying the Spanish at the same time that it provided a fresh and lucrative target. Thus 
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when Apaches took wealth from El Paso, they indirectly continued siphoning wealth 
from sources of aid farther south, places like Casas Grandes and Parral in Nueva 
Vizcaya. Apaches may not have realized it, but their failure to totally remove the 
Spanish prompted influxes of livestock and metal goods into the region, making 
available the tools to maintain and grow their world, Apachería.64
! Acting out this process, Apaches forged superior access to and control over local 
resources, in effect creating a Native empire. Apache political, economic, and social 
systems never recalibrated the political economy of the region, thus their societies did 
not do the kind of work we typically expect from “empires”–that term for space and 
process defined after Euro-American manifestations of state and power. But accounts of 
Faraones from Pecos Pueblo south to El Paso and east to La Junta de los Ríos indicate 
that there existed no other group or state at this time that could challenge them. Despite 
the difficulty inherent in attaching the political category of “empire” to Apaches, there are 
environmental ways to describe their brand of territorial domination, and these will lead 
us back, eventually, to a discussion of “empire.” Apaches were the “keystone group” of 
the northern Chihuahuan Desert, affecting the region’s character far out of proportion to 
their numbers:  They outcompeted the Spanish and Puebloan groups and shaped the 
material wealth and the military reach of those societies. Although I derive the term 
keystone from the ecological notion of “keystone species,” I also use the term politically 
and economically. Apache raiding and trading practices fundamentally circumscribed 
what kinds of political and economic (and social) formations could occur. Although their 
language did not become the lingua franca of the region and their cultural customs and 
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mores did not graft themselves atop Spanish and Puebloan ones, they maintained such 
a strong presence in the ecoregion that every group who bordered them was 
necessarily and profoundly affected.65  
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Chapter 3  
Experimentation: Faraon Apachería During the Second Era of Colonial Encounter
! Antonio de Valverde y Cosío was many things over the decades. He was a 
soldier for don Diego de Vargas in the 1690s, a presidio captain at both Santa Fe and El 
Paso, and, finally, the governor and captain-general of New Mexico from 1718 to 1721. 
His most important role, however, has passed largely unnoticed: that of a witness. More 
than Vargas (who died abruptly in 1704), more than Otermín (who departed El Paso for 
Mexico City, without reluctance, in 1683), and more than any other literate person in the 
northern reaches of the Chihuahuan Desert, Valverde was a witness to the increasing 
sophistication of Faraon politics, to the broad expansion of their territory, and to their 
eventual recession in the rio arriba of the Rio Grande.
! For instance, Valverde was there when Faraones consumed the final years of 
Vargas second term as governor of New Mexico. As a solider who had been brought to 
New Mexico by don Diego de Vargas, he was nearby, if not present, when the architect 
of the official reconquista rode off for the last time to the Sandia and Manzano 
Mountains east of the new villa of Bernalillo to punish the Faraones, in 1704. Valverde 
would have heard that the Faraones left little more for the Spanish to fight than recently 
extinguished campfires; that they had baited–dared–the Spanish to follow them east 
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over the arid plains and mesas; that Vargas had died without achieving any success in 
reducing them.1
! Valverde, as captain of 49 presidials at El Paso’s Nuestra Señora del Pilar y el 
Glorioso San José, was there again in 1707 when Apaches watched from the edges of 
the Hueco Bolson; when they peered down from the Franklin and Hueco Mountains, 
watching for any sign of laxity, weakness, or distraction on the part of the soldiers. 
When, inevitably, Valverde was forced by regulations to send squads out as escorts for 
traveling missionaries or merchant caravans, or when royal military service around 
Santa Fe came due, he was there when Faraones swooped down and attacked. In 
times like those, and they came often, Valverde face his opponent on two fronts. Often 
out-maneuvered and decoyed, the Valverde watched many horses and cattle vanish 
into the mountains.2
! Almost ten years later Valverde was still in New Mexico, and about to take up the 
mantle of acting-governor, when his colleague Juan Páez Hurtado mounted a campaign 
against Faraones in 1715, this time in a locale more north than ever before noted, in the 
rio arriba region of the Tiwa pueblos, where Taos and Picuris Puebloans traded with 
Jicarilla Apaches and other northern Athapaskan-speakers. Valverde might have 
handled the paperwork that found its way to the vicegeral court in Mexico City. He 
undoubtedly was familiar with his colleague’s expedition diary. In any event, Valverde 
would have known that the only thing Hurtado’s soldiers rode upon were Faraon tracks 
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that had long ago gone cold. Ironically, while Hurtado hunted in the north and Valverde 
was present in Santa Fe, Faraon spies had actually surveilled Hurtado’s movements 
and had felt confident enough to double back to Pecos for a bit of trading. Faraones 
were engaging the imperial economy and drawing wealth from the Middle Rio Grande 
Valley–right under the governor’s nose and free from presidial oversight.3
! Finally, in the penultimate year of his governorship, 1720, Valverde wrote to the 
viceroy in Mexico City, the Marques de Valero, to complain that the “Apache tribe of 
Faraones invade the kingdom with death and robbery. They dwell within the territory 
around this villa [Santa Fe] as far as the jurisdiction of the Paso del Rio Norte [El Paso] 
and La Junta de los Ríos.” The governor did not report that Faraones were present in 
the rio arriba around Taos, Picuris, or the riverine spots that were the typical haunts of 
Jicarilla Apaches, in present-day south-central and southeastern Colorado. Valverde 
knew this because he had led a campaign the previous year that was nearly identical to 
Hurtado’s 1715 campaign. Just as Hurtado had done, Valverde too answered the call of 
Jicarillas begging for help against a mounted scourge that was wiping them from their 
rancherías and gathering horses, bison, and corn all around them. Like Hurtado, 
Valverde soon found that his efforts came to naught. Nevertheless, at the same moment 
that Faraones infiltrated and exploited the Middle Rio Grande Valley, Valverde 
witnessed events on his 1719 campaign that signaled the first series of setbacks that 
were just then affecting Faraon Apachería.4
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! This period, from 1692 until 1720,more than any other before it, reflects the 
ambitious and sophisticated capacities of Faraon geopolitical strategy to dominate 
territories and economies that have typically been reckoned as components of New 
Spain. To Franciscan Custo Francisco Ayeta and Governor Antonio Otermín in the 
1670s and early 1680s; to Governor Domingo Jironza Petriz de Cruzate in the 1680s; 
and to Vargas through the first years of the 1700s, Apaches must have seemed like an 
unstoppable force, adapting quickly and efficiently to the perils and possibilities offered 
by the first era of colonial encounter:  Within a decade of colonization, they had 
mastered new technology like horses and guns within a mosaic of distinct ecologies. 
Since then, they had frequently outcompeted the Spanish on eastern, southern, and 
northern fronts. What Valverde was witnessing, on the one hand, was the florescence of 
an ethnically distinct Apachean strategy that had been maturing for nearly one hundred 
years. On the other hand, Valverde also witnessed the withering challenge offered to 
Faraones by Comanches and Utes, and the former’s retreat to the Chihuahuan Desert 
by the 1720s; there, Apache culture and politics adapted to the landscape and set them 
on the path that would lead to the Mescalero identity and a reformulation of their power.
!
!  Somewhere between 1691 and 1694 Faraones–the keystone group of southern 
Athapaskans–and Jicarillas–their counterparts to the north–parted ways in terms of both 
strategies and fortunes. Although these Apaches had been ostensibly aligned (or at 
least not antagonistic) through most of the seventeenth century, these two ethnicities 
began to negotiate the second era of colonial encounter, ushered in by Vargas, in new 
ways. The consequences of this divergence shaped not only the region but should now 
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also reform our ideas and beliefs about the role of the northern Chihuahuan Desert and 
its inhabitants within larger questions of colonial history. Although little had changed in 
terms of Apaches’ ability to engage the ecoregion more efficiently than the Spanish in 
order to feed and outfit their population, the means by which Faraones exploited that 
advantage evolved into novel modes of competition that were more efficient than ever 
before. 
! For its part, Jicarilla competition was a faithful continuation of practices that had 
been occurring all throughout the seventeenth century. In that sense, these Apaches’ 
practice of frequently raiding the fields and ranchos of the Spanish vecinos in the Middle 
Rio Grande Valley from their habitations in present-day southeastern Colorado did not 
resemble a noticeable deviation. It seems that the motivation behind Jicarilla 
competition was not only to procure more material than the Spanish (and at Spanish 
expense), but also to cripple the Spanish colonists’ ability to survive on the land–to 
eradicate them and seize their property completely, just as in 1680. And just as in the 
1650s, 1670s, and 1680s Jicarillas would soon conspire with Puebloans in 1696 to wipe 
out the Spanish and retake the territory above the Jornada del Muerto for themselves. 
Jicarillan competition resembled a zero-sum game where the winner would eventually 
take all. There was no room for extensive mutualism or coordination of interests.
! It appears that Faraones, on the other hand, abandoned their attempts to 
eradicate the Spanish soon after Vargas made his official reconquista, but before the 
1696 uprising. Instead of attempting to extract, completely, the resources of the Spanish 
empire, Faraones contrived to transform Spanish colonial places into renewable 
resource depots. I call the Faraon system that developed during this time “symbiotic 
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bellicosity.” Symbiotic bellicosity ritualized cyclical modes of engagement as the 
normative feature of the Spanish-Apache interchange from about 1694 until 1720, 
producing benefits to both participants in the process. The system was bellicose 
because the use of violence or the threat of potential violence carried it through the full 
cycle of modal engagements. It was a form of competition that immediately benefited 
Faraon raiders, who received heightened access to local resources, and that belatedly 
benefited Spanish colonists, who then had justifiable recourse to petition for material aid 
from the interior of New Spain. It was, however, a system that did not yield equivalent 
dividends; Faraones retained the advantage.
! It is worth defining this concept in more detail since it represents a new 
interpretive framework that helps to shape our understanding of eighteenth century 
engagement. The first mode of engagement in the cycle was usually initiated by 
Faraones. First, Faraones approached the Spanish, usually at Pecos pueblo or 
Albuquerque, with the promise of peace in order to initiate a cycle of low-risk trading. 
When yield from trading became meager, whether because of political or climatic 
reasons, Apaches reverted to the second phase: raiding and pillaging, thereby 
catalyzing the shift to the next phase. Third, in response to privation and poverty owing 
to the Apachean attacks, governors petitioned Parral or Mexico City for additional 
supplies which would then be sent via caravan up the Camino Real de Tierra Adentro–
right through Faraon territory and back into their orbit of their Native economy. This 
influx of livestock, metal tools, foodstuff, and other items rejuvenated the local economy. 
Faraones were then inclined, as in phase one, to forsake the inherently risky venture of 
raiding for the low-risk, modest-yield activity of trading, and thus the cycle started anew. 
173
! There is little indication that any of the historical actors involved consciously 
realized that their behavior fell into the pattern that I have termed symbiotic bellicosity. 
Additionally, there is, of course, no surviving evidence produced by Apaches of this 
period that unequivocally corroborates these assertions. Nevertheless, practices that 
are sustained and coordinated do not seem to be aberrations of isolated phenomena 
but reflect a sense of intent and intelligence. What their exact thinking was we will 
probably never know, but symbiotic bellicosity takes their sophistication into account 
and provides a workable model for historical analysis.
! Symbiotic bellicosity is a historical process defined by causality, but the traditional 
tool-bag of the historian comes up short in the analysis of this period. Analytics like race, 
gender, agency, and power do not provide sufficiently deep insight into how and why 
Faraones and Jicarillas weathered so differently the post-Vargas period and the coming 
Comanche period. Environmental science, the interdisciplinary linchpin of this study, 
does not provide the answers that were so important to chapters 1 and 2. In order to 
supplement the gaps left by documentation and traditional analysis, I have drawn on the 
economic study of game theory. This theory and its models offer a heightened level of 
quantitative assessment upon the histories of different populations. The study of games 
and their outcomes can help us understand more concretely why Faraones did as well 
as they did while Jicarillas seemed to suffer, and why the Spanish only seemed to find 
tentative gains. The northern Chihuahuan Desert during the start of the eighteenth 
century was still full of relatively fresh encounters and rapidly changing economies; 
people still migrated within new geographies while they tried to understand and interact 
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with a new world where horses, guns, and imported commodities radically changed 
what one could expect from contests. As such, the idea of game theory works well as a 
way to measure how and why certain strategies fared better than others and why 
certain political economies came to be privileged as successful.5  
! At its heart, game theory allows economists to ask questions about how different 
players choose different strategies based on expected payoffs, and then to analyze the 
utility, or efficiency, of their chosen strategies in relation to the choices of the other 
player(s). The ‘games’ reflect the competitions entered into between the historical actors 
of the northern Chihuahuan Desert. The payoffs could be many things, from horses, 
maize, and captives, all the way to complete domination of the other player’s territory, 
populations, and economic means. Games, at their most basic level, involve two types 
of players, named ‘hawks’ and ‘doves.’ Hawks always compete with the purpose of 
claiming the entire resource over which the competition depends, and will only concede 
defeat when beaten in violent confrontation. Doves would prefer to share the resource 
equally, but will abandon the resource if challenged by a hawk. There are vast 
intricacies to game theory and its applications–far too many to review here. There are a 
few, however, that specifically reflect on asymmetries that refine the ways that players 
behave. This point is crucial since, historically, there is really no group or individual who 
completely embodies the ‘hawk’ or ‘dove’ strategy. In reality, players almost always 
adopted mixed strategies that vacillated between hawk and dove many times in any 
given game and series of games. These refinements to our understanding of games are 
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critical since game theory would mean little if it could not account for things like 
deception, perseverance, reputation, prior ownership, and other asymmetries.6
! Specifically, the ideas of a player acting as a ‘retaliator’ or ‘assessor,’ and of 
adopting ‘bargaining’ or ‘threats’ into their strategies refines how the game is played and 
what outcomes are statistically likely and desirable. A retaliator is a player who begins 
play as a dove but may end play as a hawk. They will gladly share the resource if the 
other player is amenable, in dove fashion, but will switch to play like a hawk when 
challenged for a resource. An assessor observes the opponent and chooses a strategy 
according to the asymmetries within the game, like prior ownership (of land, for 
instance) or superior armament (harquebuses versus arrows). The ability to assess is 
simply the ability to learn and develop. Bargaining is the process whereby players 
attempt to gain advantages, and thus a larger share of the contested resource, by 
negotiation and communication; in this way they bypass the costly effects of violent 
conflict over a resource, which takes away from the net gain they would otherwise 
receive. Threats occur when players bluff their way into convincing their opponents to 
behave like doves without incurring the actual cost of behaving like a hawk.7 
! Generally, it is better to act like a hawk than a dove, and better to act as an 
assessor or retaliator than to act as either a hawk or a dove. The reasoning that 
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produces these observations follows this line: Doves concede the contest too often and 
fail to gain advantages over hawks in nearly every case. Hawks succeed in ever case 
except when they meet another hawk, because then only one player eventually prevails 
while both endure the expensive cost of fighting (i.e. injuries, deaths, broken weapons). 
Retaliators and assessors usually do better than hawks because they mix their 
strategies and, by avoiding or delaying the expensive violence of hawk-ish play, 
increase their gains by minimizing their exposure to risk. As I proceed with my analysis I 
will revisit these ideas and apply them to the scenarios at hand.8
! For Faraones, symbiotic bellicosity helped transform the New Mexican branch of 
the Spanish empire into something akin to a renewable resource, almost like an 
acequia. Its inter-continental, imperial markets produced and transported goods and 
wealth that the places and inhabitants of the northern Chihuahuan Desert could not 
have produced independently. When, as an acequia, the Spanish network of empire 
was properly tapped or pumped it nourished Apachería with resources that were 
deliverable via the oceans, ports, and up the Camino Real de Tierra Adentro. Apaches 
could have easily learned this about the New Spain through their experiences of the 
previous twenty years. Since the 1670s, when they obliterated the Tompiro pueblos of 
the Middle Rio Grande Valley and then, during the interregnum, when they tried 
repeatedly to annihilate the Spanish presence in major uprisings, they had witnessed 
the incredible tenacity of these newcomers–their ability to survive like no other 
indigenous population could have under similar circumstances. By the start of the 
177
8 Maynard Smith, 14-16, 18.
  Sugden, 63.
eighteenth century Apaches had ample evidence that the Spanish investment in the 
Middle Rio Grande Valley would not be allowed to wither and recede.9
! It is worth pausing here to ask: why did Faraones bother to raid at all, and not 
use trade as their exclusive strategy? Raiding was dangerous and risked valuable 
members of an already small social group. Part of the answer lies with James Brooks’ 
monograph Captives and Cousins. Brooks’ work is mainly concerned with socio-
economic questions of masculine honor and captive-exchange networks as a way to 
understand the linkages between borderlands communities. Captives and Cousins 
describes a system of violent reciprocity as the principal means of exchange between 
multiple cultures that desperately needed to interact but were prevented from peaceably 
doing so because of social and cultural distance. The Spanish, despite their interest in 
Plains products and annoyance with the persistent raiding by non-Puebloans, stayed 
tethered to riverine places and were unwilling to find a permanent cultural bridge 
between their society and Native ones. They would have probably preferred to be 
isolationists. In spite of that, the effects of their imperial economy rippled out and 
touched everyone in the region, regardless of location or status, and this had the effect 
of forcing interest and attention back upon the Middle Rio Grande Valley. For Natives, 
refusal or inability to connect with that economy was a damning handicap. The tools of 
resistance and domination came through the colonial exchange; Native groups 
equipped with horses, and harquebuses could compete on a more or less level field 
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with Europeans. But the Spanish did not make Athapaskan-Spanish/Puebloan trade 
easy. Regulations were often changed at the caprice of the governor, for example. 
Considering the reluctance of the Spanish to participate in a regional economy that non-
Spanish and non-Puebloan players might find equitable, Apaches quickly found that 
raiding was often necessary as the means of inter-ethnic exchange.10 
! The games that these two Apache groups developed were not confined to play 
with the Spanish alone. There was no binary whereby Natives, writ large, pitted their 
collective will against Europeans’s, writ large. False binaries like these do not describe 
the complexity of creative meaning-making and nuanced competition. Beginning in the 
1710s, the documentary record for New Mexico becomes crowded with examples 
wherein Faraones play competition games with Jicarillas, to the lasting detriment of the 
latter. After 1696, when Vargas roundly crushed the rebellion of which Jicarillas were a 
part, these Apaches settled into distinctly more peaceful, even docile, relations with the 
Spanish. Vargas would have regarded Jicarillas as “reduced,” the Spanish term that 
connotes an understanding of imperial subjugation and an implied promise to fealty on 
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the part of the Native group. In game theory terms, when Jicarillas began trading 
peaceably at Tiwa pueblos, they settled into an economic model of competition that 
provided fewer dividends than the one adopted by Faraones. Essentially, it was dove 
strategy with slight retaliator tendencies. That is, Jicarillas adopted a less aggressive 
strategy and began conceding the advantage in the contest more often, but that is not to 
say that they could not be roused to violence if attacked and challenged to give up all of 
their advantage. Faraones appear to have realized quickly that their kin were in a 
weakened position and this is perhaps why they aggressively expanded their targeting 
of places and resources to include non-Spanish targets, such as Jicarilla rancherias in 
the rio arriba all the way up to the Canadian River Valley. 
! Faraones, a people who had been expansionistic for at least twenty years by 
now, labored to outcompete Jicarillas and to assimilate their environments, and possibly  
their bodies, into the Faraon political economy. Faraones did not have to practice 
symbiotic bellicosity with Jicarillas because Jicarillas never evinced the same ability to 
regenerate their population and their wealth via distant networks. Whereas Faraones 
had Albuquerque, El Paso del Norte, and La Junta de los Ríos to fall back on, to speak 
only of settled agricultural spaces, Jicarillas had recourse only to Taos and a handful of 
northern pueblos. Faraon competition with Jicarillas took on a hawk strategy with 
assessor qualities. That is, Faraones consistently claimed the entire resource in the 
games, or contests, entered into with Jicarillas and, knowing from recent experience 
that they held an asymmetric advantage over Jicarillas, they exploited that population’s 
180
propensity to retreat. Eventually, Jicarillan space imploded as it became increasingly 
isolated from the resource-benefits of the broader Apachería that Faraones controlled.11
! In contrast, the royal provinces of New Mexico and Nueva Vizcaya were part of a 
more politically stable, inter-continental network that stretched down into South America 
and east to the Caribbean and Europe. Even amid the strong Native presences that 
mediated the forces of Catholic culture and monarchical politics, places like Santa Fe 
and El Paso survived just the same as Mexico City and Veracruz because they were 
parts of a premodern empire. New Mexico could rely on supplies coming from the south 
through Nueva Vizcaya and the interior of New Spain, even if the regularity of delivery 
and the quantity of aid often left much to be desired. Unlike Jicarillas, who might only be 
able to try their hand at subsistence living if all else failed (assuming that they were not 
being attacked), the governor could always petition the viceroy who could petition the 
king for relief. The intercontinental network of ships, ports, roads, and wagons meant 
that the Spanish empire was elastic in the availability and deliverability of resources.12 
! Vargas’ reconquista was less a clarion victory for Spanish imperial hegemony 
and more a reintroduction of Spanish political interests to the larger geopolitical arcs of 
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the region. It was a field full of competition. Apachean imperialisms, Puebloan 
grievances, and French mercantile expansion all competed to varying degrees with 
Spanish political interests. Imperial politics and celebratory myths aside, the most that 
can be said about Vargas’ so-called bloodless reconquista is that it was an economic 
refertilization of the Middle Rio Grande Valley—at the expense of the Spanish. During 
the interregnum goods and animals had ceased to travel above El Paso, but Vargas’ 
return of the Spanish to Santa Fe and the Rio Grande pueblos allowed grains, cattle, 
horses, mules, and other animals and wares to again flow up the Camino Real de Tierra 
Adentro. Faraones might have been pleased to see the caravans move out north from 
El Paso del Norte for the Jornada del Muerto and the rio abajo. This merchandise was 
destined to revitalize pueblos, haciendas, and farms that were materially valuable to 
Apaches. The river that was the Spanish province of New Mexico was flooded anew, so 
to speak, and the uplands and all its inhabitants were nourished, however unintended, 
as a consequence.13
! On a side note, the re-entry of the Spanish into the Middle Rio Grande Valley 
marks the beginning of an unusual kind of borderland. Instead of a European-oriented 
system where Apaches or Comanches delicately balanced multiple empires against 
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each other in order to carve out a niche for themselves–following the typical formulation 
of a borderlands as an analytical category–this period marked the beginning of a Native-
oriented contest. In a fascinating inversion, it was the Spanish who struggled to locate 
and retain spaces of survival amidst the carnage of coming Apache-Comanche fighting. 
This borderlands would not mature for another thirty to forty years, and it is the subject 
of chapter five, but it is worth noting that it had its beginnings here, during a period that 
has been traditionally set aside as representative of Spanish glory and might.14 
! The Captain General made a diplomatic, fast, and peaceful tour of the Middle Rio 
Grande Valley in the autumn of 1692. Perhaps because of bison hunts, the reaping of 
maize, the weather, or the curiosity of observing just what the Spanish were up to, 
Vargas encountered virtually no resistance, least of all from Apaches. He secured peace 
with Tupatú, leader of the northern pueblos, just outside of Santa Fe and was back in El 
Paso by December to conduct a census of that area as well as to report on the numbers 
observed around the Middle Rio Grande Valley pueblos. Before he got back to El Paso, 
however, Vargas stopped at the ruined pueblo of Socorro on December 10, 1692. He 
was poised at the northern edge of the Jornada del Muerto. Indicative of the Little Ice 
Age, that global climatological event that lasted from about 1550 to 1850, temperatures 
were depressed across the region and the Rio Grande was frozen over. Snow and hail 
battered the soldiers. Although he believed that certain pueblos in that vicinity should be 
repopulated with vecinos, he adjudged that the southernmost abandoned pueblo of 
Senecu should be left abandoned, for that was “Apache country.” This observation, later 
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communicated to the viceroy, the Conde de Galve, constitutes a significant 
acquiescence on the part of the Spanish. By forfeiting serious competition for control 
over the camino real between El Paso and the Middle Rio Grande Valley, Vargas made 
a kind of inverted Act of Possession; he certified that the Jornada was, and would 
remain, Apache country. 
! Beyond the Jornada, Faraones continued to make claims to the El Paso del 
Norte/Casas Grandes area far to the south. Again, Vargas did not seem very 
concerned. The real focus of his attention was firmly set on the holy grail of 
gubernatorial ambition:  permanent recapture and reoccupation of Santa Fe. He said as 
much to King Carlos II in the spring of 1693 when he apologized, somewhat shrewdly, 
for not having taken New Mexico a full two years sooner. That had been his wish, but he 
had been forced to rescue the province to the south and west from Apaches and Pimas 
instead. Despite the many complaints by the displaced cabildo of Santa Fe and the 
officials of Nueva Vizcaya, Vargas only initially deigned to conduct a few punitive 
expeditions that produced negligible results. Again and again he chose to undervalue 
the territory around El Paso and to underestimate the peoples there, and thus he 
declined to compete for the Trans-Pecos during his tenure. The Faraones in the Trans-
Pecos were, in his eyes, a problem for the presidio at El Paso and the forces of northern 
Nueva Vizcaya; a problem and solution distinct to that of Santa Fe. Spatially and 
politically, this decision to not compete for the Trans-Pecos—when compounded with 
Spanish ineptitude at negotiating the range and basin area of the northern Chihuahuan 
Desert—produced important consequences. The choices that Vargas made make it 
clear that, implicitly, he devalued huge chunks of geography east and south of Santa Fe 
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as desplobado, or wasteland, and effectively surrendered them to Athapaskans for 
generations to come. He avoided the game altogether, epitomizing the dove that walks 
away from contest and leaves the payoff completely to the opponent. Vargas’ choices 
produced powerful opportunities for indigenous groups like Faraones. Across 
landscapes where Spanish imperialism either failed or dared not engage, actors like 
Faraones found the time, the means, and the space to refine their strategies for 
survival, exploitation, and success. The political consequence was concomitant with the 
spatial consequence.15
! The Spanish maintained a presidio of fifty soldiers at El Paso, just enough, as 
Brigadier General Pedro de Rivera found in September of 1726, to maintain an imperial 
presence, but not enough to make a persuasive case for presidial control beyond the 
immediate area of the fort. The site would never be overrun or fade from the landscape 
of European settlements. The other prominent place of the northern Chihuahuan 
Desert, where the Rio Conchos and the Rio Grande met at La Junta de los Ríos, would 
not receive a presidio until the late 1740s. That entire stretch of the Trans-Pecos, with 
its linkages to Nueva Vizcaya and the Central Mexican Plateau, was left to Apaches as 
a land un-competed for, and so beyond the enforceable boundaries of Spanish empire. 
Apaches moved across it and exploited it at will, with only rare rebuke from El Paso and 
Casas Grandes. Captain Juan Fernández de la Fuente from the Janos presidio in 
Nueva Vizcaya knew this. Guarding territory southwest of Vargas’ position, he was not 
enthralled with the impending exit of so many soldiers from his vicinity. On February 27 
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he had been shared into intelligence gained from a Jumano that Apaches were 
amassing to destroy the Spanish at El Paso, the presidio included. Fernández and 
others considered that the Janos, Sumas, and Jocomes were the equivalent to 
Athapaskan because they acted “as one formidable body.” As for Vargas’ mission, the 
captain was skeptical. New Mexico, he relayed to the governor of Nueva Vizcaya and 
the viceroy, was firmly in the “shackles” of the Apaches and “not with 100 soldiers could 
you easily enter that realm and then leave again without a presidio.”16
! Vargas knew this too in the course of his penultimate entrada. He spent the 
spring of 1693 in Zacatecas, from where he sent letters to the viceroy, the Conde de 
Galve, and king, asking for supplies and providing advisory information. In May he 
requested twenty quintals of gunpowder, along with four artillerymen, and six to eight 
artillery pieces from Veracruz with four-pound shot. (The Royal Spanish Academy 
defines one quintal as roughly 46 Kg, which means that a whopping 2,030 pounds of 
gunpowder was requested.17) There is good reason to believe that he intended all along 
to use it against the Apaches. Indeed, he relates in a letter just fifteen days later to the 
king, Carlos II, that he was forced to leave behind a sizable rear-guard, 25% of his 59-
strong troop, with the supply train when he ventured out around Santa Fe, even erecting 
palisades against the threat of Apache raiding. He might have felt a little like his 
predecessor, Otermín, at that point. All around them on the horizon smoke rose from the 
mountains, making it clear that they were noticed, and their presence was being actively 
‘discussed’. Shortly thereafter, he arrived at the pueblo of La Cieneguilla in the Galisteo 
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Basin, just south of Santa Fe between Pecos pueblo and the Rio Grande. He found 
Puebloans from Cochiti, San Marcos, and San Felipe who, much like the Spanish at El 
Paso, were themselves concentrated and huddled about this one habitation, located on 
a steep mesa. When asked why they gathered there when the land was arable and 
apparently vacant all around them, the Puebloans replied that it was the only defensible 
place left to them following repeated Apache incursions that left many dead and much 
property missing or ruined.18 
! Perhaps Vargas had more reason to fear Apaches than he was willing to reveal 
in correspondence to his superiors, for in the months before his final entrada he made 
an assertion that was utterly baseless and that would come back to haunt those in the 
Middle Rio Grande Valley. From the safety of Zacatecas, surrounded by the trappings of 
war, he opined that the mesas and the sierras to the east of the Rio Grande were 
impregnable to Spanish conquest, and implied that indigenes in those regions were all 
but irreducible. This Apachería was seemingly without sufficient water supplies–a 
strange observation that totally overlooked the presence of the Pecos River and all its 
tributaries, not a day’s ride east from Santa Fe! He rationalized that this aridity 
prevented a war party such as his from easily sustaining itself over the land, evoking the 
difficult journeys that militaries had had since the days of Rodriguez-Chamuscado. 
Perhaps he was seeking to narrow the scope of his task and was thus making the case 
to ignore the uplands and to focus his resources on the pueblos. Vargas must have 
known that his observations were spurious, for earlier that year he had been led by a 
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captured Apache through the Hueco Mountains and to the area of the Guadalupe 
Mountains on one of the few trips he took east from El Paso del Norte. There he had 
seen and drunk from springs and ojos, as well as that of playas. The Pecos River 
headwaters, located in the Sangre de Cristo Mountains, as well as all the other rivers of 
the Trans-Pecos, originating to the west, had their sources in mountain streams. 
Surface flow and other resources in the Trans-Pecos were not only sufficient, but 
plentiful, in some cases. But Vargas, just as he had done with his consideration of the 
Jornada, Senecu, and the so-called desplobado conceded that space to Apaches.19 
! Vargas’ reentry was a boon for the Middle Rio Grande Valley economy, elevating 
it from one of paucity to one of limited means and potential. Vecinos and friars who 
returned with Vargas brought fresh food, animals, tools, and the promise of productive 
enterprises like haciendas of horses, cattle, and sheep, and milpas of maize and wheat. 
In this way, the Spanish reconquista of New Mexico, so long associated with European 
dominance, instead resembled an injection of resources into the Middle Rio Grande 
Valley region. During the interregnum horses and cattle had all but vanished from 
southern pueblos and those that existed in the north were concentrated around San 
Ildefonso pueblo where Jicarillas and Tiwas likely controlled them; those from the south 
had likely gone to Faraones and other groups who rode, traded, and perhaps consumed 
them. Decline in agricultural yield caused by a drought that lasted from 1681 to 1686 
compounded the scarcity of animals during the 1680s. Increased aridity, fractured 
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societies, and the loss of life and social disruption owing to revolt would have put 
considerable stress on pueblo fields, preventing them from producing sufficient 
quantities of maize and other grains for trade by as much as fifty percent. This 
recession in trade and the shortages of goods that Apaches experienced must have 
come as an unwanted check on the development of their burgeoning horse culture, both 
in the Trans-Pecos and in the area of present-day southern Colorado.20
! As Native groups readjusted to life with the Spanish, a cleft appeared in the 
broader Apachería that hints at how and why Faraones and Jicarillas would find such 
radically different fortunes in the colonial encounters of the eighteenth century. Whereas 
before Vargas there was seldom explicit mention of inter-Athapaskan enmity–owing to 
Spanish ignorance of precise ethnicities and a lack of documentation–there is evidence 
that by 1693, at the latest, a split either formed or intensified between Jicarillas and 
Faraones. Whereas the narratives of the 1680 and 1684 revolts indicate that seizure of 
Spanish goods and annihilation of the colonists were hallmark features of Apache 
groups across the many ecoregions of contact, Faraones and Jicarillas had participated 
in these revolts differently:  the former were present both in 1680 and in 1684 while the 
latter were present only in 1680. Jicarillas continued the previous century’s ‘hawkish’ 
practice of heavy raiding, conspiracy, and rebellion with a view to exterminating the 
Spanish and again seizing all their materials. Faraones, on the other hand, had learned 
much from their time observing and battling the Spanish around El Paso del Norte and 
Casas Grandes. They began to explore alternate strategies that were predicated on 
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‘hawkish’ attributes, such as raiding, but that were now tempered by the advantages 
that come with assessment. As they did so, they broadened their repertoire of choices 
from which to choose how they might play games against the Spanish. Symbiotic 
bellicosity began here and now.21
! The first clear sign of Faraon-Jicarilla divergence came in the spring of 1694. 
Juan de Ye, a Pecos Puebloan, arrived at Santa Fe on March 27 in company with three 
Apaches to see Governor Vargas. Although the new governor of New Mexico had not 
been in the Middle Rio Grande Valley long, he had already met and conferred with Ye, 
the governor of Pecos pueblo and a cultural go-between, on other matters during the 
previous winter and he apparently trusted him. Governor Ye acted as interpreter and 
facilitator for the three Plains captains. Through Ye, these Apaches approached Vargas 
and offered their friendship and promised to visit Pecos pueblo in October to trade some 
of their stores of bison products. Vargas rejoiced at this opportunity and at the chance to 
begin his tenure in Santa Fe by establishing peaceful relations with a group that had 
previously been a perennial thorn in the side of the empire. (As a sign of the Spanish’s 
enthusiasm, it is worth noting that an adjutant of Vargas’ at the time, none other than 
Antonio de Valverde, “happily bought the bison meat and robes off of them.”) Contented, 
these Apaches departed with Ye for Glorieta Mesa and Pecos pueblo. Spanish 
documentation does not firmly denote what ethnicity these Apaches were at the March 
meeting, but when they came again just over a month later, on May 2 and again with 
Juan de Ye, they were positively identified as Faraones. Vargas, perhaps believing that 
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he sensed an earnest willingness on the Faraones’ part to recast their relationship with 
the Spanish, ventured to open the possibility for an even firmer commitment of 
friendship than he had ventured during the March meeting. He asked them why the 
Faraones were not Christians. The captains made a provocative, and calculated, 
reply.22
! They had come specifically for the purpose of baptism, he said, and they would 
love nothing more than to dwell among the Spanish, in pueblos–provided that the 
Spanish first wipe out the rebels around Taos and release their dwellings to the 
Faraones! There is no evidence that Vargas laughed in their faces or dismissed their 
proposal out of hand, but it must have struck him as surprising. Spanish-Apache 
collusion and the prospect of Athapaskan reducción, reduction, into missions flies in the 
face of expectation. But why offer any sense of mutualism or cooperation now, and why 
suggest that violence against fellow Athapaskans was permissible? It seems absurd 
given the incessant forays that Faraones had made against El Paso and Casas 
Grandes over the past fourteen years.23
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! Whatever Vargas personally felt regarding this proposition on the part of 
Faraones, he must have noticed that these people stood in stark contrast to their kin, 
the Jicarilla. During the previous winter of 1693 and 1694, Vargas had been parrying the 
first threats of conspiracy, ambush, and rebellion to the reestablished colony. In fact, 
since November friendly Puebloans, usually Keresans, had relayed reports that a 
combination of Tanos, Tewas, Tiwas and Apaches was forming in the north with plans to 
take all the Spanish horses from the Santa Fe presidio and to drive the Spanish from 
New Mexico once again, in a grim reenactment of 1680. 
! A piece of detailed intelligence came on December 17 from the nigh ubiquitous 
Pecos Governor, Juan de Ye, whose reports were endorsed by the local missionary to 
Pecos, fray Salvador de San Antonio. He stated to Governor Vargas that the would-be 
rebels were amassing on San Juan Mesa in the rio arriba (located near the spot where 
the Rio Chama enters the Rio Grande from west) and that they had plenty of Spanish 
swords and lances, leather jackets for themselves, and armor for their horses. They 
apparently lacked harquebuses, but Vargas must have nonetheless been aggrieved to 
hear that he was facing an indigenous armored cavalry from lands that were only 
leagues from the province’s capital.24 
! Reports and rumors continued to fly well into January of 1694, but nothing came 
of them...yet. If rebels were not said to be materializing on San Juan Mesa it was only 
because they were instead gathering on San Ildefonso Mesa, even closer to Santa Fe. 
For the time being, nobody flinched and rebellious activity remained dormant while the 
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Spanish war machine tensed around Santa Fe. In one sense this episode is a prelude 
to the outbreak of revolt that would come in 1696, but in another more immediate and 
important sense this moment brings into focus just how much Faraon and Jicarilla 
strategies had diverged in the wake of Spanish reintroduction.25 
! A good clue that offers insight into the nature of inter-Athapaskan differences 
comes from their associations with pueblos. The Tiwas from Taos and Picuris pueblos 
were ethnically distinct from the Towas at Pecos pueblo. The former were long-time 
allies to Jicarillas and located in the rio arriba, just north of Santa Fe along the Rio 
Grande near its confluence with the Rio Chama. The latter were historically tied to the 
Faraones and were located east of Santa Fe, on Glorieta Mesa, away from the Middle 
Rio Grande Valley and near the headwaters of the Pecos River. Faraones, Jicarillas, 
and other Apachean groups had long jostled for superior access to the Middle Rio 
Grande Valley by tapping different pueblos, and different ecologies, in their endeavors 
to cultivate opportunities during the first era of colonial encounter. In this way the end of 
the seventeenth century was not dissimilar from the beginning:  these were periods of 
adjustment to the arrival of still-new ethnic populations (the Spanish) and the challenges 
and opportunities that accompanied them. One clear difference, however, between the 
first and second eras of colonial encounter were the demographic factors involved. 
Pueblo populations, for instance, had by this point sunk to between 7,000 and 13,000 in 
1660, down from a possible high of 60,000 in 1601. The number of people at Pecos 
itself fell from between 1,500 and 2,000 in the 1670s and 1680s to about 800 persons in 
1694. Declining Puebloan numbers must have disrupted the quantity of goods and 
193
25 Governor Vargas, December 1693-May 1694, Campaign journal, Legajo 38, Parte 3, Historia, AGN, 
CSWR.
foods that could be produced and, thereby, increased the perceived contest between 
Apaches for access to the products of riverine habitation. As the Faraon need for maize, 
pottery, and other items held steady, or grew, demand for wares from Pecos outstripped 
supply and possibly sent them looking for alternative outlets from other, outlier, pueblos 
such as Taos and Picuries.26 
! While Faraones spent 1694 quietly, cautiously assessing their competitors and 
eyeing fresh economic linkages, Jicarillas began working in tandem with “apostates,” as 
the Santa Fe cabildo put it, to keep the province on the brink of ruin. Vecinos of the 
colony’s capital could only despair as a blitz of raids and nocturnal thefts removed 
nearly all of the cattle, oxen, and horses that had been brought north from El Paso del 
Norte for the resettlement of New Mexico. The exact number of animals taken is 
unclear, but the fact that the vecinos and the friars complained of having only 500 left to 
them suggests that at least as many animals had been stolen. Cabildo members 
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complained to the viceroy, the Conde de Galve, that not even their grain was safe; 
whatever maize they still possessed was theirs through force of arms alone. The elite of 
Santa Fe lamented that the few families that had survived at El Paso del Norte for 
twelve years had suffered so much between that place and the capital that Apaches and 
apostates “could make a road of [their] blood.”27 
! The cabildo’s statement to the viceroy reflects truth as well as ignorance. On the 
one hand, it correctly summed up the situation south of the Middle Rio Grande Valley 
pueblos that had been extant since 1680. Faraon raiding around El Paso and Casas 
Grandes had not abated and the stretch of camino real that joined those places to 
Santa Fe was firmly clutched within the Faraon grip. Fourteen years of violence at the 
hands of Athapaskans and their Suma, Manso, and Janos associates led the cabildo to 
be mistrustful of the dialogues that Vargas was entertaining with Faraones. It was knee-
jerk response to blame this group of Apaches for the woes of 1694, but the cabildo were 
mistaken. Jicarillas–who were never noted south of the Jornada del Muerto–were 
responsible for the most recent bouts of raiding. Careful ethnic distinctions eluded the 
Spanish who were still coming to terms with the social complexities of a dynamic 
colonial world that kept shifting beneath their feet.28 
! Faraon amenability to peace and settlement with Vargas, meanwhile, in the 
spring of 1694 represented something new:  the diversification of Apachean foreign 
policy and the beginnings of a more sophisticated effort at expanding territory and 
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securing Spanish resources. Even as Jicarillas prepared to replicate the recent past, 
Faraones were fast moving beyond a strategy predominated by tactical maneuvers 
(hawk-oriented raiding and pillaging) and instead began experimenting with a dual-
purpose approach. The first prong is reflected in the episode when the Faraones 
attempted to jockey the Spanish, in the spring of 1694, to eliminate Tiwa and Tewa 
Puebloans and their Jicarilla allies. Whereas the interregnum years of New Mexico had 
been characterized by drought, the concentration of remnant European resources into 
fortified pockets, and the cessation of fresh imports of grains or livestock (except what 
was taken through raiding at El Paso or Casas Grandes), Faraones now prioritized 
gaining access to the imperial economy that came up the Rio Grande and the camino 
real. In all likelihood, they calculated that if Vargas and the Spanish dealt a heavy 
enough blow to the rebels around San Juan and San Ildefonso Mesas, then Jicarillan 
access–and competition–would be eradicated along with their most dedicated Puebloan 
allies, leaving the remainder population exposed to assimilation or acculturation into 
Faraon social, political, and economic structures without incurring any cost.29 
! The second purpose of this strategy concerns the expansion of Faraon 
Apachería. All appearances suggest that Faraones planned to expand their population 
around the northern edges of the province’s borders by laying claim to the southern 
edge landscapes of the Rocky Mountains. Although it is impossible to say how they 
would have actually capitalized on this advantage since they never succeeded in taking 
the rio arriba, it seems likely that they would have used it to advance their exclusionary 
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access to the Middle Rio Grande Valley economy as well as to mediate its access for 
the Native groups who had to trade through intermediaries in order procure horses and 
metal goods, just as they had done with the Jumanos in the 1670s. If access and 
control to the newest resource of south-central North America was indeed their project, 
then this effort to expand Faraon Apachería to the northeast would almost certainly 
have not represented an abandonment of the Trans-Pecos territory and its access to El 
Paso del Norte and La Junta de los Ríos. Instead, it would have merely expanded the 
scope of Faraon presence within, influence over, and access to the imperial economy.30 
! The idea of increasingly sophisticated Faraon diplomatic strategy and territorial 
ambition finds some corroboration in the administration of Antonio Valverde y Cosío at 
the end of the 1710s, when hostility between Faraones and Jicarillas and Tiwas erupted 
into open conflict after the Spanish hesitated and ultimately declined to participate in 
Faraon geopolitical designs. Where the Spanish failed to enact Faraon designs by 
proxy, Faraones eventually attempted to incorporate this territory by their own means. 
Before that happened, however, Faraones seemed content to sit and wait to see what 
happened when Jicarillas would eventually provoke Vargas’ wrath in response to their 
collaboration with upstarts and rebels. In this way they minimized the costly damages 
that often accompanied violent action and instead watched, almost as a third party, 
while Jicarillas and the Spanish waged a war of attrition against each other.
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! The rebellion of 1696 was disorganized, poorly executed, and brief in comparison 
to the one of August 1680. It began on June 4 when rebels swiftly dispatched five 
missionaries and twenty-one vecinos. This event was the first, and most severe, 
setback suffered by the Spanish. Just four months later, in October, Vargas broke the 
rebellion’s back and, although he would occasionally mop up pockets of resistance for 
months to come, the immediate threat of widespread and coordinated violence was 
ended almost as soon as it began. The pueblo of Cochiti, for example, an area 
especially intense rabble-rousing, was defeated early on, in July 23. A Spanish soldier 
pleased Vargas when he decapitated the rebel leader there, Lucas Naranjo, and placed 
his head on a stake as a warning to others. Picuris pueblo fell on October 26 and 
Vargas took many captives while most of the remaining Tiwas fled to Cuartelejo to eek 
out a new life with Jicarilla Apaches. By November Vargas felt so assured of his 
superior position that he not only attacked and dispersed a rather insignificant camp of 
Tewas, Tiwas, and Jicarillas in the Sangre de Cristo Mountains above Santa Fe, but he 
also pursued them for 65 leagues (about 169 miles) into present-day southern 
Colorado, where he defeated them and seized most of their property. Vargas reckoned, 
in a letter to the viceroy, then the Conde de Moctezuma, that he had humiliated them 
and bred a profound fear in them that the Spanish were capable and willing to attack 
them in their own lands.31
! The short-lived rebellion was a non-event for Faraones. Their role was limited to 
some stirrings around Pecos and Bernalillo that concerned local missionaries but that 
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never amounted to anything. They stood firmly outside of the rebellion and weathered 
the event without appreciable diminishment of their population or their material goods. 
Conversely, the failed rebellion cost Jicarillas dearly. Vargas wrought crushing defeat on 
Jicarillas, Tiwas, Tewas, and others, and forced the former into a position of weakness 
that would open the door to their further exploitation by Athapaskan, as well as by Ute 
and Comanche expansionism. Jicarillas and their Puebloan allies had challenged the 
Spanish with an almost pure hawk strategy and the Spanish had met the challenge by 
also ‘playing’ hawk. When Vargas escalated the conflict to a degree that was 
insupportable for the indigenous players, Jicarillas lost the contest and suffered the high 
cost of violent competition. In terms of game theory, this rebellion was a so-called war of 
attrition, a particular kind of game given to hawk-hawk play, where both sides harm 
each other over a long period of time; where only one side can afford the time and 
resources to win; and where neither side can recoup the losses incurred during the 
violent game. The Spanish of New Mexico, connected as they were to the vast imperial 
network of New Spain, could weather the high cost better than the relatively isolated 
Jicarillas could.32
! It is an attractive impulse to imagine that Faraones masterminded the 
degeneration of the region as a means to deal with their enemies by proxy because it 
would find a political vector for early Apachean domination that would match the 
ecological one that I have analyzed over the previous chapters. It is too much of a 
reach, however, to construct the available evidence so generously. The most that can 
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be said is that Faraones were disinclined to openly engage Vargas because they had 
access already to a much broader territory to satisfy their societies’ needs. The risks of 
open warfare outweighed the benefits of a more measured trade-and-raid approach. 
Jicarillas, on the other hand, did not have the same magnitude of access to alternate 
ecologies and Spanish places. Their fight for access from the northern borders of New 
Mexico was their only chance at participation in the broader colonial economy and so 
they, tragically, took a calculated but high risk in a relatively unknown market (Vargas’) 
and found that disappointment was their return.
!  The chronology provided here is a sampling of a much broader sequence of 
events. I have culled these moments out as representative of how Tiwas and Jicarilla 
Apaches fared poorly in the face of prepared Spanish resistance. Vargas’s 
administration signaled the reversal to the bureaucratic atrophy that had precipitated 
Otermín’s fall in 1680 and the anemia that had allowed for the rebellion in 1684. No 
Athapaskan or Puebloan group could have known that the game had changed, but the 
enduring Spanish commitment to the Middle Rio Grande Valley and Vargas’ tenacity 
were clear signs. If Faraones were looking for a gauge of Spanish political and military 
capability, then the three years from 1694 through 1696 provided an abundance of 
intelligence to be used in future strategizing.
! Following the November conclusion to the revolt, Faraones reemerged into the 
foreground. In December of 1696 Captain Lázaro de Mizquía addressed the Santa Fe 
cabildo and recommended a sweeping plan:  Remove the Tiwas, Tanos, and Keres from 
the pueblos at Picuris, Taos, Cochiti, Santo Domingo, and Jemez; relocate them to the 
south (presumably in the abandoned Piro areas); assign presidials to the area to 
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oversee the dislocated Puebloans; and use them as a human buffer against Apache 
incursions that came from the southeast. Once the relatively greater threat offered by 
Jicarillas and Tiwas evaporated, Spanish attention swiftly turned back to Faraones. 
Events did not pan out as Mizquía would have liked, but his report betrays a much 
broader and more durable reality that underlay the storm of revolt and war that had 
raged over much of 1696. Faraones, Apaches of the Jornada del Muerto and the Trans-
Pecos, continued to siphon and sap the resources of the colony from the south while 
Vargas fought in the north.33 
! Immediately on the heels of the 1696 rebellion Governor Vargas was replaced, 
despite his best efforts to secure a second appointment. His successor, Governor 
Cubero arrived in Santa Fe in 1697, and immediately exercised his right to conduct a 
residencia of Vargas’ term. The man who had finally taken back the Middle Rio Grande 
Valley for New Spain was made to suffer the humiliation of being locked up in Santa Fe, 
going from the palace to shackles in a matter of days. Cubero soon had charges laid 
against him over his handling of the province and the 1696 revolt. Vargas’ son, Juan 
Manuel de Vargas Pimentel, was outraged. As the proceedings wore on he petitioned 
the Mexico City junta in 1700 to allow his father to travel to the imperial capital. To do so 
Pimentel requested that his father’s bond be waived by the government and that an 
armed escort be provided. The escort seemed especially crucial because, Vargas’ son 
complained, there had been a number of deaths recently that had gone unreported. 
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Pimentel could have been lying; he could have been making a bid to get his father some 
protection not from Native groups but from Cubero’s forces. But surrounding evidence 
suggests otherwise. Making the trip from Santa Fe to El Paso del Norte and down 
through Parral on the Camino Real de Tierra Adentro involved passage through Faraon 
territory. Recently, those Apaches had been responsible for an attack on a courier 
traveling south on the camino real and they had cut down two of the Spanish. Months 
earlier, Apaches around El Paso del Norte had also taken a widow, Maria Parea, 
captive.34 
!
! Vargas was eventually cleared of wrongdoing by the junta general in Mexico City, 
given a new title (Marques de la Nava de Barcinas) by the Crown, and returned for a 
second term as governor in 1703. Although he was undoubtedly glad to return to Santa 
Fe despite Cubero’s best efforts, he immediately found his administration challenged by 
Faraones in the Albuquerque-Belen Basin, just west of the Sandia and Manzano 
Mountains and dangerously near to Santa Fe. This area had historically been dotted 
with southern Tiwa pueblos–the very ones that Otermín had noted as being diminished, 
abandoned, or ruined in 1681. During his first administration, Vargas had fretted over 
the reduced numbers of Puebloans in the area and the perceived Spanish need to 
populate it as a means of defense. Sometime just before the 1696 event, Vargas 
granted Captain Miguel Garcia and don Fernando Duran y Chaves lands there and 
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these veteran Spanish soldiers immediately started haciendas. Duran y Chaves’ house 
was at the outpost of Bernalillo, just north of where the villa of Albuquerque would be 
founded, in 1706. Since Bernalillo’s inception, reports had been steadily streaming in 
that Faraones (or Siete Rios Apaches, as they were sometimes named) had been 
pillaging horses and cattle. What had begun as a minor irritation was fast becoming a 
biting nuisance and Vargas prepared a response, perhaps make a demonstration of his 
power following his return.35
! On March 29, 1704 Vargas met his troop in the plaza de armas at Bernalillo. He 
had fifty presidials with him and 116 Puebloan auxiliaries. Vargas set out from his villa 
on March 30, but unlike his rugged forays into the Hueco Mountains and beyond in 
1692, the captain general hugged the Rio Grande and its bosque, preferring to stay 
close to water, and he grazed his horses on saltgrass beneath the shade of cottonwood 
trees. In lieu of firsthand soldiering, he relied heavily on scouts from the Tewa and Keres 
pueblos, chaperoned by Spanish captains, to locate and engage the Faraones. Over 
the course of the expedition he ventured only a little over 15 leagues (39 miles) 
downriver–and paltry distance–and abstained from montane travel or combat. 
! The very next day, March 31, Captain Jose Naranjo, the Spanish leader of the 
scouting party reported that Apaches were moving south and east out of the Sandia 
Mountains and into the vicinity of Abó, one of the ruined Tompiro pueblos located in the 
Estancia Basin. The Spanish and auxiliaries had fought them, without success, around 
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a watering hole that was dubbed “Carnuel.” The Estancia Basin forms the northern 
border of the Central Closed Basin, the larger topographical land form that comprises 
the mountain ranges east of the Jornada del Muerto and extending eastward to the 
watershed of the Pecos River. Naranjo probably did not realize it, but the Faraones 
were retreating through territory that was very familiar to them. The Spanish, however, 
were not nearly so familiar and risked much at the prospect of leaving their riverine 
haven. Furthermore, this was a dry time of year during a long-term drought that 
stretched from 1700 to 1709. The average rainfall in this area during the month of 
March or April would have been about half an inch, if the Spanish were lucky, and it 
would have been cold: an average of 57º F. Wintertime snowfall would have delivered 
some high-elevation snowpack, but that had yet to thaw; significant rains would not 
come again until July and the next monsoon season. Apaches were luring the Spanish 
into treacherous conditions. Strategically, their escape path from the Middle Rio Grande 
Valley invited the Spanish to dare passing through an improvised “Jornada del 
Muerto.”36 
! Vargas smelled the trap. Disregarding the eastward slopes of the mountains and 
the approaches to the Pecos watershed, he instead dispatched scouts to reconnoiter 
the mountains and the watering holes that were nearer to him. For example, the 
Cañada del Infierno, the Canyon of the Inferno, on the westward slopes Manzanos near 
the pueblo of Isleta received considerable attention although there was little indication 
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that it was a viable site of recent Apachean activity. Vargas was most likely reluctant to 
engage Faraones who, by this point, had moved south and east...into the shunned 
spaces of the Trans-Pecos and back to the havens of other rancherias on other rivers 
and into labyrinthine mountain basins with snowpack, fuelwood, and wild game. These 
resources would have provided sufficient subsistence in addition to the calories derived 
from the pillaged cattle and horses. Vargas continued south along the river for another 
10 miles before he gave up the mission and turned back on April 2. He was in his early 
60s, a ripe age, and his energies had waned. The project came to an abrupt and 
definitive end on April 8 when he died in Bernalillo, his final task truncated and 
incomplete. Like the anticlimactic Dominguez-Lopez journey to the Edwards Plateau in 
1683, Vargas had accomplished little more than to pass through a corridor of space 
where Spanish power was heavily tempered by its transience. 
!
! These accounts of Apaches on the camino real and their role in the lackluster 
end of Vargas are almost anecdotal. They speak to presence, to action, and to tenacity, 
but there is little in them that is new. Indeed, these examples harken back to patterns 
that date back to the 1670s, perhaps even the 1650s. A third example, however, 
provides a connective tissue to the ways that the Middle Rio Grande Valley after 1692 
was a distinct geopolitical theater compared to that prior to 1680. Beginning with the 
1690s Apachean foreign policy crystallized and became more sophisticated and 
advantageous than what had existed even during the so-called Manso Rebellion of 
1684. In contrast to Jicarilla policy in 1696, Faraon strategy shifted beyond its earlier 
stages of endemic raiding and Puebloan conspiracy to embrace strategies that were 
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much more nuanced; the hawk strategy of the previous century that was almost purely 
antagonistic gave way to a mixed strategy where violence was always an option, but it 
was seldom the first choice. From 1692 to 1707, and arguably through 1721, Apaches 
practiced symbiotic bellicosity. They alternately baited the Spanish into resupplying New 
Mexico through low-intensity violence and offered trade in places like Albuquerque, 
using tropes and narrative devices that would have appealed to Spanish ears.37  
! After Vargas’ first term, a figurative winter settled over New Mexico. Famine and 
privation hit the colonists hard and vecinos had resorted to eating gruel made from their 
household pets, horses, grass seed, leather, and bone, much as they had done during 
the 1670s. Back when he was certified by the Santa Fe cabildo in 1702, Cubero was 
treated to glowing praise and was credited with quickly “reducing” certain groups of 
Apaches who were thought to be serial raiders, including Faraones and Jicarillas. One 
of the key ways Cubero accomplished this so-called reduction was to import vast 
quantities of material goods, including 300 mules, 100 oxen, and enough horses and 
cattle and other supplies to last the colonists for two full years. Cubero did the work that 
Oñate had done upon the colony’s founding and that the Franciscan mission supply 
service had done throughout the seventeenth century:  he injected imperial wealth into 
New Mexico and made it attractive as a newly diversified product to Apachean 
economy. When he did that, he probably did more to “reduce” Apache groups than any 
military campaign might have done. (Considering that Apaches had thwarted veteran 
governors for long periods of time, the cabildo’s praise should be read with a grain of 
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salt.) More probable is that Cubero did not subordinate Apaches, but instead created 
enough wealth that New Mexico could afford to trade with Apaches and, through 
peaceful exchange, win a respite. In leaner times vecinos must have been less likely to 
trade their few meager possessions and, as a consequence, they were raided and 
plundered. The New Mexico Spanish misunderstood their role in the larger, Apache-led 
economies of the region. The arrival of Cubero and his supply trains from the dusty 
Jornada del Muerto merely made New Mexico attractive to Apache traders and allowed 
trade to become possible again for vecinos.38
! Regardless of lingering questions over the efficacy of Cubero’s martial reduction 
of Native groups, vecinos and Puebloans were again starving in 1705, as they had in 
1702, as they had in the initial moments of Vargas’ resettlement project, and as they 
had during the entire span of the 1680s, and before. People were impoverished and 
could be found naked in the streets, in the plazas, and in the countryside. The lean 
times that Cubero had remedied with his stimulus of livestock, seed, and material goods 
had returned with a vengeance. Before Governor Cuervo y Valdez had even been able 
to take the seat of power in Santa Fe the cabildo despaired at their condition. In the 
spring of 1705 they begged the viceregal court for horses, lead, and gunpowder 
because there had been none for them to defend themselves or mount escorts since 
1703. If the new governor wondered at what kind of legacy Vargas had left him, he did 
not have to wait long. Soon, Faraones descended from the Sandia and Manzano 
Mountains in broad daylight and took eighty cattle from Bernalillo. Afterwards they 
celebrated in the mountains with great smoking fires, no doubt barbecuing the freshly 
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taken meat. They did not deign to conceal their fires or withdraw out of eyesight from 
the Middle Rio Grande Valley because they knew that New Mexico’s government was in 
transition and correctly gauged that the Spanish were, at that moment, impotent to 
challenge them.39 
! By the winter of 1705-1706 Cuervo y Valdes became desperate. Despite his best 
efforts he failed to secure the province’s capital and had to entrust the defense of Santa 
Fe and Bernalillo to his inferiors so that he could rush to El Paso del Norte and stave off 
imminent Faraon Apache attacks there. If Faraones were trying to squeeze blood from a 
rock it worked, but only because of New Spain’s vast inter-continental network. In 
February of 1706 the junta general in Mexico City took note of the situation and 
authorized the transmission of relief aid. The governor himself had already purchased 
500 hundred head of cattle and tons of grain from Nueva Vizcaya in an effort to plug the 
sieve. In addition to that this incredible influx of foodstuff and livestock, the junta 
authorized materiel and personnel. There was a catch, though. These supplies were 
meant to be used in a purely defensive posture:  Cuervo y Valdez was not allowed to 
fight back. Apaches had succeeded in securing additional wealth for New Mexico 
without incurring the risk of offensive warfare, in spite of the fact that Vargas had only 
just weathered a serious rebellion reminiscent of 1680. Faraones, intentionally or not, 
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had measured out just enough violence to win, but at a lower cost. This is classic hawk 
plus assessor play; the Spanish could only act, by decree, as doves plus assessor.40
! Unwittingly the new governor sweetened the deal for Apaches by concentrating 
much of this newfound wealth in a new villa named Albuquerque. No doubt using some 
of the fresh supplies sent up the Camino Real de Tierra Adentro, Cuervo y Valdes 
located 252 persons in about 35 families in 1706. He had the vecinos sow fields that 
were watered by new acequias and build houses and corrals of sturdy material. Tano 
Puebloans, displaced from their original habitations by earlier raiding, supplemented the 
Spanish population with a new, nearby mission between Santa Fe ad Albuquerque:  
Santa Maria de Gracia de Galisteo. Before the adobe had time enough to dry, though, 
fray Juan Álvarez was again writing from San Pablo to request that even more materials 
be injected into the region. Specifically, he also wanted to enrich the Galisteo Basin and 
the Tanos there with more herds of cattle and soldiers enough to protect them.41 
! Faraones noticed the swollen economy and took advantage of the situation:  they 
scaled back their raiding operations and instead entered into peace with the Spanish in 
order to receive gifts and to trade. Given that Cuervo y Valdes made no serious punitive 
expeditions against these Apaches it is unlikely that they were coerced into peace. 
Unlike Navajos to the north and west who did enter into peace after devastating attacks 
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on their rancherias and fields, Faraones appear to have been driven by other 
motivations. During the late winter and spring of 1706 they entered into peace both at 
Santa Fe and Pecos pueblo, receiving gifts of cloth, flannel, knives, tobacco, ribbon, 
and valuable animal hides.42 
! At Albuquerque, a detailed account of one of these meetings exemplifies how 
Apaches made themselves politically and economically attractive to the Spanish when 
they so desired. Faraones rebranded their group as one that was compatible to imperial 
places...and the economy that came with them by appealing to Catholicism’s 
predilection for supernatural visions and the Spanish’s agrarian fixation on maize. One 
day, just before the summer solstice, there came from the Sandia Mountains a Faraon 
leader with a Tigua interpreter named Andres, along with a handful of other Faraones. 
They met with the alcalde mayor, Captain Martín Hurtado. 
! They had a fantastic story to share with their Spanish neighbors that was 
carefully engineered for a European audience. Apparently the people of a Faraon 
rancheria in the mountains had been going about their daily affairs when, suddenly, a 
specter appeared before them. Quickly the visage of a man took shape before them and 
immediately arrested their attention. The Faraones surmised that he was a spiritual 
embodiment of their people. Equipped with a spectral bison hide–a mark of power, 
wealth, and accomplishment–the spirit proceeded to speak, and admonish them. He 
told them that their lives in the mountains produced nothing but evil and destruction, and 
that they lived as animals in the wilderness. The phantom counseled them that they 
should acknowledge the god of the Spanish as the one true god and to live in peace 
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with them. No miracles occurred in relation to this sighting, but the account probably 
brought to Hurtado’s mind the story of Juan Diego and his 1531 account of seeing a 
phantom girl on the slopes of Tepeyac, the Lady of Guadalupe. This story was in wide 
cultural currency among the Spanish and these Faraones, through captives and through 
their exchanges at trade fairs, had doubtless become familiar with it. These Apaches 
knew their audience well and spoke to religious concerns, as well as secular ones. 
When they claimed that they had been told that they lived like beasts causing 
destruction, they spoke to the practical project of missionary work that franciscans since 
Alonso de Benavides had spoken of since 1630. They were carefully prompting the 
Spanish to believe that there was a sense of mutualism and progress at play. It worked. 
Hurtado’s report of the encounter suggests he was riveted.43 
! The Apache captain, sensing that the alcalde mayor was hooked, proceeded with 
cues that would have then appealed to Spanish worldly concerns:  Apparently, the 
specter ended his presentation by giving atole, a hot drink made from maize, to the 
Faraones of Sandia. Maize was, of course, a staple crop for the pueblos and the 
vecinos alike. Its consumption as a liquid speaks to themes of baptism and voluntary 
dependence on the foods of the river valley and the ways that it is processed. If 
Faraones were beguiling the Spanish into accepting peace and allowing them access to 
trading opportunities, their choice of narrative and allusion was excellent and well-
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placed. Hurtado certainly was persuaded, for he reported immediately to Governor 
Cuervo y Valdes that he believed that the Apaches of Sandia and the Manzanos could 
be settled into pueblos and assimilated into colonial life with “a little diligence and 
fortitude.” Just two years after Vargas met his end nearby, and two years before similar 
raids and pillaging would again wrench much wealth from this valley, Hurtado, and 
possibly the governor, were eagerly grasping at fantasies of peace at Faraon prompting. 
The Faraones had just bargained their way into a commitment not to depredate over 
Albuquerque and Bernalillo, but had secured a promise of future financial dealings.44 
! The prospects for trade were bright during this time. The prior autumn’s harvest 
had yielded surplus grain, some of which would be available for barter, and vecinos 
were commonly in possession of powder, bullets, tobacco, chocolate, and sugar. The 
Spanish relaxed their fears of imminent attack. Juan de Ulibarri, a Spanish military man 
and part of the Santa Fe cabildo, relocated just ten soldiers to Albuquerque to protect 
Spanish interests in what was now the southeastern frontier against Faraones and 
Chilmos. This relatively light commitment of Spanish military muscle speaks to the 
detente that Apaches had offered, and which the Spanish had bought. These were 
robust times when trade was more lucrative for all. Pillaging and open aggression would 
have been potentially more effective in obtaining wealth, but at a risk that was 
disproportionately high.45 
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! The pattern that exists here reaches back at least ten years through the 
administrations of Cuervo y Valdes, Vargas, and Cubero. During this important time of 
Spanish reintroduction and the ostensible reconquista of New Mexico, Apaches 
influenced the Spanish politically, economically, and spatially. They systematically baited 
the colonizers into sending more and more supplies into the Middle Rio Grande Valley 
as a means to diversify and enhance the resources that were available. Faraones 
alternately traded and raided, in effect re-channelling the wealth and clout of New Spain 
far beyond the river valley and into the ranges and basins of the Trans-Pecos. It is 
impossible to say with certainty how much of this practice was deliberate because 
Apaches did not leave records behind and it would be an extreme undertaking to find, 
let alone corroborate, any oral history that speaks to the question. Even still, for ten 
years, at least, an unmistakable pattern existed that points to an Apachería that was 
grown and maintained through manipulation of Spanish political and economic 
structures. 
! In the decades that passed between 1692 and the 1720s Faraones variously 
harried or courted the colony and, by doing so, worked it like a resource that had the 
unmistakable advantage being able to consistently regenerate itself no matter how 
much it was drained or pruned. The cycle that was first witnessed through Vargas’ and 
Cubero’s tenures was replayed during the administrations of Governors Francisco 
Cuervo y Valdez and Jose Chacón Medina Salazar y Villaseñor. Despite the fact that 
Jicarillas and Navajos each endured targeted military action that greatly reduced their 
ability to dictate the perimeters of their Native space, Faraones negotiated this period 
with exceptional dexterity. They siphoned wealth from the Spanish through low-intensity 
violence and cyclic pillaging. Essentially, Faraones played the game aggressively as 
long as the costs were low and the payoffs high, but whenever the Spanish escalated 
the conflict and began to respond in with retaliation, Faraones switched to diplomatic 
and peaceable strategies and were able to accrue modest gains without the 
diminishment of the cost of warfare. In the course of their manipulation, Faraones gave 
life and meaning to Apachería; they converted the Spanish Middle Rio Grande Valley 
into an artificial resource and used it in complement with the natural resources of the 
northern Chihuahuan Desert and its edges.46
! Early in 1714 the northern edge of the Jornada del Muerto buzzed with activity. 
On the slopes of the Fra Cristobal Mountains scores loitered and conversed, passing 
the day, until they finally decided that it was time to start the trip up the Rio Grande. 
They lit upon their horses, organized their groups and ranks, and set out on the camino 
real, dominating the official pathway of imperial New Spain. The ground shook beneath 
them and no one dared, or could, stand in their way...including the Spanish. These 
Faraones rode with impunity and seized Spanish horses wherever possible. So great 
was their ability at this moment that they could afford to play asymmetrical games with 
the Spanish, both threatening them and then delivering on the threat. They dared to 
ambush armed escorts of Spanish militia when the opportunity arose and the seized 
horses from Bernalillo, again. But this was not a case of Faraones directing high-
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intensity violence against the Spanish, as if inviting war. Granted, these riders plucked 
what low-hanging fruit haciendas and ranchos offered, but they blazed past Santa Fe 
and made for the rio arriba, deep into Jicarilla territory.47 
! These Apaches were heading for the rio arriba area to challenge their ethnic 
cousins, Jicarillas, for access to the grasses and river valleys of the upper Rio Grande, 
the Canadian, and the Arkansas Rivers because these spaces were well suited to horse 
pasturage or to the dry-farming of maize. But why, and why did they wait twenty years 
after they first suggested such a scheme to Vargas, in 1694? Although the inner socio-
political reasoning and justification for aggressive maneuvers against fellow Apaches 
has not survived in documentary form, climatological modeling and peripheral history 
offers persuasive clues. 
! From 1714 to 1738 drought gripped the Bernalillo area. Since 1706, at the latest, 
Apaches had habitually worked the Albuquerque-Belen basin for the stores of horses, 
cattle, grain, and other raid-worthy goods from the new villa. Evidence handed down by 
Vargas, Hurtado, Felix Martinez (long-time captain of Santa Fe presidio), and other 
Spanish in the area attest to the fact that this area had emerged as a focal point in the 
economy of Faraones. The drought presented a complication, however. Although 
Faraones had the ability to pick up stakes and go elsewhere for subsistence purposes, 
the Spanish inhabitants of the basin could not, and the reduced rainfall would have 
reduced the quantity and quality of crops and the lack of moisture for riparian grasses 
would have reduced the quality of livestock. In this way Faraones may have begun 
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looking elsewhere to supplement the income lost from this area, although there is no 
indication that they were actively hurting for the means to subsistence. After all, this is 
still the period when they would have been obliging the Spanish to continually import 
fresh goods up the camino real.48 
! The effects of drought in and around Bernalillo should not be overstated in light 
of the account from March 1694 when Faraon captains attempted to entice Vargas to 
vacate the pueblos of the rio arriba and give them to their own Apache groups. The 
sustained nature of the Faraon attempt to absorb rio arriba territory does not reflect a 
need to defray the incidental consequences of a drought. Although Faraones likely 
missed the produce that they would have otherwise raided or traded for from Bernalillo 
and Albuquerque, the fact that they returned to this particular span of territory speaks to 
the reality that they were likely striving to diversify the types of territory over which they 
held dominion in 1714 just as in 1694. Concomitant with this reason was their strategic 
elimination of a competitor and potential rival to the opportunities and benefits of 
Spanish presence in the Middle Rio Grande Valley. Just as had been done with the 
Jumano kin of the Tompiro pueblos in the 1670s, whom Apaches had expelled from 
their trade linkages with the pueblos, Faraones were likely attempting to cut off other 
groups, however ethnically related, from enriching their stores of horses, metal goods, 
or weapons. In addition, there was an economic incentive. If Faraones displaced 
Jicarillas, they would gain dedicated access to trade with pueblos in the Jemez 
Mountains and with Navajo peoples.49
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! From 1714 to 1715, Faraones attacked Tiwa and Jicarilla lands, but declined to 
give sufficient cause to New Spain to launch an offensive war. Instead, a repeat of what 
had occurred during the Cuervo y Valdes administration occurred. On November 3 of 
1714 the Fiscal, in response to petitions from Santa Fe, authorized the quick release of 
25,000 pesos to go to the presidio of New Mexico–a vast figure that would have 
translated into the purchase and importation of more horses, tools, cows, mules, and 
munitions. And like before, the junta general, together with Viceroy Fernando de 
Alencastre Noroña y Silva, ordered in January of 1715 that these monies and the 
materials that went with them could only be used defensively, to “persuade” Apaches to 
peaceful ends lest aggravating these Athapaskans spark a regional pan-ethnic war. The 
official Spanish response to Faraon activities in 1714 and 1715 offered little competition 
for the actual control of physical spaces. Instead, Governor Mogollón, the viceroy, and 
the junta general merely fattened the potential targets found in Spanish and Puebloan 
places.50
! By late July of 1715 the lieutenant governor of Taos, don Geronimó, was 
regularly informing Mogollón of Faraon incursions against Jicarilla rancherias and 
against the horse herds held by Tiwas at the pueblo of Picuris. The New Mexico 
governor seemed to have figured out that Faraones were rapidly expanding into the 
territory of the Jicarilla and their Tiwa allies, perhaps seeking to place that block of 
geography and the Great Plains economy that went with it under their aegis. If 
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successful, their domination would form a contiguous cord from the northern borders of 
New Mexico all the way down its eastward side into Nueva Vizcaya.51 
! Compounding this worry was the prospect that French imperialism, creeping 
down the Great Plains, would somehow exploit, use, or be aided by Faraon 
ascendancy. Since 1695 Vargas had sent detailed accounts to Mexico City of the 
periodic forays of French traders and exploratory groups into the area of present-day 
southeastern Colorado and their encounters with Jicarillas. Jicarillas, for their part, 
consistently represent themselves as being friends of the Tiwas and the Spanish, and 
they appear to have rebuffed any attempts at engagement with the French. The Spanish 
might have feared that Faraones would be more amenable to French overtures 
considering the French propensity to sell firearms and the Faraones penchant for using 
them. Although Mogollón never explicitly expressed alarm at the prospect of a Faraon 
Apachería becoming overtly imperialistic through access to French empire, this brief 
and quiet moment, from 1714 until 1724, represented the height of Apachean 
ambition.52
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! But it was not to be. What might have been a Faraon empire that spanned the 
Chihuahuan Desert, the Great Plains, and the Rocky Mountains instead found itself 
confined to the desert with only constricted access to the Great Plains. The reasons 
behind the failure of Faraones to make good on their momentum makes sense of why 
the expansion of their Apachería ceased and instead rededicated itself to operating from 
the desert. They had, simply put, explored more than they had exploited, and the long-
term payoff fell short of expectations. Faraones had learned much about Spanish 
tenacity and the material wealth around El Paso del Norte during the interregnum and 
they applied this new knowledge to try to apply new strategies to the Middle Rio Grande 
Valley and the rio arriba post-Vargas. They had found some success with what I term 
symbiotic bellicosity but they were unsuccessful in their bid to find a strategy that was 
stable enough to work against the Spanish and the Jicarillas once Comanches and Utes 
appeared from the north. Their ensuing spatial contraction did not signal the decline of 
Apache geopolitical power, however, but rather its plateau. The significance of 
Apachean choices and opportunities in the Trans-Pecos area and beyond would 
reverberate for another century and a half, but their clout in terms of circumscribing and 
exploiting Spanish empire was eroded by the powerful competition offered by Uto-
Aztecan speakers. A detailed account of these ten years is better suited to an analysis 
of Jicarilla or Comanche history. For the purposes of charting Apachean history and the 
powerful role played by arid geographies it is enough to outline what happened in the rio 
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arriba from 1714 to 1724 and to define the arena of Athapaskan–Uto-Aztecan 
competition.53
! Eventually, Mogollón sent General don Juan Páez Hurtado to investigate and 
pursue damages inflicted upon the Picuris as well as Jicarillas around the Canadian 
River. The expedition, seemingly in contradiction to the directive issued by the junta 
general of Mexico City on 22 January 1715, resembled the Dominguez-Lopez 
expedition of 1683 that ventured through the Trans-Pecos and onto the Edwards 
Plateau of present-day Texas. Like the Jumanos who had come to Otermín and Cruzate 
for aid against Apaches, Jicarillas now came to Mogollón for succor against Faraones. 
And like the Dominguez-Lopez expedition, Hurtado typically found only tracks, remains, 
and the frustration of wandering in a land that was thoroughly surveilled and dominated 
by other groups.
! In typical Spanish fashion, Hurtado possessed a large retinue. Traveling with him 
were 36 presidials, 21 vecinos, 151 Puebloan auxiliaries, and 388 horses, of which 
about half belonged to the auxiliaries. Strikingly, there were thirty Pecos Puebloans 
present, with harquebuses and horses of their own. The Spanish were understandably 
suspicious of these people as auxiliaries because they were historically known to 
fraternize with Faraones. It is possible that they were actually willing to assist in 
relieving the pressure on Tiwas since Faraon creation of alternate, and nearby, markets 
would have hurt their own pueblo’s access to the Plains economy. For sedentary groups 
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the imperial economy of the Middle Rio Grande Valley was still shaky after all, riddled 
with droughts, raids, shortages, and dwindling indigenous populations. The Pecos 
contingent might have been using the Spanish to remind the Apaches where their 
proper trading venues were. Or, reasonably, they could have been spies.54
! A junta de guerra held in Santa Fe the previous summer surmised that Faraones 
would be harvesting the maize at that time from riparian areas where they had planted 
seeds the previous spring, and so Hurtado set out at the tail-end of August to try to 
intercept them before they could disperse over the Plains and the Trans-Pecos. For the 
next fifteen days he marched about 300 miles over the lands east of Taos and Picuris 
pueblos, and reached just past the Canadian River. This effort failed utterly and by 
September 13 he was low on supplies and even lower on morale. His troop, desperate 
for some kind of success found itself traveling in the final days about fifteen leagues, 
over double its typical distance, but in no particular direction. Having traveled 42 miles 
in a day, he echoed one of his predecessors, Maestre de Campo Juan Dominguez de 
Mendoza, and berated his guide as worthless and deceitful. Unlike Mendoza, however, 
who was content to part company with the Jumano leader Sabeata, Hurtado gave 
physical expression to his rage and he whipped his guide, making a scene and 
undoubtedly alienating many of the Puebloan auxiliaries. The very next day, his spies 
approached him and reported that the Faraones had gone to Pecos, as they were fully 
apprised of the Spanish expedition. He made a beeline for Santa Fe, arriving there on 
September 30.55
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! Thus, the Faraones prevailed over the Spanish and the Tiwa in the sense that 
their transhumant activities, their maize harvesting, and their designs on Jicarilla and 
Tiwa country proceeded without interruption. But it was a short-lived advantage. Four 
years later, the Spanish found the upward trajectory of Faraon Apachería reversed by 
the time Governor don Antonio Valverde Cosio undertook another expedition, in 1719. 
The Faraon reversal, however, could not be attributed to the Spanish, who served only 
as witnesses. Actually, Utes and Comanches were responsible this time. In response to 
a 1716 attack by Utes on Taos and news from Madrid that France (and England) had 
declared war on Spain, the governor was ordered to win Jicarillas over to the Spanish 
cause and to neutralize the French threat. Leaving again in the autumn, Valverde spent 
nearly two months of 1719 tracking over nearly the same route as Hurtado. Again he 
had a disproportionate number of Puebloan and Jicarilla auxiliaries; there were 645 
Natives compared to 60 presidials and 45 vecinos. Eventually Carlana Apaches, led by 
their eponymous leader, joined their Jicarilla kin and the Spanish, bringing 69 fighters 
with them. Over the 315 miles that he traveled, Valverde heard new and surprising 
stories of the devastating attacks of Comanches and Utes on northern Apaches. 
Valverde recorded such reports on at least ten occasions. Significantly, an important 
interpreter and cultural go-between on this trip was don Geronimó, the same lieutenant 
governor of Taos who had alerted Mogollón to the Faraon threat in 1714. In the 
intervening five years it seems that the Uto-Aztecans had reconnoitered the area well:  
they knew enough about the location and defenses of Jicarilla and Carlana rancherias 
that nearly every one that the Spanish encountered had either been burned or had a 
story of recent hostilities. Like Dominguez, and like Hurtado, Valverde was ultimately 
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unsuccessful in his bid to catch the raiders.  The difference this time was that the pursuit 
aimed not at Faraones, but at Comanche and Ute rancherias.56
! It should come as a shock that there is not one mention of Faraones in the rio 
arriba region and in present-day eastern Colorado during Valverde’s 1719 expedition. 
Although Spanish documents do not explicitly narrate how their absence came about, it 
appears that, within a five-year period, from 1714 to 1719, Faraones had ended their bid 
and allowed the entire geography to fall under Ute and Comanche power. This 
acquiescence constitutes a baffling shift of trajectory for Faraon Apachería as a Native 
space that was expanding deep past the northern Chihuahuan Desert and into the 
Great Plains and Rocky Mountains region. If Faraones had successfully dislodged 
Jicarillas and compelled Tiwas and Tewas into becoming dedicated trade partners, then 
they might have  been able go to the Spanish for aid and adopt, essentially, the same 
posture that Jicarillas were now adopting. But Faraones had been unsuccessful and 
could not reasonably seek Spanish aid or asylum in a land that was still, demonstrably, 
not their own. They had little recourse but to fall back to more familiar territory. We can 
better understand some of the reasons for this dramatic change in regional geopolitics 
by turning to an event Valverde witnessed on the banks of the Arkansas River towards 
the end of October, just before he turned back for Santa Fe. 
! On October 22 the Spanish and their allies were encamped near a place called 
Cuartelejo, the site of a massive concentration of Apaches that had been known to the 
Spanish for decades, but seldom visited. There, on the banks of the river, Valverde 
might have felt himself transported to another world where preconceptions about 
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Spanish empire and the nature of Athapaskan living were shattered. He had good 
reason to feel that way. As he walked among the 200 tents that sheltered over 1,000 
people he came across a scene that made concrete the reality that Spanish dominion 
ended much sooner than anyone cared to imagine. Here was a whole town of people 
living life outside of imperial jurisdiction. Touring the camp, he approached an Apache 
leader who was wounded and, upon closer inspection, found that the man had been 
shot. Athapaskans with firearms was a reality of the northern borderlands since before 
the time of the 1680 revolt, but this was different. This man was bleeding because of a 
French bullet, fired from a French gun, by Native groups allied to the French who were 
nearby.
! Valverde soon learned that Pawnees were closely aligned to the French and 
were regularly being supported by French arms and mounts. This open dispersal of 
European materiel to Native groups was something that the Spanish had never 
dreamed of doing—but that could now be credited for militarizing the southern Great 
Plains. From Pawnees, French arms passed easily to Comanches and Utes who 
sometimes traded for them, but more often procured them through violent means. 
Faraon Apaches, on the other hand, were limited in their access to harquebuses and 
horses through what they could find, seize, or surreptitiously trade for around Spanish 
hubs. In terms of supply they could not compete with a foe who was armed more easily 
and with better weapons. Additionally, Apaches had a much more difficult time 
outmaneuvering or escaping Comanches and Utes because they were similarly 
nomadic, light in traveling weight, and inured to long-distance travel. Thus, Comanches 
224
and Utes, armed by the French via Pawnees, had the technological edge to explode 
onto the scene and offer a more symmetrical, and lethal, competition to Faraones.57
! The New Mexican governor, meanwhile, was understandably stricken with panic. 
Deeming the French and their arms trafficking to be the core threat, he made for Santa 
Fe immediately and prepared another expedition, this time to be led by one of his 
lieutenant generals, don Pedro de Villasur, who was tasked with finding and neutralizing 
the French threat. This choice and the ensuing moments had profound implications for 
the future of Comanchería, and Apachería, and New Mexico. 
! Camped near a river in present-day Nebraska in the middle of August, Villasur 
took him time fulfilling his mandate from Valverde. He rested comfortably on the 
assumption that Spanish arms, once deployed to the field, commanded respect. He 
probably also assumed that any French presence among the tribes would guarantee the 
chance to parlay. The sun rose high in the sky and the presidials and vecinos loitered 
about camp perhaps enjoying the hot breeze through the tall-grass prairie. In a moment 
of hubris or blunder, Villasur inexplicably let the troop’s horses loose to graze on the 
buffalo grass and blue grama. Valverde learned what happened next from the few 
bedraggled survivors who managed to make it back to Santa Fe under the protection of 
Carlana and Jicarilla Apaches. Over 200 Pawnee and French fighters rushed the camp 
and fell on Villasur’s troop and massacred 45 of the Spanish, including Villasur himself, 
three Spanish captains, 19 soldiers, 11 auxiliaries, and one missionary. It was an utter 
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disaster for New Spain and especially for New Mexico. Such an extensive loss of 
experienced personnel crippled the practice of empire and immediately set back most 
Spanish designs in the region by decades. Valverde came under fire for this debacle 
almost as soon as the reports could be written and the threat of French-sponsored 
arms-trafficking went unchallenged for the time being.58
! The Jicarillas gained no respite from Comanches and Utes through Spanish 
intervention and by 1723 they were actively campaigning for missions and a presidio to 
be located among the core locus of their population, some 160 miles north of Santa Fe. 
Despite having been deeply complicit in 1680, 1696, and other conspiracies and 
uprisings, this group of Apaches found themselves so hard-pressed that they petitioned 
for Spanish protection at the cost of their independence and traditional way of life. This 
was a stunning reversal not just for Jicarillas, but for the geopolitical calculus of the 
entire region. Comanches and Utes, armed like no other Native groups before them, 
continued to pound into Jicarilla habitats with such regularity that rapine and death 
became common in the rio arriba. The Jicarillas grew impatient and desperate with 
Spanish promises and threatened to move west to live with Navajos, a prospect that 
distressed the Spanish. By this point Santa Fe valued Jicarillas, ironically, as a buffer 
population. The governor of New Mexico at that time, don Juan Domingo de 
Bustamante, favored the idea of situating a presidio among them and entreated the 
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viceroy, the second Marques of Casa Fuerte, to reallocate presidials meant to form a 
garrison at La Junta de los Ríos to a proposed presidio, “La Jicarilla,” instead. The Uto-
Aztecan ascendancy had turned foe into friend and sent Jicarillas and Spanish into 
each other’s arms; meanwhile, Faraones dug deeper into the Trans-Pecos and most 
likely began to seriously consider expanding farther to the south, below La Junta de los 
Ríos and El Paso del Norte, as they would do by 1740s.59 
! For Jicarillas, resolution did not come until 1727 when don Pedro de Rivera y 
Villalón weighed in on the matter. He had been sent on a royal-backed inspection of the 
northern edges of New Spain and so had the ear of the viceroy as well as the court in 
Madrid. Although there had been much correspondence that seriously entertained a 
third New Mexico presidio, when Rivera lambasted the idea, the issue was dropped. 
Rivera was no doubt cognizant of the straits that Spanish imperial resources were in 
following the Villasur massacre. Consequently, instead of enacting empire through the 
establishment of presidio to the north, the Spanish instead further consolidated their 
resources to the Middle Rio Grande Valley. The Jicarillas were instead settlers in 
ranchos just south of Taos pueblo, well within the Spanish orbit but far removed from 
their indigenous settings. The decline of Jicarillas came about swiftly, buried in the 
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considerations of bureaucratic paperwork. Generations of agitation and the fiery 
Faraon-Jicarilla competition ended with a whimper.60
! This recounting and analysis of events in the rio arriba and the Plains might 
seem like a digression, but it helps to explain why Faraon Apachería took the shape and 
location that it did. The Faraones might have become an inter-regional force that tapped 
multiple ecological zones and pincered Spanish New Mexico from the south, east, and 
north. But that did not happen. Instead, Comanchería was born and soon dominated the 
Canadian and Arkansas River watersheds, entrenching itself over the southern Great 
Plains. Soon it dominated the northern access routes into the Middle Rio Grande Valley 
via Tiwa pueblos and thereby gained access to the important imperial economy of New 
Spain.61
! In response to the emergence of a new and powerful player on the geopolitical 
landscape, Faraones shifted to the northern Chihuahuan Desert and the short-grass 
prairies of its northern edge landscapes. There, they used the land in creative ways to 
manifest an Apachería that was efficient, redoubtable, and significant. At the same time, 
they coalesced their ethnic identity with those of Gileño and Natagé peoples until the 
compound identity of “Mescalero” was borne into the documentary record. This 
Apachería would survive the Spanish empire, the Mexican republic, the Texan republic, 
and last well into the American period before it, and Comanchería, finally succumbed to 
external pressure late in nineteenth century. Xeric landscapes became sites of 
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entrenchment where advanced knowledge of landforms and resources allowed them to 
outmaneuver the better-armed Comanches and Spanish for decades to come.62
! For the time being Faraones carried on much as they had before, not appreciably 
vexed or humbled by their expulsion from the rio arriba by Comanches and Utes. The 
grand project of symbiotic bellicosity ended without morphing into a strategy that could 
maintain the same level, and kind, of competition. Comanches and Utes could afford to 
play hawk more often and, armed with firearms, with less cost, than Faraones or the 
Spanish could afford to match. Faraones continued to siphon wealth from New Mexico 
and to develop their practices of resource extraction from the desert. Governor 
Bustamante was painfully aware of this fact. When he diverted resources to the rio 
arriba, he had been preparing for some time to travel south, not north, to the 
Albuquerque-Belen Basin. He was set to hunt out and engage Faraones who were still 
pillaging goods and livestock from Albuquerque, using the Sandia and Manzano 
Mountains as cover. But when Jicarilla captains arrived in Santa Fe and threatened to 
abandon the area unless the Spanish sent immediate aid, Bustamante redirected his 
fifty presidials to rendezvous with Jicarillas, leaving on November 17, 1723. Apparently 
there was a benefit to the expansion of Uto-Aztecan groups:  they at least attenuated 
imperial resources and kept the Spanish from focusing too much on Faraones who 
continued their practices all along the Trans-Pecos.63
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! In conclusion, the Spanish ultimately failed to dislodge Faraones from the rio 
arriba but they did not have to wait long before those Apaches were displaced by a new, 
and more menacing, foe. By the early 1720s Comanches and Utes armed with French 
guns and on French horses had interrupted Faraon designs and fast became the 
preeminent source of expansion and aggression in the southern Great Plains around 
present-day southeastern Colorado. Comanches and Utes had come a long way very 
quickly since 1706, when Sergeant Major Juan de Ulibarri de la Tornada first noted 
them in an expedition north of Taos. By all accounts it was just ten years before they 
and their Ute allies exploded onto the scene and caught the Spanish, Faraones, and 
Puebloans by surprise.64
! Spatially, Faraon Apachería plateaued in the 1720s when expansion of its 
northern borders was checked by fresh, inter-regional competition. Uto-Aztecan-
speaking groups successfully jimmied their way into New Mexico and gained access to 
the pueblos and ranchos of the Middle Rio Grande Valley. By the 1720s Pecos pueblo 
represented their northern reaches and Faraones do not again appear in the rio arriba 
in any appreciable way. In all, they lost much of their access to Taos and Picuris 
pueblos, places for which they had been maneuvering since the 1710s, but they kept 
their hold on the Galisteo Basin, the Albuquerque-Belen Basin, and the entire Trans-
Pecos, just as they had for the past forty years and as they would for about fifty more 
years. Faraones may have been seeking to add the rio arriba and the fecund valleys of 
present-day southern Colorado to their list of granaries just as they had done with El 
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Paso and La Junta, but they were thwarted from this northward expansion despite the 
sophistication of their policies.
! Economically, Faraon wealth became less diversified because a subset of 
specialized goods that were found only in rio arriba places were now more difficult to 
procure. They could still count Pecos, Albuquerque, (sometimes) Santa Fe, and many 
other Spanish places in New Mexico as part of their network, but the new Spanish villa 
of Santa Cruz de la Cañada, the pueblos north of Santa Fe, and those in the Jemez 
Mountains were now fraught with risk. In response to this diminished access to 
manufactured goods, crops, and European livestock, Faraones intensified exploitation 
of the natural resources of the northern Chihuahuan Desert, the subject of chapter four. 
The north-south orientation of the colonial world–with its longitudinal stretches of 
mountains and rivers–that had obliged the Spanish to move northward now lay open for 
Faraones to venture south, deeper into the province of Nueva Vizcaya. They would 
move via the camino real and the Rio Conchos, the former departing from El Paso del 
Norte and the latter from La Junta de los Ríos. Eventually, they tapped into the Bolsón 
de Mapimí, an ecologically distinct area of the northern Chihuahuan Desert in present-
day Chihuahua and Coahuila. But that evolvement was still a generation in the making, 
and is the subject of chapter five.
! The next chapter steps away from themes of expansion and competition in order 
to focus on how Faraones were equally creative and adaptive when negotiating the 
ecological offerings of their new homeland, the northern Chihuahuan Desert. Despite 
the violence of symbiotic bellicosity and the aggressive expansion of Faraon Apachería, 
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there was always a core to Apachería that existed beyond raids, seizures, and captive-
taking. 
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Chapter 4 
Emergence: Faraones in the Trans-Pecos and La Junta
! In 1686 fray Alonso de Posada, former custo of New Mexico and now 
procurador-general of the Franciscan Order in Mexico City, found himself playing the 
part of a geographer. It was an unexpected and ad hoc project designed to address a 
problem that was even more surprising and immediate than the one (still) posed by 
rebel Puebloans of the Middle Rio Grande Valley. Three years earlier, in 1683, news 
had come to El Paso that the French explorer René-Robert de LaSalle had appeared on 
the shores of present-day Texas, bringing with him men, arms, supplies, and the threat 
of a French counter-imperial attack. Fear crushed atop fears at El Paso, and the 
beleaguered Spanish refugees now found themselves faced not only with insurgent 
Puebloans to the north and harrying Faraones and Mansos all around, but now also the 
fear that the French would soon arrive from the rear and lop off the northern portions of 
the empire. Indeed, even as Posada worked, LaSalle was still wandering in what is 
today eastern Texas (although he would soon be killed in a mutiny, in 1687). On top of 
that, a former governor of New Mexico, don Diego Dionisio de Peñalosa (1661-1664), 
had defected from Spain after a falling out with the Inquisition and had recently curried 
favor in Parisian courts, where he supplied intelligence regarding New Mexico and two 
other provinces adjacent to New Mexico: “Quivira,” to the east, and “Teguayo,” to the 
west. 
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! Embarrassingly, Posada and other Spanish investigators were largely clueless 
about Quivira and Teguayo. As we know now, both were part historical anachronism and 
part political fiction. Nevertheless, the Spanish were terrified that the French knew 
something that they did not, and so Posada combed through the archives in the hopes 
that he would discover something that would defuse the damage done by Peñalosa. In 
the end, Posada seized on Alonso de Benavides’ 1630 Memoria for much of his 
information. From the geographical descriptions in Benavides’ work, Posada wove an 
intricate geography full of rivers, mountains, and expansive Native-controlled territories.1 
! Posada’s Informe is lengthy and attempts to account for lands that reach from 
the Gulf of Mexico all the way to California, with a northern latitude that terminates just 
above Taos. Posada conceived of Teguayo as a place that stretched far north and west 
of Santa Fe, in the Great Basin and then on to the Californias, whereas Quivira 
occupied the southern Great Plains reaching into present-day central Texas. In his 
attempts to describe what Quivira might look like and its significance for New France, 
Posada unwittingly described parts of North America that were already being claimed 
colonially, and even imperially, but not by French or Spanish agents. In fact, a Native-
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produced territoriality was just then forming, but Posada could not “see” it because it 
was not a European creation.
! Indeed, Posada soon made clear that all of Quivira seemed overrun by Apaches:  
“There is already a nation that is the master over all the Plains, and they are called the 
Apache.” Posada elaborated further on these Apaches of the Great Plains:  
“This nation occupies and has their own lands and they defend it, 400 
leagues long west to east, and 200 leagues from north to south; and in 
some parts more:  and the center is the Plains of Cibola, sharing land to 
the east with Quivira, with whom they always make war” and “that on 
many and diverse occasions they have entered into their [Pecos pueblo] 
lands...a mass of Apache rancherías, to sell their hides and chamois, and 
they trade Indian children from the Quivira nation for horses, where are 
they are known to make assault in their lands.”2
! It appears that Posada imagined a space over 1,000 miles east to west and over 
500 miles north to south that would have embraced the Mississippi River and the course 
of the Rio Grande in present-day Texas. At this time in the seventeenth century, 
Apaches were still among the handful of Plains groups who could have habitually raided 
groups so far east, captured “Quivira” children from the Mississippi valley, and then 
traded them for horses in the pueblos. As such, this practice represent a vector of 
Athapaskan expansionism which cannot be treated here. When Posada hinted at these 
events occurring far to the east, he was describing the activities of Jicarillan, Lipan, and 
other Plains groups such as Pawnees and Kiowas. The story of these eastward-leaning 
Apaches ranging into Oklahoma and Louisiana is one of resources, bodies, and energy 
flowing latitudinally. Faraones likely participated in this west-east economy through their 
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participation at trading fairs, but primarily their attention was oriented longitudinally into 
the economic heart of New Spain. These two directionalities had different life spans:  
Plains Apaches’ latitudinal territorialities would continue to expand until the 1720s, when 
Comanches from the north, armed with French guns, began to encroach and compress 
their Apacherías westward and southward. Faraon Apachería expanded until the 1740s, 
but maintained vast holdings throughout the Chihuahuan Desert well into the nineteenth 
century. This analysis is chiefly concerned with Faraon Apachería.3 
! In addition to assigning over 500,000 square miles to Apaches, Posada also 
gave clues about the character of their power. No doubt influenced by the events of the 
Manso Rebellion, the status of the Middle Rio Grande Valley, and the documented 
practices of Faraones, he correctly updated Benavides’ Memoria with the observation 
that the 
“Apache nation hold as pacified those [groups] in the Rio Grande district 
for about 100 leagues, and from these nations, there follow those of the 
Jumana [sic] with the rest of those mentioned in the La Junta de los Ríos 
of the Rio Grande and Conchos and they [the Apache] hold these captive 
in this place...until the mission of Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe [at El 
Paso].”4
In this Posada is clearly thinking about Faraones, since no other group ever had a 
documented presence that far south. There were no illusions. The Spanish were 
surrounded, at least on their northern and eastern flanks, by Apaches. Posada noted 
that these Apaches
“have given such great war to the Spanish who are common and have 
hand weapons, making many assaults and ambushes in the pueblos of 
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the Indians, savagely killing the men and carrying away the women and 
the living children, taking them as legitimate captives, trading them for 
corn seed by day, and Spanish horses by night, and taking all the rest of 
the damages that they commit as the industry of their arrogant strength;... 
they boast that they dwell in the mountains all around New Mexico and 
make war on the Spanish, and that they possess all the Plains of Cibola.”5
! The textual cartography of Alonso de Posada makes clear that, by 1686, the 
Spanish had codified information regarding the strong position that Apaches occupied in 
the northern Chihuahuan Desert and its northern ecotonal reaches, as well as their 
expansion southward and their aggressive posture towards neighboring indigenes. The 
significance of an enlarging Apachería was lost on his Spanish audience, however, 
because of fixation on the French, ignorance of Native cultures, and bureaucratic 
misdirection. Posada’s Informe did little to alter Spanish preconceptions of the 
relationship between environmental variance and geopolitical vectors of power. Had 
Posada and the viceregal court acknowledged concerted agency within indigenous 
actors (like Faraones) and perceived their practices as part of deliberate and 
competitive strategies—not just an accident of location—they might have realized 
sooner the hidden value of much that they shunned. As it was, they were over-focused 
on the French and the threat that emanated from LaSalle; they never translated the 
‘information’ of the Informe into ‘knowledge’ of Athapaskan geopolitical reality. The fact 
that Posada’s text did not lead to a revision of Spanish-Apache foreign policy or a 
reassessment as to the fecundity and utility of certain landscapes suggests that 
Faraones were not taken seriously. Whatever inroads these Apaches were known to 
have made were likely thought to be incidental to the 1680 revolt, and probably 
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impermanent. After all, how could an indigenous group be performing the work of 
empire and colony when their place on the ground was not anchored in permanent 
adobe walls, like those of missions and presidios? 
! Forty-two years later, in 1728, Francisco Álvarez Barreiro produced another map 
of the northern frontiers of New Spain that laid bare the strides Faraones had made. 
What is more, Barreiro’s cartography utilized the most recent intelligence. Where 
Posada had based his textual geography on antiquated data and did not provide a 
physical map to illustrate his findings, Barreiro’s cartography was informed by a wealth 
of information learned while he and Brigadier General don Pedro de Rivera toured the 
frontier from 1724 until 1728. Barreiro had accompanied Rivera on the latter’s official 
visita, or inspection, and had served as the company’s engineer and cartographer.6 
Map 11: Francisco Alvarez Barreiro, “Plano Corográfico de Las Provincias Del Nuevo 
México, 1728.”7 
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! Barreiro’s illustrations are startling. The labels “Tierra de los Apaches 
Pharaones,” or, simply, “Apaches Pharaones” fill nearly every blank space between 
Santa Fe in the west, San Antonio de Bexar in the east, the Rio Medina (the Colorado 
River, almost certainly) to the north, and the Rio Grande to the south.  Between 
landscapes that are dotted with trees, representing prairies, or landscapes full of rocky 
outcrops, representing mountain ranges, a tremendous amount of space is taken up 
with these labels and with the illustration of so many little huts or houses, representing 
Faraon rancherías. Five of the rancherías are located just east of Pecos pueblo and 
demonstrate that these Apaches were still considered an anchor of inter-ethnic 
presence and exchange in the region; another ranchería is just east and south of 
Albuquerque and likely portrays the Faraon presence that was so conspicuous during 
the immediate post-Vargas period of Spanish re-occupation. Three more rancherías 
exist farther down on the Pecos River and suggest that Faraones were thought to 
dominate that waterway’s entire stretch. In all, Barreiro’s illustration corroborates 
Posada’s text and seems to assign to “Pharaones” the entire breadth of the desplobado 
that existed between the Spanish outposts of Santa Fe and San Antonio. 
239
Map 12: Territories within Francisco Alvarez Barreiro, “Plano Corográfico de Las 
Provincias Del Nuevo México, 1728.”
(1: Faraon Apachería; 2: Natagé Apachería; 3: New Mexico; 4: Suma Territory; 5: Nueva 
Vizcaya; 6: Coahuila; 7: Bolsón de Mapimí)
! “Pharaones,” however, are missing from the south central portion of the 
desplobado. In that place, immediately to the northeast of La Junta de los Ríos, Barreiro 
illustrated six rancherías for “Apaches de Natagé.” These Apaches were almost 
certainly Faraones or closely aligned with them. There are three ways to arrive at this 
conclusion. Linguistically, Natagé is an Athapaskan-derived term for mescal-eaters; this 
would seem to firmly place Natagés under the larger appellation of Mescalero. In turn, 
there is broad consensus that Faraones were predecessors to Mescaleros, the Spanish 
term for mescal-eaters. Barreiro was speaking of a people who were undergoing a 
sweeping lexical shift within the written record in response to their new horticulture and 
diet along the Trans-Pecos. Just as Faraones had initially been called “Apaches 
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Vaqueros” by early seventeenth century Spanish to reflect their bison diet, so too did 
Faraones become named after their consumption of mescal agave in the first quarter of 
the eighteenth century.8
! Faraon is a useful term that I have adopted to discuss an ethnic grouping of 
Apaches, but etymologically it does not appear until after 1692, when the Spanish paper 
trail picks up again in earnest, and the archival obliterations of 1680 begin to recede in 
importance. It appears that it was a politically-charged appellation, on the part of the 
Spanish. There is no evidence that the term is Athapaskan or that it holds any particular 
relevance to Apache societies today. The “Pharaon” spelling seems to be a 
straightforward orthographic allusion to the widely accepted belief that this indigenous 
group had made a reputation of besting Spanish militia, vecinos, and presidials. To the 
Spanish the Faraon Apaches seemed to exist over the land as ‘heathen’ overlords, just 
as they imagined the pharaohs had done in ancient Egypt. The daily reality of their 
many smoke columns, their scattered horse- and footprints, and their demonstrated 
willingness to disrupt peaceful living–as seen in the Manso Rebellion–defined the 
contours of their identity. As the eighteenth century wore on, however, the name 
“Pharaon” was gradually replaced by terms that were rooted in observation of domestic 
economy rather than perceived and actual political practice. These Apache people 
would have been seen as still relevant, still powerful, but situated now in a place in 
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which the epitome of their ethnic identity revolved around the act of harvesting, roasting, 
and consuming mescal agave.9 
! Finally, if we read the map as a diachronic illustration of ethnogenesis, and set 
that alongside the snippets of historical documentation available, we get a picture of 
Faraon engagement with the xeric ecology of the Trans-Pecos and with the horticultural 
practices of their Suma neighbors. Cartographically, Faraones and Sumas are 
illustrated on opposite ends from each other, the former all around the northern Trans-
Pecos, the latter between El paso and La Junta, and Natagés in between. Faraones 
around Pecos pueblo represent a Plains bison economy; Sumas between El Paso and 
La Junta represent a horticultural economy centered around mescal agave cultivation, 
as noted by Dominguez in 1683. Between the two is situated the label “Apaches del 
Natagée.” Barreiro could not have been aware of it, but he was cartographically 
visualizing the progression of cultural adaptation between prairie and desert 
environments that historians would arrive at, through different means, hundreds of years 
later. Throughout this chapter, I will show that the Natagé label represents the adoption 
by Faraon Apache culture of the agave plant, through Suma influence, as a significant 
source of carbohydrates. While Sumas may or may not have been Apaches in the strict 
sense of shared ethnicity, Barreiro’s map seems to make a compelling case for seeing 
Natagés as an ethnogenetic product of Faraon-Suma encounter.10
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Map 13: Excerpt from Francisco Alvarez Barreiro, “Plano Corográfico de Las Provincias 
Del Nuevo México, 1728.” “Tierra de los Sumas” is in the lower left, “Apaches 
Pharaones” are located in the top center and top right, and “Apaches del Natagée” are 
low center. 
! There was a certain myopia that plagued the Spanish and that kept them from 
apprehending the world around them and the interconnectivity of events that they 
themselves were often swept up into. The reason behind this is twofold. First, and 
simply, this was a geography that was always of secondary interest to the larger 
requirements and thrusts of empire. The French were meant to invade from farther east, 
if they were to invade at all, and San Antonio de Bejar and the missions of present-day 
eastern Texas were designed to allay that risk. La Junta de los Ríos seemed to be a 
geopolitical backwater of indigenous people who did not appear to threaten the larger 
continental stability of New Spain. As we shall see in chapter five, however, this was a 
badly drawn assumption. Eventually, the Trans-Pecos became so much more than a 
powerful new appendage of Apachería–it became a gateway to the Bolsón de Mapimí, 
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an internally draining, or ‘endorheic,’ basin deep within Nueva Vizcaya, and hundreds of 
leagues nearer to Mexico City than the Spanish ever wanted their enemies.
Second, Spanish myopia was also caused by the political and economic 
prejudices of Spanish imperial paradigms that were, in turn, a subset of environmental 
prejudices. Although Posada vested Quivira with meaning through Apache presence, 
ultimately its status as a desplobado–a wasteland–decided its discursive fate. One gets 
the impression that no matter what Faraones were doing, the Spanish would have 
undervalued them because they existed in the desplobado. These environments were 
anathema to the cultural preferences of the Spanish for well-watered, arable land with 
forests and extractable resources nearby. To Posada and others, the idea of desplobado 
adjudged the land to be of almost no worth, and no degree of alchemy could redeem it
—or  its inhabitants—from discursive purgatory.11
! The term desplobado is, however, totally inappropriate as an ecological 
assessment of the region. If the term does any kind of work it is merely to elaborate 
upon the same ecological prejudices and blind-spots of the Spanish that we witnessed 
in chapter one, when we considered the reports of the first entradas into the area.  
Actually, the Trans-Pecos is something of a mesopotamia. Within its tributaries, desert 
grasslands, and mountain basin oases are diverse resources such as potable water, 
nutritious pasturage, carbohydrate-rich Agave species, and access to bison populations. 
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The Trans-Pecos was perfectly adequate, if not abundant, for nomadic or semi-nomadic 
populations who had the social and structural elasticity to range over the landscape on 
seasonal quests for resources. The wealth of resources over the landscape is 
produced, in part, by the Pecos River that forms the eastern border of the Trans-Pecos. 
It originates just north of Pecos pueblo, in the Sangre de Cristo Mountains, and 
historically coursed over rich grasslands populated by bison and other wild game. 
Nearly all of its tributaries are drawn from mountain springs or basins to the west of the 
river, and thus lay over the Trans-Pecos like a spiderweb of minor, life-giving waterways. 
Although Posada may have come just short of realizing it, the barely understood 
watershed that he touched upon was a powerful ecoregional resource that Apaches 
would long develop. The Pecos River was and is a pivotal feature of the ecoregion, 
transcending and connecting forests, grasslands, and empires. Posada may have 
named this area “Quivira,” after the Spanish fantasy of riches upon the Plains—but we 
should now call it by a differently descriptive name, Faraon Apachería.12
! How did Faraones turn the northern Chihuahuan Desert to their advantage and 
construct an imperialistic Native space that outshone the Spanish? Typically, the 
historical trajectory of colonial encounters has it that Europeans seamlessly expanded 
across space, conquering it, while indigenous groups fell back into enclaves of 
resistance. This process was the reverse, however. The world-with-Apaches that 
Posada had noticed in 1686 changed radically in the following decades, and by the time 
Barreiro drew his maps in 1728, it had largely become a Faraon world. Posada’s and 
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Barreiro’s maps gesture at the story of Faraon Apachería and its rapid, ambitious, and 
creative expansion before, during, and after Spanish reintroduction under Vargas and 
Comanche ascendancy in the 1720s. Spanish colonial documentation, coupled with 
current work in environmental science–and sometimes triangulated with ethnographical 
study–can provide us with a richer history of the period and the region than has 
previously been imagined. In this way we can leave, figuratively, the few geographical 
places–like Santa Fe and El Paso–that are consistently privileged in historical 
documentation, and begin to reorient our analytical gaze onto entire landscapes and 
populations that have passed under-noticed.13
! The transformation of Faraon Apachería into a space that was coterminous with 
the northern Chihuahuan Desert happened concurrently with the refinement of Faraon 
strategies for competition and encounter in the Middle Rio Grande Valley (otherwise 
known as “symbiotic bellicosity,” the subject of much of chapter three). In other words, 
the wealth derived from raiding over the seventeenth century and the success of the 
1680 revolt produced the kind of momentum that Faraones needed to expand into the 
Trans-Pecos. Faraones built their counter-territory with the blood, animals, and tools of 
Spanish empire. The twin processes of environmental adaptation and political 
refinement were heavily interwoven; symbiotic bellicosity was made possible by Trans-
Pecos expansion. In that sense, this chapter is both complementary and antecedent to 
the arguments of chapter three:  it was because of the developments that occurred 
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across the Trans-Pecos from 1683 until 1748 that symbiotic bellicosity became a 
workable strategy in New Mexico from 1692 until 1720. 
! It is useful to think of the period from 1685 until the 1748 as the second era of 
colonial encounter. Earlier, and at the end of the first era of colonial encounter, 
Faraones had learned that they could not defeat the Spanish outright and eject the 
invaders from their colonial outposts, as demonstrated in the revolts from 1680 to 1685. 
Armed with this knowledge, Faraones began to experiment with new ways to conceive 
of their world and their strategic place within it. What followed was the emergence of a 
complex system engineered by Faraones and practiced across vast territory that 
dwarfed New Mexico and rivaled Nueva Vizcaya. Over the course of sixty-three years, 
until Comanche ascendancy around 1748, Faraon Apaches developed sophisticated 
strategies that gave their territory an imperialistic tone, and that helped them to 
recalibrate the Trans-Pecos socially, economically, and politically. With amazing celerity, 
Faraones investigated and colonized new landscapes such the Guadalupe Mountains, 
the Hueco Tanks, La Junta, and the many mountain basins of present-day western 
Texas, just as they had done in the Central Closed Basin near the Jornada del Muerto 
before 1680. Along the way, Faraones encountered a bevy of indigenous groups, like 
Jumanos or Sumas, and sometimes cooperation and mutualism developed–as in the 
case of Sumas–other times not–as in the case of Jumanos. Always, however, Faraones 
grafted their transhumant calendar over the terrain and repositioned the political 
economy of the region to their advantage. In that process, they enlarged Apachería and 
developed a kind of indigenous imperialism. 
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! It was this exploration and exploitation of Trans-Pecos resources and new, 
mutualistic strategies that afforded Faraones the means to play the Spanish less 
hawkishly, and to thus avoid the high cost of violence. Now, Faraones switched 
effortlessly between the dove-hawk spectrum of strategies–efficiently ‘assessing,’ 
‘retaliating against,’ ‘bargaining with,’ or ‘threatening’ their Spanish and indigenous 
neighbors. More than ever they could exploit the threat of violence rather than violence 
itself. Given the opportunity, other Native groups might have behaved similarly, but the 
course of history had allocated a disproportionate share of horses and European 
weaponry to Apaches, thereby setting the stage for a conflict where the Spanish and 
Faraones were principal opponents, with others struggling to compete or survive. Within 
this contest, Faraones outstripped the Spanish and accomplished more in sixty-three 
years than the Spanish had in over twice that, because Apachean culture and society 
featured greater plasticity, and thus a superior ability to adapt to novel encounters and 
challenges. In place of governance by strong leaders with sprawling tenures, Apaches 
governed themselves through persuasion and a revolving array of local, well-known, 
participatory leaders whose tenure and reach were always contingent on their ability to 
assess imminent situations and to articulate compelling responses. The problem for the 
Spanish was that the structure of empire was an alien concept birthed without regard to 
the novel ecosystems of North America. This structure was conceived of in Mexico City, 
or Madrid, where scant knowledge of local, protean circumstances produced verbose 
regulations of colonization that hamstrung local Spanish agency.  Small, nomadic bands 
of Faraones, on the other hand, were not bound by centralized government or a set of 
institutions, like the mission and presidio, that would so narrowly dictate their 
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relationship to the land or its inhabitants. Instead, these Apaches constantly moved 
about a set of landscapes that frequently brought groups into contact with one another, 
such that resources could be exchange, news shared, and coordination perfected. Seen 
from this angle, the elaborate structure of Spanish civilization came up short against the 
responsive and creative culture of Faraon Apachería. Faraones diversified their 
economy and advanced politically in ways that the Spanish could not have imagined 
under the surveillance of the Catholic Church, and viceregal and royal courts.14 
! This chapter leaves the Middle Rio Grande Valley and turns to the Trans-Pecos 
ecoregion of the northern Chihuahuan Desert. Within this area, I privilege the rather 
special area known as La Junta de los Ríos, an unusually wet and productive area 
located at the confluence of the Rios Conchos and Grande, near present-day Presidio, 
Texas. In that place Puebloans, often termed Julimes (or, less commonly, 
Patarabueyes), worked fields and riverbanks with minimal Spanish surveillance or 
presence. It is within La Junta and the mountains and basins of the Trans-Pecos that we 
can gather a fuller picture of what Faraon Apachería looked like beyond the Spanish 
encounter and how these people were able to build a strong position for themselves. 
Faraones colonized an area that had never been heavily grazed or over-burned, and 
consequently found grasslands that were intact and free from woody plants, or forbs 
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unpalatable to ungulates. It was remarkably analogous to the Great Plains and was thus 
supportive of their nomadic horse culture.15
! Argumentation concerning events that mostly occurred far from Spanish eyes 
requires interdisciplinary work. Historical documentation concerning this geography and 
this topic is sparse and does not easily yield a narrative structure to complement 
analysis. But what scattered and fragmentary documentation does exist provides 
indications about where and when Apaches were present and it offers clues as to what 
might have been happening. Thus, historical documentation functions in this chapter as 
a kind of sputtering spotlight that periodically and momentarily illuminates certain 
sections of the Trans-Pecos. These flashes of illumination form an evidentiary base 
upon which to build broader analyses that are buttressed by other disciplines (namely, 
environmental science and, less so, ethnography). This analysis reveals that Faraones 
experienced the Trans-Pecos in multitudinous ways; historical documentation is the first 
step to triangulating their social and economic behaviors with ecological possibilities, 
and ethnographic likelihoods. The limited reconstruction that I am about to offer stands 
as a conservative estimation that almost surely falls short of the full scope of practices 
that occurred nearly 300 years ago. My hope is that this analysis opens the door to what 
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Apachería was beyond the violent colonial encounter, and beyond the discursive 
limitations that the ethnocentric Spanish gaze can provide.16
! The emergence of new and complex systems for ecological and social 
engagement within Faraon and other proto-Mescalero cultures is crucial to a more 
complete understanding of what happened and why during the colonial era. Scholarly 
analysis is often overladen with accounts of raiding, thieving, mutilation, and murder 
because the Spanish sources on which we depend are predominately filled with the 
those kinds of episodes. While it is true that violent encounter shaped the colonial 
moment and affected indigenous peoples in powerful ways, violence did not constitute 
every modality of survival or proliferation. What follows in this chapter is an analytical 
framework that is complementary to, yet distinct from, that of ethnography. Analysis of 
Faraon history through the lenses of competition over spaces and resources center the 
narrative around ethnicity and its culture, and is not dependent on the sustained and 
fraught colonial encounter to give it direction and meaning. Yet this was a time of 
cultural flux, when new practices were being investigated, evolved, and perfected; as 
such a close study of the series of interactions between Apaches and their 
environments is the best way to access the nature and course of change. In this case, 
an analysis of the domestic side of Faraon Apachería makes it possible to corroborate 
Posada and Barreiro, and to expand upon them, in ways that they never intended. 
!
! Sometime just before March in the year 1692 the snow pack from the San Juan 
and Sangre de Cristo mountains of present-day southern Colorado and northern New 
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Mexico began to thaw. When that happened water cascaded off of the mountains and 
tumbled into the watershed, charging the Rio Grande anew. Despite being in the grip of 
a La Niña cycle dry spell since 1689, the floodwaters were sufficiently ferocious, and 
Rio Grande freshets coursed with enough power that they crashed into El Paso and 
washed away, and all but ruined, the salinas (salt flats), that the Spanish and Puebloans 
depended upon. This was a potentially catastrophic problem because salt was needed 
to preserve certain foods, such as butchered meat, and to replace electrolytes lost in 
the bodies of humans and livestock alike. For Vargas, the problem took on 
expeditionary dimensions:  The ability to carry salt as both a nutritional supplement and 
as a preservative was vital to the Spanish, because it freed them from dependence on 
local ecological resources outside of El Paso. Freedom from the need to hunt fresh 
meat or find sodium saved numerous hours and calories for the troop on their marches 
through lands that were hostile, unfamiliar, and unpredictable. Diego de Vargas knew 
this and it complicated life for him greatly. He had never really taken his eyes off of the 
holy grail that was a successful entrada into New Mexico and a reclamation of Santa 
Fe. But no amount of eagerness, drive, or leadership could obviate the demands of 
practical means. Before he could seriously entertain plans to leave El Paso del Norte for 
Santa Fe, he needed salt both to maintain what was essentially still a refugee 
settlement and to ensure his men’s health.17 
! The exact route that Vargas took to find salt flats is not clear. His itinerary does 
not provide precise directions and did not consistently report the distances traveled. 
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Still, he appears to have gone no less than 62 leagues (161 miles) and trended mostly 
to the east, towards the Guadalupe Escarpment of present-day New Mexico and Texas. 
In this terrain his pack train labored and lumbered over the craggy, rugged, and nearly 
impossible trails. He had with him an Apache guide, captured during an earlier 
expedition, who led him through gaps and passes to find small watering holes that were 
often insufficient for Vargas’ troop of 20 soldiers, 60 auxiliaries, and a handful of vecinos 
and servants. The Apache guide, never named, quickly earned the suspicion of the 
Spanish by never leading them through easy paths or to large populations of his people. 
As Vargas followed him to what is today known at Guadalupe Mountains National Park, 
the troop would have climbed atop Permian limestone to about 3,000 feet. There, on the 
geologic barrier between the Great Plains and the Chihuahuan Desert Vargas could 
have surveyed the rich ecotonal space that was firmly situated within Apachería.18 
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Map 14: The Trans-Pecos and the Lands South and West of El Paso.
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.
Map 15: The Area of Vargas’ 1692 Journey to find Salt Flats.
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.
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! To the north the land was carpeted with Chihuahuan grasslands full of tobosa 
(Hilaria mutica), sacaton (Sporobolus airoides), black grama (Bouteloua eriopoda), and 
burrograss (Scleropogon brevifolius)–all plentiful and nutritious for grazing. The odd 
creosote bush may have dotted the landscape but grazing at this time was not so strong 
as to privilege this woody and shrub-like species. His gaze might also have been drawn 
to the various Opuntia species, like prickly pear and chollo, and their menacing spines 
may have caused him to overlook the importance and plentiful Agave lechuguilla that 
dotted the landscape and held within its stalks a rich trove of carbohydrates and 
moisture. To the south he might have seen much of the same vegetation in addition to 
many depressions scattered over the level portions of land, some filled with water, 
others likely not.19
! Eventually, the Apache guide led Vargas and a smaller contingent of soldiers and 
auxiliaries down a difficult road, passing a handful of watering holes, ojos, and to the 
salt flats. It was uneventful. Vargas encountered a few Apaches along the way but he 
never engaged them in battle (although he marked them out both before and after this 
event as manipulators and destroyers of the whole province and region). He was 
probably wary of making an attack because he only had a small force, and he was 
constantly reminded that the harsh landscape was unfamiliar and not easily defensible. 
Perhaps seizing on Vargas’ hesitation or doubt, his guide consistently hinted that there 
were many Apaches in the surrounding peaks, just beyond, ready to attack. Vargas 
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knew this to be true because their smoke filled Spanish nostrils. The new governor, true 
to his mandate for salt harvesting, declined to compete for total knowledge of, and 
control over, the local natural resources. He drank from the mountain-top watering 
places, had his troop pack up as much salt as they could carry, and then hustled back to 
El Paso, arriving there on March 18. He risked being in the field only ten days, four of 
which were used to rush back to El Paso.20
! We should linger a little longer where Vargas dared not, because there is 
evidence that Faraones had thoroughly infiltrated the region, either taking it from Sumas 
or co-opting them into their ranks. On March 12, while resting in his tent, Vargas 
interrogated his Apache prisoner. Vargas quizzed the guide about the surrounding 
mountains, the existence of water sources, and the presence of other Apaches. The 
Apache replied that 
“the mountains separate us from the bulk of the Apache peoples, who live 
beyond towards the salty river that is distant...and the mountain is the 
Black Mountain, where it is patchy, and ahead water is found, and it is 
good for a ranchería.”
The reference to the salty river must correlate to the Pecos River, frequently termed the 
Rio Salado (Salty River) by the Spanish. Vargas was most likely camping in the 
Guadalupe Mountains. The salinas that he had found were so thick and hard that men 
could break off chunks of salt with their axes. This description strongly suggests that 
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Vargas reached the lands just southwest of the Guadalupe Mountains where there are 
still many large salt flats.21 
! Vargas judged the area as unsuited to agriculture because water sources were 
insufficient for acequia irrigation, a requirement of the Recopilación de Leyes, the body 
of laws governing the placement and manner of settlement. He left quickly and the 
Spanish never made a serious effort to settle this space, let alone control it. It was a 
shunned space even more than the Pecos watershed, yet it was replete with sweet 
water, grasses, salts, and wood in certain places–Vargas and others of the Spanish just 
did not know where to go to find it. The documentary record does not clearly relay 
Vargas’ directionality, but it appears that the Apache guide was leading Vargas along the 
southwestern margins of a mountain system that trended north-south. Along this route, 
Vargas would have encountered much more xerophytic flora (requiring little water) than 
he would have if he gained a northern position, where greater precipitation had allowed 
for less xeric plant life (requiring an environment that is between arid and hydric). 
Additionally, Vargas was led to no springs during his journey...only ojos of water that 
would have been brackish and stagnant, yet potable. It is reasonable to guess that the 
Apache guide knew better:  at least ten springs, many of them with fresh water, run at 
varying elevations all along this range. In fact, there is enough moisture that grama 
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grasslands grow from 4,500 to 7,500 feet, but the guide never took Vargas there. These 
were tributaries of the Pecos River, and that was Faraon territory.22
! Vargas’ journey introduces many elements of the Pecos watershed and the 
Trans-Pecos into the historical record, but it cannot begin to cover the enormity of that 
ecoregion. It is necessary to buttress historical documentation with more recent analysis 
of the region in order to shed light on the spaces that the Spanish did not see, but that 
certainly mattered to indigenous inhabitants and that had almost identical ecological 
characters and processes then as now.  
! The Trans-Pecos region, as defined in this analysis, is that space between the 
Pecos River and the Rio Grande. Contrary to popular usage, I understand the Trans-
Pecos as a extending above the present-day boundary of the state of Texas to include 
the Pecos River all the way up to its headwaters near Santa Fe. (There was, 
ecologically and geopolitically, much overlap between the Trans-Pecos and the riparian 
empire of the Middle Rio Grande Valley.) The watershed of the Pecos River stands 
alongside that of the Rio Grande and the Rio Conchos as the principal systems for 
water catchment and delivery in the Chihuahuan Desert.23
258
22 Almaráz, 169.
   Richard E. Greenleaf, “Land and Water in Mexico and New Mexico, 1700-1821,” New Mexico Historical 
Review 47:2 (1972): 1-2.
   Gehlbach, 404-405.
   A Watershed Protection Plan for the Pecos River in Texas (Online: Texas State Soil and Water 
Conservation Board, 2008), visited September 10, 2012. http://pecosbasin.tamu.edu/media/1923/
pecosriverwpp.pdf: 5-7.
23 Britten, 12.
    cf. Almaráz, 169-170 where he defines it more narrowly, as a place that is bounded on the east by the 
Caprock escarpment, on the west and southwest by the Pecos Lowland, on the southeast by the 
Edwards Plateau country, an on the north by the Canadian River.
 Map 16: The Area of the Trans-Pecos in the Chihuahuan Desert.
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.
! Headwaters for the Pecos River lie in the Sangre de Cristo Mountains and flow to 
the south and east where the northern Chihuahuan Desert meets the southern Great 
Plains. In all, the Pecos river courses for about 926 miles through New Mexico and 
western Texas, draining 38,000 square miles before meeting the Rio Grande near 
present-day Del Rio, Texas. In all, it falls from around 13,000 feet to 1,050 feet. The 
Roswell Artesian Basin, extending on the west from the Sacramento and Sierra Blanca 
Mountains east to the Pecos continually discharges fresh water from the shallow aquifer 
into the river. Despite this influx of freshwater, and unlike the Rio Grande and the Rio 
Conchos, Pecos water has much higher levels of salinity owing to the fact that it runs on 
the southwest border of the Permian Basin, an inland sea extant 250-300 million years 
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ago. When that sea evaporated it left salts like halite and gypsum in layers as thick as 
1,000 feet.24
! The salinity of the Pecos River, while noticeable enough during the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries to earn it the name Rio Salado, or “Salty River,” was 
not so alkaline as to make the water lethal to plants or not potable to animals, except for 
one stretch near the site of present-day Girvin, Texas where the river becomes highly 
saline. Salt Creek, aptly named, feeds the Pecos from tributaries to the west, deep in 
the Apache and Delaware Mountain ranges. The creek delivers, per annum, 45,700 
tons of sodium into the river, altering the chemistry of the river so that there is over 
1,000 parts per million (ppm) of sodium, or 12,000 milligrams per liter. Usually anything 
below 1,000 ppm of sodium is considered freshwater, but levels during colonial times 
must have regularly reached levels well in excess of 1,000 ppm. Before there was a 
town called Girvin, this stretch of the Pecos was referred to as “Horsehead Crossing” 
and was one of the most fordable spots on the river; it could be anywhere from sixty-five 
to one hundred feet across with a fast current of water seven to ten feet deep. 
Horsehead Crossing earned its moniker owing to the litter of horse, bison, and cow 
skulls lying all around–bleached out proof that water there was salty enough to kill.25
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! But Apaches and other groups accustomed to using the river would not have had 
to go far to avoid excessive salts. Just downriver, at the confluence of the Pecos River 
with Independence Creek the volume of the river increases by over forty percent and 
the salinity, accordingly, is halved. This juncture occurs about 40 miles southwest by 
west of present-day Ozona, Texas. The distance between the massive influx of salt and 
its dilution from Independence Creek is a scant 75 miles. Independence Creek draws its 
incredibly fresh water from a collection of springs to the west that act as so many 
tributaries. The most productive spring produces a staggering three to five thousand 
gallons of fresh water every minute. Even with rates of evaporation of seventy-five to 
105 inches per year, the quantity of water available would have been a boon to people 
who did not depend on irrigation networks for crops or fixed settlements.26 
! The edaphic profiles–soil types–of the Pecos River watershed consisted of 
mostly well-drained aridisols (alkaline soil) and entisols (soil that is slightly differentiated 
from its parent material). Soils in the riparian zones were mostly alluvial. These soil 
types, combined with annual precipitation that ranges from 18 to 20 inches in the 
mountains around present-day Fort Davis to 10 inches at present-day Pecos, Texas, are 
more than sufficient to support stands of grama grasses such as black grama 
(Bouteloua eriopoda), blue grama (Bouteloua gracilis), and buffalo grass (Buchloe 
dactyloides). Overgrazing in the Texan and American periods has left much of the land 
devoid of grasses, but it is likely that in times before intensive cattle ranching the 
grasses carpeted the land up to 7,500 feet. Certainly, above 4,000 feet increased 
snowfall and decreased temperatures keep more moisture in the soil, making stretches 
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of grass there particularly bountiful. The presence of nutritious grasses along the banks 
of the Pecos ensured that there existed suitable pasturage for roaming horse cultures 
as well as for seasonal bison herds. These riverine conditions, so conducive to the 
success of natural flora and Apache nomadism, were not so well adapted to the water 
needs of the Spanish. As noted in chapter one, the Spanish insisted on irrigating arable 
lands with acequias, but even on the Rio Grande the damming of water increased soil 
salinity that, in turn, was damaging to crops of maize and wheat. When the slightly 
alkaline water of the Rio Grande inundated fields, and subsequently evaporated or 
percolated, it left behind salt deposits that eventually built to levels that destroyed crops. 
Armed with the experience of the Middle Rio Grande Valley, Spanish likely knew that the 
acequia model would have failed miserably, and quickly, on the much more saline 
Pecos.27
!  Faraones were free to engage this environment in creative ways in order to 
offset increased competition offered by an entrenched Spanish empire, and the 
juggernaut that would soon become the Comanche empire. The Pecos River was a 
viable option as a means to procure water and thus provided Athapaskans with an 
avenue of southward expansion in just the way that the Rio Grande had offered the 
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Spanish an avenue northward. A key difference is that Apaches were also using the Rio 
Grande for southward expansion whereas the Spanish had passed over the Pecos 
River as a suitable site for movement or habitation. In all, the Pecos River Valley and all 
its tributaries provided water, carbohydrates, protein, and salt. These are key fuel 
elements that were highly desirable to a rapidly developing horse culture pushing the 
limits of its territory. In turn, that horse culture would have had access to desert grasses 
that were well adapted to arid and semi-arid conditions. Fluctuations in the timing and 
magnitude of annual rains would have had little effect on their soil and its ability to foster 
plant life. That the Spanish shunned the region is only a commentary on the inability of 
their imperial strategy to model itself in terms of ecological realities. The Trans-Pecos 
was, in fact, a sufficiently rich and fertile place more than capable of supporting groups 
like Apaches.28
! The Espejo expedition of 1583 provided the Spanish with the first, albeit dim, 
sense of the Pecos watershed. Discussed in chapter one, this expedition was one of the 
first to explore the interconnectivity of the Pecos and the Rio Grande rivers. At that time, 
Espejo ventured up the Rio Grande on the way to the pueblos, but he came down the 
Pecos (about as far as present-day Roswell, New Mexico) on the return to Santa 
Bárbara in Nueva Vizcaya. Espejo’s chronicler did not record much information about 
the river valley and, in the end, the expedition’s account did not sell the Pecos as a 
viable means to access the Middle Rio Grande Valley–the only other Spaniard to travel 
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the Pecos was Gaspar Castaño de Sosa—and that was on an illegal expedition in 1590. 
Almost exactly 100 years later, another expedition occurred that provides better 
documentary insight into what the seventeenth and eighteenth century Trans-Pecos 
region looked like. It was undertaken by Maestre de Campo Juan Dominguez de 
Mendoza, the ubiquitous soldier of seventeenth century New Mexico, and by fray 
Nicolas Lopez, the Custo of the Franciscan order in New Mexico at the time.  
! The impetus for this excursion was borne of entreaties made by Juan Sabeata, 
the Jumano leader, who came from La Junta to Governor Otermín and then to Governor 
Cruzate in the summer and autumn of 1683, respectively. He complained of European 
peoples (whom the Spanish assumed were French) who wandered present-day eastern 
Texas and of the rapacious Apache who pressured their borders. Perhaps sensing the 
beleaguered attitude of the Spanish, he also tantalized them with accounts of Puebloan 
populations who so desired to become Catholic that they had erected their own make-
shift churches in anticipation of missionaries. Sabeata was a good pitch-man for the 
Jumanos and Julimes of La Junta, and Governor Cruzate dispatched Dominguez and 
some presidials in the late fall of 1683 to catch up to, and provide escort for, Custo 
Lopez and two other Franciscans, who had eagerly gone on ahead. The maestre de 
campo traveled the banks of the Rio Grande downriver, attempting to navigate through 
rough, canyon-filled terrains that were not easily passable to heavy Spanish riders and 
loaded carts. His trek was often serpentine and this fact forced Dominguez to 
experience more of the region than direct travel required, thus allowing a broader view 
of the region. Unfortunately, this indirect method of travel also contributed to poor 
record-keeping and there is some confusion about the exact route that Dominguez took. 
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Nonetheless, the maestre de campo’s account suggests how and where Apaches were 
establishing themselves and how they might have sustained themselves.29
Map 17: The Area of Maestre de Campo Juan Dominguez de Mendoza’s 1683 Journey 
from El Paso del Norte to La Junta de los Ríos.
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.
! On December 17, just a couple of days and 20 leagues (about 52 miles) into 
what would become a five month journey, Dominguez and his men stopped at a 
campsite near a Suma ranchería on the Rio Grande. They named the spot Nuestra 
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Señora del Pilar de Saragossa. This was the second of about eighteen Suma 
rancherías that they would encounter as they ventured down the craggy banks of the 
Rio Grande until they reached the pueblos of the Julimes and the two friars. As 
Dominguez reined in his horse Sumas crowded around him, begging for aid and 
claiming that they were already forced to concentrate their numbers into smaller and 
smaller places because of incessant Apache assaults. This should have come as an 
alarming surprise to Dominguez since he was still so near to El Paso, but he ultimately 
did nothing about it. Soon, laments and protestations like the Sumas’ became familiar 
refrains on (mostly) deaf Spanish ears. Geopolitical nuances aside, however, 
Dominguez noticed something here that would soon become significant. Sumas, 
Dominguez noted, privileged “mescal,” a kind of agave, as a foodstuff, much like 
Jumanos. This particular horticultural practice was crucial to indigenous subsistence in 
the Chihuahuan Desert, and by the 1720s the practice had taken such a prominent 
place in another’s groups economic practice that the Spanish began to call them 
“mescal-eaters”:  Natagés or Mescaleros–the ethnogenetic successors to Faraones.30
! The adoption of mescal agave as a principal foodstuff by Faraones probably 
derived from a sense of mutualism that joined Sumas to the newcomers from the Plains. 
Soon after Dominguez departed the area (and probably because of his apathy) these 
two groups put aside their differences and found grounds for cooperation. In fact, it 
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appears the period of Suma-Apache enmity was short, lasting just from 1680 to 1683, 
when Sumas were harassed and crowded by Faraones who had moved south with the 
Spanish. Upon their arrival in the Trans-Pecos, Faraones had wasted little time in 
counter-colonizing Sumas’ lands. The reason that Sumas had turned to Maestre de 
Campo Dominguez for assistance in defeating these Apaches was because they were 
unable to compete with Faraones who were only recently armed with the booty of the 
1680 revolt. When Dominguez, although generous with his promises, provided no 
material aid, Sumas wasted little time in learning and accepting the new geopolitical 
reality of their situation. Survival dictated they join with Faraones, as well as Mansos, in 
the common cause of ejecting the Spanish. The Manso Rebellion of the following year, 
1684, stands as the first moment of documented, concrete mutualism between Sumas 
and Faraones. Afterwards, Sumas maintained a limited degree of autonomy in regards 
to their identity, as evinced by the continued mention of them in the documents of El 
Paso and La Junta, where they were sometimes gathered into missions. Beginning in 
1712, however, and continuing through two more periods (1745-1752 and 1772 or 
1773) they frequently joined Faraones in raiding exercises and were eventually 
identified as coterminous with that group.31
! Whereas mutualism endowed Sumas with a network capable of resisting the 
Spanish, Faraones were treated to an intimate lesson in how best to survive in this xeric 
landscape. The most important lesson was the cultivation of agave. The agave species 
that Sumas consumed were probably Agave lechuguilla, A. americana, or A. 
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neomexicana. Positive identification is difficult, but it is possible to tease out some data 
given the similar character among the species. Those data can, in turn, suggest what 
kinds of resources were readily available in the Trans-Pecos. For example, the base of 
most agave species is known as the inflorescence peduncle–the flowering “century 
plant” stalk that emerges from the center of plant where it meets the leaves–and it is 
highly nutritious. For every one pound of cooked agave, Sumas would have taken in 
about 135 grams of carbohydrates and nearly 300 grams of water, in addition to about 5 
grams of protein and a host of vitamins and minerals. The protein that Sumas were 
missing from agave was most likely supplemented by bison flesh, to which they would 
still have had limited access, even if only as a trade commodity with Apaches or 
Jumanos (the latter had given hides to Otermín at their August meeting, suggesting their 
ability to continue at least some hunting).32 
! Agave species played an important part in the livelihood of Trans-Pecos dwellers. 
Agaves’ ability to survive and thrive in xeric and alkaline soil conditions provided Sumas, 
Faraones, and others with carbohydrate- and water-rich sustenance. They thrive in the 
kind of saline, or brackish, riparian system that the Pecos River offers and in the aridisol 
soils of the Trans-Pecos. A. americana represents the species of agave most adapted 
to highly alkaline conditions. Whereas even hardy species like A. lechuguilla can 
tolerate about 50 ppm of alkaline soil, already an appreciable quantity, A. americana 
can tolerate up to 144 ppm of salt. Processed by Apaches and other Native groups into 
foodstuff, agave plants would have provided excellent carbohydrates as well as sodium 
in soluble and digestible levels to humans. Given that most of the tributary arroyos to 
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the Rio Grande (below El Paso) and Pecos derive from mountains that were in turn 
caked with sodium from the Permian Sea, it is no wonder that Maestre de Campo 
Dominguez saw so many agave plants littering the hillsides and the ground as he 
ventured across the Trans-Pecos. In the coming days, within 150 miles of the camp 
Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Saragossa, Dominguez would note twice more extremely 
dense communities of agave plants prospering in the hills and mountain sides.33
! Geographical expansion worked to bring Faraones into contact with many 
indigenous neighbors. The number and range of these diverse encounters appear to 
have had the effect of multiplying the kinds of behaviors that Faraones thought were 
possible. For example, Jumanos were widely known to be adroit traders and brokers 
who operated over a broad territory. Prior to the 1670s, when Apaches dismantled 
Jumano access to the Middle Rio Grande Valley through their destruction of the Tompiro 
pueblos, Jumanos had been known to tie, economically, the Middle Rio Grande Valley 
pueblos to La Junta to present-day eastern Texas. Mutualism and a heightened sense 
of cooperation typified their society and, although they could not resist the armed and 
mounted attackers who eventually wrecked their trade network, it appears that the 
material benefits of mutualism were not lost on Apaches. If the Jumano were victorious 
over Faraones in any regard, it is in the success of their strategic model to influence 
Faraon modes of competition. In this way we can begin to make better sense as to how 
Faraones were able to engineer something like symbiotic bellicosity so soon after they 
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colonized the Trans-Pecos and began revisiting the Vargas-era Spanish of New Mexico. 
The Jumano inclusion into Apachean society functioned as an ethnogenesis, in the 
sense that new ethnic identity categories were forming out of the shards of so many 
more fragile identities that had been fatally fractured during the colonial encounter. 
Clearly this was a not a world where Apaches ruled indomitably and where their culture 
encapsulated all others; as soon as the two groups met, tinges of Jumano practice 
appeared in Faraon behavior as far as Santa Fe and Albuquerque.34
! Returning to the 1683 expedition:  on December 29 Dominguez met fray Lopez 
at La Junta de los Ríos, near present-day Ojinaga, Chihuahua and Presidio, Texas. He 
had traveled just over 280 miles down the Rio Grande through difficult canyons but also 
along riparian woods of cottonwood and mesquite where they had found more than 
enough water for his men and their animals. They paused for two days where the Rio 
Conchos met the Rio Grande, doubtless to assess the prospect of the missions. 
Dominguez remarked on the good quality of the lands, the favorable weather, and the 
rich supplies of wood and water. Within three days of travel farther downriver, however, 
the environment and the experience of the troop reverted back to what it had been 
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before the approach to La Junta. Worse, there was now, for the first time, a real 
shortage of wood for campfires and for Catholic monuments (Dominguez usually 
erected a wooden cross on a hill nearby his campsites). January 3, 1684 found the 
party camped at a place they named San Nicolas, at the confluence of the Rio Grande 
and Alamito Creek, in present-day Texas. They had come about 55 miles downriver 
from La Junta de los Ríos and canyons were rising before them that made access to 
water difficult and that would be nigh impassable to loaded horses and carts. The 
challenges of local topography meant that Dominguez abruptly found himself in 
ecological and logistical trouble, and was forced to change his course.35 
! This was a minor irritation for Dominguez, and it does not make much of an 
impression in his itinerary. But as an historically documented boundary marker for the 
La Junta de los Ríos area, however, it is a useful signpost. Again, it is worth stepping 
away from Dominguez for a moment to consider the confluence of the Rios Conchos 
and Grande in ecological terms. At La Junta, habitation, refuge, and exploitation were 
possible on a scale not common in the Chihuahuan Desert, except in the Middle Rio 
Grande Valley and a few other locales. 
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Map 18: The Regional Location of La Junta de los Ríos.
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.
           
Map 19: The Area of La Junta de los Ríos.
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.
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! Seated at about 2,500 feet above sea level, La Junta de los Ríos is surrounded 
by mountain ranges. The Chinati Mountains (7,800 feet) sit on its northern edge; to the 
east are the Cienagas (up to 4,600 feet); to the south are the Ricas; and the Sierra 
Grande (5,250 feet) is to the west. Dominguez might have viewed these ranges as 
similar to those surrounding the pueblos of New Mexico and the villa of Santa Fe that he 
knew so well, but if so then he certainly realized that they stood out as a liability. Time 
and again the Sangre de Cristo, the Sandia, and the Manzano ranges, to name but 
three, had served as bastions of Apache offensives. Seen this way, the mountains 
around La Junta appeared less like defensive bulwarks and more like extensive 
liabilities, especially in light of Sabeata’s pronouncements of Apache attacks. The terrain 
was also difficult. The foothills and passes now known as Forgotten Reach and Presidio 
Valley challenged Dominguez and other Spanish travelers with their heavy carts and 
heavily packed horses and mules. The 135 miles of Rio Grande that led to La Junta de 
los Ríos are nettled with blocked off canyons and extraordinarily rugged approaches. 
Ascending rocky slopes of gravel or cacti would have been both unpleasant and 
dangerous to soldiers and Franciscans hauling supplies like candles, sacred objects, 
food, salt, metal tools, as well as armor and weapons. Only in the last 50 miles did the 
valley widen to a mile wide, offering slightly easier cart passage to the Julimes of La 
Junta.36
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! Ecologically, the boundaries of La Junta extend farther than the settlements or 
the confluence itself. The boundary area is defined by the areas where the rivers’ banks 
are accessible, but not necessarily habitable. In turn, the lack of accessibility after a 
point is strictly determined by steep canyons that abruptly rise and meet the water at its 
edge. In all, the Rio Conchos-Rio Grande confluences stretches up and down the Rio 
Grande for 65 miles, and up the Rio Conchos into present-day Mexico for 40 miles, 
creating a sizable oasis. On January 3 Dominguez was fast-approaching the southern 
extremity of La Junta’s Rio Grande boundary. He must have noticed that the 
contributions to the confluence are far from equal between the two rivers. The Rio 
Grande is much diminished before the confluence. There are no tributaries below the 
Middle Rio Grande Valley of New Mexico that add a substantial volume of water to its 
flow. At its best, the Rio Grande is a “top-heavy” river in the sense that its volume is 
disproportionally large in the area from its source down to the Jornada del Muerto. 
Water supply comes mainly from summertime rainfall in the higher altitudes of the 
Middle Rio Grande Valley–usually 20-30 inches–that runs-off into tributaries like the 
Rios Chama and Puerco. In addition to monsoon rains, snowfall accumulates in the 
mountains of the southern Rockies during winter. In the spring, this snow melts and 
creates more run-off that goes to the Rio Grande watershed. The total volume of water 
that typically went to the Rio Grande would have been plenty to feed La Junta de los 
Ríos, if not for the high evaporation rates–40 inches to 80 inches a year–and the fact 
that these sources of moisture are hundreds of miles from La Junta. Even in the 
infrequent years of plentiful moisture throughout the Middle Rio Grande Valley, 
evaporation from the surface of the river takes its toll on the long journey of about 500 
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miles south and southeast. In contrast, the Rio Conchos headwaters are only 200 miles 
away, in a basin with 15 to 30 inches of rain a year, and there is less impact from 
surface water evaporation. Climatic analysis conducted from 1900-1913 indicated that 
the Rio Grande provided average annual runoff of 645,246 acre feet at La Junta, 
whereas the Rio Conchos provided over three times that: 2,045,769 acre feet.37
! These ecological characteristics define La Junta de los Ríos as a place of great 
opportunity in the Chihuahuan Desert. Water, pasturage, and wood could be found in 
great quantities. Even for a peoples like Apaches whose horse culture enabled them to 
go to wet places like mountain springs and playas (slight depressions in otherwise flat 
ground that catch rainwater and hold it until evaporation or percolation dry it again), the 
offerings of La Junta de los Ríos must have been tempting as a close parallel to the 
kinds of trading and resource extraction that they knew from the Rio Grande pueblos far 
upriver. Strategically, the flow of the Rio Conchos up into the Central Basin of Mexico 
would have provided an excellent pathway for entering Nueva Vizcaya and the interior 
of New Spain, all the way down to Parral. Otermín complained Apaches were already 
wont to raid that far south as early as 1683, but these seem to have been exploratory 
endeavors because Apaches do not often appear in the colonial documents of Nueva 
Vizcaya until later. Within a generation that would change, and then the riverine 
pathways that the Spanish had used to invade the Middle Rio Grande Valley in the 
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1580s would become the very same highway that Faraones seized to counter-invade 
New Spain.38
! Let us return to Dominguez’s entrada, faced as it was with the impassable banks 
of the Rio Grande. The maestre de campo made a ninety-degree turn to the northeast 
and walked up the waters of Alamito Creek, keeping the Chinati and Davis Mountains 
on his left. From this time on they would travel mostly north and east, making headway 
across the Trans-Pecos and Llano Estacado, crossing the Pecos River, on January 13, 
near present-day Fort Stockton, Texas. They arrived at the end of their eastward 
exploration, somewhere just east of San Angelo on the Conchos River in present-day 
Texas on or about February 7, and did not leave until May 1, 1684. Where Dominguez 
stopped and what he saw for this latter part of the expedition is not entirely germane to 
the study of the Trans-Pecos, but for the purposes of charting the regional ecology and 
Apache practices, a few moments require our attention. Through them we see can 
begin to appreciate the level of sophistication that Apaches had already attained in their 
ability to turn the environment against intruders at the same time that they drew 
advantages from it.39 
! The Spanish crossed paths with unknown Apaches on January 17, near present-
day Rankin, Texas. They walked and rode along the Pecos and its adjoining plains for 
six leagues, the land on either side scorched by fire. Suddenly there appeared a group 
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of Natives, mounted and armed with harquebuses, firing–surprisingly–welcome shots 
for the Spanish. These were Jediondos, allies to the Jumano nation, known to Juan 
Sabeata, and also at odds with the newcomer Apaches. Their name translates to “the 
stinking ones,” probably because they were near a point in the Pecos River that was 
malodorous because of high sulfur levels. For the next two days Dominguez lingered at 
this spot, a camp he named San Ignacio de Loyola, perched on a hill above their 
ranchería, awaiting a rumored Apache horse-raid that never materialized. Sabeata 
joined the Jediondos in complaining that Apaches had been active in the area, making 
war on them, and that they needed Spanish help to defeat them. Sabeata made his 
case for Spanish-sponsored Apache removal all the way to the end of the journey and 
among every friendly group they encountered, fearful as he was that Apaches were 
about to take over the entire apparatus of Jumanos’ extensive trading network. 
Mendoza had little time or concern for it, though; he (again) pledged aid and moved 
on.40
! It is remarkable that the Jediondos had horses and harquebuses, considering 
that they did not appear in the record before this and are not mentioned later. Access to, 
let alone possession of, such valuable technology catalyzed Apachean ascendancy in 
the same way that it would empower Comanches later in the eighteenth century. Why 
was this group not more powerful or at least well-known? The answer probably lies in 
how and when they procured the horses and guns. In terms of horses, it may have been 
relatively easy to find them. Many mounts that had been lost on entradas from 1580 to 
1610 were by this time feral and roamed over the land; it would not have been 
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impossible to find and capture some. They also could have been traded as commodities 
with groups like Jumanos, although their frayed commercial network may have been at 
a loss to come with sufficient supply. More than likely, however, both horses and 
harquebuses were probably taken from Faraones in one of the many skirmishes about 
which the Jediondos and Jumanos complained. Certainly, Jediondos behaved as a 
people at war:  their ranchería was defensively set against a large boulder for 
protection. While it is unclear how long the Apaches had been traveling downriver along 
the Pecos from the southern Great Plains, penetrating this deeply into the northern 
Chihuahuan Desert, Jumanos and Jediondos believed that there was new, aggressive 
Apachean expansion taking place. It is reasonable to suspect that repeated Apache 
attacks in the area had led to at least a few Apache losses, and the losses of their 
weapons and mounts.41
! More intriguing than the provenance of these European tools is the detail 
concerning the recently burned plains. Shortly after January 17 and the first scorched 
field, from January 25 through January 28, Dominguez again found himself on burned 
grassland, but this time he was looking at recent horse tracks. Alarmingly, Sabeata 
insisted they were from Apaches. He was at this time near the headwaters of the Middle 
Concho River. It is unlikely that these fires were set to stimulate growth. Rather, they 
were likely set deliberately in an attempt to stymie the Spanish, or Jediondos, through 
the destruction of pasturelands..42 
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! The dominant grass in the area was almost certainly black grama, a highly 
nutritious grass that usually abounds after a fire because the trash at ground level–
detritus–gets burned away and, in the process, fixes fertilizing nitrates in the soil. As a 
result, its ‘net above-ground primary production’–its individual and community-wide 
growth–increases. This kind of regeneration through flame only works during certain 
times of the year, however, when precipitation is soon to follow, providing the moisture 
needed for photosynthesis. Dominguez saw this in January, when the spring thaw and 
the summer monsoon were a distant future. Given the lack of moisture, all that the 
maestre de campo would have seen was actual wasteland. It is likely that up to 75% of 
the edible grasses like blue and black grama, as well as three-awn grasses, would have 
been scorched away; conversely, disturbance plants such as forbs and shrubs, not 
palatable to Spanish cattle or to horses, would have increased by over 500%. This 
maneuver was extremely destructive:  it would have taken 2-7 years for these grasses 
to reach their former levels. Deleterious ecological effects were even more likely 
because these plains were on the banks of the Pecos River. Located within the flood 
plain, springtime thaw would have actually further damaged the burned ground by 
eroding away nutrients and denuding the soil when the snow melted and floods ensued, 
sometime during the month of April or May.43
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! Despite coming close to Faraones at least three more times, Dominguez was not 
keen to engage them and Faraones, for their part, declined to challenge Dominguez 
openly. The maestre de campo’s reluctance is understandable given the fact that he had 
only seventeen soldiers with him, he was in unfamiliar terrain, and there had long been 
mutinous groans from his ranks. He had hesitated at most of the opportunities to follow 
up on leads, dallying while spies took days to report back or assuming that Apaches had 
too much of a head start on him. His report of the three Apache assaults are 
conspicuous for their omission of any retaliatory maneuver. It appears he was rather 
interested in his chances at (personal) imperial gain at the trade fair Sabeata had 
promised. He may have also felt unmotivated to lift up the banner of Spanish empire 
considering the litigation that was looming over him at El Paso (regarding his part in the 
failed Otermín entrada of 1681) and that could ruin his finances and career. Or, as a 
soldier, he might have reckoned that it was enough to have one province already in the 
grips of rebels and that opening up a new theater of conquest and war was not the most 
attractive dispensation of resources.44
! Hastily, Dominguez abandoned Sabeata’s trade-fair and returned to La Junta de 
los Ríos, the most promising, and nearer, prospect for increasing the reach of New 
Spain from El Paso. When the maestre de campo had first arrived there almost six 
months before, the Julimes received them well, speaking as best they could in the 
Castilian tongue. The friars reportedly baptized about 100 people. Crops of maize, 
wheat, beans, squash, and tobacco must have looked like gilded candy to travelers 
come from the near-destitution of El Paso. But Dominguez’s second time among the 
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Julimes did not elicit much of a diary entry because the journey up to “it [was] rough 
land, with little water, and almost impassable.” Traveling with armed and mounted 
soldiers who were weary and a little mutinous, Dominguez’s arrival at La Junta elicited 
quietude from the Julimes. Dominguez did not tarry and, soon, Julimes–perhaps already 
wary of their new bedfellows–joined the rebellion of 1684 that was already under way 
around El Paso del Norte and Casas Grandes.45
! After the 1683-1684 Dominguez-Lopez expedition, there are only a few additional 
Spanish accounts before 1750 that help us to illuminate the ecological character of La 
Junta and its changing role within Apachería. The first was the trip undertaken by 
Sergeant Major Juan Antonio de Trasviña Retis, lieutenant general of Nueva Vizcaya, in 
the year 1715. Retis had with him a retinue of thirty soldiers, twenty auxiliaries from the 
Nueva Vizcayan pueblos of San Antonio de Julimes, San Pablo, Santa Cruz, and San 
Pedro de Conchos, four Franciscans, and enough servants to tend to fifty pack animals. 
He traveled from deep within Nueva Vizcaya down the Rio Conchos to resurvey the 
pueblos of La Junta and the peripheral rancherías of nomadic groups. The missions that 
fray Nicolas Lopez had established in 1684 lasted only slightly longer than the water of 
a playa. Disinterest from faraway officials in New Mexico and Nueva Vizcaya, pressure 
from close by Apache groups, and rage over Spanish slave raiding in the area had the 
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effect of evaporating any sense of mutualism that Jumanos, Julimes, and others had 
held out to the Spanish.46 
! Retis departed from the Real de San Francisco de Cuéllar on May 23, 1715 and 
reached La Junta by May 31, traveling over some 85 leagues (about 220 miles). The 
Spanish saw fields of wheat, maize, and legumes around most of the pueblos, and 
Retis noted that Sycamore branches, being the most prevalent type of wood, formed the 
structure of their roofs. There were a few other tree species present in groves and 
thickets (which speaks to the perennial presence of water), but the lieutenant governor 
felt that there was little there of secular interest. Of the fifteen settlements that existed in 
1683, Retis noted only eight now, a reduction of nearly 50%. The Dominguez-Lopez trip 
produced no demographic figures for La Junta, but Retis noted that there were about 
1,400 people present at his visit. Whether the population had shrunk or it had merely 
consolidated is difficult to determine. Almost certainly it was a bit of both. At least some 
attrition must have occurred owing to the violence of raiding and losses from kidnapping 
and enslavement.  Evidence of consolidation came from the sites of two pueblos–Santa 
Cruz and Cibolo. These two places, noted as populated by Dominguez and Lopez, were 
now abandoned. Retis’ interpreter, don Antonio de la Cruz, reported that the people 
from those places had fled to other pueblos to try to avoid raiding. Although the name of 
the group responsible for the raiding is not given, Faraones stand out as the usual 
suspects. To Retis, La Junta remained conspicuous for its settled peoples and its 
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richness, but it had clearly been affected by the violence that accompanied recent shifts 
in local power.47 
! Perhaps sensing an opportunity to expand empire into a troubled and, therefore, 
weakened area, Retis did not advocate a total withdrawal from the region. He believed 
La Junta could be consolidated under Spanish power through the proselytization of 
individuals under the Catholic Church, the primary organ of Spanish cultural 
indoctrination. By the time he concluded his entrada he recommended that two 
additional missionaries be sent in addition to the four that he left. Furthermore, he felt 
that 100 cattle, 100 sheep, and agricultural implements should be purchased and sent 
by the exchequer to further the development of a subsistence economy on the Spanish 
model.48 
! Retis was likely guided in his thinking through the orchestration of a familiar and 
tempting scenario at the hands of Faraones. Over a century of Spanish presence and 
imperial practice had made it plain to every indigenous group in the area that the 
preferred targets of colonization were sedentary, agriculturalist peoples, just like  
Julimes of La Junta de los Ríos. Faraones certainly realized this lesson in their close 
dealings with the Spanish and the Puebloans of the Middle Rio Grande Valley, and I 
suspect that they exploited that intelligence to create an attractive target for the 
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Spanish. Perhaps Retis was meant to feel that he could be another Oñate if only he 
could rein in La Junta, and make it profitable to Nueva Vizcaya. In any event, by 
creating a sense of instability and weakness within La Junta, Faraon activity invited 
Spanish investment and the committed, if infrequent, influx of material and pastoral 
goods. Low-risk, moderate-yield manipulation like this has all the earmarks of symbiotic 
bellicosity, with the key difference being that Julimes, and not vecinos or Puebloans, 
were the foils of ‘bellicosity.’ While the Spanish rushed in, contented with their 
prospective winning of so many converts, Faraones contented themselves with 
rejuvenated access to imperial economy. Agents like Retis may have thought that they 
were building Spanish empire in a backwater zone that was free for the taking, but the 
region was in fact already firmly embedded with imperialistic Apachería and had been 
for over thirty years.
! Faraones offered subtle, sophisticated, and surprising competition at La Junta. 
According to the second-hand accounts that Retis heard from certain Puebloans at a 
place named San Francisco, Apaches were apparently friends of the pueblos, and–
furthermore–they had made known, publicly and often, their desire for baptism, just as 
Julimes and Jumanos had done (and just as Faraones had done at Pecos in 1694)! 
During his time there Retis never came face to face with any Apaches, but there were 
rumored to be 60 Apache families living all around La Junta who wanted to meet the 
Spanish. Rumor had it that they were staying away because of a smallpox epidemic that 
cannot be verified but that is a distinct possibility given the many inter-ethnic contacts 
that Faraones were forging at the time. Had Apachean behavior suddenly shifted to 
dove-oriented strategies in the years following Dominguez’s entrada? Almost certainly 
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not. In 1693, while Vargas was renegotiating the place of his people in New Mexico, 
Maestre de Campo Don Joseph Francisco Marín of Nueva Vizcaya was already 
penning letters to the viceregal court that reiterated more familiar observations. In his 
letter of September 30 he gave a report of the province of Nueva Vizcaya, its borders, 
its peoples, and its problems. Among the details was a list that named “unreduced” 
Native groups, where they were, and if they were dominant. Apaches were mentioned 
as being pervasive all around La Junta de los Ríos, extending into Texas and upriver 
into New Mexico. (They are not mentioned in connection with the lands between La 
Junta and Durango, although there is some doubt that groups such as the Salineros, 
Jojocomes, and the Chisos were not, in fact, Athapaskan.) In all, Marín mentioned 
fifteen groups, yet Apaches were the only group mentioned twice and who were singled 
out especially as “being the sole instigators of violence and war between these 
otherwise peaceful nations.” For Marín and others in Nueva Vizcaya, Apaches did not fit 
into the social or political structures sanctioned by the Crown or the Church; on the 
contrary, their ubiquity was matched only by their aggression.49 
! Another litmus test of the region thirty-two years later further suggests that 
Faraones, or Natagés, were still imperially exploiting La Junta after Retis. In 1747 
Joseph de Ydoiaga, captain of the presidio of San Bartolomé, visited La Junta de los 
Ríos again. There was still no permanent and stable Spanish presence and this entrada 
was yet another mission to assess the need and suitability of a heavier vecino presence 
and the possible erection of a presidio. By that time only seven pueblos remained, the 
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rest abandoned or congregated into surviving settlements. Apache pressure had been 
relentless, but so too was the problem of heavy erosion over the riverine lands. The 
erosion likely came about in two ways. One, Apaches might have forced the agricultural 
production of the zone to harmful output levels by the 1740s in their bid to draw grains 
from places beyond the Middle Rio Grande Valley and El Paso; two, the Puebloans 
themselves might have caused the erosion by virtue of their population being ever more 
concentrated and dependent on adjacent plots of land while aboriginal plots went to 
seed. What makes Ydoiaga’s account meaningful is not the familiar descriptions of 
ruination, consolidation, and all the raiding and violence that produces it. Rather, it is 
meaningful because of the brief history of La Junta that he provides. On the one hand, 
Retis was clearly an advocate of the Franciscan Order (many of the supplies and men 
were personally funded by him) and had delivered a report on the potential of La Junta 
that bordered on missionary boosterism. On the other hand, Ydoiaga’s report relayed 
the events that occurred after 1715 and raised serious doubts on Retis’ acumen as an 
observer. Apparently, in 1724, Faraones and Sumas instigated revolt and devastated 
the mission project. Troops from Ciudad Chihuahua put down this revolt, but they were 
less than thorough in their action because violence broke out again in 1726 and 1727. 
These revolts occurred at the same time that Brigadier General don Pedro de Rivera 
was conducting his famous inspection of the terrain north of Nueva Vizcaya. These 
outbreaks prompted his recommendation that a presidio be located among the pueblos, 
staffed by presidials drawn from surrounding garrisons. The presidio did not materialize 
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and by the time Ydoiaga was writing, the desplobado was said to support over 400 
Apache warriors.50
! This scattered chronology provides for an interesting analysis of what Retis saw 
in 1715, when Apaches asked for baptism and were said to treat peacefully with the La 
Junta puebloans. In fact, the situation looks remarkably similar to what New Mexico 
Governor Vargas encountered at Pecos Pueblo in 1694 when Faraon captains there 
asked for baptism and promised trading opportunities. There, just as here, Apaches 
appear to have attenuated their practices of the seventeenth century and to have 
adopted a mixed strategy of engagement with the Spanish. Their scouts and spies 
around La Junta must have known that Retis came with a small but formidable force 
and that outward aggression would be needlessly costly, especially for Faraones who 
would likely bear most of the casualties. In any event, there is little evidence that 
Apaches in the area were desperately in need of resources. By this point they could 
draw on local, wild, resources, El Paso del Norte, La Junta, and, more distantly, the 
New Mexico pueblos when needed. With this in mind it appears most likely that 
Faraones were waiting to see if they could facilitate the conversion of La Junta into a 
more efficient, higher yield, economic and ecological site. If this was the case, then the 
Apache promise of baptism and peaceful relations stands as a powerful inversion of the 
imperial project. Whereas these pueblos might serve the Spanish empire in a purely 
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cultural way, through proselytization, the accompanying expansion of cultivated 
foodstuffs and the trade linkage with Nueva Vizcaya would have stood as a significant 
economic boon to Faraon Apachería. In terms of tangible benefits, Apaches stood to 
gain tremendously, and they apparently did so for almost ten years.51 
! While the Spanish hunkered in refugee settlements and established frail 
outposts, Apaches expanded contiguously eastward and south along the blind 
peripheries of the Spanish empire. Touchstone dates, extending out over sixty-five 
years, from 1683 to 1715 to 1747-1748 suggest a continuous, dedicated presence of 
Apaches and their aggressive, if conservative, effort to retune the indigenous peoples 
and terrains of La Junta to their own ends. In the absence of any real Spanish 
competition (Franciscans were only as formidable as their Puebloan militia, if there was 
one), Apaches were free to enjoy the waters of the Rio Grande, the Pecos River, the Rio 
Conchos, the fruits of the rancherías and pueblos, and both riparian and montane 
woodlands. The importance of La Junta de los Ríos to Apaches cannot be stressed 
enough because it would have been a boon as a supply of carbohydrates. Although 
agave and other wild flora rapidly ascended in importance as a source of 
carbohydrates–thus negating the need for violent engagement with agrarian centers–
Faraones apparently still had a strong preference for maize, and possibly wheat; 
foodstuffs that had become a staple to their society over the previous hundreds of 
years. In that sense, Apaches interest in La Junta reflects that they were simply 
following the grain:  first utilizing that of the Middle Rio Grande Valley, then toying with 
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the produce coming up around El Paso del Norte and Casas Grandes, and then, 
perhaps at the same time, developing grain sources further east of that position at La 
Junta de los Ríos while they also utilized agave. While the Spanish were contracting 
and crowding into narrowing slivers and points of empire, Faraones were locating 
granaries all over the Chihuahuan Desert to supplement their lucrative bison economy.52
! More remarkable than diversified access to grain, however, is that the first half of 
the eighteenth century represents the emergence of a complex system that, over time, 
transformed Faraones into Mescaleros (or Natagés) and the northern Chihuahuan 
Desert into a redoubtable indigenous place. This complex system was borne of the 
processes whereby Faraones transformed their social space–Apachería–to fit the 
ecological and social landscapes of the Trans-Pecos, and the concomitant recalibration 
of their society through the evolution of conventions. In turn, these conventions 
redesigned their relationship to the land and to their neighbors. Unlike the previous one 
hundred years when raiding, conspiracy, and endemic violence characterized the 
modalities of encounter, during the subsequent sixty years a fresh sense of mutualism 
developed between proto-Mescaleros, the Spanish of New Mexico, and certain Native 
neighbors like Sumas. This occurred because Faraon culture and political economy was 
not impermeable to the peoples that it encountered. Just as the tools and practices of 
European colonialism–the horse and the harquebus–had been learned and redeployed 
almost immediately upon colonial contact, Apaches likewise learned from groups like 
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Sumas and Julimes. Raiding and violence did not subside, but Faraones learned, 
adapted, and explored fresh strategies of subsistence that reduced the frequency of 
costly competition. This development was made possible by the distribution of their 
economy over a broader geographic area that fostered moments of cooperative 
encounter.53 
! This was a powerful moment in the historical arc of the northern Chihuahuan 
Desert and its edge landscapes. It was powerful because it produced a people and a 
space, Mescaleros and their Chihuahuan Desert Apachería, that persisted well into the 
premodern era and, indeed, the modern era. But more than that, this moment is 
powerful because the socio-ecological learning that Faraon groups exhibited, along with 
the genesis of strategies like symbiotic bellicosity, represents a degree of plasticity that 
the Spanish never approached, and that Comanches were only at this moment 
beginning to realize. Too often historical narrative and analysis had privileged European 
models and achievements because they occurred within the structure of a centralized, 
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organized government and an elaborate bureaucracy. But these were actually 
weakness. Highly complicated structures like centralized government and bureaucracy 
actually stunted the Spanish and prevented them from competing as efficiently as they 
could have in the new geographies of North America and inhibited them from 
negotiating the myriad variables that the colonial encounter produced. Faraones had no 
such rigid structures to prevent them from learning rapidly and adapting freely to the 
colonial era. Read this way, in terms of strategies, efficiencies, and pay-offs it is clear 
that indigenous groups–Apaches being but one–who might have suffered greatly during 
encounter with Europeans nonetheless retained the advantage of superior social, 
economic, and ecological plasticity over colonizers.54
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Chapter 5
 Denouement: the Bolsón de Mapimí and Cracks in the System
! Not long after the 1740s drew to a close, the ground shifted beneath the feet of 
Faraones. Over a century had gone into the ongoing development of new and efficient 
strategies of competition, and Faraones had been tireless in evolving their transhumant 
mobilities to take full advantage of horse culture. They had claimed vast territories that 
abutted or breached Spanish places all the way from the Middle Rio Grande Valley 
southeast to the confluence of the Pecos and the Rio Grande. At La Junta de los Ríos, 
where the Rio Conchos joins the Rio Grande, the pueblos seemed to be almost in a 
state of vassalage to Faraones in 1748, providing them with crops of maize, squash, 
beans, and wheat to supplement their diet of Plains-sourced bison and Spanish-sourced 
cattle. The Spanish had tried for nearly seventy years to gain a foothold at La Junta and 
to incorporate it into the architecture of Spanish empire, but it had gone to Apachería 
instead. So long were the Spanish kept at bay that the presidio that had first been 
recommended by Maestre de Campo Dominguez in 1683 did not appear until 1760, and 
even then it was not until 1787 that something previously unthinkable happened. 
At the Presidio del Norte of La Junta, on a cool March morning, eight Mescaleros 
arrived, weary and burdened. Leading 200 families behind them, they entered the 
shadow of the bulwarks to meet the captain, Domingo Díaz. There was no sneak attack 
and the mountains did not smoke all around the Spanish with portents of assault. These 
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Mescaleros had come to ask for peace; they had come to ask for an “establecimiento 
de paz”–effectively, a reservation. These peoples–who, since 1581, had been as a 
phantom menace across an ocean of desert that the Spanish barely understood–
signaled to the Captain Díaz that they wanted to quit the desert and live with vecinos 
and friars. If the Spanish had suddenly renounced the sedentary life of their missions 
and presidios to take up nomadic hunting and gathering, there could not have been 
such a stark about-face. What then led these Mescaleros to do so?1
! Sixty years before, the world had been a different place. The final expansion and 
the coming denouement of Mescalero Apachería had not yet begun when Captain José 
de Berroterán found himself utterly in over his head somewhere near the Rio Grande. It 
was April 14, 1729 and the commander of the Conchos presidio was adrift in the 
Chihuahuan Desert, far downriver from La Junta de los Ríos, his intended destination, 
and undoubtedly anxious about disappointing don Pedro de Rivera, the visitador and his 
superior. For the better part of a month, since March 15, he had done his best to forge a 
path up the Rio Grande from the Coahuila presidio of San Juan Bautista (present-day 
Guerrero, Coahuila). But he struggled, and soon he halted his progress in order to take 
stock of his situation, such as it was, near present-day Langtry, Texas. He was just 
upriver of the confluence between the Rio Grande and the Pecos River; thirsty, 
bewildered, paranoid, and exhausted.  Morale was low and rations were lower. The 
brutal landscape of rugged canyons and gorges, agave-choked arroyos, and waterless 
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plains had taken its toll on hundreds of horses whose dehydration had accelerated their 
demise.2
! When he had begun his trip Berroterán was cocksure. The Conchos Presidio 
captain had been tasked by Pedro de Rivera with finding an upriver route to connect 
Coahuila to Nueva Vizcaya, via La Junta. But Berroterán, feeling that this was not 
enough of a challenge, decided also to seek out and engage enemy Apaches. Once on 
the Rio Grande, however, he found himself crisscrossing a maze of ridges and doubling 
back on his old tracks. The early days of the expedition were consumed with sending 
out wave after wave of spies and scouts to hunt out Apaches.  Now, he was focused on 
locating water. It was with desperate anticipation that the captain awaited the arrival of 
his spies and any news of moisture that they brought. His journal is laconic in its 
description of the landscapes through which he passed in his efforts to find enough 
forage for his surviving men and animals. We know now that he had hit a wall, almost 
literally, in the form of canyons that ranged from 50 to 300 feet high, and that contained 
a swift and rapid Rio Grande. Berroterán had traveled about 57 leagues (about 150 
miles) from San Juan Bautista to reach the area around Langtry, and now he traveled 
almost another 57 leagues hither and thither for a few ponds or some remnant puddles 
in the bottoms of arroyos. Nothing, however, was really enough to quench the thirst of 
his large retinue of animals and to fuel the expedition towards its goal. Two weeks later, 
on April 28, he held a meeting with his troop and decided that enough was enough. 
Berroterán, a young and rising star in the martial establishment of New Spain, had had 
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his first taste of the northern Chihuahuan Desert between the Big Bend region and the 
northern edges of the Bolsón de Mapimí. Bitterness undoubtedly lingered in his mouth 
as he turned south, away from the Rio Grande and the southern edges of the Trans-
Pecos, and beat a hasty march for Conchos presidio deep within Nueva Vizcaya.3
! This journey had not been Berroterán’s idea. Visitador Pedro de Rivera and his 
cartographer, Francisco Álvarez Barreiro, had planned to go there themselves, but they 
had not been able to reach La Junta de los Ríos during their visita. They, of course, 
made it to Santa Fe and San Antonio de Bejar because these places stood out as 
prominences–key localities–that represented significant Spanish investment and, so 
political and economic interest. But the Spanish empire had developed along a north-
south axis, and Rivera had elected to approach Santa Fe and San Antonio de Bejar by 
forking out from Parral to the south in each case, rather than traversing the space 
between them from west to east. Desiring to assess the intervening landscape, Rivera 
had tasked Berroterán with providing intelligence about the area between the two 
colonial outposts. For Rivera’s purposes, Berroterán failed; his diary was a worthless 
tool for the extension of empire. As a tool for grasping indigenous territorialities, 
however, Berroterán’s accounts are valuable as the first clues to Mescalero Apachería’s 
final elaboration southward into the Bolsón de Mapimí, and the heart of the Chihuahuan 
Desert. 
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Map 20: The Area of the Bolsón de Mapimí. 
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.
! The Bolsón de Mapimí had been a space of indigenous resistance and bellicosity 
since the middle of the seventeenth century. A brief history of the region reveals its 
important placement within the larger geographic arc of competing empires and 
resistances. Toboso attack groups, long associated with the Bolsón, had been lashing 
out at Spanish attempts to settle them into missions, and to draft them into mining 
towns, since the 1620s. Although not Athapaskan (they were Taracahitan-speaking), 
Tobosos are the nearest thing to ethnogenetic ancestors that Mescaleros had. Tobosos 
and Faraones practiced concurrent wars of attrition against the Spanish, often deploying 
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similar or identical tactics. Just like Faraones in the Manzano, Sacramento, Fra 
Cristobal, and Órganos Mountains of New Mexico, Tobosos erupted from the Sierra 
Madre ranges of the western Bolsón to launch attacks on Nueva Vizcaya. After they had 
seized grains and horses–typically from haciendas on the lower Rio Conchos–Tobosos 
took to the mountain basins and the concealed cienegas (marshes) that were located 
deep within the Bolsón, thereby eluding the Spanish who were loathe to the rugged and 
waterless land–just as Faraones had long done. Tobosos frequently traveled to La Junta 
de los Ríos to trade their wares with Julimes, Jumanos, and (by 1680) Apaches. This 
group survived within the Bolsón de Mapimí beyond the 1680s, and it is a distinct 
possibility that they shaped the future course and manifestation of Apachería.4 
! Eventually, around 1680, the Spanish succeeded in crushing these peoples and 
shipping many off to Monterrey as prisoners and laborers. Into the vacuum swept 
Tarahumaras, another tribe of Nueva Vizcaya who likewise challenged the claims of 
Spanish empire. Whereas Tobosos had been a persistent, if somewhat irregular, thorn 
in the side of the Spanish, Tarahumaras began to attack the settlements along the 
Camino Real de Tierra Adentro with methodical consistency beginning in 1690. In that 
year they killed many missionaries and they razed numerous churches. When this 
happened again in 1691 the Spanish mounted annual expeditions in September and 
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October to go out and harass Tarahumaras in the Bolsón. It was no use, though, and 
the Spanish soon broke off after finding that there was not enough water to support 
thousands of men and animals. Nearly thirty years went by before the Spanish again 
tried to assail the indigenous insurgents of this region.5
! By 1698, however, Tarahumaran power in the Bolsón de Mapimí had begun to 
wane, and groups of Cocoiomes and Acoclames began to flex their muscle in the 
region. Tarahumares had long harried the Rio Conchos and much of Nueva Vizcaya 
along the camino real, but their numbers had been gradually weakening. Their mission 
population had sunk from about 80,000 in 1550 to about 3,000 in 1690, a reduction of 
about 95%. When Tarahumaras rebelled during the summer of 1697, veteran General 
Juan Fernández de Retana quashed it with unusual venom:  the punitive campaign 
included long lines of summary executions and decapitations. Tarahumaran power, 
whittled away by over a century of disease, slave-raiding, and war had finally been 
broken. By 1726, at the same time that Faraones were becoming known as Natagés 
and Mescaleros around La Junta de los Ríos, Cocoiomes and Acoclames continued the 
Tarahumaran tradition of launching coordinated and sustained attacks along the camino 
real. These aggressions came on the eve of Rivera’s visita and, based on the priority 
that he assigned this problem and his redistribution of presidials and monies, the tide 
soon turned against those in the Bolsón de Mapimí. Rivera’s Reglamento of 1729 
commanded that the “captains of the presidios from Pasaje to Conchos [around the 
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Bolsón de Mapimí] will suppress the Cocoiomes, Acoclames, ...[and others] who 
continually harass Nueva Vizcaya.” Provided with viceregal mandates and a fresh array 
of martial resources, the Spanish were able to mount sustained attacks within the 
Bolsón, where they killed many Cocoiomes and Acoclames and shipped the captives to 
Mexico City.6
! Twenty years after the mop-up, Berroterán witnessed first-hand the cost of 
Rivera’s success in the Bolsón de Mapimí. Eager to point out the unintended 
consequence that the 1729 Reglamento produced, Berroterán noted, almost in the 
same breath as when he narrated the victory over the Cocoiomes and Acoclames, that 
“about four hundred Apaches have come into the land [i.e. Bolsón de 
Mapimí] and overrun it, but have yet to begin killing and stealing because 
of the good relationship I have with them. We should be cautious of them 
because once they know the mountains they will come and go at will.” 
The Spanish, it seems, had unintentionally swept clear a difficult landscape that was 
contiguous with La Junta and then left it available to their longtime competitor in the 
north. Rivera’s policies translated into an invitation for Mescaleros to take up residence 
in the Bolsón and to extend their imperialistic practices far beyond New Mexico and into 
Nueva Vizcaya.7 
! This information was contained in a report written in the early spring of 1748 by 
Berroterán for the viceroy, the Conde de Revillagigedo. Towards the end he gave a 
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prediction about what the Apache immigration into Nueva Vizcaya meant. If his insights 
seem unoriginal, given the analogous events that had occurred around New Mexico 
since the early seventeenth century, their precision is startling: 
“Any respites should be viewed as moments of convalescence from a bad 
sickness and preparation for other and more serious ones threatened by 
Apaches, who have penetrated the presidios lands.... With these 
[presidios] eliminated, Apaches would have total and free access to the 
more than 180 leagues that stretch from the presidio of San José del Paso 
to that of San Juan Bautista del Rio Grande. This has happened with 
others who have inhabited that refuge, which shelters thousands of 
enemies. All the mountains and rough country are impassable to us but 
are accessible to them. Once they penetrate and move into that long, 
narrow strip, they will occupy almost all of the eastern side of Nueva 
Vizcaya and the western side of Coahuila, and will easily destroy both 
these important jurisdictions.”
! But how exactly did Mescaleros come to the Bolsón de Mapimí (outside of an 
accidental Spanish invitation), and how did they integrate the natural resources of that 
place into their xeric, geopolitical economy?8
! The clues that Berroterán gave about Mescalero mobility force us to rethink how 
we conceive of the directionality of empire. Typically it seems that Europeans do the 
moving, the exploring, the invading, and the colonizing. In what we call the borderlands, 
the majority of historiography implicitly argues that the Spanish came from the south 
and relentlessly pushed north and that Puebloans, Apaches, Comanches, and others 
resisted, succumbed, or thrived while remaining mostly in situ. In this case, however, 
Mescalero migration lines make it plain that the directionality of the period was far from 
a European-dominated south-to-north model. Rather, Mescaleros pushed south after 
contact, and continued to grow and adapt long after Spanish directionality stagnated 
around Santa Fe. Ironically, the Rio Conchos, that very same river that allowed for the 
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initial entradas into what would become New Mexico during the late 1500s, was also the 
riverine pathway that introduced Apaches to the interior of New Spain.9
! The importance of the Rio Conchos to Mescalero counter-invasions became 
clear to the Spanish towards the end of May in 1766, when Nicolás de Lafora, the 
cartographer on the Marques de Rubí visita, made a sweeping tour of the region. He 
was part of a caravan from Durango that was heading north, having just left the derelict 
presidio of Cerro Gordo in Nueva Vizcaya. LaFora and the rest of the mounted riders 
passed cautiously over the dry arroyos branching off of the Rio Enmedio, Rio Florido, 
and the Rio Parral, tributaries of the Conchos. These arroyos were treacherous and 
carts could be ruined or horses fatally injured if they fell into the deep recesses caused 
by erosion after over-grazing had left the land too devoid of grass to hold the soil during 
floods. The riders kept their extra horses, their pack-mules and their carts nearby. The 
land was parched, water flowed only from a few places and there was not nearly as 
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much grama or bunch grasses as they would have liked. But the problems underfoot 
paled against the dangers away and overhead. Over twenty-six miles these Spanish 
travelers anxiously eyed the Sierras Baos and Peñoles on their right hand side. These 
mountains were part of the western boundary of the Bolsón de Mapimí, and the caravan 
hoped that they would not be attacked by Apaches who were known to issue from 
mountain passes in order to attack nearby haciendas or travelers, such as 
themselves.10 
! Lafora might just then have been thinking of Governor Otermín and the scene the 
former New Mexico governor faced in 1681 when he passed by the ruined pueblos of 
the Piro on his failed reconquista of New Mexico. Lafora and his company found 
themselves traveling through a land also marked by violence:  abandoned or damaged 
haciendas stood alongside pitiful-looking makeshift huts, and much of the livestock was 
vanished from the area. The situation was not, however, as dire as that following the 
1680 revolt–the ground was not littered with the recent dead, and the ashes from the 
fires in adobe houses and buildings had been snuffed. Indeed, there were still just more 
than 4,000 vecinos living over about 3,000 square miles, and although their agricultural 
and ranching endeavors had been retarded by raiding, they still managed to produce 
maize, wheat, and some fruits. Nonetheless, Lafora could tell that this was contested 
land. Although they noted twenty-six working haciendas spread out over five tributary 
streams, the number of abandoned ranches must have stood out more. As recently as 
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1760, and probably earlier, local franciscans observed that Apaches had driven many of 
the hacendados out of the valley, ruining their estates.11
! There is no evidence that Lafora actually thought of Otermín—and  why should 
he? He was traveling through the Rio Conchos Valley, deep within Nueva Vizcaya, 
southeast of La Junta de los Ríos and almost due south of El Paso del Norte. He was 
comfortably within the established borders of New Spain. He was not following up on a 
successful pan-ethnic revolt of Native groups and he was not trying to reclaim a lost 
provincial capital from an entrenched foe. It is likely that Berroterán’s prescient thoughts 
eighteen years earlier, in 1748, regarding the Apache arrival in Nueva Vizcaya, 
prepared Lafora for what he saw. Nicolás de Lafora betrayed no surprise at Apachean 
presence and power during his comprehensive inspection of the northern frontier of 
New Spain from 1766 to 1768. He merely described it. As Barreiro had been for Rivera, 
Lafora was engineer and cartographer for the Marques de Rubí, the visitador, or the 
royally-appointed inspector of the realms; Rubí was tasked with making 
recommendations to the Bourbon monarch so that the northern frontiers could be 
quelled and made safe, and maybe profitable. The task of describing the landscape and 
the condition of roads, lands and places fell to Lafora. 
! Regardless of Lafora’s lack of surprise at Mescalero activity, this moment of the 
visita is worthy of closer analysis as evidence of Apache counter-invasion. The day that 
he recorded his anxiety about passing just west of the Sierras Baos and Peñoles–May 
20–he was passing through the Valle de San Bartolomé, near the headwaters of the Rio 
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Conchos river valley.  The territory should have been as close to “Spanish” as any land 
in the northern reaches.  It had been 195 years since the Rodriguez-Chamuscado 
expedition had set out from this place to investigate the rumors of clothed and farming 
peoples along a great river. San Bartolomé, and the nearby villa of Parral, had been the 
launching board for Spanish invasions of the Middle Rio Grande Valley and for the 
construction of the Camino Real de Tierra Adentro. In the late sixteenth century San 
Bartolomé was considered stable and corporate enough to the Spanish empire that 
entradas and supplies were siphoned off and sent northward regularly to support 
fledgling New Mexico. By the time of Lafora, however, Spanish impetus for the 
expansion of territory northward had stalled and Santa Fe still represented the 
northernmost outpost of the imperial network. For Mescaleros, however, there still 
existed the means and ability for exploration, invasion, and fresh exploitation. In a 
reversal of the usual directionality attributed to the borderlands of North America, 
Mescaleros pushed south, successfully embedded themselves within established 
provinces, and directly challenged the preconceived spaces of European empire with a 
territoriality all their own. They had come down the Rio Grande, passed to La Junta de 
los Ríos, and then passed up the Rio Conchos, mimicking (and mocking, in a way) the 
route of the first conquistadores.12 
! What Lafora saw in the coming two and half weeks made it plain that the 
situation had become even worse than that communicated in Lezaún’s 1760 report, 
where that franciscan detailed the flight of vecinos from the Rio Conchos valley. In 
addition to displaced Spaniards, ruined land, and the conspicuous absence of livestock, 
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Lafora also found that the region was dangerously understaffed militarily. One week 
after the visita had passed the abandoned presidio of Cerro Gordo it came upon 
presidio Guajoquilla on May 24, on the Rio Florido, tributary of the Conchos. As they 
wove through woods of mesquite and acacia they approached the walls of the garrison, 
established in 1752, with a complement of 66 presidials. Rubí and Lafora must have 
been surprised to have come from the beleaguered Valle de San Bartolomé and the 
vacant Cerro Gordo only to learn that months earlier 26 of the presidio’s soldiers, just 
less than half, had been removed. These men had been transferred to the presidio of 
San Buenaventura, to the west, where they would combat the mounting danger posed 
by Gileño Apaches, who operated on the western side of the Camino Real de Tierra 
Adentro and in the ecotonal overlap with the Sonoran Desert. As a token to the need for 
defense the Spanish had situated 300 Tarahumara Natives nearby in the pueblo of 
Atotonilco, where they cultivated maize and wheat. Ever short on funds and presidials, 
the vicegeral court was trying to balance tangible urgency with larger policy initiatives 
like those set out in the now-35 year old 1729 Reglamento. It is doubtless that the 
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Spanish, forced to cede some of their strength to other locales, were attempting to 
make a buffer of the Tarahumaras against the Apaches.13 
! Fifty-seven miles northward, the Conchos presidio loomed on the horizon, where 
Berroterán had been captain not long ago. The area was dying a slow death, much like 
that of Guajoquilla, because this presidio too had been abandoned, its presidials 
redistributed northward into the so-called desplobado to staff the presidio at La Junta. 
Only 25 families remained there alongside 200 Tarahumaras and Chisos in the mission 
of San Francisco. For the next two weeks Lafora stepped over dry and parched land, 
heading northwest, still skirting the mountainous borders of the Bolsón de Mapimí. As 
he surveyed the tributaries of the Rio Conchos a landscape of Native mule-herders and 
subsistence fields passed before his eyes, instead of rich haciendas and cash crops. 
Nearing Ciudad Chihuahua, at Chancaple, he came upon a settlement that had been 
reduced to two or three huts because Apache depredations had frightened off all the 
others; at La Pastoria de Mapula he found that land tenure had been so disrupted that 
the thirty people present did not actually live there, but were merely contract laborers 
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sent from Chihuahua to herd cattle. Apache raids had succeeded in disrupting the local 
economy to the point that it no longer made sense to invest families and serious capital 
into the area; rather, would-be hacendados sent laborers in who could be easily 
replaced with more if they were captured or killed.14
! Finally, Lafora came to Ciudad Chihuahua after traveling 221 miles. It was June 
12, and summer was fast upon the caravan as they passed through the grassy plain 
called El Bajío, a valley just over two and half miles wide. This bustling villa of Nueva 
Vizcaya boasted of 400 families and commanded agricultural and mining endeavors in a 
vast perimeter around it. It had remained vibrant and vital to the political and economic 
structure of the Spanish empire even when places like Parral and Santa Eulalia had 
faded from importance. Ciudad Chihuahua should have been the throbbing pulse of 
Nueva Vizcaya, but Rubí and Lafora found it withering in fear and poverty. Soon they 
learned that the people of the villa, along with all of those who had abandoned the Rio 
Conchos in the days of Lezaún, were in danger of perishing because all of the livestock 
had been taken. No horses and no mules meant that there was no way to work mines 
and fields; the economy was frozen in place. Rubí was at a loss as to how such a 
calamity could befall so major a Spanish place. The troop soon learned that they had 
witnessed the answer firsthand:  The valley of El Bahía was narrow–only a mile wide–
and Apaches often used it as a choke point to ambush travelers, taking every animal 
and more than a few human lives. To make matters worse, there was no pasture for 
Rubí’s animals. The few animals that had remained to the Spanish at Ciudad 
Chihuahua in the months leading up to this wretched state had overgrazed the local 
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pasturage and there was little grass left that was close enough to guarantee the horses’ 
and mules’ safety. Robbed of a critical re-supply point, Rubí and Lafora left the next day. 
! The visita’s course had passed along the northwestern borders of the Bolsón de 
Mapimí, composed of the many chains of the Sierra Madre Occidental and the Rio 
Conchos watershed. What Rubí and Lafora saw confirms that the Spanish of Nueva 
Vizcaya had clung to a few riparian places like Ciudad Chihuahua, San Bartolomé, and 
missions, small villas or mining centers. Although no rebellion-from-within–like the one 
that expelled the Spanish of New Mexico in 1680–had occurred, the records of this 
visita suggest that Nueva Vizcaya’s situation was similar to that of 1670s New Mexico, 
in terms of Athapaskan ascendancy and Spanish decline. Mescaleros had ventured into 
the Bolsón de Mapimí by 1748; had added the Rio Conchos watershed to their cycles of 
raiding and seizure; and were actively redirecting portions of Nueva Vizcaya’s economic 
wealth into vectors of their own Athapaskan economy. Lafora and Rubí were forced to 
travel beneath mountain chains that smoked with Mescalero fires; fires that relayed 
information about the Spanish position and the location of desirable property to the 
many groups dwelling in the rugged basins and beyond. The Baos, Peñoles, and all the 
other mountain chains west of the Bolsón de Mapimí were a long way from Los 
Órganos or the Manzanos in New Mexico, but the well-documented presence of 
Apaches in Nueva Vizcaya and the mounting evidence of their adroit exploitation of 
Spanish imperial spaces suggests that the trajectory of New Spain’s history in the so-
called borderlands of North America should be reimagined. Just as Faraones had forced 
the economy and material wealth of the Middle Rio Grande Valley into Apachería’s orbit 
as early as the 1670s, their ethnogenetic successors south of the Jornada del Muerto, 
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Mescaleros, were now integrating the Rio Conchos Valley into similar economic 
landscapes.15  
! As Lafora continued north he ventured closer to the Rio Grande, deeper into 
country pockmarked with ranges and basins, and farther into the orbit of Mescalero 
Apachería. Whereas the visita had recorded communities of broken and irregular, if 
sometimes barely functional, haciendas and missions around the Valle de San 
Bartolomé and Ciudad Chihuahua, now the landscape gave way to total devastation 
and abandonment. Almost a month after leaving Chihuahua Lafora passed by the 
haciendas of Palo Blanco and Hormigas, both abandoned by their owners because of 
Apache attacks. At Hormigas, a herd of feral cattle remained drinking from ponds, 
probably left there by Apaches as a source of protein and leather should the need arise. 
The Sierra Grande loomed to the northeast and beyond that lay La Junta, their next 
destination and long a focal point of Apache expansion and migration.
! But a visit to this sight—known to be of strategic importance to Apaches—was 
not to be. Just then, at Hormigas, on July 9, Rubí and Lafora learned that the governor 
of Nueva Vizcaya had abruptly, and unexpectedly, ordered the closure of the Presidio 
del Norte and that its presidials were then moved to another presidio, Julimes, farther 
up the Rio Conchos. Rubí decided that to visit Julimes would mean significant 
backtracking, and there was little expectation that they would learn anything new by 
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surveying more of the Rio Conchos Valley. Lafora and the company turned to the 
northwest, towards El Paso; Rubí’s was the second consecutive visita, after Rivera’s, 
that failed to visit La Junta de los Ríos. And while it may have made logistical sense to 
Rubí and Lafora to avoid La Junta, that place’s importance as a gateway between 
ecoregions and between territorialities was actually bespoken by the eleventh hour 
reshuffling of the Presidio del Norte. Just as it had been since 1683, La Junta was the 
epicenter of a widening and shifting array of Mescalero pressure points. The Presidio 
del Norte had been established only seven years previously, but in that short time it had 
become plain to the Spanish that La Junta, although an important granary to Apaches, 
was only the most obvious pass out of myriad others. The sudden shift of presidials 
between garrisons that were so near to each other signals that the Spanish were 
becoming aware that they were trying to stem a flood that had already breached the 
imagined walls of their empire. The northern frontier had rapidly deteriorated in twenty 
years, and Spanish claims were being peeled  back across multiple geographies.16
! At the start of the summer season the visita company moved north by northwest, 
paralleling the Rio Grande far off to the east, keeping the Sierras Magdalena and 
Cascaramusas to their immediate right. Beyond those mountains lay windrows of peaks 
and basins that led, eventually, to the Rio Grande and La Junta, but knowledge of that 
space was tenuous and the paths were dangerous. In the thirty-six leagues (about 94 
miles) that Lafora traveled to reach Carrizal, the border between Nueva Vizcaya and 
New Mexico, he passed places like Los Reyes, ojo de Jesus Maria, Ojo Caliente, and 
Agua Nueva. Three haciendas, at least, were scattered along the way but they were all 
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abandoned and fallen into ruin because Apaches had “overrun” the area and did not 
“permit” Spanish occupation. On July 12, at two springs called Gallego and El Chivato, 
halfway between Hormigas and Carrizal, Lafora camped at the foothills of the Sierra 
Magdalena. Apprised by local report and the presence of semi-permanent wickiups 
across the landscape, Lafora knew that these springs were among the favorite spots 
where Apaches gathered during their travels into the south. From this place, 
“Apaches often meet...and divide up the routes to Encinillas lagoon, Santa 
Clara valley, and Hormigas. From here they attack Chihuahua at will and, 
once sated, return to this place and from here take the road to Gila by way 
of Cerro del Chile or Sierra Blanca, then Siete Rios by Agua Amargosa, 
the plains of Los Castillos and San Elceario. From these ranges they 
always find safety and return to their rancherías unharmed.”17
! The porosity of this 280 mile gap between El Paso and La Junta was obvious to 
the Spanish. So much so that the governor of Nueva Vizcaya tried to bridge that gap by 
placing a troop of presidials adjacent to El Chivato and Gallego, at a spring called 
Nueva Agua. A garrison of 50 presidials, as many as were at El Paso, were stationed 
there for a time, but there were no silty banks or woodlands there to support long-term 
residence. The garrison was too far from either the Rio Grande or the Rio Conchos, and 
it soon withered. In these desert lowlands soils were dry and sandy; there was little 
wood for shelter; less land for gardening; and only brackish ojos. Besides their own 
horses, all the presidials had to eat was what grain they brought with them and the 
Agave lechuguilla all around. It was with disdain and disgust that the presidials 
eventually left to be distributed to other garrisons and presidios–they demolished many 
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of their buildings before they left, both to make sure that Apaches could not use them as 
well as to mark out how unsuited the terrain was permanent residence.18
! Interestingly, after Rubí and Lafora passed through this area and critiqued the 
decay of Spanish interests in the region, the Nueva Vizcayan governor tried to retake it 
from the Apaches by sending another, smaller, garrison back to Agua Nueva. But 
whereas 50 presidials could not sustain themselves on the land–let alone block Apache 
encroachments–the new troop of 30 presidials found themselves unable either to 
sustain or defend themselves. Within a short time, Mescaleros succeeded in taking 
every single horse from this troop (probably about 900-1,200 horses, at the typical 3-4 
horses per soldier), leaving the Spanish to fight on foot; a death sentence. Indeed, 
many presidials were killed in the ensuing skirmishes and many more wounded in the 
daily attacks. Agua Nueva was, again, soon abandoned.19 
! As Lafora and Rubí proceeded on to El Paso and farther up the Rio Grande into 
the Middle Rio Grande Valley, they witnessed and recorded many of the same 
occurrences that had colored those regions since the 1670s. Apaches still used El Paso 
as a gateway and inhabited all the Trans-Pecos, specifically the Siete Rios areas of the 
Central Closed Basin. The Órganos Mountains, called Los Mansos by Lafora, were still 
a place of Apache rancherías. Places like Perillo and Roblerito, immediately antecedent 
to the Jornada del Muerto from the south, and the Jornada itself were all firmly within 
the orbit of Mescalero power, and travelers traveled at great peril (the visita was 
attacked no fewer than three times here). Interestingly, Lafora made a significant 
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geographical mistake and claimed that the Los Mansos (Órganos) Mountains extended 
past the villa of Albuquerque up to Sandia pueblo. In reality, he had passed at least 
three major mountain chains:  the San Andres, Manzanos, and Sandia. His confusion is 
revealing in that he had firmly placed Apaches within Los Mansos Mountains and then 
continued to identify their ubiquity with that specific mountain range all the way to the 
lands just short of Santa Fe. This array of Apache presence and the nature of their 
activities does not bear close scrutiny; previous chapters have analyzed Apache 
expansion into and manipulation of these territories. It is enough to say that the 
Comanche pressure that had forced Faraones and Mescaleros almost south of Pecos 
pueblo in the 1720s had not sufficiently intensified in the ensuing four decades to 
dislodge Apache interests.20 
! Lafora summed up his experiences in the northern Chihuahuan Desert with 
powerful statements that listed the ways in which Apaches seemed to prevail over the 
Spanish in place after place, and time after time.. Regarding Nueva Vizcaya especially, 
Rubí’s engineer stated, unequivocally, that the 
“Apache Indians are the only ones who commit hostilities against this 
province [i.e. Nueva Vizcaya]. They are situated along its entire frontier 
from the province of Coahuila to Sonora.”21 
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And: “The attacks of the Pharaones Apaches, either from Sierra Blanca or 
Siete Rios [that part of the Trans-Pecos just northeast of El Paso], occur in 
the neighborhood of the presidio of El Paso del Norte.”22 
Lafora believed: 
“...all these attacks could be prevented if the presidios of Janos and Paso 
del Rio del Norte did their duty, for the places mentioned are behind them, 
as are also the sierras of La Magdalena,...and others where the enemies 
take shelter, and from which they sally forth to attack haciendas and 
travelers.”23
! Lafora’s harsh criticism of the Janos and El Paso presidios dovetails with the 
frustration he had expressed on July 9 regarding the administration of the presidial 
company that seemed to dither somewhere between La Junta de los Ríos and Julimes, 
to no great effect. This criticism came as a refrain to the many calls for stronger presidial 
presence at the Rio Conchos-Rio Grande confluence that had come down from various 
Spanish authors since the revolts of the 1680s. At its base, Lafora’s critique addressed 
a problem that the Spanish did not fully grasp (Mescalero modalities of mobility and 
competition) and offered solutions that had virtually no chance of practical success. 
Mescaleros moved across the landscape with much more agility and portability, both 
economically and socially, than the Spanish could. Mescaleros could locate and process 
resources to support their society and culture from a broader array of landforms and 
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fauna. Compounding this asymmetry of superior Mescalero maneuverability and 
ecology-engagement was the issue of access.24 
! In virtually the same breath as he critiqued the constellation of presidios, Lafora 
also noted the many mountain passes and basins that Mescaleros used to move south 
into Nueva Vizcaya. In addition to Gallegos and El Chivato, he also listed no fewer than 
twenty-eight places, in addition to “several other places which they visit less frequently,” 
a staggering number that only gestures at the porosity of the northern border. Evidently, 
where the Spanish saw contiguous and impassable mountain chains there were, in fact, 
a plethora of access points and the water and fauna to support human and animal 
movement. We can take it for granted that Lafora could only have learned of a portion of 
the available entry points–there must surely have been more than thirty. Given the 
difficult terrain, the agility of attack groups, and the scarcity of presidials, it is no wonder 
that the Rio Conchos watershed and the Bolsón de Mapimí had been drawn into the 
orbit of Mescalero Apachería following the long suppression of previous indigenous 
groups. The decline in Spanish wealth and the diminishment of Spanish places that 
Lafora witnessed on the visita was emblematic of processes that had begun a century 
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earlier when the inelasticity of Spanish imperial society first began to give way before 
the robust dynamics of indigenous modalities and mixed competition strategies.25
!
! Lafora did not realize it, but he was looking at the edge of an empire–of sorts. 
Just as the Middle Rio Grande Valley had functioned as a productive edge to the 
emergent counter-territory of the Faraones (centered in the Trans-Pecos), providing 
access to the tools and animals of Spanish empire the Rio Conchos Valley likewise had 
become the edge of the a similar space of imperial expansion for the Mescalero.  As 
Faraones around and south of La Junta recreated themselves as Mescaleros, they 
continued the same set of practices that they had developed since the inception of New 
Mexico in 1608 and the first sustained contact of the Great Plains with Spanish empire. 
These Apaches negotiated the colonial encounter by risking acceptable loses of life and 
material in order to gain access to tools and animals. In turn, these resources allowed 
them to succeed and to thrive in xeric landscapes that had previously discouraged the 
formation of Native territories owing to the wide dispersal of water, carbohydrates (in the 
form of dry-farmed maize), and bison protein. The Spanish, for their part, never ceased 
to shun the Bolsón de Mapimí, an area that abutted significant colonized areas, just as 
they had shunned the Trans-Pecos adjacent to the Middle Rio Grande Valley. In both 
cases the diminished competition offered by the Spanish allowed Apaches to form and 
maintain a competitive advantage.26
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! But how did Mescaleros locate and maintain this edge–this space of encounter? 
Mescaleros utilized natural resources from the Bolsón de Mapimí. Specifically, they 
drew upon playas, agave stands, and errant livestock, and transformed this space into a 
bastion of indigenous power. It helped that the Bolsón is an endorheic basin, meaning 
that all water that occurs drains internally. Rainfall and river-flow never reach the Rio 
Grande, the Rio Conchos, or the Gulf of Mexico. Instead, the sierras the gird the Mapimí 
trap every bit of moisture and send it cascading down mountain slopes, foothills, 
bajadas, and into arroyos or playas. Ignoring the high rates of evaporation, the arid 
Bolsón had this one great advantage:  it kept what water it produced. Mescaleros drew 
this ecoregion, yet another shunned space, but to greater and deadlier effect. Whereas 
the Trans-Pecos portion of the Chihuahuan Desert had sat adjacent to New Mexico, the 
absorption of the Bolsón de Mapimí into Apachería threatened to implode Nueva 
Vizcaya and drive an unassailable wedge between it and Coahuila, to the east. 
Tactically, this counter-invasion threatened to destroy the underpinnings that held 
together the imagined landscapes of northern New Spain; strategically, it represented a 
deliberate and sustained effort to seize upon the opportunities offered by the colonial 
encounter and to counter-claim large swathes of this North American region away from 
European colonists. Mescaleros were themselves becoming colonists of the Bolsón and 
conquistadores of places like the Rio Conchos Valley. It was the work of indigenous 
colonists that made Apachería possible, and it was water, grass, agave, and animal 
flesh that ultimately supported this final surge of Mescaleros south into the heart of the 
Chihuahuan Desert.
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! In terms of historical documentation, an ecological understanding of the Bolsón 
de Mapimí comes in bits and pieces, since the Spanish declined to settle the region or 
to describe it in any detail. In 1728, Francisco Álvarez Barreiro felt that neither New 
Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, nor Coahuila could lay claim to it. Whereas thick red lines 
roughly demarcated the borders of those provinces in his map of 1728, the Bolsón de 
Mapimí sat beyond them, to the northeast of Nueva Vizcaya, to the west of Coahuila, 
and contiguous with the similarly borderless Trans-Pecos to the north. All around it 
Barreiro drew the signs for missions and presidios, but within the space what would 
have been the Bolsón he merely drew the symbol for rancherías and labeled it as 
“Tierra havitada de los Yndíos Enemigos Cocoymes, Acoclames, Tripas blancas, 
Zizembres, y otras Naciones, quasi estinguidas”–‘land inhabited by the Indian enemies 
Cocoiomes, Acoclames, Tripas Blancas, Sisembres, and other nations, (who are) nearly 
exterminated.’ By the time of the Marques de Rubí’s visita in 1766 Lafora similarly left 
the area a blank, except for illustrating the isolation of the interior by way of lines of 
mountain chains all around, and the addition of a few presidios on the Rio Grande to the 
north. Lafora labeled the space as “Tierra desplobada donde se abrigan lose Yndios 
enemigos y Apostates de los Missiones y de ella salen a hostilisas a la Nueva Vizcaya y 
Coahuila”–‘wasteland where are sheltered the enemy Indians and mission apostates, 
and from where they depart to make hostilities upon Nueva Vizcaya and Coahuila.’ 
Groups whom Barreiro adjudged to be near extinction in 1728 had either regenerated 
their numbers or been supplanted by other indigenous peoples, like Mescaleros, in the 
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intervening forty years. Still, there are few sources from Nueva Vizcaya that shed light 
on what the Bolsón de Mapimí was like.27
! Around 1683, former governor of Nueva Vizcaya don Lope de Sierra y Osorio 
sent a letter to the viceroy in which he weighed in on what he felt were grave and 
imminent dangers to Nueva Vizcaya. The 1680 revolt of the pueblos in New Mexico and 
the failure of Governor Otermín to retake Santa Fe in 1682 were still fresh topics at that 
time and surrounding administrators were beginning to assess or predict the fallout in 
their own dealings with local Native groups. Sierra y Osorio had been devastated when 
in the previous year Tobosos, still the dominant force in the Bolsón de Mapimí at the 
time, had escalated their violent engagement with the Spanish around Parral. There, 
near the headwaters of the Rio Conchos, Tobosos had attacked convoys and ranches in 
late winter and early spring, taking nearly six hundred animals and the material goods 
from almost ten carts in the process. This locale was the same one that Lafora noted as 
being beleaguered and depressed owing to the raiding of Mescaleros just over eighty 
years later. The ex-governor felt sure that these Tobosos had been inspired by the 
rebels of New Mexico and the incredible license that they supposedly enjoyed after the 
expulsion of the Spanish.28
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! Needling home the urgency of the matter, Sierra y Osorio reminded the viceroy 
that his court had ordered a Spanish retaliatory force to march out with Tarahumara 
auxiliaries and one hundred harquebuses to punish the Tobosos, but that they had 
come back empty-handed, as did three subsequent attempts. Ten years later, when don 
Diego de Vargas had begun the long and complicated work of reintegrating the Middle 
Rio Grande Valley back into the imperial network, Nueva Vizcayan Maestre de Campo 
don Joseph Francisco Marín echoed Sierra y Osorio when he wrote, from Parral, that 
Tobosos and others had made a mockery of the province’s 383 presidials by routinely 
attacking convoys or travelers in order to steal horses. Marín gave a riveting description 
of the typical act, wherein a group of three or four mounted fighters burst out of 
mountain passes or ravines, rushed the forward guard of the Spanish travelers, and fell 
their horses first so as to leave them helpless, and then taking whatever they wish from 
the defender-less carts and people who remain. Marín despaired that these Tobosos 
attacked with such celerity that before nearby presidials could even begin to mount a 
counter-attack they were easily twenty to thirty leagues (52 to 78 miles) ahead of them. 
Unexpectedly, Marín also noted that when Tobosos retreat to the mountain skirt of the 
Bolsón, they also return to the company of Apaches, who had already begun their slow 
reconnaissance of the area and who were the “sole instigators of violence and war 
between [the] otherwise peaceful nations” around La Junta. These early Apache 
arrivals, certainly Faraones, could have been advising or aiding Tobosos, or they could 
have been there simply to observe what possibilities lay beyond the Rio Grande; either 
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way, Tobosos were already sharing the method behind sophisticated raiding and attacks 
with Apaches as early as 1693.29 
! Of course, Tobosos, unlike the New Mexico Puebloans, never defeated the 
Spanish outright. Rather, just as would be the case in Lafora’s day, they forced 
themselves into the vast imperial economy that the Spanish brought and forcibly 
concentrated new wealth into indigenous territoriality. It helped that they had a sizable 
haven to fall back on. Sierra y Osorio noted that the Bolsón de Mapimí was a 
“land that is rough and nigh impenetrable to Spaniards owing to its thick 
underbrush and aridity. There are no known creeks or rivers there and the 
Indians appear to live off of a few lagoons and stagnant ponds. It is 
thought that they feed on fruits, roots, and the bark of plants and trees. [...] 
Entering their country is treacherous and we have little advantage.”30
! Sierra y Osorio’s assessment of the ruggedness and aridity of the Bolsón de 
Mapimí was, already by now, a familiar refrain that reached back through the sixteenth 
century. What makes his account useful, however, is the mention of lagoons and 
stagnant ponds; this is an important clue about how indigenous insurgents thrived. 
Some of these water sources were almost surely playas, temporary ponds or lakes 
formed in the depressions of flat, desert terrain immediately following rainfall. Berroterán 
noticed similar features across the northern reaches of the Bolsón when he attempted 
to reach La Junta de los Ríos from presidio San Juan Bautista in 1729.31
!
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 In mid-April of 1729, Berroterán had been attempting to blaze a trail for more 
than three months, one month of which had been spent solely on trying to navigate up 
the canyon-cluttered banks of the Rio Grande. He was in the ecotonal zone where the 
Bolsón de Mapimí and the Trans-Pecos overlap. Although reports of an elusive and 
dangerous group of enemy Apaches were regularly fed to him by his spies, Berroterán 
chose to ignore them. He was already in crisis mode. His supplies were low and he 
could not really consider martial engagement that could cost him men and resources. 
Rather, he snatched up any rumor of water that floated his way. He sent wave after 
wave of Native spies out to locate watering sources–ojos, or playas. Soon the subject of 
water came to dominate the final entries of his diary. Berroterán survived this terrain and 
kept his lagging expedition from expiring by drawing enough moisture from only five 
ponds, or troughs, spaced not less than ten miles apart. Just before he quit his mission, 
Berroterán was forced to dart from pond to pond, and he depended on these playas for 
his redemption from the harsh aridity of the Bolsón.32
! As he retreated south, Berroterán ventured deeper into the Mapimí as opposed 
to swinging out east into Coahuila as was the custom. It is unclear why he chose this 
route, unless it was to avoid facing certain officials in Coahuila whom he had spurned 
when they had earlier tried to recall him to help battle Native groups in the area. 
Regardless of his reasoning, Berroterán’s need grew greater the longer he stayed in the 
Bolsón. On the retreat, scout after scout left the troop to find water; they traipsed over 
leagues of the Chihuahuan Desert, dodging agave and bridging arroyos while their own 
gourds began to dry and crack. Eventually, somewhere southeast of present-day Big 
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Bend National Park, five out of seven of these scouts collapsed, unable to carry on and 
resigned to death. The texture of arid soil and the sight of rugged peaks must have bit at 
their last remaining drops of moisture and hope. Berroterán hastily organized a rescue 
for these invaluable scouts, but he himself might have endured a similar fate had it not 
been for a stroke of incredible luck. Near the Sierras Animas (a southern part of the 
larger Sierra del Carmen just inside the eastern border of the Bolsón) he found 
immense playas, formed when hail filled the large depressions in the land and then 
melted into water. Berroterán took no chances on perhaps finding more water or losing 
more men; amazingly, he was able to provision his troop with enough water to last for 
another 100 leagues (260 miles). Playas saved this entrada from certain death.33
! Eighteen years after Berroterán, and sixty-four after Sierra y Osorio, Captain 
Fermín de Vidaurre remarked upon the same landscape, tasked as he was with 
renewing the quest for a route up the Rio Grande to La Junta de los Ríos. He too 
noticed these playas and made good use of them to resupply his troop. Vidaurre had 
set out from Presidio Mapimí in the winter of 1747, no doubt hoping to avoid the heat of 
spring and summer and to take advantage of any snowfall that might occur as a source 
of moisture that would not evaporate quickly. Still, the journey was difficult. He stuck to 
basically the same route as Berroterán had, keeping as close to the edge of the Bolsón 
de Mapimí as he could as he hustled northeast to the presidio Santa Rosa, thence on to 
the northwest towards La Junta. The snow that was meant to keep him from drying out 
also blockaded him at certain junctures and prolonged the route. By the time December 
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came the expedition was a month old and attempting to negotiate the massive ranges of 
the Sierras del Burro and Carmen that had blocked Berroterán.34
!  Vidaurre did not clearly record the distances and directions he traveled, probably 
owing to the fact that he so often had to serpentine around mountains and cliffs. At the 
end of 1747, on December 31, he was probably somewhere on the eastern face of the 
Sierra del Carmen. He had traveled westward for just over nine leagues that day 
(twenty-four miles), over over hills choked with Agave lechuguilla until he came to a 
playa that had formed in the broad depression of an arroyo bed. There, rainwater had 
puddled from a winter storm. If there was any question about the water’s potability, 
Vidaurre was answered by the presence of Mescalero wickiups–this had been an 
Apache ranchería just days earlier. Two days later Vidaurre had made little progress 
picking through the canyons and narrow mountain passes when he chanced upon two 
more playas where rainwater had also collected and where there was also evidence of 
a ranchería, just days old. Most of the subsequent details of Vidaurre’s expedition are 
not entirely relevant to an historical discovery of playas, especially given the captain’s 
inexactitude about his location at any given time. Suffice to say, he encountered many 
snowy puddles from which he watered his troop in the course of his march.35 
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! One detail remains, however, that helps establish the relationship between 
Apaches and playas. About one week after he left the wickiups on the playa, Vidaurre 
was spending most of his time traveling north and south in his search for water and a 
suitable path westward. Eventually he got word from a scout that there was a 
treacherous mountain pass that would allow him to continue towards La Junta about 9 
leagues off, but that there was a sizable gathering of Apaches near it. Vidaurre, 
although gladdened at the thought of escaping from the labyrinthine mountains, 
hesitated at the news of a ranchería nearby. He advanced cautiously and brought his 
expedition to a full halt more than ten miles from the Apaches; he then sent ahead a 
325
lieutenant with a small escort of soldiers to learn the mood of the gathering and to 
parlay. Vidaurre had some cause to believe that this might not be an amiable encounter:  
he had had over twenty-five horses taken from his troop only days before and everyone 
suspected that Apaches were responsible; earlier in December, the omnipresent threat 
of rancherías proved so unnerving that a small portion of the troop–vecinos from 
Saltillo–had abandoned the enterprise rather than risk combat.36
! In the end, the lieutenant’s report was favorable and the Spanish were welcomed 
in peace, and these Apaches exchanged perfunctory greetings with them. These 
Mescaleros went so far as to offer themselves as scouts for the Spanish...to help them 
out of the area all the more quickly. Theirs was a ranchería of about 250 Mescaleros 
about 40 leagues (104 miles) to the west of the last sighting of playas and wickiups, 
probably somewhere between the Sierra del Carmen and the Chisos Mountains. The 
leader of the ranchería, an elder named Luz, who looked to be about eighty years old 
and was wrapped in a fine bison skin, told them that neighboring Apache peoples were 
aggressive and bellicose, possessed harquebuses, and also ate agave. Vidaurre did not 
waste time in leaving the ranchería on the next day and putting over 25 miles between 
him and this area. He wove his way through hills covered in Agave lechuguilla and 
drank from ojos and playas with his Mescalero guides. Two weeks later he had been 
successfully escorted out of the area and appeared at La Junta de los Ríos.37
! This ranchería had enjoyed much company; from all around in the basins and 
crevices of the mountains “thick smoke” wafted up, surrounding Vidaurre’s position and 
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pointing to the presence of many more rancherías with hundreds more Mescaleros. 
There can be little doubt that these Apaches knew about the playas that Vidaurre had 
visited, and probably utilized them regularly as they cycled through habitation sites all 
around the Bolsón de Mapimí and its periphery. Theses Apaches dwelt in close 
proximity to the playas, probably less than fifty miles. The fact that Vidaurre 
encountered Apaches in the Sierra del Carmen and not at the playas themselves only 
suggests that these Mescaleros had moved on from the locations either because it 
suited them or because they wanted to make sure that any meeting with the Spanish 
captain occurred in a setting of their choosing–specifically, deep within the mountains 
where the Spanish would be on unfamiliar ground and where Apaches already 
controlled defensible heights. 
! The recurring mention of life-saving playas suggest that pockets of water dotted 
the Bolsón de Mapimí, and that the Spanish designation of it as a desplobado is 
unfounded and misleading. These playas were numerous and sufficient enough to 
support rancherías and to nourish large Spanish retinues. Recent surveys of the Bolsón 
de Mapimí Biosphere, a small subset of the larger Bolsón located near the center of the 
region, suggest that playas cover at least 24% of the biosphere’s 664 square miles. The 
area of the entire Bolsón is a topic of debate, with various geographers coming to 
radically different conclusions based on the ecological vectors from which 
measurements are made, but the range appears to be 50,000 to 59,500 square miles. 
Mean annual rainfall is about eleven inches–lower than the Middle Rio Grande Valley by 
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two inches, or 15%–and the majority of precipitation occurs from July to September, 
during monsoons.38 
! There are four limitations, however, that should be understood before we over-
hydrate the Bolsón with playas. First, within the Bolsón there was nothing comparable to 
the Pecos River watershed, with its mountain-spring tributaries that stretched out 
eastward across the Trans-Pecos; that part of the Chihuahuan Desert was a relative 
mesopotamia in comparison to the Bolsón. Second, although the plentiful Rio Conchos 
was accessible from the Bolsón, the mountain ranges which form the westward border 
of the Bolsón de Mapimí also constituted the absolute eastward barrier of the river. 
Tributaries for the Conchos came from the west and flowed east into the main body of 
water, but the Rio Conchos itself had no way to cross the Sierra Madre and enter the 
Bolsón. For Mescaleros, travel to the Rio Conchos necessarily included an elevated risk 
of meeting, and confronting, the Spanish. Third, the Rio Grande watershed cannot be 
considered part of the hydrology of the Bolsón de Mapimí, except for minor and 
seasonal tributaries that barely extended from within the ecotonal zones between the 
Bolsón de Mapimí and the Rio Grande. Finally, these playas were, by their very nature, 
seasonal ponds, filled only during the occurrence of rainfall. The Bolsón de Mapimí 
provided sufficient water resources to support Tobosos, Tarahumaras, and Mescaleros, 
but in comparison to the Trans-Pecos, it presented a reduced abundance. 
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! Nevertheless, these playas were oases, and Mescaleros adjusted their 
transhumant mobilities to take advantage of the endorheic basin’s most common water 
source. Playas filled whenever there was a storm over the basin floor during the 
summer monsoon season, or whenever rainclouds broke over a mountain and the 
runoff rushed out through alluvial fans, into bajadas, and into the beds of arroyos (which 
comprise another 54% of the land area in the biosphere). Granted, it would have been 
more work for Mescaleros to watch for rain and to reach the sites of precipitation than it 
was to camp at a river’s edge, but over time the locations of major playas and the 
probability and timing of their seasonal filling would have become intuitive cultural 
knowledge. The success of Mescaleros in dominating the Bolsón strongly suggests that 
they developed a detailed calendar and cartography, probably in part because they 
already had some knowledge of playas from their time in the Central Close Basin, east 
of the Jornada del Muerto, where similar ponds are spread out over that endorheic 
basin’s floor and can be as deep as twenty feet. Between the time that Berroterán first 
noted an Apache presence in 1748 until the first clear signs of difficulty communicated 
by fray Lezaún and Lafora in 1760 and 1766, respectively, Mescaleros had almost an 
entire generation to learn the Bolsón de Mapimí without much fear of attack. The 
internal topography and passes of the Bolsón were almost wholly unknown to the 
Spanish because of their insistence on only traveling the peripheries. Sierra y Osorio 
called them “stagnant ponds,” but he could not have been more wrong about what 
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actually existed there. Tobosos and Mescaleros certainly knew better, as did Berroterán 
and Vidaurre and anyone else who frequented playas.39 
! Once these playas filled with water, there is good reason to believe that the water 
remained long enough to support micro-ecologies at the edge of the pond. The key to 
understanding how this occurs comes from a knowledge of soil types (edaphic profiles) 
and xeric grass species. The edaphic profile of desert landscapes contains mostly 
aridisols. Aridisols have little organic material in them, and they sometimes drain quickly 
because of their high sand content, but just as often there exist within them properties 
that retain enough water to support desert grasses. Aridisols are differentiated into two 
sub-types: argids and orthids. Argids contain a strata of clay within the soil, while orthids 
can form hard layers of caliche near the surface if mineral levels (e.g. calcium) are high 
enough. Both aridisol types allow for some percolation of water into aquifers below, but 
if water hits the surface at speed, or in overwhelming volumes, then the sudden 
presence of so much moisture creates a semi-dense strata that can keep playas filled 
for weeks. The presence of playa waters would have produced two benefits. First and 
foremost, Mescaleros would have immediately enjoyed stores of potable, if alkaline, 
water from which they could hydrate themselves and their animals.40 
! Second, we now know that grasses like Tobosa (Hilaria mutica) and Buffalo 
Grass (Buchloe dactyloides) grow along the margins, and thrive during both wet and dry 
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periods. These grasses would have been a nutritious foodstuff for cattle and horses, or 
the errant bison herd. Hilaria mutica is a perennial grass that, if faced with drought 
situations, automatically slows down rates of photosynthesis and transpiration, thereby 
conserving water, to the point that it becomes dormant. Vidaurre likely pastured his 
horses in stands of Tobosa while he skirted the Bolsón de Mapimí and drank from the 
pools of water that had collected in the bottomland clay (argids) sites, where Hilaria 
mutica was and is a climax species–meaning that its prominence within the flora of the 
micro-environment was an inevitability. Tobosa has the added advantage of being a 
rhizomatous grass. The roots of Tobosa are composed of many rhizomes–subterranean 
shoots that extend outward from the mother plant until available moisture and 
germination can produce another instance of the grass. This root structure gives Tobosa 
the ability to capture and protect moisture underground, even when there is only a light 
shower near a playa that is not sufficient to fill the depression. Typically, water from the 
light rain “runs-on” into the playa and percolates into the ground before the center of the 
depression can be attained. But that is actually a benefit for Tobosa because the 
underground, rhizomatous roots stand in the path of the water and take it up without the 
risk of evapotranspiration. The end result is that this grass is successful at the edge of 
playas when it floods (taking up water as any grass would); in times of light rain (when 
its root systems capture percolated water); and in times of drought (when it becomes 
dormant to survive).41
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! Buchloe dactyloides is not as successful at tolerating drought as Hilaria mutica, 
but it is still remarkably drought-resistant, and its presence is noted all around the 
Bolsón de Mapimí even today. Like Tobosa, Buffalo grass is a perennial, but its root 
system is stoloniferous, meaning that it too grows by means of shoots that travel 
aboveground. Whereas Tobosa grows well at the edges of playas, Buffalo grass 
appears to do well towards the center of the depression, where it can collect more 
surface water through its above-ground roots. During the monsoon season, when the 
playas fill in for weeks at time, Buffalo grass has adapted to survive even when 
submerged, showing signs of growth even when it emerges from water after as much as 
a year.42 
! Both Hilaria mutica and Buchloe dactyloides are nutritious grasses, yielding 
enough protein, calcium, and phosphorous for horses and cattle to live on, although 
protein levels in times of long drought are usually substandard. Hilaria mutica, when 
tested in the Jornada del Muerto between summer and winter of 1962 and 1963, yielded 
an average of just more than 8% of its biomass as protein–an excellent figure, while 
Buchloe dactyloides yielded almost 7% during a sample taken from the Llano Estacado 
from the winter of 1962 until the spring of 1964. When Mescaleros regularly visited their 
rancherías around playa sites, or when the Spanish periodically stopped at the same 
locations along the edges of the Bolsón, they also helped propagate these grass 
species through the act of grazing. Both Tobosa and Buffalo grass perform reasonably 
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well when there is little or no grazing, but with regular, semi-intensive grazing, the 
number of plants increases and covers a wider space. Only during years of prolonged 
drought and heavy grazing would Mescaleros have contributed to a serious 
diminishment of the micro-environment.43
! The only question that remains is what Mescaleros used for carbohydrates, but 
the answer is straight forward and simple. The Bolsón de Mapimí is firmly understood to 
be the geographic center of the Chihuahuan Desert. Agave lechuguilla, or mescal, is 
what is known as an “indicator species” of the Chihuahuan Desert, meaning that 
populations of this succulent are coterminous with the ecological area of the desert. 
Vidaurre alone, during his 1747-1748 trek, mentioned stands of agave nearly ten times–
a high figure, and more than any other topographical attribute, except water. Later, in 
the early winter of 1782, Colonel Juan de Ugalde led over 300 soldiers and Lipanes 
auxiliaries into the Bolsón de Mapimí with one month’s worth of supplies. Two months 
later his troop returned, arriving at the presidio of Guajoquilla; their overstay of one 
month would have spelled their demise had it not been for Agave lechuguilla. Ugalde 
also reported that he had found twenty-nine rancherías and many more springs during 
his trek over (by his calculation) about three-quarters of the Boslón. Mescal populations 
were just as prolific in the Bolsón as they were in the Trans-Pecos. Mescaleros would 
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have been well at home in the cultivation and roasting of its leaves and fluorescing 
peduncle, or stalk.44
! Playas occurred over a vast territory wherever rainfall occurred, forming in 
depressions over plains and in arroyo beds. From their rancherías situated on basin 
floors or atop mountain ranges, the storm showers that produce playas would have 
been visible for miles around. In all likelihood, though, Mescaleros did not need simply 
to watch and wait for rain to appear on the horizon. The fact that their documented 
presence in the Bolsón reaches back at least to 1683 strongly suggests that seasonal 
patterns of precipitation, and the location of wide depressions, would have become 
common cultural knowledge, and rancherías would have been situated nearby these 
hospitable sites to anticipate the moisture. These miniature oases supported ecological 
micro-communities capable of providing water to small nomadic groups and their 
livestock, with the added benefit that the edges of playas nurtured pastures of Tobosa 
and Buffalo grass upon which protein-rich ungulates grazed. The bunches of Agave 
lechuguilla that littered the desert floor and the foothills of the Bolsón de Mapimí 
provided more than enough carbohydrates to a people who had been accustomed to 
roasting peduncles and stalks from their residence in the Trans-Pecos. This was as far 
from a desplobado as the Trans-Pecos was. In geopolitical terms, the Bolsón de Mapimí 
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    v. Chapter 4, infra, for a review of the high nutritional load of this plant and the means of its cultivation.
provided sufficient resources for Apachería to thrive and to turn the ethno-utilitarian 
discourse of Spanish imperialism on its head. More practically speaking, the migration 
into the Bolsón and the particular usage of resources represents continuity with the 
previous one hundred years of expansion. Mescaleros still maintained access to the 
granaries of El Paso del Norte and La Junta de los Ríos, but now they also added the 
haciendas and ranchos of the Rio Conchos valley to Bolsón de Mapimí playas and 
basins.  
! By 1771, Colonel Hugo de O’Conor, the newly-appointed military commander of 
Chihuahua (Nueva Vizcaya), was perfectly situated to provide a sweeping look at what 
Mescalero Apachería looked like from the Bolsón de Mapimí. O’Conor was part of a 
vanguard of high-level administrators who were implementing sweeping imperial 
reforms, known as the Bourbon Reforms, handed down from Madrid. The Bourbon 
dynasty had ascended the Spanish throne in 1700 and had immediately begun to 
reform the empire that they inherited from their Hapsburg predecessors, but it was not 
until 1770s that King Carlos III addressed the problem of overly-centralized authority 
under the viceroy in Mexico City, and the lack of efficient policies for the disparate 
northern provinces of New Spain. Five years after O’Conor’s first observations, the new 
system would, in 1776, provide for a new administrative structure called “Provincias 
Internas” that replaced the older notion of ‘provinces.’ In this scheme, authority 
concentrated in the hands of local governors, but instead of reporting to the viceroy far 
to the south, these officials were now responsible to an intendant–a kind of sub-viceroy–
who was primarily concerned with the security and welfare of the northern frontier. The 
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intendant was responsible to the king alone. The basic idea was that the administrative 
body of the northern frontier needed to be more agile and independent so that it could 
quickly form policies that were suited to the stressors imposed by Apache, Comanche, 
and British factors.45
! The royal court in Madrid and the viceroyalty in Mexico City had long known of 
the calamitous state of their empire along the northern frontier. Accounts by military men 
like O’Conor drove home just how narrowly the Spanish were maintaining their hold on 
this region. O’Conor himself was aghast that Nueva Vizcaya had been gripped by 
almost continuous war for almost twenty-three years, since 1748 (not coincidentally, 
when Berroterán made his now-infamous prognostication about Mescalero exploitation 
of the Bolsón de Mapimí). The Rio Conchos watershed, and all of the struggling 
haciendas that Lafora had visited five years earlier, had fallen deeper into ruin and 
exploitation. Large estates at Encinillas and all along the approach to the Valle de San 
Bartolomé (near Parral) had been ruined, their elite families displaced and many of 
vecinos and laborers left dead in the fields or on the roads. Just recently, near Ciudad 
Chihuahua, Mescaleros had attacked and taken nearly six hundred horses and killed 
almost a dozen men. Even more alarming than these cases for O’Conor, the reach of 
these attacks was becoming longer and sometimes penetrated down almost to 
Durango, deep within the empire. This news came in addition to that of the north being 
as precarious as ever. El Paso del Norte, the erstwhile villa of Nueva Vizcaya and 
closest settlement to the Middle Rio Grande Valley, had not escaped the clutches of 
these pandemic assaults. Sometime in 1771 Apaches had raided there from the Bolsón 
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de Mapimí and had seized up to 1,000 head of cattle, horses, and mules, and killed 
seven men. O’Conor included with his account a five-page list of 28 haciendas, 23 
ranchos, and many mission and pueblos, all on the brink of ruin or already destroyed. 
O’Conor, proceeding with this litany of examples, at one point apologized to the viceroy 
for burdening him with the details of so many attacks and the casualties involved, but he 
stressed the important fact that Mescalero depredations occurred on a daily basis and 
that they acted with near impunity. Colonel O’Conor lamented that presidials seemed 
impotent in their ability to halt the attacks.46
! Seventeen years later, in 1788, the violence that washed over the province had 
crested. Esteban Lorenzo, the bishop of Durango, likely shuddered when he perceived 
that the predictions of Berroterán in 1748 had come true with a vengeance and that 
Apachería had encroached into Nueva Vizcaya, virtually unchecked. He blamed an 
underfunded military and an ever-shifting presidio line for the fact that Mescaleros 
enjoyed a vast area that was over 1,500 miles east to west, and 780 miles north to 
south–a suspiciously large territory of over one million square miles. Lorenzo’s high 
estimation of Mescalero space stems from the fact that he counted the area of the 
Bolsón in addition to raided places as part of Apachería, and because he conflated 
Gileños with Mescaleros. His focus was, nevertheless, trained upon Mescaleros. In the 
years since Rubí’s inspection, he lamented that Mescaleros had streamed like waves 
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across the Sierra Grande and the Rio Conchos and that the Bolsón de Mapimí had 
become a “wide open door that was left for them to approach the haciendas stealthily, 
so they could kill and rob with impunity.” Lorenzo chaffed that retaliation against these 
Apaches was made extremely difficult because they were in control of “the most rugged 
places” in the mountains, just as they had done since the seventeenth century, and 
because Mescaleros were every bit as expert in military matters as were the Spanish. 
The level of destruction had become so great that the once-great villa of Ciudad 
Chihuahua had become a sepulcher, filled with the vecinos and soldiers. In 1766 Lafora 
had described Ciudad Chihuahua as if it were a city under siege; in 1771 O’Conor noted 
its vulnerability to withering raids; by 1788 there seemed to be little left worth fighting 
for.47
! Almost 200 years earlier Ginés de Herrera Horta and Juan de Ortega stood in an 
office in Mexico City. Horta was an auditor and a legal advisor; Ortega was a cavalry 
captain; across the desk sat don Francisco de Valverde y Mercado, an investigator 
appointed by the then-viceroy. These were unremarkable meetings. Viceroy Zúñiga y 
Acevedo wanted to know more about the mysterious northern province that don Juan 
de Oñate had recently founded in the name of the Spanish King. Horta and Ortega both 
recited demographic figures and described agricultural types and yields. Speaking of 
the world beyond the pueblos, Horta stated that Puebloans customarily traded with 
“Vaqueros,” or “Apaches,” who moved about the prairies to the east. Ortega added that 
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scores of Apaches often bring meat, fat, and tallow to traded for maize and blankets at 
the fairs of Pecos and Taos pueblos. These Vaqueros stacked their trade goods on polls 
and attached those polls to little shaggy dogs. They came from 40 to 50 leagues (~100 
to 130 miles) across the plains for the exchanges.48
! Valverde was unimpressed enough with this information that there is no evidence 
that the viceroy heard anything about it. After all, Vaqueros came off as transient people 
who ambled across the plains and the mesas over 1,400 miles away. Their lives and 
their choices seemed immaterial to larger colonial projects. In the intervening 187 years, 
however, Vaqueros, then Faraones and Natagés and Mescaleros closed much of that 
gap. In terms of physical distance, they shaved off about two thirds. By the time Hugo 
de O’Conor supplied information to the viceroy again in 1788, Mescaleros were banging 
on the walls at Durango, just 500 miles from Mexico City. Geopolitically, the gap had 
narrowed even further. The Chihuahuan Desert that had seemed a barrier to Espejo, 
Oñate, Otermín, Dominguez, Vargas, Berroterán, Vidaurre, LaFora, and O’Conor had 
revealed itself to be a highway. But those lands, that had once appeared so irrelevant to 
the structure of empire that the Spanish turned away almost as soon as they glanced, 
had been revealed as a highway. Through the Chihuahuan Desert, Apaches supplied 
and sheltered themselves, and found a beautifully tuned passive-weapon to 
complement the very active weapon that they exercised through their emergent 
territorialities.
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Conclusion: Desertification and Mescalero Counter-Territoriality
! Ninety-nine, sixty-eight, thirty. Those are the number of years that it took for 
Faraones and Mescaleros to impose their socio-political territory–Apachería–over the 
eastern Middle Rio Grande Valley, the Trans-Pecos, and the Bolsón de Mapimí. In the 
early days of New Mexico, from 1581 to 1660, Faraones fed parasitically off of the 
imperial economy that was centered out of Santa Fe and fed by the Franciscan mission 
supply service. By the time that Governor Antonio de Otermín was fleeing south towards 
El Paso del Norte in 1680, Apachería stretched from the area of Pecos pueblo down 
through the Jornada del Muerto, to the point where the Rio Grande turns southeast 
towards the Gulf of Mexico. During the next 68 years, from 1680 until 1748, Faraones 
doubled the length of the Rio Grande over which they held court. They breached the 
Hueco Bolsón, counter-claimed La Junta de los Ríos from the Spanish and Jumanos, 
and consolidated their hold over the Pecos River. In the process of meeting, destroying, 
and adopting indigenous desert groups (like Jumanos and Sumas) they altered their 
political economy enough that these Apaches of the Pecos and lower Rio Grande came 
to be known by new names:  Natagé or Mescalero. Since 1683 Faraones had begun to 
use La Junta as a way-station to travel up the Rio Conchos, where they learned from 
Tobosos and their century-old war in Nueva Vizcaya. Over the course of the next 30 
years, from 1748 until 1788, they filled the Bolsón de Mapimí and colonized its playa 
sites and its basins. The momentum with which Apachería expanded only seemed to 
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increase over time, and in 1788 O’Conor and Lorenzo might have feared that 
Mescaleros’ preeminence over the geopolitical landscape would soon reach into the 
innermost sanctums of New Spain. 
Map 22: The Progression of Faraon and Mescalero Apacherías, 1581-1788. First panel: 
Middle Rio Grande Valley and southern Great Plains, 1581-1680; second panel: Trans-
Pecos, 1681-1748; third panel: Bolsón de Mapimí, 1749-1788 (note that by this time the 
southern Great Plains had fallen to Comanchería, and far central-west had become 
Gileño territory).
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.
! Nevertheless, those eight Mescaleros, trailing 200 families behind them, arrived 
at El Paso del Norte in 1787. They petitioned for an audience with Captain Domingo 
Díaz. They asked for a truce; for peace; for an establecimientos de paz. Mescaleros 
had asked for peace before, had won it, and had flouted it. Díaz likely thought he was 
going through the motions of a fairly well-established routine. He could not have known 
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that this time was different, that something had changed, and that the borderlands were 
about to take on a new geopolitical complexion.1!
! To understand motives of these Mescaleros at El Paso, we might ask ourselves 
how the Bolsón de Mapimí had changed over the previous two centuries.  It is worth 
remembering that the violence that Lafora, O’Conor, and others recorded was more 
frequent and extensive than anything that Mescaleros had perpetrated since the turn of 
the eighteenth century. As such, Mescalero behavior in the Bolsón de Mapimí 
represents a startling alteration to their modes of engagement and competition from the 
decades before 1748. In the space of a generation a different calculus of risk-
assessment and inter-ethnic competition had emerged. After 1740, and within the 
Bolsón, symbiotic bellicosity or the subtle manipulation of Spanish economic and 
political structures do not appear as popular strategies for competition. Yet there was 
something distinctly reminiscent of early seventeenth century New Mexico regarding the 
way history played out in the Bolsón. Mescaleros utilized high-risk, aggressive 
strategies like raiding and seizure much more often along the Rio Conchos and around 
the edges of the Bolsón, just as their Faraon kin had done around the Middle Rio 
Grande Valley before 1680. These older, but redeployed, strategies were every bit as 
high-risk as they were before 1694, and carried within them the threat that valuable 
community members would be killed or injured, that materials would be lost or ruined, or 
that the Spanish would make immediate or imminent reprisals which carried within them 
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yet more threats to life and property. Bolsón Mescaleros either valued their martial and 
economic capabilities as superior to the Spanish–thus allowing for unchecked, reckless, 
and hawkish aggression, or these Apaches did not enjoy the same kind of elasticity and 
material wealth that allowed for mixed strategies of competition that were time-
consumptive, yielded less, but that featured lower risk to persons and wealth. The 
causes of escalated violence reveal much about the denouement of Apachería and its 
symbol of the manifestation of expansive indigenous power.2
! Apaches were never technologically superior to the Spanish–the Spanish always 
had more guns and at least some horses, even if Apaches had more horses, territory, 
and greater mobility. Mescaleros knew that open conflict was always a perilous and 
expensive enterprise that ran the risk of multiple casualties or loss of material. Rather, 
the ultimate causality behind increased raiding derives from three interrelated factors. 
First, and already mentioned, the offerings of the Bolsón were less abundant when 
compared to the Trans-Pecos, with fewer resource sites and marginally lower quality. In 
their efforts to supplement playa- and basin-based natural economies, Mescaleros had 
recourse to older granaries like those at El Paso, La Junta, and the Middle Rio Grande 
Valley, but at the loss of increased intra-Athapaskan competition. Bolsón Mescaleros 
would have had to cooperate, or compete, with Faraones–as they were still called to the 
north–who had never left the El Paso and Rio Grande areas, while Natagés–as they 
were still called to the northwest–had already engaged the Julimes pueblos. The next 
343
2 Susan M. Deeds, Defiance and Deference in Mexico’s Colonial North: Indians under Spanish Rule in 
Nueva Vizcaya (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003): 6 for the idea of “mediated opportunism” as the 
“crossroads between cultural and environmental opportunism on the one hand and moral boundaries and 
biological barriers on the other.” This analytical construct could possibly be useful here, leaning more 
towards biological barriers and less to moral ones.
best supplementation would have been the Rio Conchos Valley and the camino real, 
with all the risk of encounter and conflict that came with it. 
! Second, when Mescaleros approached Spanish places deep within Nueva 
Vizcaya, they did so from a position of relatively greater resource-deficiency than their 
Faraon counterparts had done, and this circumstance narrowed the scope of available 
strategies. When Faraones had made the choice to practice symbiotic bellicosity (i.e. 
threatening, bargaining, negotiating) during the early 1700s, they did so because they 
could de facto afford to commit themselves to protracted encounters that would 
probably yield less material goods than what could be attained through raiding, but that 
came at significantly lower risk. Supported by backup granaries located across the 
northern rim of Nueva Vizcaya and within the mesopotamia that was the Trans-Pecos, 
Faraones possessed the means to cultivate and refine their modes of competition. 
Mescaleros did not have so many secondary sources of wealth to support their 
population while encounters played out. If bargaining failed, then the expenditure of time 
and resources would be a pure loss and potentially catastrophic to their economy. 
Bolsón Mescaleros accepted the high risks attendant to raiding-based competition 
because there was less guarantee of access to alternate wealth and because of the 
increased likelihood of deprivation.3
! Third, Comanches had begun to exert renewed pressure on Faraones in the 
Middle Rio Grande Valley and on Lipanes and Natagés in what is today northwestern 
and central Texas by the 1750s. In New Mexico, Governor Tómas Vélez Cachupín 
began to see the tide turning during his administration (1749 to 1754). Cachupín 
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believed that Comanches had eclipsed Faraon Apaches to become the preeminent 
Native group in the region, and he consequently ameliorated violent encounters with 
Comanches in the hopes of promoting trade and peace while exhibiting a blasé attitude 
towards Apaches. When, in April of 1752, Comanches rode out from the rio arriba to 
raid a place called La Soledad del Rio Arriba for horses, a militia of vecinos immediately 
set out to punish attackers, losing one of their number in the process. When the vecinos 
returned to Taos with their comrade’s corpse, the Comanches who were present in the 
area were not so much as questioned; quite the contrary, they were given armed 
escorts back to the Arkansas River Valley so that Jicarilla Apaches would not bother 
them on their way home. Later, when giving advice to his successor, Francisco Marín 
del Valle, Cachupín made it clear that Comanche safety, access, and interest must be 
privileged above that of Apaches and Utes should all three attend trade fairs at Taos at 
the same time. As for Apaches, Carlanas and Cuartelejos–the same groups who had 
petitioned for a presidio within the rio arriba in the 1720s–had been pushed south into 
the area of Pecos pueblo. Pecos pueblo and the Albuquerque-Belen Valley had been 
Faraon territories thirty years earlier; now, in a chain effect, Faraones had been pushed 
south, into the Jornada del Muerto and the Central Closed Basin to the east. Faraones 
were still formidable, and Cachupín saw them as a distinct threat, but they no longer 
wielded sufficient geopolitical clout to ensnare the Spanish.4
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! The antecedent for Cachupín’s favorable treatment of Comanches was a stinging 
defeat that the Spanish had inflicted upon them in what is today the Texas panhandle 
the year before. In that engagement the Comanche left hundreds of warriors dead on 
the field. The Comanches, thanks to trade linkages with the French, were often better 
equipped with firearms than the Spanish, and they must have thought that it was a rare 
day that the risk of hawkish play with New Mexico would come back to bite them. That 
day came, however, and the survivors were forced to pay the high price that came in the 
form of lost members, destroyed material wealth, and political humiliation. Comanches 
agreed to Governor Cachupín’s peace, but then immediately turned their attention to the 
east, to Texas, and to the Lipanes relationship with the Spanish around San Antonio de 
Bejar. The sudden impact of Comanchería upon the Lipan Texas Edwards Plateau sent 
shockwaves into Apachería south and and west, into the Trans-Pecos and, 
consequently, into the Bolsón de Mapimí.5
! A detailed treatment of Comanche-Lipan relations in Texas does not belong to 
this analysis; the long series of threats, attacks, counter-attacks, and reversals before 
1788 do not figure into a deep understanding of Mescalero Apachería and the 
Chihuahuan Desert. One episode, however, stands out as a turning point for Lipanes, 
and consequently for Natagés and Mescaleros. In 1749, after many years of incessantly 
raiding Spanish missions and haciendas, Lipan Apaches felt that the pressure exerted 
by Comanches and their allies from the southern Great Plains necessitated a change of 
strategy. Lipanes cemented peace with the Spanish at San Antonio and persuaded 
them to consider erecting a mission and presidio for them somewhere to the northwest. 
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Eight years later, in 1757, the Mission Santa Cruz de San Sabá was established, just 
outside present-day Menard, Texas. Whereas Jicarilla had tried a similar tactic thirty 
years earlier in trying to entice the Spanish to set up a presidio north of Taos, Lipanes 
succeeded in attracting missionaries and presidials to their territory, where they felt they 
would be guaranteed added protection against the approaching hulk that was 
Comanchería. It was all for naught, however, and the following year, in 1758, thousands 
of Comanche and allied Native fighters stormed the mission and destroyed it. It appears 
that not even the Spanish could stand in the direct path of competing indigenous 
territorialities. Lipan Apachería was left in shambles, and the survivors fled south. They 
never regained meaningful control over central Texas or enjoyed broad access to the 
bison trade of the southern Great Plains. Virtually overnight a diaspora of Lipanes 
surged into the lower valleys of the Rio Grande and in to Coahuila, crowding the fringe 
Mescaleros–Natagés–who were already there.6
!
! As Faraones from the Middle Rio Grande Valley moved south in a bid to temper 
the ferocity of Uto-Aztecan competition, they joined their Mescalero cousins around the 
Rio Grande between the Trans-Pecos and the Bolsón. This crowding around El Paso 
del Norte helps explain why there had been an uptick in violence, since now Mescaleros 
from the Bolsón, Faraones from the Jornada del Muerto, and Gileños from the west now 
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vied for access to the same granary. When Lipanes moved south and west from 
Spanish Texas places like San Antonio de Bejar, they too brushed up against the edges 
of the Bolsón, but on the northwestern and western sides. The consequences of these 
forced, Comanche-prompted migrations were twofold:7  
! First, these displaced Athapaskans set off a chain reaction that pushed 
populations farther south, from the Middle Rio Grande Valley into the southern Trans-
Pecos and thence into the Bolsón de Mapimí. As the tributaries of the Pecos River and 
the granaries of the Spanish receded into the northern horizon, new arrivals began to 
crowd the already marginal resources of the Bolsón and the southern Trans-Pecos. 
Different and more groups now vied for the same playas and pastures, and in the 
process they strained the ability of xeric-adapted, nomadic horse cultures to make the 
most out of the Chihuahuan Desert. The system began to overload, and every group 
suffered. Second, when Bolsón Mescaleros saw their ethnic or linguistic kin come down 
off of the southern Great Plains, they must have also realized that their access to the 
bison trade had been reduced if not eliminated.8
! After access to bison meat via Faraon-Carlana or Lipan Apache lines had been 
choked by Comanche consolidation over the southern Great Plains, Mescaleros had to 
become increasingly creative in sourcing protein. Local production was problematic 
because pastoralism was more difficult in the Bolsón; there were too few pastures that 
were extensive or durable enough to grow herds comparable in size to those that had 
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existed within the Trans-Pecos. Consequently, the importance of haciendas and 
ranchos as sources of protein grew, and soon overtook the resources provided by wild 
game and local husbandry. Cattle, goats, and sheep were just as sought after and 
important as ever, but it also appears that horseflesh became a prevalent item on the 
Mescalero menu.
! “A piece of mule, horse, or deer is all the same to them [Apaches], but they prefer 
to steal mules and horses from the Spaniards, thereby assuring themselves of abundant 
food with less work than hunting.” Nicolás Lafora penned this faintly ethnographic 
observation in 1766, once he had finished surveying the wreckage that was Nueva 
Vizcaya all along the Rio Conchos. To Lafora, the thought of consuming horseflesh was 
abhorrent, and he likened it to rumors that Mescalero practiced cannibalism and forced 
Caesareans on captured women, only to perform infanticide on whatever there was of a 
fetus. Whether or not macabre violence like this actually occurred, or occurred regularly, 
is as difficult to prove as is the Apache butchering of horses. But the level of implied 
destruction inherent in Lafora’s observations dovetails with the hypothesis that the 
ecologies of the Bolsón de Mapimí did not offer Mescaleros the level of resource 
abundance required to sustain themselves as they had done in the centuries prior. 
Consequently, new ideas about what food could look like evolved, as did the strategies 
by which that food could be procured. Additionally, there are historical precedents for 
Apache consumption of horseflesh in the Chihuahuan Desert.9
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! All the way back in 1581, when Faraones–or ‘Vaqueros’ as they might have been 
called in the days of Rodriguez Chamuscado–were first becoming acquainted with the 
Spanish and their motley array of tools and animals, the consumption of horseflesh was 
already a developing practice. Sometime in the autumn of 1581, Francisco 
“Chamuscado” Sánchez led his group of three franciscans and nine soldiers on an 
investigation of the strange cows that they had heard reports of from Puebloans of the 
Rio Grande. The Spaniard’s curiosity was piqued, and they decided it would be a good 
idea to coerce a Puebloan to serve as a guide out onto the prairies. Soon they came 
across bison (probably somewhere around the Canadian River), and they carefully 
killed a few animals and butchered some meat before retreating back to the pueblos. 
Supplies were evidently low, however, and by the time they entered the Galisteo Basin 
the Spanish were starved of water and grain. In a pueblo that is now difficult to identify, 
they intimidated the Puebloans with the novelty of their harquebuses and proceeded to 
pilfer food from each of the three hundred houses.10
! But in a moment of counter-discovery, some of their horses went missing. For the 
Spanish, this was a calamity. Horses were their principal means of transportation and 
these animals furnished immediate advantages of mobility and aggression over 
pedestrian Puebloans. Fearful of setting off a revolt, the Spanish treaded carefully but 
set out immediately to investigate. They soon came upon a pueblo that they called 
Malagón (probably San Lazaro of the Galisteo Basin) and found evidence of a 
slaughter. The horses were gone, and they probably would have been forgotten to the 
entrada’s diary, if the soldiers had not then conducted searches of the Puebloans’ 
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rooms and found horseflesh inside one of them. Whereas the Spanish had just been 
learning about the edible fauna of the southern Great Plains, Puebloans were no less 
keen to learn about the value of the meat that could be gotten from these new visitors. 
The people of Pecos pueblo, about 30 miles east by north, would have learned of this 
experience immediately and shared it with their longtime Plains trading partners, 
Faraones.11 
! After 1610, however, once the Spanish entrenched themselves among the 
pueblos, surveillance by colonists and domination by the Catholic Church appears to 
have quashed Puebloan experimentation with horseflesh. Faraones, for their part, 
probably experimented with it as well (although there is no direct primary documentation 
of this), but they likely confined their protein resources to bison and other wild game; for 
Apaches, horses’ immediate value was in transportation and as trade commodities. 
Nonetheless, by the time Faraones began to breach into Nueva Vizcaya after the 1680 
revolt, they would have again encountered a landscape where indigenous peoples 
experimented with horse consumption. Governor Sierra y Osorio noted in 1683 that 
Tobosos, raiding from within the Bolsón, were especially fond of seizing cattle and 
horses because of their value both as transportation and as food. Maestre de Campo 
Marín agreed with Sierra y Osorio a decade later when he noted that Tobosos and other 
raiders were fond of eating horses and mules as food. Marín was disgusted with the 
idea of eating horseflesh, and he could only imagine that Tobosos must be just as fond 
of cannibalism. Hyperbole aside, Marín and Sierra y Osorio both mentioned Apaches, 
whether at La Junta or at El Paso, as being conspicuously present throughout northern 
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Nueva Vizcaya at this time. Observing their Toboso neighbors, and probably noting the 
absence of bison in the immediate area, it might have made excellent sense to 
Faraones that horses, being much faster than cattle when running, could be whisked 
away to guarded mountain havens before the Spanish could mount a reprisal. Once 
there, whatever horses that could not be traded, used for transport, or pastured could 
have been consumed rather than going to waste.12
! Working around the campfire and the spits of their rancherías, Mescaleros who 
prepared and ate horse enjoyed a quality of nutrition that was similar to that provided by  
bison or beef. Consider the nutritional profiles of bison, beef, and horse based on a one 
pound raw steak from the thigh muscle, about 454 grams. The traditional protein 
source, Bison bison, yields up about 95 grams of protein and only 5.5 grams of fat. This 
protein load is nearly twice the amount that would be needed daily by an adult female or 
male; children require less. Male bison typically weigh between 1,200 and 2,000 
pounds, and females between 700 and 1,200 pounds. Bones, viscera, and inedible 
parts aside, it is no wonder that these hulking mammals were such a nutritional boon to 
indigenous peoples, to say nothing of their commodity value in terms of hides, tallow, 
and horns. A similarly sized steak of beef provides comparable amounts of protein, 
about 94 grams, but much more fat: 13.5 to 21 grams per 454 grams (1 pound). Horse 
meat provides the lowest ratio of protein to fat, but even that margin is negligible. Per 
pound of raw horse steak there is about 90 grams of protein and 30 grams of fat. 
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Nutritionally, these meats are comparable, and Mescaleros would have enjoyed similar 
benefits regardless of which they consumed.13
! When Mescaleros defocused on the bison trade they found themselves cut off 
from a protein source that was free from countervailing Spanish competition. To defray 
the lost protein loads, these Bolsón Apaches intensified their seizure of cattle and 
horses from Spanish corrals and pastures along the Rio Conchos, El Paso, and 
eastward into Coahuila. From 1778 to 1787 alone, Mescaleros took almost 20,000 
animals, and lost nearly 7,000 to the Spanish. Many of these animals were injured or 
killed in the course of this tug-of-war and represent millions of wasted calories, both in 
terms of potential protein and in the pastures upon which they grazed. Whatever 
remained of the equilibrium borne of symbiotic bellicosity vanished beneath the hooves 
of attacking Mescaleros and counter-attacking Spanish, and frenzied, violent 
competition signaled the reduction of the array of modalities that had typified 
competition from 1700-1730.14 
! As opportunities for the exploration of new strategies disappeared, the cost of 
over-exploitation landed on everyone’s shoulders. Over time, Mescaleros lost hundreds 
of people and stores of material wealth as they raided and counter-invaded Spanish 
places from the 1750s through the 1780s, all for the purpose of retaining control over 
their shrinking and crowded Apachería, and in a bid to sustain populations that they had 
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once enjoyed over ecosystems contiguous with the Great Plains. The Spanish, in turn, 
injected vast sums of capital (in the form of horses, guns, and salaries) and real, kinetic 
energy into the struggle to reassert their fantasy of imperial dominion, and to try to 
exterminate Apaches. Neither side seems to have realized it, but they had unwittingly 
set into motion the long-term deterioration of the Chihuahuan Desert ecosystem. The 
tools of empire that had been introduced to the Middle Rio Grande Valley with Oñate 
and his predecessors had allowed for unprecedented experimentation with the vectors 
of mobility and of competition. Horses and metal made the world a new place, and no 
one seemed to understand the limits of new means of production and heightened rates 
of consumption and waste. Two hundred years after Onate, the ecologies of the 
Chihuahuan Desert and its edge landscapes betrayed what those limits were to 
Apaches and Spanish alike in the context of profligate warfare, fire, and long-term 
drought.15
! Colonel Juan de Ugalde was driven by a bloodlust for Mescalero lives and booty 
that was unrivaled in his time, or previously. He was, at once, a tireless and respected 
soldier as well as a duplicitous and vexing rogue who did not shirk from ignoring peace 
agreements if attacks on erstwhile enemies were possible. He sometimes played the 
game of inter-imperial competition with Mescaleros with the veneer of a dove, when, in 
fact, he retained a hawkish strategy at all times. For eight years he cleverly bluffed and 
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threatened his way into numerous triumphs over Bolsón and Trans-Pecos Apaches. On 
February 15, 1783 Ugalde had been five months within the Bolsón de Mapimí, arcing 
out of the area from time to time to resupply at a mission or hacienda. He had been 
unsuccessful in doing more than chase phantoms and rumors across the mountain tops 
and the llanos of scrub and agave. In the Sierra del Pino he had almost sacked a 
Mescalero ranchería in October, but failed. He had either wasted too much time dividing 
his men, and allowed Mescalero spies to find him out, or he was betrayed by his Lipan 
scouts (the reason that Ugalde favored). Many of his horses had gone lame, some of 
his auxiliaries had abandoned him, but Ugalde himself was unwavering and undeterred 
in his craving for combat. With supplies running dangerously low, he decided to make 
one last attempt to reconnoiter the southern portion of the Sierra del Carmen, a 
mountain chain that extends from within the Bolsón to the Rio Grande around the area 
of present-day Big Bend National Park, but even that gamble came to nothing.16 
! He rested with his horses and men at the ojo known as Guadalupe, near the 
Sierra del Carmen on March 2. He had had enough. The next day, he saddled his horse 
and readied his men for their retreat by planning the route to the next known ojo. 
Wintertime precipitation accounts for less than 30% of annual rainfall in the Bolsón, and 
the Spanish were probably thirsty and a little bit cold as they waited to return empty-
handed to Nueva Vizcaya. Suddenly, some of the few Lipan spies that were left to him 
returned, and reported that they had seen unfamiliar horses not far off. Ugalde seized 
the chance to attack whomever was out there and immediately cantered off with 80 
presidials. As he neared more spies came from the targeted area and said that the 
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Spanish had probably been discovered, and that Ugalde should be careful, and to 
secure the troops’ cattle so that a counter-attack did not leave the troop bereft of meat. 
Ugalde, complied, then divided his men and and began climbing back into the Sierra del 
Carmen until he reached a great height.17
Map 23: Study of the Sierra del Carmen.
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.
! Below him he saw scores of Mescaleros gathered around their wickiups, 
harquebuses in their hands. Both Ugalde and the Mescaleros knew that the ranchería 
enjoyed the superior position, and these Apaches celebrated the believed superiority 
with conspicuous shouting and dancing. The Spanish colonel would not be put off, 
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however, and after leading his men for half an hour down to just within the basin where 
the Mescalero were situated, he paused before the attack. His whole force assembled 
before him, Ugalde spurred his horse, raised his harquebus, and shouted “long live the 
King!” The Spanish troop stormed the ranchería but were repulsed twice before they 
seized it on the third rally. In terms of prisoners and bodies, however, it was less of a 
victory than Ugalde wanted:  nearly all of the Mescaleros had escaped into higher, and 
more defensible havens in the Sierra del Carmen, and eluded Ugalde’s grasp. He had 
killed four Mescaleros in the attack, bringing the total number of slain enemies to six. 
Considering that he had been in the field for just less than six continuous months and 
had rescued only twelve captives, there were some who doubted his accomplishments. 
Indeed, it is ironic that the secretary to the colonel decided to include a brief “nota” at 
the end, where we learn that, while Ugalde was reconnoitering the Bolsón de Mapimí, 
Mescaleros had attacked Nueva Vizcaya ten times, leaving 19 dead, wounding two 
Spanish captains, taking sixty-seven captives, reclaiming eight of their own number, and 
seizing 744 head of horses and mules. An impressive haul in comparison.18
! It is a mistake, however, to assume that Ugalde did no real damage. On the 
contrary, his campaigns were incredibly punishing because they were, basically, 
Spanish counter-raiding missions. The colonel may have only killed six Mescaleros, but 
he destroyed 4 rancherías and took 154 animals back for the Spanish. The first three 
rancherías were empty, and so he only destroyed the wickiups, but after the last battle 
he succeeded in sacking 43 full tents. His men took all the material that they could carry  
and burned the rest. The destruction of wickiups alone would have placed a burden on 
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Mescaleros inasmuch as Apaches would have had to spend time resourcing more wood 
to rebuild, but the loss of an entire community’s tools, food, clothing, and shelter 
represented a catastrophic blow. This six month expedition, moreover, was only 
Ugalde’s fourth campaign. In the previous three forays into the Bolsón de Mapimí, he 
had raided 120 tents, taking most of the possessions (and burning the rest), seizing 
countless firearms, scores of prisoners, and over 500 animals. Sustained campaigning 
like that undertaken by Ugalde was expensive and exhausting, but it produced an 
entirely new climate in the Bolsón de Mapimí, and soon Mescaleros began to actively 
sue for peace at presidios, like the one at La Junta, in the hope of escaping this 
Spaniard who seemed intent on their complete annihilation.19
! More than a generation’s time had passed since Comanche pressure from the 
southern Great Plains had forced Faraones and Lipanes southward, and sliced off large 
chunks of their Apacherías. The consequent Comanche-enforced injunction from bison-
hunting on the Plains prompted Mescaleros to adopt more violent strategies of 
competition with the Spanish, but the price of that policy revealed itself immediately. 
Even before Ugalde, Hugo de O’Conor had also taken advantage of the military license 
afforded by the Bourbon Reforms. In 1776 he launched a series of campaigns that 
lasted for four years and that targeted Mescalero strongholds along the Pecos River 
and the Bolsón de Mapimí. He was largely unsuccessful in doing mortal or material 
damage, but he did manage to force Mescaleros deeper into the Bolsón and back into 
the Siete Rios region of the Central Closed Basin–where an expanding Comanchería 
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waited to pounce on them. Pincered between the Comanches to the north and the 
Spanish to the south and east, Mescaleros plied the presidios that surrounded the 
Bolsón de Mapimí with pleas for peace.20 
! O’Conor’s aggression aside, the Spanish were legally inclined to hear overtures 
of peace. After the Marques de Rubí’s visita had finished in 1768, his and Lafora’s 
findings led to the production of a fresh Reglamento, in 1772, meant to reorganize the 
northern frontier. It was the first major policy shift since Rivera’s visita had produced its 
own Reglamento, in 1729. The tenth chapter is devoted to the subject of Apaches and 
how best to temper their assaults and incorporate them–or “reduce” them–into the 
imperial structure. Presidio captains were encouraged to establish truces with Apache 
groups, pending the approval of only the inspector-commandant who oversaw the 
province militarily. (The Reglamento abolished the requirement that provincial 
authorities wait for permission to come from the viceroy in Mexico City since that 
process took far too long and often hampered peace talks.) Prisoners and petitioners 
were to be treated with respect, and rules were set in place to regulate the taking of 
spoils from rancherías. But chapter ten also impugned Mescalero integrity by prefacing 
its recommendations with the observation that these Apaches “demonstrate the desire 
for peace, or reduction when their numbers are inferior or are set back by our 
successes, but who abuse us immediately after, at the first chance, [they] who interpret 
as a weakness our clemency.” Apache groups who flouted peace agreements were 
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barred from them, and were to be exterminated with prejudice. The Reglamento was 
thus an ambiguous document that tried to acknowledge historical realities while 
advocating for political-cultural desires. It was open to competing interpretations that 
made negotiations unpredictable, and strategies unstable.21
! Indeed, Ugalde often ran afoul of his colleagues on these missions. Presidio 
captains who constructed the 1772 Reglamento more favorably for Mescaleros often 
had their feet trampled by Ugalde when they tried to extend peace to their former foes. 
Ugalde commandeered presidials and supplies and hoarded both in the field for months 
at a time, returning them to their garrisons only after they were exhausted from the hunt 
for Mescaleros. These captains could have reasonably feared that Ugalde’s campaigns 
would irritate Mescaleros to the point that they would choose to attack Spanish places in 
retaliation, the very event that captains had tried to avoid, or that their garrisons would 
simply be left too defenseless. Sometimes the confusion over policies of war and peace 
led to embarrassing contradictions. Once, Ugalde tracked a group of Mescaleros north 
out of the Bolsón de Mapimí, across the Rio Grande, and towards the Chisos Mountains 
of the southern Trans-Pecos. It was the tail end of March when he finally caught up to 
the ranchería situated at the opening to an arroyo. At dawn Ugalde gave the signal and 
stormed the ranchería, this time killing 4 and taking 12 prisoners; the rest fled into the 
Chisos to safety. Once again, he sacked the ranchería and took or burned all the 
possessions.22
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Map 24: The Big Bend Region and the Chisos Mountains.
Edited Excerpt from A.K. Lobeck, Physiographic Diagram of North America.
! But Ugalde was in for a surprise this time. The leader of the ranchería, a man 
named Quijiequsya, approached the Spanish once the smoke had cleared, and asked 
to be reunited with his family. Moreover, he was confused (and probably annoyed) that 
his people had been attacked so soon after they had completed a peace treaty with the 
captain of the Presidio del Norte, the garrison at La Junta de los Ríos that had only 
been rededicated fourteen years prior, in 1773. Ugalde marched towards La Junta, his 
blood already up, when he came upon a newly abandoned ranchería, its material wealth 
still sitting in the wickiups. As his men once again seized everything in sight, his anger 
must have climaxed when he found a document of safe conduct that had been issued at 
del Norte. Believing that a gross error in judgement had been made, Ugalde rushed 
towards del Norte to try to rectify the situation. He came upon more abandoned 
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rancherías along the way, and it became increasingly clear that they were all making for 
the presidio in a bid to gain protection from a Spaniard, namely him! One ranchería, a 
few leagues east of La Junta, was not as fortunate as the others and Ugalde, despite 
being aware of peace treaties, attacked it in a surprise pincer maneuver. Yet again, 
most of the Mescaleros handily escaped with their lives, but the tools and clothing from 
23 tents were taken or destroyed, along with 83 horses and mules.23
! Eventually an officer of Presidio del Norte, Juan Bautista Elguézabal, tracked 
down Ugalde, along with 42 of his men, and a terrific row ensued. Elguézabal had 
orders from his captain, Domingo Díaz, that demanded Ugalde hand over all prisoners 
and seized goods. The colonel refused and tried to convince Elguézabal to abrogate the 
peace agreements on the grounds that Mescaleros were untrustworthy and because 
they continued to raid from the Bolsón de Mapimí. Eventually the presidial captain left 
empty-handed while Ugalde departed for the Guadalupe Mountains, to the north. The 
rest of his campaign, however, came to naught, and he soon returned to his base at 
Santa Rosa. We should not put too much weight on the inefficiency of the Spanish 
peace process to explain the denouement of Apachería. In reality, by the time 
Mescaleros began asking for peace, the long and inexorable processes of ecological 
degeneration were already well under way. The damage had been done, and after more 
than 13 years of counter-raiding by him and O’Conor, the edges of Apachería began to 
crumble.24
!
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! Still, the prolonged and guerrilla-like campaigns of Spanish commanders like 
O’Conor and Ugalde were not such an incredible innovation of military strategy that they 
alone can explain why Mescaleros suddenly doubled back on a trajectory of competition 
then 200 years old. Other factors came into play that help explain why Apachería in the 
Bolsón de Mapimí and the southern Trans-Pecos became unstable, and unsustainable. 
The answer, ironically, is an inversion of the arguments laid out in chapter one. In the 
seventeenth century, the Spanish newcomers to the Middle Rio Grande Valley 
depended on the Rio Grande for their acequias and potable water, but the aridities of 
the landscapes between the Chihuahuan Desert and the steppes of the Rocky 
Mountains produced shortfalls that crippled the Spanish’s ability to maintain themselves 
and to thrive. At the same time, Faraones utilized a much broader range of geography, 
including southern portions of the Rio Grande around the Jornada del Muerto and the 
Pecos watershed, just to the east; they fared much better through periods of drought 
because they had recourse to more spaces where water could be found.
! By 1786, however, Mescaleros found themselves hemmed into the southern 
Trans-Pecos and the Bolsón de Mapimí; into a set of ecologies that were, relatively, 
more marginal than those that they had enjoyed before 1748 and Comanche 
ascendancy. Playas and the oases they produced were plentiful, but only if it rained. 
The Rio Conchos was a breadbasket, but only so long as the Spanish could still 
produce and so long as there was rain enough for maize fields and for pastures for 
horses and cattle. Perhaps if typical precipitation levels had persisted through the 
eighteenth century then the arc of Mescalero history would have stayed its course, and 
Apachería might have consolidated its grip over the Chihuahuan Desert, or even found 
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the means to make a resurgence back into the northern Trans-Pecos and the southern 
Great Plains. But none of that happened because of drought. When Mescaleros first 
coursed down the Rio Conchos from La Junta de los Ríos during the 1680s the 
fluctuations in rainfall from year to year were typical:  a dry year, a wet year, two dry, 
one wet, but never a prolonged drought that seriously compromised ecological 
regeneration. That all changed in 1784. That year an acute multi-year drought began 
that crippled water supplies across Chihuahua and Coahuila, and certainly the Bolsón 
de Mapimí. Maize crops failed and famine soon picked at every villa and ranchería of 
the Chihuahuan Desert. The next year, 1785, became infamous as “El Año del 
Hambre”–the year of hunger. When rains finally returned in the monsoons of 1786, it 
was too much:  seeds in the soil that were not washed away in flash flooding were 
ruined. Ugalde–just then preparing for his fifth campaign–could not have picked a better 
time to harass the Bolsón de Mapimí and the southern Trans-Pecos; Mescaleros were 
most likely famished and parched owing to the poverty of their own rancherías and the 
offerings of Spanish places. The combined pressures of relentless Spanish counter-
raiding and climatic disaster overwhelmed Apachería, and made Spanish reservations 
seem attractive by comparison.25
! It is likely that Ugalde and O’Conor also contributed to the decimation of favorite 
Mescalero habitation sites. Fires set to destroy material goods and wickiups could have 
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easily spread to populations of grass in the baked playas or desiccated mountainous 
basins. Whereas desert grass species like Tobosa (Hilaria mutica), black grama 
(Bouteloua eriopoda), and Buffalo grass (Buchloe dactyloides) actually thrive after a 
burn during years of average rainfall–sometimes increasing their production by up to 
400%–these same species would have withered if burned repeatedly, especially during 
a drought, taking anywhere from three to ten years to rebound to pre-fire levels. If 
Apaches attempted to revisit the site or when the Spanish came through again on 
patrol, the reduced grass populations would have been exposed to overgrazing that 
would have reduced production and abundance even further. If the fire spread out of 
control, nearby stands of Agave lechuguilla would also be affected; these succulents 
typically die in fires and do not regenerate unless the damage is minimal. It is likely that 
entire stands would have perished for years. At favored ranchería sites all over the 
Bolsón de Mapimí and the Trans-Pecos Mescaleros would have looked on in anguish at 
the stands of agave that once carried plentiful water, fiber, and carbohydrates, but that 
now hung limp on the landscape, blackened and shriveled. Either unintentionally or 
through biologically-minded malice, O’Conor and Ugalde stripped these areas of 
pasturage and forage through the use of fire and their regular presence. Perhaps they 
decided that if the Chihuahuan Desert was not fit for Spanish habitation and domination, 
then it should be fit for no one. The Bolsón de Mapimí may have been an Eden of lesser 
sorts when Mescaleros found it in 1748, but the convergence of a profound drought with 
punishing Spanish counter-raiding had made it into a desplobado by the 1770s and 
1780s. As playas turned to dust and maize crops failed, and as desert pastures 
withdrew into the sandy soil, Mescaleros realized that–for the first time in 200 hundred 
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years–the Chihuahuan Desert had come up short, that great mobility was no longer an 
option, and that a radical transformation was needed to survive.26
!
! That radical transformation, however, did not signal the end of Mescaleros, nor of 
their intimate relationships with the many ecologies of the Chihuahuan Desert. Rather, 
the arrival of Mescaleros at Presidio del Norte at La Junta and their request for 
settlement on an establecimiento de paz reflected the ebb of one age and the dawn of 
another; it was the transition from the age of encounter, discovery, and experimentation, 
to an age of resistance, survival, and nation-empires. During the first age that lasted 
from the 1581 until 1787 Apaches–themselves relative newcomers to the southern 
Great Plains and the northern Chihuahuan Desert–quickly seized the tools and 
implements of European empire, and turned them to their own advantage. First as 
Faraones, then as Natagés and Mescaleros, these Athapaskan-speaking peoples 
reimagined their concepts of space and mobility through the lens of horse-travel, and 
transformed the northern Chihuahuan Desert into a mesopotamia of alkaline waterways, 
agave plants, playas, and Puebloan and Spanish granaries. The Spanish remained 
stubbornly moored to a handful of riparian sites, and set themselves at the mercy of a 
fickle and often harsh ecosystem, and at the mercy of the indigenous peoples who 
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managed it so much more efficiently. The ability to encounter, discover, and create 
depended on the ability to learn, and to adapt. Time and time again this group of 
Apaches demonstrated their elasticity and efficiency by plying the tools of empire to the 
landscapes that lay before them, and not to the fantasized landscapes of empire as the 
Spanish did.27
! Faraones had begun as inhabitants of the edge landscapes just east of Pecos 
pueblo, but within a century had surged south, past the Middle Rio Grande Valley and 
deep into the Trans-Pecos, past El Paso del Norte, and to La Junta de los Ríos. On the 
eve of O’Conor’s series of assault in 1776, Faraones-turned-Mescaleros had long 
roamed the Bolsón de Mapimí and had just finished raiding down to the provinces that 
were a breath away from Mexico City. Whereas the Spanish had attained their northern 
extreme of Taos in 1610, Mescaleros had worked tirelessly and had inverted the typical 
directionality that we attribute to the age of empire; they spearheaded a southward-
bound Apachería that showed little signs of slowing or stopping. But processes of 
counter-invasion and counter-empire ran into a geopolitical, ecological, and practical 
wall by the 1780s. Just as Apaches had used the apparatus of empire to mount their 
southward thrust in the 1600s, Comanches had done the same, and by the 1750s the 
vanguard of southern Apachería saw its northern rearguard squeezed and amputated 
by the now-archetypal horsemen of the colonial Plains. Mescaleros were an example 
among many examples of surprising and indigenous counter-empires. The arc of 
Apachería had preceded that of Comanchería, which itself preceded the arcs of 
Mexican, Texan, and American empires.
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27 Michael Witgen, An Infinity of Nation: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012): 26-27.
! The eight leaders of Mescalero who arrived to see Captain Díaz on that cool day 
in March were not surrendering, and they were certainly not divorcing themselves from 
the many advantages that the Chihuahuan Desert had historically provided. No one 
knew at the time that this was the start to the long denouement. Hugo de O’Conor’s 
vitriolic Informe, written fifteen months later in September of 1788, seems to confirm that 
even as Mescaleros were toying with the notion of how best to incorporate 
establecimientos into an Athapaskan geopolitical landscape, small bands of fighters 
were still raiding the Rio Conchos and using the Bolsón de Mapimí as a platform for 
mounting an aggressive counter-empire. At the same time, Bishop Esteban Lorenzo 
went so far as to advise the viceroy that Mescaleros were not reducible and that the 
only way to incorporate them into the empire was as so many corpses; this religious 
man advocated total annihilation. Elastic as they had ever been, the Mescaleros at La 
Junta were negotiating, bargaining, and adapting to weather what they felt was a 
fleeting storm. That storm, it turned out, was much larger and enduring than anyone, the 
Spanish included, could have guessed. Within years, Comanches would begin piercing 
southward into Apachería in search of fresh resources; in decades New Spain would 
convulse and experience wars of revolution and independence; and in just over half a 
century, Texans and Americans would invade with an entirely new calculus of ecology 
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and competition while, at the same time, the Little Ice Age ended and temperatures rose 
while moisture levels fell.28 
! In 1787, however, none of these impending events were apparent. It is only with 
historical hindsight that we begin to understand that the system had climaxed. Apaches 
had experimented in how much power and abundance they could accrue through 
creative usage of the Chihuahuan Desert, but those possibilities began to wane with the 
arrival of Comanche raiding parties within Apachería and years of near-continuous 
Spanish counter-raiding. As hawkish strategies of competition intensified, so did the 
price, in the form of individual lives lost and material wealth perished. Sustained drought 
and sustained conflict at the granaries of Apachería reduced the production of maize 
and livestock to levels that could scarcely sustain the needs of either community. 
Perhaps more than any other group who traveled the ranges and basins, Apaches 
dared to imagine what kinds of worlds the xeric landscapes of the Trans-Pecos and the 
Bolsón de Mapimí could produce. And for two hundred years Mescaleros had achieved 
unexpected, and often incredible, results, but 1788 represents the moment when the 
Chihuahuan borderlands became, for the first time, desert.
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28 O’Conor, 6 September 1788, Civil, AGN, CSWR.
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